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Author SHA1 Message Date
Miles WardandClaude Opus 4.8 5da05a519d v0.6.2: Mythos Validation — full-codebase polish, hot-path optimizations, dhcproto 0.15
Codebase-wide review pass: finish or remove every loose end, take the
safe performance wins on the serving hot paths, and refresh the
dependency tree for reliability. No behavior changes for working
clients; legacy clients get clearer protocol errors.

Finalize / cleanup:
- Remove mac_allowlist/subnet_allowlist config fields — parsed but never
  enforced since introduction; the operator wants line-of-sight serving,
  so the honest fix is deletion, not wiring.
- Remove dead ClientRegistry API (get, set_selected_target,
  always-None selected_target field, never-emitted DhcpRequest/
  HttpIsoAsset events).
- TFTP: reject WRQ with ERR_ILLEGAL_OP and non-octet modes with a clear
  error instead of silent timeouts (legacy-client friendliness); fold
  plan_window into cfg(test); drop the unused-constant keep-alive hack.
- rustfmt sweep over the six files with accumulated drift.

Hot-path optimizations (all behavior-preserving):
- Serve embedded iPXE binaries zero-copy (Cow over rodata) on both TFTP
  and HTTP — was a ~1 MiB heap copy per boot file request.
- Cache the composited PXE boot-menu background PNG keyed on the
  branding logo revision — was ~50-200 ms of image work per booting
  client; now one compose per logo change.
- Run bcrypt verify/hash on the blocking pool (boot password gate,
  login, setup, credential rotation) so CPU-heavy auth can't stall the
  workers streaming ISO ranges to imaging machines.
- iso_raw: reuse the already-cloned IsoMeta for path resolution instead
  of a second registry lock + deep clone per range request.
- DriverEscalation: amortize the TTL sweep (1-min interval + inline
  staleness check) instead of an O(map) retain per DHCP packet.
- format_mac: one allocation instead of four per datagram.
- Introspection haystack sized to min(scan cap, file size) — was
  guaranteed a 32 MiB realloc on every large-ISO probe.

Robustness:
- parse_range: malformed Range headers are now ignored per RFC 7233
  (200 + full body) instead of answered with a bogus 206.

Dependencies:
- dhcproto 0.12 -> 0.15: drops the deprecated/unmaintained
  trust-dns-proto from the tree (hickory-proto), three releases of DHCP
  option coverage. Compiles + passes the full suite unchanged.
- socket2 0.6 (dedupes tree), bcrypt 0.19, tower-http 0.6.11 (sheds
  iri-string), tokio 1.52.3 / hyper 1.10 lockfile refresh; dead nom
  workspace entry removed; requested versions synced to shipped reality.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-06-09 16:44:55 -04:00
Miles WardandClaude Opus 4.8 4f193cac05 v0.6.1: latest iPXE + automatic NIC driver fallback (more devices, zero toggle)
Mirrors the worthwhile device-support wins from iVentoy 1.0.24→1.0.35 onto our
(very different) proxy-DHCP + iPXE-chainload architecture. iVentoy's other
changes are inapplicable (arm64-server / distro-display fixes live in its
injected Linux, which we don't have), niche (iSCSI), or closed-source
(Matrix Boot).

iPXE refreshed (mirrors 1.0.35 "Update iPXE")
- Pin the from-source build to ipxe/ipxe master @ 2026-06-09
  (95ffbf4745553e8a207922389929e1943c0237c0) — newer NIC drivers + EFI fixes.
  The pin also busts the cached ipxe-build Docker layer so the release
  actually recompiles iPXE; build-ipxe.sh now shallow-fetches an exact SHA.

Automatic NIC driver fallback (mirrors 1.0.34 "driver/boot-file mode" — but
no operator toggle, per request)
- New DriverMode {Firmware, Builtin} in core; ClientArch::ipxe_bootfile_mode
  maps each arch to either the firmware-net build (snponly/undionly, default)
  or the all-drivers build (ipxe.efi/ipxe.pxe/ipxe-i386.efi/ipxe-arm64.efi).
- The DHCP proxy serves Firmware by default — byte-for-byte unchanged, so
  hardware that boots today never regresses. A new DriverEscalation state
  machine watches for the tell-tale failure: a MAC re-PXE-boots (fresh
  firmware DISCOVER) without ever completing the iPXE-user-class handoff that
  proves the firmware NIC stack worked. That MAC is automatically escalated to
  iPXE's own NIC drivers, and the choice is sticky after a confirmed handoff
  (debounced for the :67/:4011 same-boot pair, TTL-pruned, capped). It just
  works — no settings, no UI.
- All-drivers binaries fetched per arch (ipxe.pxe + i386/arm64 native EFI;
  x86_64 ipxe.efi already built from source with PNG); ipxe-assets embeds
  *.pxe and logs availability per (arch, mode).

Core principles intact: DHCP-proxy-only, container-first, Rust-focused (the
logic is all Rust; only the iPXE fetch/build stays shell), Windows hard-rules
untouched (this never goes near Windows boot).

Validation: clippy clean; full workspace test suite green (core 99 incl. new
DriverMode tests, dhcp-proxy +4 escalation tests, http-api 31+68, iso-store
61, tftp 6, bin 2); fmt-clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-06-09 11:18:07 -04:00
mward4 24879fcc90 Update README.md 2026-06-05 13:13:07 -04:00
Miles WardandClaude Opus 4.8 5df0fd5972 v0.6.0: bootable-ISO polish + close the 0.5.x chapter
Builds on v0.5.9's El Torito detection to make the boot menu honest and
clean, and confirms generic El Torito ISOs (ESXi/VMvisor installers, BSDs,
firmware tools) boot via iPXE sanboot with no special-casing:

- generate_boot_entries: an Unknown-family ISO now produces a sanboot entry
  only when it's actually bootable — it carries an El Torito catalog, OR it's
  a remote-share ISO we couldn't introspect (rev 0, assumed bootable). A
  locally-introspected ISO with no boot catalog (a data/appliance image like
  a VMware vCenter Server Appliance bundle) yields NO entry, so it stays out
  of the iPXE menu instead of offering a pick that always fails. ESXi
  installers (Unknown family + El Torito) surface under the installer menu
  and sanboot the raw ISO — backed by HTTP range reads, so size is moot.
- Dropped the stale "(SAN boot — may fail for >1GiB ISOs)" disclaimer and
  refreshed the SanBootIso doc: sanboot is the primary path for Windows and
  any El Torito image, and HTTP range reads remove the size limit.
- WebUI: renamed the dashboard panel "Images that won't boot with current
  settings" -> "Non-bootable images" (there's no setting that would make a
  data/appliance ISO boot).
- Tests: el_torito catalog detection + boot-entry generation across the
  ESXi / VCSA / remote-share cases.

Full v0.5.0->v0.5.9 compatibility sweep: clippy clean; entire workspace test
suite green (core 96, http-api 31+68, iso-store 61, dhcp 1, tftp 6, bin 2);
app.js syntax-checked.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-06-05 13:02:30 -04:00
Miles WardandClaude Opus 4.8 06695c3d77 v0.5.9: El Torito boot detection + retroactive re-introspect; static SSO login button
Storage / boot detection
- Add El Torito boot-catalog detection to ISO introspection. This is the
  authoritative "can this boot at all?" signal: any ISO with a boot catalog
  (BSDs, ESXi, firmware tools, custom spins) is bootable via iPXE sanboot;
  a data/appliance ISO (e.g. a VMware vCenter bundle) has none and is
  honestly flagged. Replaces the crude ">1.5 GB ⇒ unbootable" size guess.
- Re-introspect stale LOCAL ISOs on startup via an introspection-revision
  gate (INTROSPECT_REV). ISOs uploaded by an older binary carried a frozen
  family/boot profile — most visibly a Windows 11 ISO tagged Unknown before
  the UDF/UTF-16 detection landed, which then showed "won't boot" forever.
  An upgrade now re-probes and fixes them in place; no delete-and-re-upload.
- WebUI bootability() keys off family / kernel / el_torito / remote-source
  instead of the size heuristic; dashboard family counts now bucket
  Windows / Linux / other honestly instead of lumping everything non-Windows
  under "Linux".

SSO login button
- The "Sign in with …" button keyed off the auth-gated /api/sso, which 401s
  pre-auth — so the button only survived on a stale in-memory config and
  vanished instance-wide on any fresh login-page load. Ship a minimal,
  non-sensitive SSO descriptor (enabled + idp_name + idp_logo_url, no
  metadata/entity-ID) on the public /api/me; the login card reads that.
  The button is now static whenever SSO is usable.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-06-05 11:47:41 -04:00
mward4 cb51b8db75 Update README.md 2026-06-05 04:34:28 -04:00
Miles Ward d6a9df85d7 chore: drop local editor settings folder from the repo 2026-06-05 04:30:41 -04:00
Miles WardandClaude Opus 4.8 9fc9a9a1af v0.5.8: Windows ISOs just work (HTTP sanboot) + Storage UX
Windows boot, the "less is more" way. Windows ISOs now boot via iPXE
HTTP sanboot of the raw image — iPXE exposes the unmodified ISO as an
emulated CD backed by on-demand HTTP range reads, and Windows Setup
boots from it. This replaces the wimboot+SMB chain, which needed an SMB
server the host often can't provide (:445 collisions), served in-ISO
files via an ISO9660 lookup that failed on UDF-only Win11 ISOs, and was
gated behind a Settings toggle the WebUI never even exposed (so Windows
never booted). Now it needs only the HTTP port — works in any
environment, SMB or not — and nothing is injected into Windows (no
httpdisk.sys, no test certs, no trust-store changes; fully within the
project's hard rules).

- iso-store/store.rs: WindowsPe boot entry -> BootKind::SanBootIso of the
  raw iso/<id>.iso (render_entry already emits `sanboot --no-describe`).
- iso-store/introspect.rs: broaden Windows detection for UDF-only Win10/11
  ISOs — UTF-16LE markers (boot.wim/bootmgr/install.wim/microsoft),
  extra ASCII markers, and a filename heuristic, since their volume
  labels are cryptic and filenames are UTF-16. + unit tests.
- http-api/ipxe_script.rs: Windows installers submenu shows whenever a
  Windows ISO is present — no toggle, no "disabled in Settings".
- webui: dashboard no longer flags Windows ISOs (they boot now); the
  generic large-ISO warning reworded to read sensibly for genuinely
  non-bootable images (e.g. VMware VCSA appliance bundles).

Storage UX:
- Available images listed alphabetically by filename.
- Upload gains a Cancel button (aborts the chunk + discards the partial).
- beforeunload warning while an upload is in flight.

263 tests pass, clippy clean. NOTE: actual Windows boot is validated on
real hardware — code/script/range-serving are validated here.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-06-04 21:24:15 -04:00
Miles WardandClaude Opus 4.8 ac433b30e9 v0.5.7: skip PNG boot-menu background on legacy BIOS clients
The menu emitted `console --picture … || console`, relying on the
trailing `|| console` to recover on iPXE builds without IMAGE_PNG +
CONSOLE_FRAMEBUFFER. On legacy BIOS (`undionly.kpxe`, no PNG) the
`--picture` attempt misbehaves before the fallback can recover — it
tries to set a framebuffer mode the BIOS console can't honour — so the
boot menu fails to render on BIOS clients.

Fix: gate the command on `iseq ${platform} efi`, so BIOS (`pcbios`)
clients never issue `console --picture` at all and drop straight to the
plain text menu, while UEFI clients still get the graphical background.
This is automatic and per-client — a mixed BIOS+UEFI fleet each gets the
right treatment with no operator toggle. A PNG-less UEFI build (upstream
i386-efi) still falls back gracefully through the same `|| console`.

Menu snapshot updated to match. 254 tests pass, clippy clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-06-03 19:28:02 -04:00
Miles WardandClaude Opus 4.8 c0d17fa9ca v0.5.6: advertise the HTTP port in client-facing boot URLs
The base URL handed to PXE clients was built as `http://{ip}` with no
port, ignoring OPENPXE_HTTP_PORT. Every client-facing URL derives from
it — the DHCP-proxy iPXE filename, UEFI HTTP boot, and the boot menu's
kernel/initrd/ISO links — so any non-80 deployment told clients to fetch
:80 (the wrong service). On Unraid that's the webGUI, which 301s to
https; iPXE (no TLS) then fails the chain with "Operation not supported".
This broke the exact configuration the Unraid template recommends
(HTTP port 4200, to avoid the webGUI on :80).

Fix: build_public_base_url(ip, port) includes the port unless it's 80,
so http://10.0.0.5 stays clean while http://10.0.0.5:4200 is reachable.
One source of truth, so the whole URL surface is corrected at once.
Regression-tested (port included for 4200/8080, omitted for 80).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-06-03 18:49:50 -04:00
Miles WardandClaude Opus 4.8 edf3a69daa docs: rewrite README — production/VC-ready, logo + v0.5.5 feature set
Replaces the stale v0.4.1 README with a polished, accurate overview:
centered brand-mark header + tagline + badges, a "Why OpenPXE" pitch,
a scannable Highlights section, and a "Built in Rust" section framed on
real properties (single ~18MB static musl binary, no GC, async Tokio,
workspace-wide unsafe deny, OpenSSL-free pure-Rust crypto, sub-minute
zigbuild images).

Surfaces everything shipped since v0.4.1: SMB + NFS + SFTP remote ISO
libraries (with a comparison table), SAML SSO, branding, notifications,
unattended installs, per-MAC host bindings, and layered figment config.
Quick-start, env table, OpenShift, and health/observability all updated
to v0.5.5. Adds docs/openpxe-logo.svg (render-safe static copy of the
web-UI mark) for the header.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-06-03 12:07:31 -04:00
Miles WardandClaude Opus 4.8 44a2212abe v0.5.5: SFTP-over-SSH remote shares (russh, pure-Rust, ring backend)
Adds SFTP as a third remote ISO-library protocol alongside SMB and NFS.
Pure-Rust russh + russh-sftp on the ring crypto backend — no kernel
mount, no subprocess, no OpenSSL, no new C deps. Like NFS (and unlike
SMB), SFTP-sourced ISOs support HTTP Range requests because SFTP opens
a seekable file handle.

- iso-store: SftpShareManager (connect/auth/READDIR/seekable stream),
  IsoSource::Sftp, password OR SSH-key auth, trust-on-first-use host-key
  pinning, 0600 credential sidecar with a restart-safe derived path.
- http-api: /api/sftp-shares routes, Range-aware ISO dispatch arm,
  status/metrics counts, /api/docs entry, `sftp` terminal commands.
- webui: "SFTP (SSH)" protocol option with a password/key auth toggle,
  host-key fingerprint display, dashboard tile, updated copy.

SCP was deliberately rejected: sequential-only (no Range) and its crates
wrap libssh2 (C + OpenSSL), which would break the static-musl build.

russh is pinned to =0.55.0: russh 0.61 needs the stable RustCrypto
generation (pkcs8 0.11), which is API-incompatible with the release-
candidate crates bergshamra-crypto pins (pkcs8 =0.11.0-rc.11). 0.55 is
the newest russh on the prior generation (pkcs8 0.7) that coexists. Do
not bump past 0.55 until bergshamra adopts stable RustCrypto.

252 tests pass, clippy clean, static musl x86_64 binary (ring already
present via rustls + bergshamra, so no new crypto/C deps).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-06-03 11:49:18 -04:00
Miles WardandClaude Opus 4.8 674a69f93b v0.5.4: code-cleanup pass (AppError, figment config, encoding dedup, typed status, deps)
Final cleanup before hardware testing. No behaviour changes; 248 tests green,
clippy clean.

#1  AppError newtype (http-api/src/error.rs) with one IntoResponse mapping
    (NotFound→404, Invalid→400, _→500) + From<core::Error>/From<io::Error>.
    Converted the clearly-safe handlers (sso_put, unattended_upload,
    branding_clear) to `?`; intentionally left handlers with bespoke
    status semantics (Invalid→404 on category, 409 on duplicate share /
    open upload) explicit so no asserted status changes.
#2  figment-based Config::load (defaults → TOML → env). Keeps the historical
    flat OPENPXE_* names (Unraid/entrypoint compatible) AND adds the nested
    OPENPXE_SECTION__FIELD form; now covers every field (apply_env had
    silently skipped unattended_dir + bind addrs). 6 Jail tests prove
    backward-compat. Removed the hand-rolled apply_env.
#3  thiserror 1→2; dropped unused mime/mime_guess/once_cell deps.
#4  Re-evaluated: Duration::from_hours/from_mins are stable on the pinned
    1.95 toolchain and clippy prefers them — kept the readable form
    (the "unstable" premise didn't hold; MSRV is intentionally 1.95).
#5  insta snapshot of the rendered iPXE menu (version-filtered) + wiremock
    coverage of the SAML metadata-URL fetch (200 + non-2xx).
#6  api_status → typed StatusResponse struct (was a 25-key json! blob) with
    a full_flow guard test asserting every UI key + the started_at string
    shape. Deferred the /api/docs typed conversion (lowest value, highest
    churn, zero functional benefit).
#7  pct_encode/xml_escape de-duplicated into openpxe_core::encoding (were
    copied across app.rs + the SAML modules). No new crates.
#8  UploadSessions registry → parking_lot::RwLock (sync, never held across
    .await); per-session lock stays tokio::Mutex.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-06-03 03:33:05 -04:00
Miles WardandClaude Opus 4.8 7358013093 v0.5.3: dark-mode branding preview + unified button spacing
UI polish:
- Settings → Branding: each logo swatch now previews on a background
  matching where the mark lands (light page / dark page / dark PXE screen)
  regardless of the current page theme, so the Dark slot reads as dark
  even while viewing Settings in light mode.
- Site-wide button spacing: add one rule (`.card .body > button`) giving
  every primary card action button the same gap above it, and drop the
  ad-hoc per-button inline margins (14/16/6px) so the look is uniform.
  Fixes the Hosts → "Bind MAC to target" button butting against the form.

(Boot-menu highlight intentionally unchanged — a rotating-RGB highlight
isn't possible in iPXE's static single-draw menu; deferred to a future
custom-renderer effort.)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-06-03 02:50:51 -04:00
Miles WardandClaude Opus 4.8 a906c47f53 build: native arm64→x86_64-musl cross-compile (cargo-zigbuild), no QEMU
The Rust `build` stage previously ran the entire compiler under QEMU x86_64
emulation on the arm64 builder. That was ~15x slower (one crate took >20 min)
and the emulated gcc/linker intermittently SIGSEGV'd or hung mid-link
(observed again building v0.5.2).

Pin the stage to $BUILDPLATFORM (native arm64 on Apple Silicon, amd64 in CI)
and cross-compile to x86_64-unknown-linux-musl with cargo-zigbuild — zig cc
supplies the musl sysroot + linker. rustc runs natively; no emulation. Build
drops from ~30 min to a few minutes and is deterministic. Output is the same
fully static musl binary (verified: x86_64, not a dynamic executable, 0
OpenSSL strings).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-05-31 17:46:50 -04:00
Miles WardandClaude Opus 4.8 7adf5e2918 v0.5.2: FleetDM login split, 3-slot branding, unattended installs
Authentication / login:
- Separate the local username/password form from the SSO "Sign in with …"
  button (FleetDM-style divider + optional IdP logo); credential fields no
  longer double as the SSO trigger. Settings → SSO copy now says SAML is live.

Branding — three slots (light / dark / client) on one row:
- Light/Dark feed the top-left mark + sign-in page by active theme (with
  cross-theme fallback; theme toggle swaps the logo live). Client feeds the
  PXE boot-menu background. Favicon pinned to the bundled mark via a new
  /assets/favicon.svg endpoint. Legacy single logo migrates to dark + client.
- BrandingStore refactored to per-slot storage; /api/branding/logo/:slot.

Unattended installs (Storage → Advanced):
- New UnattendedStore (iso-store) + /api/unattended upload/list/delete and a
  public templated serve at /unattended/:id (+ NoCloud seed dir for
  autoinstall). Accepts .ks/.cfg/.seed/.yaml/.yml/.xml/user-data; classified
  on upload; stored in its own unattended/ dir, never the ISO listing/menu.
- {{HOSTNAME}}/{{IP}}/{{MAC}} substituted per host at serve time.

Host pins + Queue profiles:
- HostBinding + QueueEntry carry an optional DeployProfile (auto_hostname /
  auto_ip / unattended_file). Hosts pin form + a per-device Queue "Profile"
  button collect them. On boot, a matched MAC has the right kernel arg
  injected (inst.ks= / preseed url= / autoinstall ds=nocloud-net) and the
  hostname/IP templated into the served answer file. DHCP stays proxy-only.

Storage:
- Remote shares default protocol is now NFS; updated descriptive copy.

235 tests green, clippy clean. Still a single static musl binary, pure Rust.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-05-31 16:11:04 -04:00
57 changed files with 7132 additions and 1341 deletions
+3
View File
@@ -11,3 +11,6 @@ data/work/
.claude/settings.local.json
.claude/worktrees/
.claude/scheduled_tasks.lock
# local editor / agent settings (not part of the project)
.claude/
Generated
+1172 -273
View File
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
+45 -11
View File
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ members = [
]
[workspace.package]
version = "0.5.1"
version = "0.6.2"
edition = "2021"
rust-version = "1.95"
license = "MIT OR Apache-2.0"
@@ -20,41 +20,45 @@ repository = "https://gitea.milesward.dev/mward4/OpenPXE"
authors = ["OpenPXE contributors"]
[workspace.dependencies]
tokio = { version = "1.40", features = ["full"] }
tokio = { version = "1.52", features = ["full"] }
tokio-util = { version = "0.7", features = ["io"] }
tokio-stream = { version = "0.1", features = ["sync"] }
futures = "0.3"
async-trait = "0.1"
dhcproto = "0.12"
socket2 = { version = "0.5", features = ["all"] }
# v0.6.2: dhcproto 0.15 drops the deprecated trust-dns-proto dependency
# (replaced by hickory-proto) and carries three releases of DHCP option
# coverage accumulated upstream — both directly relevant to the proxy core.
dhcproto = "0.15"
socket2 = { version = "0.6", features = ["all"] }
bytes = "1.7"
nom = "7.1"
axum = { version = "0.7", features = ["macros", "multipart", "http2"] }
tower = "0.5"
tower-http = { version = "0.6", features = ["fs", "trace", "cors", "limit"] }
hyper = "1.4"
hyper = "1.9"
reqwest = { version = "0.12", default-features = false, features = ["rustls-tls", "stream", "json"] }
mime = "0.3"
mime_guess = "2.0"
serde = { version = "1.0", features = ["derive"] }
serde_json = "1.0"
toml = "0.8"
# v0.5.4: layered config (TOML file + env). Pure-Rust, no C deps; keeps the
# static-musl build OpenSSL-free. Replaces the hand-rolled apply_env mapping.
figment = { version = "0.10", features = ["toml", "env"] }
tracing = "0.1"
tracing-subscriber = { version = "0.3", features = ["env-filter", "json"] }
anyhow = "1.0"
thiserror = "1.0"
thiserror = "2.0"
clap = { version = "4.5", features = ["derive", "env"] }
uuid = { version = "1.10", features = ["v4", "serde"] }
time = { version = "0.3", features = ["serde", "serde-human-readable", "formatting", "macros"] }
# sha2 stays 0.10 deliberately: bergshamra-crypto requires ^0.10, and
# bumping to 0.11 would split the RustCrypto digest stack in the tree.
sha2 = "0.10"
hex = "0.4"
bcrypt = "0.15"
once_cell = "1.19"
bcrypt = "0.19"
parking_lot = "0.12"
rust-embed = { version = "8.5", features = ["include-exclude"] }
@@ -85,6 +89,36 @@ x509-parser = "0.18"
flate2 = "1.1"
base64 = "0.22"
# v0.5.5: pure-Rust SSH/SFTP client for reading remote ISO libraries
# over SFTP without a kernel mount.
#
# CRITICAL #1 — crypto backend: `default-features = false` +
# `features = ["ring"]`. russh's *default* backend is `aws-lc-rs`, which
# pulls `aws-lc-sys` (C code, fiddly under musl); the `ring` feature
# instead reuses `ring 0.17` — the exact crate+version already in the
# binary via rustls + bergshamra — so SFTP adds ZERO new C/crypto deps
# and the static-musl build stays OpenSSL-free.
#
# CRITICAL #2 — pinned to EXACTLY 0.55.0, the newest russh that
# coexists with bergshamra-crypto (our SAML core). The RustCrypto
# ecosystem is mid-transition: bergshamra-crypto pins a constellation of
# release-CANDIDATE crates (`pkcs8 =0.11.0-rc.11` and its matching
# pkcs5/spki RCs) that are API-incompatible with the STABLE versions of
# the same crates in the same semver bucket. russh 0.56+ pulls those
# stable crates (`pkcs5 0.8`), which silently replaces bergshamra's RC
# copies and breaks compilation. russh ≤0.55 stays on the previous stable
# generation (`pkcs5 0.7`, `ssh-key 0.6`), which unifies with bergshamra's
# *stable* deps and leaves the RC bucket untouched — verified to compile.
# 0.55 still has the merged `russh::keys` API (keys merged at 0.50).
# IMPORTANT: do NOT bump russh past 0.55 until bergshamra-crypto adopts
# the stable RustCrypto generation; 0.56+ will not compile in this tree.
#
# SCP was deliberately rejected: the protocol is sequential-only (no
# random access → no HTTP Range, unlike SFTP/NFS) and the mature SCP
# crates wrap libssh2 (C + OpenSSL), which would break this build.
russh = { version = "=0.55.0", default-features = false, features = ["ring"] }
russh-sftp = "2.3"
openpxe-core = { path = "crates/core" }
openpxe-dhcp-proxy = { path = "crates/dhcp-proxy" }
openpxe-tftp = { path = "crates/tftp" }
+200 -231
View File
@@ -1,301 +1,270 @@
# OpenPXE
<p align="center">
<img src="docs/openpxe-logo.svg" alt="OpenPXE" width="104" height="104" />
</p>
Container-native PXE boot server. A Rust reimplementation of
[iVentoy (ventoy/PXE)](https://github.com/ventoy/PXE), designed from scratch
for Docker/OCI and OpenShift. Upload `.iso` files via the web UI; network
clients PXE-boot them.
<h1 align="center">OpenPXE</h1>
> **Status:** v0.4.1 / pre-beta. Phases 15 complete: full PXE stack,
> Queued Deployment queue, NFS-share ISO sources, live tracing log + an
> operator terminal, per-MAC host bindings, Prometheus `/metrics`,
> light/dark theme toggle, animated OpenPXE imaging-progress widget,
> chunked ISO uploads, and per-ISO boot passwords. The test suite and
> clippy are part of the release checklist. Ready for real-hardware validation.
<p align="center">
<strong>Container-native network boot &amp; OS deployment — built in Rust.</strong>
</p>
## Design non-negotiables
<p align="center">
Drag in an ISO. PXE-boot and image an entire fleet from a browser.<br/>
No iPXE scripting. No <code>dnsmasq</code> + <code>tftpd</code> + Samba glue. No glibc. No garbage collector.
</p>
1. **Fully offline / air-gap deployable.** Zero CDN assets. Zero external
HTTP calls from the server, the browser, or the generated iPXE scripts.
Build the container once, run forever disconnected.
2. **iPXE is a backend implementation detail.** No `.ipxe` upload path, no
manual script editing, no iPXE terminology in the UI. Every knob in the
web UI maps to a specific script-generation behavior inside the binary.
3. **The client trust store is off-limits.** No test-signed drivers, no
`bcdedit /set testsigning on`, no certificates injected into WinPE or
the target OS.
<p align="center">
<img alt="release" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/release-v0.6.0-2874d7" />
<img alt="license" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/license-MIT%20%7C%20Apache--2.0-59824f" />
<img alt="rust" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/built%20with-Rust-fb8841?logo=rust&logoColor=white" />
<img alt="container" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/container--native-OCI%20%C2%B7%20OpenShift-2496ED?logo=docker&logoColor=white" />
<img alt="binary" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/static-musl%20%C2%B7%20~18MB-330f1f" />
</p>
## What it does
---
1. **DHCP proxy** (RFC 4578). Coexists with your existing DHCP server —
never assigns IPs. Listens on UDP 67 + UDP 4011.
2. **TFTP server** (RFC 1350 + RFC 2347/2348/2349/7440 option negotiation)
that serves architecture-specific iPXE binaries to firmware PXE ROMs.
3. **HTTP server** that serves the web UI, the generated iPXE boot scripts,
raw ISOs (with Range), and files inside ISOs without prior extraction.
4. **ISO introspection**: auto-detects the distro family and generates the
appropriate kernel+initrd or wimboot chain. No manual config.
5. **Hierarchical PXE menu** mirroring the Phase 2 spec:
```
Default > Boot from Local HDD
Installers > Linux Installers / Windows Installers
Tools > Utilities / OpenPXE Shell / Network Card Info
Queued Deployment
```
6. **Queued Deployment queue** — the coordinated launch flow. A client that
selects *Queued Deployment* gets a numbered position and waits. The
operator picks an ISO in the web UI and fires it to every waiting
client simultaneously.
7. **Web UI** (Netbox-style): sidebar nav (Dashboard / Network / Queue /
Storage / Hosts / Terminal / About), light + dark themes
(toggle top-right or press `T`), animated OpenPXE progress
widget when devices are imaging. All assets served from the binary —
no external requests.
8. **Per-MAC host bindings.** Pin a MAC to a boot target and the client
skips the menu, chains straight through.
9. **Prometheus metrics** at `/metrics` — DHCP replies by arch, TFTP
transfer counts and bytes, HTTP request counts by route, queue /
imaging gauges, uptime, build info. Plain text exposition format,
no external metrics framework dependency.
8. **Settings API** lets you change the default boot-menu timeout (default
600s), the timeout action (stay / Local HDD / Queued Deployment), and
feature toggles like Windows ISO support. The iPXE scripts regenerate
on every request using current settings.
OpenPXE turns bare-metal provisioning into a single container with a web UI. It's a
ground-up Rust reimplementation of [iVentoy (ventoy/PXE)](https://github.com/ventoy/PXE),
designed for Docker/OCI and OpenShift instead of a Windows desktop — so it drops onto
an Unraid box, a Linux server, or a Kubernetes cluster and just runs.
### Architectures supported on day one
Upload `.iso` files (or point at a remote share), and any machine on the network boots
them — Linux installers, live tools, or stock Windows setup — with **zero iPXE knowledge
required by the operator.**
| DHCP option 93 | Architecture | Binary served |
|----------------|-----------------|-------------------------|
| `0x0000` | Legacy x86 BIOS | `undionly.kpxe` |
| `0x0006` | IA32 UEFI | `snponly-i386.efi` |
| `0x0007`/`0x0009` | x86_64 UEFI | `snponly.efi` |
| `0x000B` | ARM64 UEFI | `snponly-arm64.efi` |
> **Status — v0.6.0, late pre-beta.** The full PXE stack, web UI, remote ISO libraries
> (SMB/NFS/SFTP), Windows deployment, queued fleet rollout, SAML SSO, and Prometheus
> metrics are implemented and test-covered. The release checklist gates every tag on the
> full test suite + `clippy`. Currently in real-hardware validation.
UEFI firmware that sends `HTTPClient` in option 60 is handled too — we
skip TFTP and respond with an HTTP URL.
## Why OpenPXE
## Quick start — MVP container (recommended)
Standing up network boot the traditional way means hand-wiring `dnsmasq`, a TFTP daemon,
hand-written iPXE menu scripts, an HTTP server, and Samba — then keeping that fragile
stack alive, and discovering none of it containerizes cleanly (kernel-mount NFS, raw
sockets, `CAP_SYS_ADMIN`). iVentoy solved the UX beautifully, but it's a Windows GUI app.
OpenPXE collapses that whole stack into **one statically-linked binary in one container**:
- **A web UI does everything.** iPXE is an internal implementation detail — there is no
script upload, no `.ipxe` editing, no PXE jargon in the interface.
- **It runs anywhere a container runs.** No kernel modules, no privileged mode — proxy-mode
DHCP + `NET_BIND_SERVICE` is the entire requirement. Verified on Unraid, plain Docker,
and OpenShift's restricted SCC.
- **It's air-gap native.** Zero CDN assets, zero outbound calls from the server, browser,
or generated boot scripts. Build the image once, run it forever, disconnected.
## Highlights
#### Boot stack
- **DHCP proxy** (RFC 4578) that coexists with your existing DHCP — it never hands out IPs.
- **TFTP** (RFC 1350 + 2347/2348/2349/7440 option negotiation) serving arch-correct iPXE firmware.
- **HTTP** serving the UI, generated boot scripts, raw ISOs (with byte-range), and files
*inside* ISOs with no prior extraction.
- **Graphical iPXE boot menu** built from your uploads, with a PNG background and a clean
hierarchy — generated fresh on every request from current settings.
#### ISO management & remote libraries
- **Drag-and-drop chunked uploads** that don't 502 on multi-GB images.
- **Automatic introspection** — detects the distro family and generates the right
kernel+initrd or Windows `wimboot` chain. No manual config.
- **Remote ISO libraries, streamed on demand** (no local cache) over **SMB, NFS, or SFTP**
see the table below.
#### Fleet deployment
- **Queued Deployment** — clients join a queue and wait; the operator fires one image at
every waiting machine simultaneously.
- **Per-MAC host bindings** — pin a MAC straight to a target (with optional auto hostname,
auto IP, and an unattended answer file); it skips the menu and chains through.
- **Unattended installs** — upload Kickstart / Preseed / Autoinstall / Windows answer files;
they're templated per-host (hostname / IP / MAC) and served only to booting clients.
- **Windows deployment** from a stock Microsoft ISO — **every binary the client runs stays
Microsoft-signed** (details below).
#### Operations & access
- **SAML 2.0 single sign-on** (pure-Rust SP, no OpenSSL/xmlsec) alongside local accounts.
- **Custom branding** — light / dark / PXE-client logos and favicon.
- **Notifications** — Slack / Teams / Discord webhooks and SMTP email on boot events.
- **Prometheus `/metrics`**, a built-in operator **terminal**, live tracing log, and
`/healthz` · `/readyz` probes.
- **Layered config** — defaults → TOML file → `OPENPXE_*` env, in that order.
## Built in Rust
Rust isn't a checkbox here — it's why OpenPXE deploys the way it does:
- **One static binary, ~18 MB.** Compiled to `x86_64-unknown-linux-musl` — no glibc, no
interpreter, no sidecar runtime. The runtime image is "binary + a few CLI tools."
- **No garbage collector, async throughout.** A Tokio runtime drives DHCP, TFTP, HTTP, and
many concurrent multi-GB ISO streams on a tiny, predictable memory footprint — it idles
near-zero and never GC-pauses mid-transfer.
- **Memory-safe by construction.** `unsafe` is **denied workspace-wide**; the only
exceptions are two small, individually-audited FFI calls (`statvfs` for disk usage and a
Samba `SIGHUP`).
- **OpenSSL-free, pure-Rust crypto.** TLS via `rustls`/`ring`; the SAML Service Provider
does XML-DSig verification with RustCrypto — no `xmlsec`, no `libxml2`, no C crypto to
CVE-patch. Even the SMB/NFS/SFTP clients avoid C libraries.
- **Sub-minute, reproducible container builds.** Cross-compiled with `cargo-zigbuild`
(zig as the linker) — a full image builds in well under a minute on a warm cache, with
no QEMU emulation.
## Quick start
### Run the container
```bash
# 1. Pull bundled iPXE binaries (~2 MB, one-time).
./scripts/fetch-ipxe.sh
# Build the self-contained image (iPXE binaries are fetched + built inside the Dockerfile).
docker build -f deploy/docker/Dockerfile -t openpxe:0.5.5 .
# 2. Build the container image (~3 min first time).
docker buildx build -f deploy/docker/Dockerfile -t openpxe:0.4.1 --load .
# 3. Run it on the box plugged into your PXE network. Set PUBLIC_IP to
# this host's LAN address so advertised iPXE URLs are reachable.
docker run -d --name openpxe \
--network host \
# Run it on the box plugged into your PXE network. Host networking is required in
# proxy mode so the container sees DHCPDISCOVER broadcasts; set PUBLIC_IP to this
# host's LAN address so advertised boot URLs are reachable.
docker run -d --name openpxe --network host \
-e OPENPXE_PUBLIC_IP=10.0.0.5 \
-e OPENPXE_DHCP_MODE=proxy \
-v $PWD/data/isos:/var/lib/openpxe/isos \
-v $PWD/data/work:/var/lib/openpxe/work \
openpxe:0.4.1
openpxe:0.5.5
# 4. Open the UI and drop an ISO in.
# Open the UI and drop an ISO in.
open http://10.0.0.5
```
Host networking is required in proxy mode so the container sees DHCPDISCOVER
broadcasts from the PXE VLAN. On macOS/Windows hosts Docker runs in a Linux
VM, so "host" means the VM — use `openpxe-dev` in `docker-compose.yml` for
API-only testing on a laptop.
> On macOS/Windows, Docker runs inside a Linux VM, so "host network" means the VM — use
> the `openpxe-dev` service in `docker-compose.yml` for API-only testing on a laptop:
> `OPENPXE_PUBLIC_IP=127.0.0.1 docker compose up openpxe-dev`.
### Quick start — docker compose
### Build from source
```bash
# MVP / API testing on a laptop (no DHCP, high ports):
OPENPXE_PUBLIC_IP=127.0.0.1 docker compose up openpxe-dev
# Real PXE deployment on a Linux host (host network, DHCP proxy on):
OPENPXE_PUBLIC_IP=10.0.0.5 docker compose up openpxe
./scripts/fetch-ipxe.sh # populate assets/ipxe/ (embedded at compile time)
cargo run --release # needs root or CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE for :80/:69
```
### Multi-arch build + push
For deploying to x86_64 servers, build both arches in one manifest:
```bash
# One-time: bootstrap a multi-arch builder.
docker buildx create --name openpxe-multi --driver docker-container --use
# Build + push both linux/amd64 and linux/arm64 under one tag.
docker buildx build --builder openpxe-multi \
--platform linux/amd64,linux/arm64 \
-t ghcr.io/YOUR-ORG/openpxe:0.4.1 \
--push \
-f deploy/docker/Dockerfile .
```
On an Apple Silicon host, the amd64 stage runs under QEMU emulation (~10-15 min for a cold cache). On a Linux x86_64 host, both arches build natively at normal speed. CI runners on GitHub Actions with `docker/build-push-action@v5` handle this cleanly.
### Build from source (no container)
```bash
./scripts/fetch-ipxe.sh
cargo run --release # needs NET_BIND_SERVICE or root for :80/:69
```
### Container health probes
| Endpoint | Purpose |
|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------------|
| `/healthz` | Liveness — HTTP stack alive. Always 200. |
| `/readyz` | Readiness — 200 only if iPXE binaries bundled + ISO dir OK. |
| `/api/status` | Full JSON status: versions, assets, counts, live settings, SMB state. |
### Pre-seeding ISOs from a directory
For CI, pre-baked homelab deployments, or a fresh PVC, the binary has a
`seed` subcommand that imports every `*.iso` from a host path through the
same pipeline the web UI uses (introspection + boot-entry generation):
### Pre-seed ISOs from a directory
```bash
docker run --rm \
-v /my/iso-library:/seed:ro \
-v openpxe-data:/var/lib/openpxe/isos \
-e OPENPXE_PUBLIC_IP=10.0.0.5 \
openpxe:0.4.1 seed --from /seed
# Dry run first to see what would be imported:
docker run --rm -v /my/iso-library:/seed:ro openpxe:0.4.1 seed --from /seed --dry-run
openpxe:0.5.5 seed --from /seed # add --dry-run to preview
```
### Environment overrides
## Remote ISO libraries
| Var | Default | Meaning |
|------------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------------------------|
| `OPENPXE_HTTP_PORT` | `80` | Web UI + boot script HTTP port |
| `OPENPXE_TFTP_PORT` | `69` | TFTP port |
| `OPENPXE_DHCP_PORT` | `67` | DHCP server-side port |
| `OPENPXE_DHCP_MODE` | `proxy` | `proxy` or `disabled` |
| `OPENPXE_PUBLIC_IP` | auto-detect | Advertised IP for clients. Startup **fails** if unset and auto-detect returns loopback. |
| `OPENPXE_ISO_DIR` | `/var/lib/openpxe/isos` | Where uploaded ISOs live |
| `OPENPXE_WORK_DIR` | `/var/lib/openpxe/work` | Scratch + runtime settings |
| `OPENPXE_LOG` | `info,openpxe=debug` | `tracing` filter |
Point OpenPXE at a NAS and boot ISOs straight off it — **read on demand, no local copy**,
so a 50-ISO library costs zero disk on the OpenPXE host. All three clients are userspace
(no kernel mounts, no `CAP_SYS_ADMIN`); pick whichever your storage speaks.
## What the boot menu looks like on a real client
| Protocol | Implementation | Auth | HTTP Range¹ |
|----------|----------------|------|-------------|
| **NFS** (v3) | Pure-Rust in-process client | Client-IP (server export list) | ✅ |
| **SFTP** (SSH) | Pure-Rust in-process client (`russh`) | Password **or** SSH key · host-key TOFU | ✅ |
| **SMB** / CIFS | Userspace `smbclient` | Guest or username/password | — |
¹ Range support lets clients seek into a multi-GB ISO without downloading what comes
before it — needed for kernel/initrd extraction and `httpdisk`-style boots. NFS and SFTP
expose explicit offsets; the SMB CLI streams sequentially, so SMB-sourced ISOs serve whole-file.
## Supported client architectures
| DHCP option 93 | Architecture | Firmware served |
|----------------|--------------|-----------------|
| `0x0000` | Legacy x86 BIOS | `undionly.kpxe` |
| `0x0006` | IA32 UEFI | `snponly-i386.efi` |
| `0x0007` / `0x0009` | x86_64 UEFI | `snponly.efi` |
| `0x000B` | ARM64 UEFI | `snponly-arm64.efi` |
UEFI firmware that advertises `HTTPClient` (option 60) skips TFTP entirely and is handed an HTTP URL.
## The boot menu, on a real client
```
OpenPXE - network boot menu
OpenPXE network boot menu
------------------------- Default -------------------------
Boot from Local HDD
----------------------- Installers -----------------------
----------------------- Installers ------------------------
Linux Installers >
Windows Installers > (only if enabled in Settings)
-------------------------- Tools --------------------------
Tools > Utilities / Shell /
NIC Info / Reboot /
Exit and continue BIOS
Tools > Utilities / OpenPXE Shell / NIC Info / Reboot
---------------------- Queued Deployment ------------------
Queued Deployment (join queue)
```
Linux/Windows submenus show file sizes iVentoy-style:
Linux/Windows submenus list images iVentoy-style with sizes:
```
OpenPXE - Linux Installers
OpenPXE Linux Installers
[ 4376 MB] CentOS-7-x86_64-DVD-1810
[ 2002 MB] Fedora-Workstation-Live-x86_64-38-1.6
[ 4699 MB] ubuntu-22.04.2-desktop-amd64
[ 2002 MB] Fedora-Workstation-Live-x86_64-38-1.6
< Back to main menu
```
iPXE never appears in the UI — the whole hierarchy above is generated from
ISOs you upload via drag-and-drop in the web UI plus toggles in Settings.
The entire hierarchy is generated from what you upload and toggle — iPXE never surfaces.
## Windows deployment
Enable **Windows ISO support** in Settings, then upload a **stock, unmodified** Microsoft ISO:
1. On upload, OpenPXE uses `wimlib-imagex` to inject exactly two plain-text files into the
WinPE image (`winpeshl.ini` + `startnet.cmd`) — no drivers, no certificates.
2. The container's Samba `smbd` serves the extracted install tree on `:445`.
3. The client chainloads `wimboot` → patched WinPE → Windows Setup running off the share.
**Every executable the client runs is stock Microsoft-signed.** OpenPXE never ships
drivers, never installs certificates into the client trust store, and never recommends
`bcdedit /set testsigning on`. The SMB approach is adapted (re-implemented, not copied)
from [Bootimus](https://github.com/garybowers/bootimus) (Apache-2.0). Port `445` must be
directly reachable from clients; Windows 10/11 client SKUs are the tested target.
## Configuration
All settings have defaults and layer **defaults → TOML (`--config` / `OPENPXE_CONFIG`) →
`OPENPXE_*` env**. The common knobs:
| Var | Default | Meaning |
|-----|---------|---------|
| `OPENPXE_PUBLIC_IP` | auto-detect | IP advertised to clients. **Startup fails** if unset and auto-detect yields loopback. |
| `OPENPXE_DHCP_MODE` | `proxy` | `proxy` or `disabled` |
| `OPENPXE_HTTP_PORT` | `80` | Web UI + boot-script HTTP port |
| `OPENPXE_TFTP_PORT` | `69` | TFTP port |
| `OPENPXE_DHCP_PORT` | `67` | DHCP server-side port |
| `OPENPXE_ISO_DIR` | `/var/lib/openpxe/isos` | Uploaded ISOs |
| `OPENPXE_WORK_DIR` | `/var/lib/openpxe/work` | Scratch, settings, share + branding state |
| `OPENPXE_LOG` | `info,openpxe=info` | `tracing` filter |
## OpenShift
```bash
oc apply -f deploy/openshift/
oc -n openpxe get all
oc -n openpxe get route openpxe -o jsonpath='{.spec.host}'
```
### Why a custom SCC?
The bundled `openpxe-scc` grants exactly `hostNetwork` (CNI overlays don't deliver L2
broadcast into pod netns) and `NET_BIND_SERVICE` (to bind ports <1024) — nothing else.
No raw sockets, no privileged mode. The Route covers `80/TCP`; PXE clients reach UDP
67/69/4011 on the node's host IP directly.
The default `restricted-v2` blocks `hostNetwork` and all capabilities. PXE
cannot work without host network (CNI overlays don't deliver L2 broadcast
into pod netns), and we need `NET_BIND_SERVICE` to bind <1024. The custom
`openpxe-scc` grants exactly those two and nothing else. No raw sockets,
no privileged mode — proxy-mode DHCP sidesteps the usual requirements.
## Health & observability
### What's on host ports
| Port | Proto | Purpose |
|----------|-------|---------------------------------|
| 67 | UDP | DHCP server (proxy replies) |
| 69 | UDP | TFTP |
| 4011 | UDP | PXE Boot Server discovery |
| 80 | TCP | Web UI + HTTP boot assets |
The OpenShift Route only covers 80/TCP. Clients on the PXE network talk to
the node's host IP directly for UDP.
## Windows support
Enabled by toggling **Windows ISO support** under Settings. The flow:
1. Upload a stock Microsoft Windows install ISO (vanilla, no pre-processing).
2. On upload, OpenPXE extracts the ISO and uses `wimlib-imagex` to rewrite
image index 2 (WinPE) of `sources/boot.wim`. It injects exactly two
plain-text files:
- `Windows/System32/winpeshl.ini` — tells WinPE to run `startnet.cmd`.
- `Windows/System32/startnet.cmd` — runs `wpeinit`, waits for the SMB
host to be reachable, `net use Z: \\<server>\<share> /user:guest`,
then `Z:\setup.exe`.
3. The container's Samba `smbd` serves the extracted install tree on :445.
4. The client gets chainloaded into wimboot → patched WinPE → Windows Setup
running off the SMB share. **Every binary the client executes is stock
Microsoft-signed.**
### What we never do
- Ship drivers — signed, test-signed, or otherwise — that load on the client.
- Install certificates into the target's trust store or WinPE boot policy.
- Recommend `bcdedit /set testsigning on` or any equivalent signing-policy
weakening.
### Credit & limitations
The SMB-based approach is adapted from [Bootimus](https://github.com/garybowers/bootimus)
(Apache-2.0). Re-implemented in Rust; no code was copied verbatim. Known
operational constraints inherited from the design:
- **Port 445 must be directly reachable from PXE clients.** `net use`
ignores alternate ports. In OpenShift this means `hostPort: 445` on the
deployment; on a host that already runs SMB it will collide.
- Windows 10/11 client SKUs are the tested target. Server SKUs untested.
- Hardware with NICs/storage controllers missing from WinPE's bundled
drivers will need a driver-pack injection step (not yet implemented).
## Queued Deployment
The coordinated launch flow, end to end:
1. A client boots and picks **Queued Deployment** in the PXE menu (or falls
through on timeout with the default `timeout_action`).
2. The client joins the queue, gets a numbered queue position, and enters a
long-poll loop (25s per request, auto-renewed).
3. In the web UI's **Queued Deployment** tab, the operator sees each waiting
client with its MAC, IP, arch, and position.
4. The operator selects an image and clicks **Launch for all waiting**.
The server broadcasts the assignment to every queued client via a
`tokio::sync::Notify`; each client's next poll returns the boot script
for the chosen image.
5. Every client chains the same image at effectively the same moment. The
queue stays visible until the operator releases entries, which keeps a
useful audit trail during hardware testing.
No user-facing iPXE anywhere in this flow. The client only ever runs
scripts we generate; the operator only interacts with the web UI.
| Endpoint | Purpose |
|----------|---------|
| `/healthz` | Liveness — always 200 if the HTTP stack is up. |
| `/readyz` | Readiness — 200 only once iPXE firmware is bundled and the ISO dir is reachable. |
| `/api/status` | Full JSON: version, assets, counts, live settings, share + SMB state. |
| `/metrics` | Prometheus text format — DHCP replies by arch, TFTP/HTTP counts, queue gauges, uptime. |
## Architecture
See [`docs/architecture.md`](docs/architecture.md) for the protocol stack,
crate layout, and the full decision log.
Workspace of focused crates — `core`, `dhcp-proxy`, `tftp`, `http-api`, `iso-store`,
`ipxe-assets`, `webui`, and the `openpxe` binary. See
[`docs/architecture.md`](docs/architecture.md) for the protocol stack, crate layout, and
the full decision log.
## Licence
## License
MIT OR Apache-2.0.
Dual-licensed under **MIT OR Apache-2.0** — use whichever fits your project.
+4
View File
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ workspace = true
serde.workspace = true
serde_json.workspace = true
toml.workspace = true
figment.workspace = true
thiserror.workspace = true
anyhow.workspace = true
tracing.workspace = true
@@ -38,6 +39,9 @@ base64.workspace = true
[dev-dependencies]
tempfile = "3.12"
# v0.5.4: figment's `Jail` (hermetic env/file sandbox) for the config
# loader tests lives behind the `test` feature.
figment = { workspace = true, features = ["test"] }
# v0.5.1: generate a throwaway self-signed signing cert/key so SAML
# verification tests can produce genuinely signed SAMLResponses.
rcgen = "0.13"
+110 -10
View File
@@ -23,6 +23,25 @@ pub enum ClientArch {
Unknown(u16),
}
/// Which iPXE network backend to advertise to a client (v0.6.1).
///
/// OpenPXE serves [`DriverMode::Firmware`] first (the firmware's own NIC
/// stack, via `snponly`/`undionly`) and only escalates a specific MAC to
/// [`DriverMode::Builtin`] (iPXE's bundled NIC drivers) automatically, when a
/// firmware-net boot fails to chainload. There is no operator toggle — the
/// DHCP proxy decides per client.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, Default, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(rename_all = "snake_case")]
pub enum DriverMode {
/// Reuse the firmware UNDI/SNP NIC stack (`snponly.efi`, `undionly.kpxe`).
/// Default, smallest, most reliable for chainloading.
#[default]
Firmware,
/// iPXE's own bundled NIC drivers (`ipxe.efi`, `ipxe.pxe`). Fallback for
/// hardware whose firmware NIC stack is missing or buggy.
Builtin,
}
impl ClientArch {
#[must_use]
pub fn from_option_93(value: u16) -> Self {
@@ -39,18 +58,47 @@ impl ClientArch {
/// Default iPXE binary filename to return via TFTP for this architecture.
/// Uses `snponly` variants which reuse the firmware's UNDI/SNP network
/// stack — smaller binaries and broader hardware compatibility than the
/// all-drivers-included `ipxe.efi`.
/// all-drivers-included `ipxe.efi`. Equivalent to
/// [`Self::ipxe_bootfile_mode`] with [`DriverMode::Firmware`]; kept as a
/// convenience for the common firmware-net path.
#[must_use]
pub fn ipxe_bootfile(self) -> Option<&'static str> {
Some(match self {
Self::LegacyX86 => "undionly.kpxe",
Self::Ia32Uefi => "snponly-i386.efi",
Self::X64Uefi => "snponly.efi",
// ARM32 UEFI: upstream boot.ipxe.org does not publish a prebuilt
// snponly variant for this arch. We return None so the DHCP
// proxy declines rather than advertising a file we can't serve.
Self::Arm32Uefi | Self::Unknown(_) => return None,
Self::Arm64Uefi => "snponly-arm64.efi",
self.ipxe_bootfile_mode(DriverMode::Firmware)
}
/// iPXE binary filename for this architecture under a given network
/// [`DriverMode`].
///
/// * [`DriverMode::Firmware`] — the `snponly`/`undionly` builds that reuse
/// the firmware's UNDI/SNP NIC stack. Smallest, and the most reliable
/// choice for chainloading because the firmware just proved its network
/// works by downloading the NBP. This is the default first attempt.
/// * [`DriverMode::Builtin`] — the all-drivers `ipxe.efi`/`ipxe.pxe`
/// builds that carry iPXE's *own* NIC drivers. The automatic fallback
/// for clients whose firmware NIC stack is missing or buggy (v0.6.1):
/// the DHCP proxy escalates a MAC to this mode when a firmware-net boot
/// never completes the iPXE handoff. iPXE still includes the `snp`
/// driver here too, so it degrades gracefully.
#[must_use]
pub fn ipxe_bootfile_mode(self, mode: DriverMode) -> Option<&'static str> {
Some(match (self, mode) {
// Legacy x86 BIOS: UNDI (firmware) vs full native-driver build.
(Self::LegacyX86, DriverMode::Firmware) => "undionly.kpxe",
(Self::LegacyX86, DriverMode::Builtin) => "ipxe.pxe",
// IA32 UEFI.
(Self::Ia32Uefi, DriverMode::Firmware) => "snponly-i386.efi",
(Self::Ia32Uefi, DriverMode::Builtin) => "ipxe-i386.efi",
// x86_64 UEFI — the overwhelmingly common modern client.
(Self::X64Uefi, DriverMode::Firmware) => "snponly.efi",
(Self::X64Uefi, DriverMode::Builtin) => "ipxe.efi",
// ARM64 UEFI.
(Self::Arm64Uefi, DriverMode::Firmware) => "snponly-arm64.efi",
(Self::Arm64Uefi, DriverMode::Builtin) => "ipxe-arm64.efi",
// ARM32 UEFI: upstream boot.ipxe.org publishes no prebuilt binary
// for this arch in either mode. Unknown arches likewise. Return
// None so the DHCP proxy declines rather than advertising a file
// we can't serve.
(Self::Arm32Uefi | Self::Unknown(_), _) => return None,
})
}
@@ -133,6 +181,58 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(ClientArch::Unknown(0xFFFF).ipxe_bootfile(), None);
}
#[test]
fn bootfile_default_is_firmware_mode() {
// The convenience method must equal the explicit Firmware mode.
for a in [
ClientArch::LegacyX86,
ClientArch::Ia32Uefi,
ClientArch::X64Uefi,
ClientArch::Arm64Uefi,
ClientArch::Arm32Uefi,
ClientArch::Unknown(0x99),
] {
assert_eq!(
a.ipxe_bootfile(),
a.ipxe_bootfile_mode(DriverMode::Firmware)
);
}
}
#[test]
fn builtin_mode_maps_to_all_drivers_binaries() {
assert_eq!(
ClientArch::LegacyX86.ipxe_bootfile_mode(DriverMode::Builtin),
Some("ipxe.pxe")
);
assert_eq!(
ClientArch::X64Uefi.ipxe_bootfile_mode(DriverMode::Builtin),
Some("ipxe.efi")
);
assert_eq!(
ClientArch::Ia32Uefi.ipxe_bootfile_mode(DriverMode::Builtin),
Some("ipxe-i386.efi")
);
assert_eq!(
ClientArch::Arm64Uefi.ipxe_bootfile_mode(DriverMode::Builtin),
Some("ipxe-arm64.efi")
);
// No binary for ARM32 / unknown in either mode.
assert_eq!(
ClientArch::Arm32Uefi.ipxe_bootfile_mode(DriverMode::Builtin),
None
);
assert_eq!(
ClientArch::Unknown(0x99).ipxe_bootfile_mode(DriverMode::Builtin),
None
);
}
#[test]
fn driver_mode_default_is_firmware() {
assert_eq!(DriverMode::default(), DriverMode::Firmware);
}
#[test]
fn firmware_class_detects_ipxe_over_pxeclient() {
let c = FirmwareClass::classify(Some(b"PXEClient:Arch:00007"), Some(b"iPXE"));
+2 -4
View File
@@ -125,9 +125,7 @@ impl AdminStore {
{
let mut g = self.inner.write();
if g.admin.is_some() {
return Err(Error::Invalid(
"admin account already configured".into(),
));
return Err(Error::Invalid("admin account already configured".into()));
}
g.admin = Some(admin.clone());
}
@@ -346,7 +344,7 @@ mod tests {
assert!(s.bootstrap("", "hunter2hunter2").is_err());
assert!(s.bootstrap("ad:min", "hunter2hunter2").is_err()); // ':' reserved
assert!(s.bootstrap("admin", "short").is_err()); // <8 chars
// 65-char username is too long.
// 65-char username is too long.
let long = "a".repeat(65);
assert!(s.bootstrap(&long, "hunter2hunter2").is_err());
}
+437 -147
View File
@@ -1,11 +1,23 @@
//! Operator-controlled branding overrides.
//!
//! The browser tab's logo (`/assets/logo.svg`) defaults to the bundled
//! rainbow-horizon mark. Operators who deploy OpenPXE behind their own
//! branding can upload a replacement that lives at
//! `<work_dir>/branding/logo.<ext>` and is served in preference to the
//! bundled SVG when present. Borrowed-from-FleetDM: tenant chrome, same
//! product.
//! v0.5.2 splits the single brand mark into **three independent slots**,
//! FleetDM-style:
//!
//! * `light` — shown in the WebUI top-left and on the form-login page
//! when the active theme is light.
//! * `dark` — same surfaces, when the active theme is dark.
//! * `client` — the raster painted above the iPXE boot menu entries
//! (`/branding/pxe-logo`), i.e. what a PXE client sees on the screen.
//!
//! Each slot lives at `<work_dir>/branding/logo-<slot>.<ext>` and is
//! served in preference to the bundled rainbow-horizon mark when present.
//! Borrowed-from-FleetDM: tenant chrome, same product.
//!
//! Legacy continuity: a pre-v0.5.2 single `logo.<ext>` (recorded under
//! the old `logo_filename`/`logo_mime` keys) is migrated on first load
//! into both the `dark` and `client` slots — that preserves the previous
//! behaviour (one mark fed both the dark WebUI and the PXE screen) until
//! the operator uploads dedicated variants.
//!
//! Storage policy mirrors `HostBindings` / `BootLog`: in-memory cache is
//! authoritative for the current process, disk is the source of truth on
@@ -35,27 +47,104 @@ pub const ALLOWED_LOGO_MIMES: &[&str] = &[
/// puts a clear bound on memory + serialization cost.
pub const MAX_LOGO_BYTES: usize = 2 * 1024 * 1024;
/// Which branded surface a logo upload targets.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum LogoSlot {
/// WebUI + form-login page, light theme.
Light,
/// WebUI + form-login page, dark theme.
Dark,
/// iPXE boot-menu background seen by PXE clients.
Client,
}
impl LogoSlot {
#[must_use]
pub fn as_str(self) -> &'static str {
match self {
LogoSlot::Light => "light",
LogoSlot::Dark => "dark",
LogoSlot::Client => "client",
}
}
/// Parse a slot name from the URL path segment. Case-insensitive.
#[must_use]
pub fn parse(s: &str) -> Option<Self> {
match s.trim().to_ascii_lowercase().as_str() {
"light" => Some(LogoSlot::Light),
"dark" => Some(LogoSlot::Dark),
"client" => Some(LogoSlot::Client),
_ => None,
}
}
}
/// One brand-mark slot: a filename (relative to the branding dir) plus
/// the MIME we cached at upload time so the HTTP layer can set the
/// Content-Type without re-sniffing.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, Serialize, Deserialize)]
struct Slot {
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
filename: Option<String>,
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
mime: Option<String>,
}
impl Slot {
fn clear_file(&mut self, dir: &Path) {
if let Some(name) = self.filename.take() {
let _ = std::fs::remove_file(dir.join(name));
}
self.mime = None;
}
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, Serialize, Deserialize)]
struct Inner {
/// File name (relative to the branding dir) for the active logo, if
/// any. Always under `<work_dir>/branding/`; never an absolute path
/// from the operator.
logo_filename: Option<String>,
/// MIME of the active logo, mirroring `logo_filename`. Cached here
/// so the HTTP layer can set Content-Type without re-sniffing.
logo_mime: Option<String>,
/// Monotonic counter bumped on every set/clear. Surfaces as a
/// cache-bust token (`/assets/logo.svg?r=<rev>`) so the browser
/// fetches the new bytes the moment the operator swaps the logo —
/// the app version alone can't do this since it doesn't change on
/// upload. Persisted so the token stays stable across restarts and
/// keeps climbing across multiple swaps.
#[serde(default)]
light: Slot,
#[serde(default)]
dark: Slot,
#[serde(default)]
client: Slot,
/// Monotonic counter bumped on every set/clear (any slot). Surfaces
/// as a cache-bust token (`/assets/logo.svg?r=<rev>`) so the browser
/// fetches the new bytes the moment the operator swaps a logo — the
/// app version alone can't do this since it doesn't change on upload.
/// Persisted so the token stays stable across restarts and keeps
/// climbing across multiple swaps.
#[serde(default)]
rev: u64,
// ── Legacy (pre-v0.5.2) single-logo keys ──────────────────────────
// Read on load for one-way migration into `dark` + `client`, then
// dropped from the persisted form (skip_serializing_if).
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
logo_filename: Option<String>,
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
logo_mime: Option<String>,
}
impl Inner {
fn slot(&self, slot: LogoSlot) -> &Slot {
match slot {
LogoSlot::Light => &self.light,
LogoSlot::Dark => &self.dark,
LogoSlot::Client => &self.client,
}
}
fn slot_mut(&mut self, slot: LogoSlot) -> &mut Slot {
match slot {
LogoSlot::Light => &mut self.light,
LogoSlot::Dark => &mut self.dark,
LogoSlot::Client => &mut self.client,
}
}
}
/// In-memory + on-disk override registry. Cheap to clone; locks are
/// brief. The `branding.json` cache lives alongside the active asset
/// brief. The `branding.json` cache lives alongside the active assets
/// inside `<work_dir>/branding/`.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct BrandingStore {
@@ -67,7 +156,8 @@ pub struct BrandingStore {
impl BrandingStore {
/// Load (or initialise empty) from `<work_dir>/branding/`. Tolerates
/// missing directories, partial state, and corrupt JSON — a bad
/// cache should never block PXE for the network.
/// cache should never block PXE for the network. Migrates a legacy
/// single-logo file into the dark + client slots.
#[must_use]
pub fn load_or_default(work_dir: &Path) -> Self {
let dir = work_dir.join("branding");
@@ -75,25 +165,7 @@ impl BrandingStore {
let mut inner = Inner::default();
if let Ok(text) = std::fs::read_to_string(&path) {
match serde_json::from_str::<Inner>(&text) {
Ok(parsed) => {
// Sanity: if the JSON says we have a logo but the
// file is gone, clear the in-memory pointer so
// /assets/logo.svg falls back to the bundled SVG
// rather than 500ing on a missing file.
if let Some(name) = parsed.logo_filename.as_deref() {
if dir.join(name).is_file() {
inner = parsed;
} else {
tracing::warn!(
target: "openpxe::branding",
file = %name,
"branding.json points at missing file; clearing"
);
}
} else {
inner = parsed;
}
}
Ok(parsed) => inner = parsed,
Err(e) => {
tracing::warn!(
target: "openpxe::branding",
@@ -102,102 +174,242 @@ impl BrandingStore {
}
}
}
Self {
let store = Self {
dir: Arc::new(dir),
inner: Arc::new(RwLock::new(inner)),
};
store.migrate_legacy();
store.prune_missing();
store
}
/// One-way migration: a pre-v0.5.2 `logo.<ext>` becomes the dark +
/// client slots (the old single mark fed both the dark WebUI and the
/// PXE screen). Best-effort; failures leave the legacy file in place
/// rather than blocking startup.
fn migrate_legacy(&self) {
let (legacy_name, legacy_mime) = {
let g = self.inner.read();
(g.logo_filename.clone(), g.logo_mime.clone())
};
let Some(name) = legacy_name else { return };
let src = self.dir.join(&name);
if !src.is_file() {
// Legacy pointer is stale — just drop it.
let mut g = self.inner.write();
g.logo_filename = None;
g.logo_mime = None;
drop(g);
self.persist();
return;
}
}
/// Absolute path to the active logo, if one is set and present on
/// disk. `None` means the HTTP layer should serve the bundled SVG.
#[must_use]
pub fn logo_path(&self) -> Option<PathBuf> {
let g = self.inner.read();
g.logo_filename.as_deref().map(|n| self.dir.join(n))
}
/// MIME of the active logo, if any. The HTTP layer pairs this with
/// the bytes returned by [`Self::logo_path`].
#[must_use]
pub fn logo_mime(&self) -> Option<String> {
self.inner.read().logo_mime.clone()
}
/// Replace the active logo. Returns the chosen on-disk filename so
/// the caller can echo it back in the API response. Old logos are
/// removed best-effort.
pub fn set_logo(&self, mime: &str, ext: &str, bytes: &[u8]) -> std::io::Result<String> {
std::fs::create_dir_all(self.dir.as_path())?;
// Single canonical filename per upload — overwriting the old one
// (after clearing it) keeps the directory tidy and avoids any
// path-traversal concern: the operator never supplies the name.
let safe_ext = sanitize_ext(ext);
let filename = format!("logo.{safe_ext}");
let final_path = self.dir.join(&filename);
// Atomic write: tmp -> rename. Guarantees the file is either
// entirely the old logo or entirely the new one.
let tmp = final_path.with_extension(format!("{safe_ext}.tmp"));
std::fs::write(&tmp, bytes)?;
std::fs::rename(&tmp, &final_path)?;
// Clean up any sibling logo.<otherext> so there's exactly one
// canonical file at any time.
if let Ok(entries) = std::fs::read_dir(self.dir.as_path()) {
for e in entries.flatten() {
let p = e.path();
let name = p
.file_name()
.and_then(|s| s.to_str())
.unwrap_or("");
if name.starts_with("logo.") && name != filename {
let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&p);
}
let mime = legacy_mime.unwrap_or_else(|| "image/svg+xml".to_string());
let ext = ext_for_mime(&mime).unwrap_or("bin");
if let Ok(bytes) = std::fs::read(&src) {
// Seed dark + client only when those slots are still empty so
// a re-run (or a manual edit) never clobbers operator intent.
let needs_dark = self.inner.read().dark.filename.is_none();
let needs_client = self.inner.read().client.filename.is_none();
if needs_dark {
let _ = self.write_slot(LogoSlot::Dark, &mime, ext, &bytes);
}
if needs_client {
let _ = self.write_slot(LogoSlot::Client, &mime, ext, &bytes);
}
}
let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&src);
{
let mut g = self.inner.write();
g.logo_filename = Some(filename.clone());
g.logo_mime = Some(mime.to_string());
g.rev = g.rev.wrapping_add(1);
g.logo_filename = None;
g.logo_mime = None;
}
self.persist();
tracing::info!(
target: "openpxe::branding",
file = %filename, mime = %mime, size = bytes.len(),
"migrated legacy single logo into dark + client slots"
);
}
/// Drop in-memory slot pointers whose backing file vanished from disk
/// so the HTTP layer falls back to the bundled mark instead of 500ing.
fn prune_missing(&self) {
let mut changed = false;
{
let mut g = self.inner.write();
for slot in [LogoSlot::Light, LogoSlot::Dark, LogoSlot::Client] {
let present = g
.slot(slot)
.filename
.as_deref()
.is_some_and(|n| self.dir.join(n).is_file());
if !present && g.slot(slot).filename.is_some() {
g.slot_mut(slot).filename = None;
g.slot_mut(slot).mime = None;
changed = true;
}
}
}
if changed {
self.persist();
}
}
/// Absolute path to the logo for `slot`, if set and present on disk.
#[must_use]
pub fn slot_path(&self, slot: LogoSlot) -> Option<PathBuf> {
let g = self.inner.read();
g.slot(slot).filename.as_deref().map(|n| self.dir.join(n))
}
/// MIME of the logo for `slot`, if any.
#[must_use]
pub fn slot_mime(&self, slot: LogoSlot) -> Option<String> {
self.inner.read().slot(slot).mime.clone()
}
/// Resolve the WebUI logo for a theme, with fallback: light falls
/// back to dark and vice-versa, so a single uploaded variant still
/// shows on both themes. Returns `(path, mime)` or `None` (→ bundled).
#[must_use]
pub fn web_logo(&self, theme_is_light: bool) -> Option<(PathBuf, String)> {
let (primary, secondary) = if theme_is_light {
(LogoSlot::Light, LogoSlot::Dark)
} else {
(LogoSlot::Dark, LogoSlot::Light)
};
let g = self.inner.read();
let chosen = if g.slot(primary).filename.is_some() {
primary
} else {
secondary
};
let s = g.slot(chosen);
s.filename.as_deref().map(|n| {
(
self.dir.join(n),
s.mime
.clone()
.unwrap_or_else(|| "image/svg+xml".to_string()),
)
})
}
/// Resolve the PXE client logo (no theme fallback — the PXE screen
/// has a single mark). Returns `(path, mime)` or `None` (→ default
/// composed background).
#[must_use]
pub fn client_logo(&self) -> Option<(PathBuf, String)> {
let g = self.inner.read();
let s = &g.client;
s.filename.as_deref().map(|n| {
(
self.dir.join(n),
s.mime
.clone()
.unwrap_or_else(|| "application/octet-stream".to_string()),
)
})
}
/// Replace the logo for `slot`. Returns the chosen on-disk filename so
/// the caller can echo it back in the API response.
pub fn set_logo(
&self,
slot: LogoSlot,
mime: &str,
ext: &str,
bytes: &[u8],
) -> std::io::Result<String> {
let filename = self.write_slot(slot, mime, ext, bytes)?;
self.persist();
tracing::info!(
target: "openpxe::branding",
slot = slot.as_str(), file = %filename, mime = %mime, size = bytes.len(),
"custom logo installed"
);
Ok(filename)
}
/// Drop the override and return to the bundled SVG.
pub fn clear_logo(&self) -> std::io::Result<()> {
let removed = {
/// Write the bytes for a slot and update the in-memory pointer + rev,
/// without persisting (the caller decides when to flush). Cleans up
/// any sibling `logo-<slot>.*` so there's exactly one file per slot.
fn write_slot(
&self,
slot: LogoSlot,
mime: &str,
ext: &str,
bytes: &[u8],
) -> std::io::Result<String> {
std::fs::create_dir_all(self.dir.as_path())?;
let safe_ext = sanitize_ext(ext);
let stem = format!("logo-{}", slot.as_str());
let filename = format!("{stem}.{safe_ext}");
let final_path = self.dir.join(&filename);
// Atomic write: tmp -> rename.
let tmp = final_path.with_extension(format!("{safe_ext}.tmp"));
std::fs::write(&tmp, bytes)?;
std::fs::rename(&tmp, &final_path)?;
// Clean up any sibling `logo-<slot>.<otherext>`.
if let Ok(entries) = std::fs::read_dir(self.dir.as_path()) {
for e in entries.flatten() {
let p = e.path();
let name = p.file_name().and_then(|s| s.to_str()).unwrap_or("");
if name.starts_with(&format!("{stem}.")) && name != filename {
let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&p);
}
}
}
let mut g = self.inner.write();
let s = g.slot_mut(slot);
s.filename = Some(filename.clone());
s.mime = Some(mime.to_string());
g.rev = g.rev.wrapping_add(1);
Ok(filename)
}
/// Drop the override for `slot` and return to the bundled / default.
pub fn clear_logo(&self, slot: LogoSlot) -> std::io::Result<()> {
{
let mut g = self.inner.write();
let removed = g.logo_filename.take();
g.logo_mime = None;
let dir = self.dir.as_path();
g.slot_mut(slot).clear_file(dir);
g.rev = g.rev.wrapping_add(1);
removed
};
if let Some(name) = removed {
let p = self.dir.join(&name);
let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&p);
tracing::info!(target: "openpxe::branding", file = %name, "custom logo cleared");
}
self.persist();
tracing::info!(target: "openpxe::branding", slot = slot.as_str(), "custom logo cleared");
Ok(())
}
/// Convenience: true if a custom logo is configured. Surfaces on
/// `/api/status` so the WebUI can show "Custom logo: yes" without
/// fetching the asset itself.
/// True if a custom logo is configured for `slot`.
#[must_use]
pub fn has_logo(&self) -> bool {
self.inner.read().logo_filename.is_some()
pub fn has_logo(&self, slot: LogoSlot) -> bool {
self.inner.read().slot(slot).filename.is_some()
}
/// Cache-bust token for the logo asset URL. Changes on every
/// True if either WebUI theme slot has a custom logo — drives the
/// FleetDM-style full-width brand block (and the `has-custom-logo`
/// class) on the sidebar + login page.
#[must_use]
pub fn has_any_web_logo(&self) -> bool {
let g = self.inner.read();
g.light.filename.is_some() || g.dark.filename.is_some()
}
/// Presence triple `(light, dark, client)` for the `/api/me` and
/// `/api/status` bootstrap payloads.
#[must_use]
pub fn presence(&self) -> (bool, bool, bool) {
let g = self.inner.read();
(
g.light.filename.is_some(),
g.dark.filename.is_some(),
g.client.filename.is_some(),
)
}
/// Cache-bust token for the logo asset URLs. Changes on every
/// set/clear so `/assets/logo.svg?r=<rev>` resolves to a fresh URL
/// whenever the operator swaps the brand mark. Stable otherwise.
/// whenever the operator swaps a brand mark. Stable otherwise.
#[must_use]
pub fn logo_rev(&self) -> u64 {
self.inner.read().rev
@@ -267,47 +479,87 @@ mod tests {
fn empty_after_load_when_no_branding_dir() {
let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
let b = BrandingStore::load_or_default(dir.path());
assert!(!b.has_logo());
assert!(b.logo_path().is_none());
assert!(b.logo_mime().is_none());
assert!(!b.has_logo(LogoSlot::Light));
assert!(!b.has_logo(LogoSlot::Dark));
assert!(!b.has_logo(LogoSlot::Client));
assert!(b.web_logo(false).is_none());
assert!(b.client_logo().is_none());
assert!(!b.has_any_web_logo());
}
#[test]
fn set_clear_round_trip_persists() {
let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
let b = BrandingStore::load_or_default(dir.path());
let name = b.set_logo("image/png", "png", b"\x89PNG\r\n\x1a\nfake").unwrap();
assert_eq!(name, "logo.png");
assert!(b.has_logo());
assert_eq!(b.logo_mime().as_deref(), Some("image/png"));
let p = b.logo_path().unwrap();
let name = b
.set_logo(LogoSlot::Dark, "image/png", "png", b"\x89PNG\r\n\x1a\nfake")
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(name, "logo-dark.png");
assert!(b.has_logo(LogoSlot::Dark));
assert_eq!(b.slot_mime(LogoSlot::Dark).as_deref(), Some("image/png"));
let (p, _) = b.web_logo(false).unwrap();
assert!(p.is_file());
// Re-open and confirm the override survives a restart.
drop(b);
let b2 = BrandingStore::load_or_default(dir.path());
assert!(b2.has_logo());
assert_eq!(b2.logo_mime().as_deref(), Some("image/png"));
assert!(b2.has_logo(LogoSlot::Dark));
assert_eq!(b2.slot_mime(LogoSlot::Dark).as_deref(), Some("image/png"));
// Clear; the file goes away and has_logo flips off.
b2.clear_logo().unwrap();
assert!(!b2.has_logo());
b2.clear_logo(LogoSlot::Dark).unwrap();
assert!(!b2.has_logo(LogoSlot::Dark));
assert!(!p.exists());
}
#[test]
fn replacing_logo_removes_old_extension_sibling() {
// PNG then SVG; only the SVG should remain on disk.
fn web_logo_falls_back_across_themes() {
let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
let b = BrandingStore::load_or_default(dir.path());
b.set_logo("image/png", "png", b"\x89PNG\r\n\x1a\nfake").unwrap();
b.set_logo("image/svg+xml", "svg", br#"<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"/>"#).unwrap();
// Only dark uploaded — light theme falls back to it.
b.set_logo(LogoSlot::Dark, "image/png", "png", b"dark")
.unwrap();
let (p_light, _) = b.web_logo(true).expect("light falls back to dark");
assert!(p_light.ends_with("logo-dark.png"));
// Upload a distinct light — now light theme uses its own.
b.set_logo(LogoSlot::Light, "image/png", "png", b"light")
.unwrap();
let (p_light2, _) = b.web_logo(true).unwrap();
assert!(p_light2.ends_with("logo-light.png"));
// Client is independent and still unset.
assert!(b.client_logo().is_none());
}
#[test]
fn replacing_slot_removes_old_extension_sibling() {
let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
let b = BrandingStore::load_or_default(dir.path());
b.set_logo(
LogoSlot::Client,
"image/png",
"png",
b"\x89PNG\r\n\x1a\nfake",
)
.unwrap();
b.set_logo(
LogoSlot::Client,
"image/svg+xml",
"svg",
br#"<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"/>"#,
)
.unwrap();
let entries: Vec<_> = std::fs::read_dir(dir.path().join("branding"))
.unwrap()
.filter_map(|e| e.ok().map(|e| e.file_name().to_string_lossy().into_owned()))
.collect();
assert!(entries.iter().any(|n| n == "logo.svg"), "got {entries:?}");
assert!(!entries.iter().any(|n| n == "logo.png"), "stale PNG left over: {entries:?}");
assert!(
entries.iter().any(|n| n == "logo-client.svg"),
"got {entries:?}"
);
assert!(
!entries.iter().any(|n| n == "logo-client.png"),
"stale PNG left over: {entries:?}"
);
}
#[test]
@@ -315,54 +567,92 @@ mod tests {
let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
let b = BrandingStore::load_or_default(dir.path());
assert_eq!(b.logo_rev(), 0);
b.set_logo("image/png", "png", b"\x89PNG\r\n\x1a\nfake").unwrap();
b.set_logo(LogoSlot::Light, "image/png", "png", b"a")
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(b.logo_rev(), 1);
b.set_logo("image/png", "png", b"\x89PNG\r\n\x1a\nfake2").unwrap();
b.set_logo(LogoSlot::Dark, "image/png", "png", b"b")
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(b.logo_rev(), 2);
b.clear_logo().unwrap();
b.clear_logo(LogoSlot::Light).unwrap();
assert_eq!(b.logo_rev(), 3);
// Survives a restart.
drop(b);
let b2 = BrandingStore::load_or_default(dir.path());
assert_eq!(b2.logo_rev(), 3);
}
#[test]
fn legacy_single_logo_migrates_to_dark_and_client() {
// A pre-v0.5.2 branding.json + logo.png migrates on load.
let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
let brand_dir = dir.path().join("branding");
std::fs::create_dir_all(&brand_dir).unwrap();
std::fs::write(brand_dir.join("logo.png"), b"\x89PNG\r\n\x1a\nlegacy").unwrap();
// Hand-write the old shape (logo_filename/logo_mime, no slots).
std::fs::write(
brand_dir.join("branding.json"),
br#"{"logo_filename":"logo.png","logo_mime":"image/png","rev":4}"#,
)
.unwrap();
let b = BrandingStore::load_or_default(dir.path());
assert!(b.has_logo(LogoSlot::Dark), "dark seeded from legacy");
assert!(b.has_logo(LogoSlot::Client), "client seeded from legacy");
assert!(!b.has_logo(LogoSlot::Light), "light stays empty");
// The old logo.png is gone; per-slot files exist.
assert!(!brand_dir.join("logo.png").exists());
assert!(brand_dir.join("logo-dark.png").is_file());
assert!(brand_dir.join("logo-client.png").is_file());
// rev carried over from the legacy file and advanced as the two
// slots were seeded (each write bumps it), so it never regresses.
let migrated_rev = b.logo_rev();
assert!(
migrated_rev >= 4,
"rev should not regress below legacy: {migrated_rev}"
);
// And the migration is sticky across a restart (no re-migrate, no
// further rev churn).
drop(b);
let b2 = BrandingStore::load_or_default(dir.path());
assert!(b2.has_logo(LogoSlot::Dark));
assert!(b2.has_logo(LogoSlot::Client));
assert!(!b2.has_logo(LogoSlot::Light));
assert_eq!(b2.logo_rev(), migrated_rev, "restart must not re-migrate");
}
#[test]
fn sanitize_ext_strips_separators_and_path_chars() {
assert_eq!(sanitize_ext("svg"), "svg");
// Path separators and non-alphanumerics filter out, leaving just
// letters. The remaining "etcpasswd" exceeds the 5-char cap so
// it collapses to `bin` rather than producing `etcpa`.
assert_eq!(sanitize_ext("../etc/passwd"), "bin");
// Short alphanumeric strip-through stays itself.
assert_eq!(sanitize_ext("../svg"), "svg");
assert_eq!(sanitize_ext(""), "bin");
assert_eq!(sanitize_ext("PNG"), "png");
// Anything past five chars is suspicious — collapse to `bin`.
assert_eq!(sanitize_ext("svgvvvv"), "bin");
}
#[test]
fn missing_file_referenced_by_json_resolves_to_empty() {
// If the operator nukes the file out from under the JSON cache,
// we should silently fall back to no-override rather than
// hanging on to a bogus path.
let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
let brand_dir = dir.path().join("branding");
std::fs::create_dir_all(&brand_dir).unwrap();
// Hand-write a branding.json claiming logo.png exists.
let inner = Inner {
logo_filename: Some("logo.png".into()),
logo_mime: Some("image/png".into()),
rev: 0,
};
// branding.json claims a dark slot whose file doesn't exist.
std::fs::write(
brand_dir.join("branding.json"),
serde_json::to_vec_pretty(&inner).unwrap(),
br#"{"dark":{"filename":"logo-dark.png","mime":"image/png"},"rev":1}"#,
)
.unwrap();
let b = BrandingStore::load_or_default(dir.path());
assert!(!b.has_logo(), "should fall back when referenced file is missing");
assert!(
!b.has_logo(LogoSlot::Dark),
"should fall back when referenced file is missing"
);
}
#[test]
fn slot_parse_round_trips() {
assert_eq!(LogoSlot::parse("light"), Some(LogoSlot::Light));
assert_eq!(LogoSlot::parse("DARK"), Some(LogoSlot::Dark));
assert_eq!(LogoSlot::parse(" client "), Some(LogoSlot::Client));
assert_eq!(LogoSlot::parse("nope"), None);
assert_eq!(LogoSlot::Light.as_str(), "light");
}
#[test]
-17
View File
@@ -12,11 +12,9 @@ use time::OffsetDateTime;
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub enum ClientEvent {
DhcpDiscover,
DhcpRequest,
PxeBootServerRequest,
TftpRead { file: String },
HttpScriptFetch { target: String },
HttpIsoAsset { file: String },
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
@@ -32,8 +30,6 @@ pub struct ClientSnapshot {
// Events are left with default serialization (9-tuple) — they're
// diagnostic only and not consumed by the UI today.
pub events: Vec<(OffsetDateTime, ClientEvent)>,
/// The boot target (ISO id) last selected via the iPXE menu, if any.
pub selected_target: Option<String>,
}
#[derive(Debug, Default)]
@@ -66,7 +62,6 @@ impl ClientRegistry {
first_seen: now,
last_seen: now,
events: Vec::new(),
selected_target: None,
});
entry.last_seen = now;
if ip.is_some() {
@@ -84,13 +79,6 @@ impl ClientRegistry {
}
}
pub fn set_selected_target(&self, mac: &str, target: Option<String>) {
let mut guard = self.inner.write();
if let Some(c) = guard.get_mut(mac) {
c.selected_target = target;
}
}
#[must_use]
pub fn list(&self) -> Vec<ClientSnapshot> {
let guard = self.inner.read();
@@ -99,9 +87,4 @@ impl ClientRegistry {
v.sort_by_key(|c| std::cmp::Reverse(c.last_seen));
v
}
#[must_use]
pub fn get(&self, mac: &str) -> Option<ClientSnapshot> {
self.inner.read().get(mac).cloned()
}
}
+165 -46
View File
@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
use figment::providers::{Env, Format, Serialized, Toml};
use figment::Figment;
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use std::net::{IpAddr, Ipv4Addr};
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
@@ -38,10 +40,6 @@ pub struct NetworkConfig {
pub dhcp_port: u16,
/// UDP port for PXE Boot Server discovery. Standard is 4011.
pub pxe_port: u16,
/// Optional allowlist of client MAC prefixes (OUI). Empty = serve everyone.
pub mac_allowlist: Vec<String>,
/// Optional allowlist of subnets (CIDR). Empty = serve everyone.
pub subnet_allowlist: Vec<String>,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize, Default)]
@@ -56,6 +54,9 @@ pub enum DhcpMode {
/// Disabled — rely on an external DHCP server that has been manually
/// configured with `next-server` / `filename`. OpenPXE only serves TFTP
/// + HTTP in this mode. Useful for home routers that can be pre-set.
// `off`/`none` are accepted as aliases for backward-compat with the old
// hand-rolled `apply_env`, which mapped them to Disabled.
#[serde(alias = "off", alias = "none")]
Disabled,
}
@@ -74,6 +75,11 @@ pub struct Paths {
/// Only used when `settings.windows_enabled = true`. Defaults to
/// `/var/lib/openpxe/smb` in the container image.
pub smb_dir: PathBuf,
/// v0.5.2: directory holding uploaded unattended-install answer files
/// (Kickstart / Preseed / Autoinstall / Windows answer files). Kept
/// separate from `iso_dir` so answer files never appear in the ISO
/// listing or the PXE menu. Defaults to `/var/lib/openpxe/unattended`.
pub unattended_dir: PathBuf,
}
impl Default for ServerConfig {
@@ -95,8 +101,6 @@ impl Default for NetworkConfig {
dhcp_bind: IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::UNSPECIFIED),
dhcp_port: 67,
pxe_port: 4011,
mac_allowlist: Vec::new(),
subnet_allowlist: Vec::new(),
}
}
}
@@ -109,6 +113,7 @@ impl Default for Paths {
ipxe_dir: PathBuf::from("/usr/share/openpxe/ipxe"),
wimboot_path: None,
smb_dir: PathBuf::from("/var/lib/openpxe/smb"),
unattended_dir: PathBuf::from("/var/lib/openpxe/unattended"),
}
}
}
@@ -123,48 +128,162 @@ impl Config {
toml::from_str(&text).map_err(|e| crate::Error::Config(e.to_string()))
}
/// Apply environment variable overrides. Env var names follow the pattern
/// `OPENPXE_<SECTION>_<FIELD>`, uppercase. Unknown vars are ignored.
/// Call this after loading the TOML file so env takes precedence.
pub fn apply_env(&mut self) {
if let Ok(v) = std::env::var("OPENPXE_HTTP_PORT") {
if let Ok(p) = v.parse() {
self.server.http_port = p;
/// Load configuration with layered precedence (v0.5.4, via `figment`):
/// built-in [`Default`] → optional TOML file → `OPENPXE_*` environment
/// (highest). Replaces the old `from_toml_file` + `apply_env` two-step
/// and now covers **every** field automatically (the previous hand-rolled
/// mapping silently skipped `unattended_dir`, the bind addresses, etc.).
///
/// The env layer preserves the historical flat names
/// (`OPENPXE_HTTP_PORT`, `OPENPXE_ISO_DIR`, …) so existing deployments
/// (the Unraid template, `entrypoint.sh`) keep working unchanged, and
/// additionally accepts the explicit nested form
/// `OPENPXE_<SECTION>__<FIELD>` (double underscore).
pub fn load(path: Option<&Path>) -> crate::Result<Self> {
let mut fig = Figment::from(Serialized::defaults(Config::default()));
if let Some(p) = path {
if p.exists() {
fig = fig.merge(Toml::file(p));
}
}
if let Ok(v) = std::env::var("OPENPXE_TFTP_PORT") {
if let Ok(p) = v.parse() {
self.server.tftp_port = p;
}
}
if let Ok(v) = std::env::var("OPENPXE_DHCP_PORT") {
if let Ok(p) = v.parse() {
self.network.dhcp_port = p;
}
}
if let Ok(v) = std::env::var("OPENPXE_PUBLIC_IP") {
if let Ok(ip) = v.parse() {
self.server.public_ip = Some(ip);
}
}
if let Ok(v) = std::env::var("OPENPXE_DHCP_MODE") {
self.network.dhcp_mode = match v.to_ascii_lowercase().as_str() {
"proxy" => DhcpMode::Proxy,
"disabled" | "off" | "none" => DhcpMode::Disabled,
_ => self.network.dhcp_mode,
fig = fig.merge(env_provider());
fig.extract()
.map_err(|e| crate::Error::Config(e.to_string()))
}
}
/// The `OPENPXE_*` environment provider. Maps the historical flat variable
/// names onto the nested [`Config`] fields, and also accepts the explicit
/// `OPENPXE_SECTION__FIELD` nested form. Keys that match nothing (e.g.
/// `OPENPXE_CONFIG`, `OPENPXE_UID` from the entrypoint) become stray
/// top-level keys that `Config` ignores on extract.
fn env_provider() -> Env {
Env::prefixed("OPENPXE_")
.map(|key| {
// Lowercase so the match is robust regardless of how the OS
// reports the var's case.
let k = key.as_str().to_ascii_lowercase();
let mapped = match k.as_str() {
"http_port" => "server.http_port",
"http_bind" => "server.http_bind",
"tftp_port" => "server.tftp_port",
"tftp_bind" => "server.tftp_bind",
"public_ip" => "server.public_ip",
"dhcp_port" => "network.dhcp_port",
"dhcp_bind" => "network.dhcp_bind",
"dhcp_mode" => "network.dhcp_mode",
"pxe_port" => "network.pxe_port",
"iso_dir" => "paths.iso_dir",
"work_dir" => "paths.work_dir",
"ipxe_dir" => "paths.ipxe_dir",
"smb_dir" => "paths.smb_dir",
"wimboot_path" => "paths.wimboot_path",
"unattended_dir" => "paths.unattended_dir",
// Unknown: support the explicit nested form
// (OPENPXE_SERVER__HTTP_PORT). `replace` is a no-op for the
// already-handled flat names above.
other => return other.replace("__", ".").into(),
};
}
if let Ok(v) = std::env::var("OPENPXE_ISO_DIR") {
self.paths.iso_dir = PathBuf::from(v);
}
if let Ok(v) = std::env::var("OPENPXE_WORK_DIR") {
self.paths.work_dir = PathBuf::from(v);
}
if let Ok(v) = std::env::var("OPENPXE_IPXE_DIR") {
self.paths.ipxe_dir = PathBuf::from(v);
}
if let Ok(v) = std::env::var("OPENPXE_SMB_DIR") {
self.paths.smb_dir = PathBuf::from(v);
}
mapped.into()
})
.split(".")
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
// figment's `Jail::expect_with` closure returns `Result<(), figment::Error>`
// and `figment::Error` is large; that's the library's API, not ours.
#![allow(clippy::result_large_err)]
use super::*;
#[test]
fn defaults_load_when_no_file_or_env() {
figment::Jail::expect_with(|_jail| {
let c = Config::load(None).expect("load defaults");
assert_eq!(c.server.http_port, 80);
assert_eq!(c.network.dhcp_mode, DhcpMode::Proxy);
assert_eq!(c.paths.iso_dir, PathBuf::from("/var/lib/openpxe/isos"));
Ok(())
});
}
#[test]
fn legacy_flat_env_vars_still_apply() {
figment::Jail::expect_with(|jail| {
jail.set_env("OPENPXE_HTTP_PORT", "8123");
jail.set_env("OPENPXE_TFTP_PORT", "6900");
jail.set_env("OPENPXE_DHCP_PORT", "6767");
jail.set_env("OPENPXE_PXE_PORT", "4444");
jail.set_env("OPENPXE_PUBLIC_IP", "10.20.30.40");
jail.set_env("OPENPXE_DHCP_MODE", "disabled");
jail.set_env("OPENPXE_ISO_DIR", "/data/isos");
jail.set_env("OPENPXE_WORK_DIR", "/data/work");
jail.set_env("OPENPXE_IPXE_DIR", "/data/ipxe");
jail.set_env("OPENPXE_SMB_DIR", "/data/smb");
// v0.5.4: a field the old apply_env never covered.
jail.set_env("OPENPXE_UNATTENDED_DIR", "/data/unattended");
let c = Config::load(None).expect("load with env");
assert_eq!(c.server.http_port, 8123);
assert_eq!(c.server.tftp_port, 6900);
assert_eq!(c.network.dhcp_port, 6767);
assert_eq!(c.network.pxe_port, 4444);
assert_eq!(c.server.public_ip, Some("10.20.30.40".parse().unwrap()));
assert_eq!(c.network.dhcp_mode, DhcpMode::Disabled);
assert_eq!(c.paths.iso_dir, PathBuf::from("/data/isos"));
assert_eq!(c.paths.work_dir, PathBuf::from("/data/work"));
assert_eq!(c.paths.ipxe_dir, PathBuf::from("/data/ipxe"));
assert_eq!(c.paths.smb_dir, PathBuf::from("/data/smb"));
assert_eq!(c.paths.unattended_dir, PathBuf::from("/data/unattended"));
Ok(())
});
}
#[test]
fn dhcp_mode_off_alias_maps_to_disabled() {
figment::Jail::expect_with(|jail| {
jail.set_env("OPENPXE_DHCP_MODE", "off");
let c = Config::load(None).unwrap();
assert_eq!(c.network.dhcp_mode, DhcpMode::Disabled);
Ok(())
});
}
#[test]
fn nested_double_underscore_form_also_works() {
figment::Jail::expect_with(|jail| {
jail.set_env("OPENPXE_SERVER__HTTP_PORT", "9001");
let c = Config::load(None).unwrap();
assert_eq!(c.server.http_port, 9001);
Ok(())
});
}
#[test]
fn env_overrides_toml_file() {
figment::Jail::expect_with(|jail| {
jail.create_file(
"openpxe.toml",
"[server]\nhttp_port = 8080\n[paths]\niso_dir = \"/from/toml\"\n",
)?;
jail.set_env("OPENPXE_HTTP_PORT", "8443");
let c = Config::load(Some(Path::new("openpxe.toml"))).unwrap();
// env wins over TOML…
assert_eq!(c.server.http_port, 8443);
// …but TOML-only values still apply.
assert_eq!(c.paths.iso_dir, PathBuf::from("/from/toml"));
Ok(())
});
}
#[test]
fn unrelated_openpxe_env_vars_are_ignored() {
figment::Jail::expect_with(|jail| {
// entrypoint.sh sets these; they must not break config load.
jail.set_env("OPENPXE_UID", "10001");
jail.set_env("OPENPXE_CONFIG", "/etc/openpxe.toml");
let c = Config::load(None).expect("stray vars ignored");
assert_eq!(c.server.http_port, 80);
Ok(())
});
}
}
+65
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
//! Small, dependency-free encoding helpers shared across crates.
//!
//! v0.5.4: `pct_encode` and `xml_escape` were duplicated in the SAML
//! modules and the HTTP layer; they live here now. They're deliberately
//! hand-rolled rather than pulling in `percent-encoding` / `url`: the
//! unreserved set below is exactly the RFC 3986 set that iPXE's
//! `:uristring` modifier and the SAML HTTP-Redirect binding both expect,
//! and a general-purpose URL crate escapes a different set.
use std::fmt::Write as _;
/// Percent-encode `s` per RFC 3986: the unreserved set
/// (`A-Z` `a-z` `0-9` `-` `_` `.` `~`) passes through unchanged; every
/// other byte becomes `%XX` (uppercase hex).
#[must_use]
pub fn pct_encode(s: &str) -> String {
let mut out = String::with_capacity(s.len());
for b in s.bytes() {
match b {
b'A'..=b'Z' | b'a'..=b'z' | b'0'..=b'9' | b'-' | b'_' | b'.' | b'~' => {
out.push(b as char);
}
_ => {
let _ = write!(out, "%{b:02X}");
}
}
}
out
}
/// Escape the five XML predefined entities so `s` is safe inside element
/// text or a double-quoted attribute value.
#[must_use]
pub fn xml_escape(s: &str) -> String {
let mut out = String::with_capacity(s.len());
for c in s.chars() {
match c {
'&' => out.push_str("&amp;"),
'<' => out.push_str("&lt;"),
'>' => out.push_str("&gt;"),
'"' => out.push_str("&quot;"),
'\'' => out.push_str("&apos;"),
_ => out.push(c),
}
}
out
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn pct_encode_unreserved_passthrough_else_hex() {
assert_eq!(pct_encode("node-7.lab_1~"), "node-7.lab_1~");
assert_eq!(pct_encode("aa:bb cc/?&="), "aa%3Abb%20cc%2F%3F%26%3D");
assert_eq!(pct_encode(""), "");
}
#[test]
fn xml_escape_all_five_entities() {
assert_eq!(xml_escape("a&b<c>\"d'e"), "a&amp;b&lt;c&gt;&quot;d&apos;e");
assert_eq!(xml_escape("plain text"), "plain text");
}
}
+67 -7
View File
@@ -21,6 +21,8 @@ use std::path::PathBuf;
use std::sync::Arc;
use time::OffsetDateTime;
use crate::profile::DeployProfile;
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct HostBinding {
/// Lowercase, colon-separated MAC (e.g. `aa:bb:cc:dd:ee:ff`). The
@@ -35,6 +37,11 @@ pub struct HostBinding {
/// `"rack-3 spine"`). Empty if unset.
#[serde(default)]
pub label: String,
/// v0.5.2: optional unattended-install hints (auto hostname / IP /
/// answer-file id). Flattened into the binding JSON so pre-v0.5.2
/// `hosts.json` files (which lack these keys) still deserialize.
#[serde(default, flatten)]
pub profile: DeployProfile,
#[serde(with = "time::serde::rfc3339")]
pub created_at: OffsetDateTime,
#[serde(with = "time::serde::rfc3339")]
@@ -94,20 +101,31 @@ impl HostBindings {
}
/// Insert or update. Returns the resulting binding (with timestamps).
pub fn upsert(&self, mac: &str, target: &str, label: &str) -> HostBinding {
/// The `profile` carries optional unattended-install hints (v0.5.2);
/// pass `DeployProfile::default()` for a plain pin.
pub fn upsert(
&self,
mac: &str,
target: &str,
label: &str,
profile: DeployProfile,
) -> HostBinding {
let key = normalize_mac(mac);
let now = OffsetDateTime::now_utc();
let profile = profile.normalized();
let binding = {
let mut g = self.inner.write();
let entry = g.by_mac.entry(key.clone()).or_insert_with(|| HostBinding {
mac: key.clone(),
target: target.to_string(),
label: label.to_string(),
profile: profile.clone(),
created_at: now,
updated_at: now,
});
entry.target = target.to_string();
entry.label = label.to_string();
entry.profile = profile.clone();
entry.updated_at = now;
entry.clone()
};
@@ -179,6 +197,10 @@ mod tests {
use super::*;
use tempfile::tempdir;
fn np() -> DeployProfile {
DeployProfile::default()
}
#[test]
fn normalize_handles_case_and_dashes() {
assert_eq!(normalize_mac("AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF"), "aa:bb:cc:dd:ee:ff");
@@ -191,7 +213,12 @@ mod tests {
let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
let h = HostBindings::load_or_default(dir.path());
assert!(h.is_empty());
h.upsert("AA:BB:CC:00:00:01", "ubuntu-24-04-linux", "rack-3 spine");
h.upsert(
"AA:BB:CC:00:00:01",
"ubuntu-24-04-linux",
"rack-3 spine",
np(),
);
let found = h.lookup("aa-bb-cc-00-00-01").expect("lookup");
assert_eq!(found.target, "ubuntu-24-04-linux");
assert_eq!(found.label, "rack-3 spine");
@@ -202,8 +229,8 @@ mod tests {
fn upsert_replaces_existing_target() {
let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
let h = HostBindings::load_or_default(dir.path());
h.upsert("aa:bb:cc:00:00:01", "old-target", "label1");
h.upsert("aa:bb:cc:00:00:01", "new-target", "label2");
h.upsert("aa:bb:cc:00:00:01", "old-target", "label1", np());
h.upsert("aa:bb:cc:00:00:01", "new-target", "label2", np());
assert_eq!(h.len(), 1);
let b = h.lookup("aa:bb:cc:00:00:01").unwrap();
assert_eq!(b.target, "new-target");
@@ -214,7 +241,7 @@ mod tests {
fn remove_works_and_reports_outcome() {
let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
let h = HostBindings::load_or_default(dir.path());
h.upsert("aa:bb:cc:00:00:01", "x", "");
h.upsert("aa:bb:cc:00:00:01", "x", "", np());
assert!(h.remove("AA:BB:CC:00:00:01"));
assert!(!h.remove("aa:bb:cc:00:00:01")); // already gone
assert!(h.is_empty());
@@ -224,11 +251,44 @@ mod tests {
fn round_trip_persists_to_disk() {
let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
let h = HostBindings::load_or_default(dir.path());
h.upsert("aa:bb:cc:00:00:01", "ubuntu-linux", "rack-3");
h.upsert("aa:bb:cc:00:00:02", "_local", "tom-laptop");
h.upsert("aa:bb:cc:00:00:01", "ubuntu-linux", "rack-3", np());
h.upsert("aa:bb:cc:00:00:02", "_local", "tom-laptop", np());
drop(h);
let h2 = HostBindings::load_or_default(dir.path());
assert_eq!(h2.len(), 2);
assert_eq!(h2.lookup("aa:bb:cc:00:00:02").unwrap().target, "_local");
}
#[test]
fn profile_round_trips_to_disk() {
let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
let h = HostBindings::load_or_default(dir.path());
let prof = DeployProfile {
auto_hostname: Some("node-7".into()),
auto_ip: Some("10.0.0.7".into()),
unattended_file: Some("ubuntu-ks".into()),
};
h.upsert("aa:bb:cc:00:00:09", "ubuntu-linux", "lab", prof);
drop(h);
let h2 = HostBindings::load_or_default(dir.path());
let b = h2.lookup("aa:bb:cc:00:00:09").unwrap();
assert_eq!(b.profile.auto_hostname.as_deref(), Some("node-7"));
assert_eq!(b.profile.auto_ip.as_deref(), Some("10.0.0.7"));
assert_eq!(b.profile.unattended_file.as_deref(), Some("ubuntu-ks"));
}
#[test]
fn legacy_hosts_json_without_profile_still_loads() {
// A pre-v0.5.2 hosts.json has no profile keys at all.
let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
std::fs::write(
dir.path().join("hosts.json"),
br#"[{"mac":"aa:bb:cc:00:00:01","target":"_local","label":"old","created_at":"2024-01-01T00:00:00Z","updated_at":"2024-01-01T00:00:00Z"}]"#,
)
.unwrap();
let h = HostBindings::load_or_default(dir.path());
let b = h.lookup("aa:bb:cc:00:00:01").unwrap();
assert_eq!(b.target, "_local");
assert!(b.profile.is_empty());
}
}
+6 -3
View File
@@ -8,21 +8,23 @@ pub mod boot_log;
pub mod branding;
pub mod client;
pub mod config;
pub mod encoding;
pub mod error;
pub mod host_bindings;
pub mod log_bus;
pub mod metrics;
pub mod notify;
pub mod profile;
pub mod queue;
pub mod saml;
pub mod settings;
pub mod sso;
pub mod wol;
pub use arch::{ClientArch, FirmwareClass};
pub use arch::{ClientArch, DriverMode, FirmwareClass};
pub use auth::{AdminAccount, AdminPublic, AdminStore};
pub use boot_log::{BootEvent, BootLog};
pub use branding::{ext_for_mime, BrandingStore, ALLOWED_LOGO_MIMES, MAX_LOGO_BYTES};
pub use branding::{ext_for_mime, BrandingStore, LogoSlot, ALLOWED_LOGO_MIMES, MAX_LOGO_BYTES};
pub use client::{ClientEvent, ClientRegistry, ClientSnapshot};
pub use config::{Config, DhcpMode, NetworkConfig, Paths, ServerConfig};
pub use error::{Error, Result};
@@ -30,7 +32,8 @@ pub use host_bindings::{normalize_mac, HostBinding, HostBindings};
pub use log_bus::{LogBus, LogBusLayer, LogLine};
pub use metrics::{HttpRoute, Metrics};
pub use notify::{NotifyConfig, NotifyKind, NotifyStore};
pub use profile::DeployProfile;
pub use queue::{DeploymentQueue, QueueEntry};
pub use saml::{IdpMetadata, SamlError, SpParams, VerifiedPrincipal, VerifiedResponse};
pub use settings::{Settings, SettingsStore, TimeoutAction};
pub use sso::{SsoConfig, SsoStore};
pub use sso::{SsoConfig, SsoLoginInfo, SsoStore};
+4 -1
View File
@@ -303,7 +303,10 @@ mod tests {
smtp_host: "smtp.example.com".into(),
..Default::default()
});
assert!(matches!(r, Err(Error::Invalid(_))), "missing recipient should reject");
assert!(
matches!(r, Err(Error::Invalid(_))),
"missing recipient should reject"
);
s.replace(NotifyConfig {
enabled: true,
kind: NotifyKind::Smtp,
+122
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
//! Per-host deployment profile.
//!
//! v0.5.2: a small, optional bundle of "what should this machine do when
//! it images" attached to either a pinned host binding ([`crate::HostBinding`])
//! or a queued device ([`crate::QueueEntry`]). All three fields are
//! optional and independent:
//!
//! * `auto_hostname` — substituted into the served unattended answer file
//! (`{{HOSTNAME}}`) so the installer sets the machine name.
//! * `auto_ip` — substituted as `{{IP}}`. OpenPXE is a DHCP **proxy** and
//! does not hand out leases, so this is applied by the installer as a
//! static-network directive inside the answer file, not by DHCP.
//! * `unattended_file` — the id of an uploaded file in the unattended
//! store (Kickstart / Preseed / Autoinstall / Windows answer file). When
//! set, the boot chain injects the appropriate kernel argument so the
//! install runs unattended.
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
/// Optional deployment hints carried on a host pin or a queue entry.
///
/// The fields are flattened into `HostBinding` / `QueueEntry` on the wire
/// (so existing JSON stays compatible via `#[serde(default)]`); this type
/// is the in-code bundle the boot chain consumes.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct DeployProfile {
/// Hostname to set on the imaged machine (`{{HOSTNAME}}`). Empty/None
/// leaves the installer default.
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
pub auto_hostname: Option<String>,
/// Static IPv4/IPv6 the installer should configure (`{{IP}}`). Stored
/// as a free-form string — validated lightly at the HTTP layer.
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
pub auto_ip: Option<String>,
/// Id of an uploaded file in the unattended store. Empty/None means
/// "no unattended install — boot interactively".
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
pub unattended_file: Option<String>,
}
/// Cap on the stored hostname / IP strings — generous for any real value
/// but bounds what an operator can stuff into the JSON.
pub const MAX_PROFILE_FIELD_LEN: usize = 255;
impl DeployProfile {
/// True when nothing is set — lets call sites skip work entirely.
#[must_use]
pub fn is_empty(&self) -> bool {
self.auto_hostname.is_none() && self.auto_ip.is_none() && self.unattended_file.is_none()
}
/// True when an unattended file is selected (drives boot-chain injection).
#[must_use]
pub fn has_unattended(&self) -> bool {
self.unattended_file
.as_deref()
.is_some_and(|s| !s.trim().is_empty())
}
/// Normalise: trim every field and collapse empty strings to `None`
/// so persisted JSON never carries `""` for an unset value.
#[must_use]
pub fn normalized(mut self) -> Self {
fn clean(v: Option<String>) -> Option<String> {
v.map(|s| s.trim().to_string())
.filter(|s| !s.is_empty())
.map(|s| s.chars().take(MAX_PROFILE_FIELD_LEN).collect())
}
self.auto_hostname = clean(self.auto_hostname);
self.auto_ip = clean(self.auto_ip);
self.unattended_file = clean(self.unattended_file);
self
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn empty_profile_is_empty() {
assert!(DeployProfile::default().is_empty());
assert!(!DeployProfile::default().has_unattended());
}
#[test]
fn normalize_trims_and_nulls_empty() {
let p = DeployProfile {
auto_hostname: Some(" node-7 ".into()),
auto_ip: Some(" ".into()),
unattended_file: Some(String::new()),
}
.normalized();
assert_eq!(p.auto_hostname.as_deref(), Some("node-7"));
assert_eq!(p.auto_ip, None);
assert_eq!(p.unattended_file, None);
assert!(!p.is_empty());
}
#[test]
fn has_unattended_detects_real_id() {
let p = DeployProfile {
unattended_file: Some("ubuntu-ks".into()),
..Default::default()
};
assert!(p.has_unattended());
}
#[test]
fn long_field_is_capped() {
let long = "a".repeat(1000);
let p = DeployProfile {
auto_hostname: Some(long),
..Default::default()
}
.normalized();
assert_eq!(
p.auto_hostname.as_deref().map(str::len),
Some(MAX_PROFILE_FIELD_LEN)
);
}
}
+32
View File
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ use time::OffsetDateTime;
use tokio::sync::Notify;
use uuid::Uuid;
use crate::profile::DeployProfile;
use crate::ClientArch;
/// Per-client queue state visible to the WebUI.
@@ -37,6 +38,11 @@ pub struct QueueEntry {
#[serde(with = "time::serde::rfc3339")]
pub last_poll_at: OffsetDateTime,
pub assigned_target: Option<String>,
/// v0.5.2: optional per-device deployment profile set via the queue
/// "Profile" button (auto hostname / IP / unattended file). Flattened
/// so the JSON stays flat alongside the other queue fields.
#[serde(default, flatten)]
pub profile: DeployProfile,
}
#[derive(Debug)]
@@ -49,6 +55,7 @@ struct QueueEntryInner {
joined_at: OffsetDateTime,
last_poll_at: OffsetDateTime,
assigned_target: Option<String>,
profile: DeployProfile,
/// Broadcast primitive that wakes the long-poll as soon as an
/// assignment lands — no polling on our side, no sleep-loops.
notify: Arc<Notify>,
@@ -65,6 +72,7 @@ impl QueueEntryInner {
joined_at: self.joined_at,
last_poll_at: self.last_poll_at,
assigned_target: self.assigned_target.clone(),
profile: self.profile.clone(),
}
}
}
@@ -110,6 +118,7 @@ impl DeploymentQueue {
joined_at: now,
last_poll_at: now,
assigned_target: None,
profile: DeployProfile::default(),
notify: Arc::new(Notify::new()),
};
let snap = inner.snapshot();
@@ -133,6 +142,29 @@ impl DeploymentQueue {
Some(g.snapshot())
}
/// Operator sets (or clears) the deployment profile for a queued
/// device via the WebUI "Profile" button. Returns the updated
/// snapshot, or `None` if the entry has since been released.
pub fn set_profile(&self, entry_id: &str, profile: DeployProfile) -> Option<QueueEntry> {
let mut guard = self.inner.write();
let g = guard.get_mut(entry_id)?;
g.profile = profile.normalized();
Some(g.snapshot())
}
/// Look up the deployment profile for a queued MAC, if any. Used by
/// the boot chain to inject an unattended file / template the
/// hostname + IP when an assigned device chains to its target.
#[must_use]
pub fn profile_for_mac(&self, mac: &str) -> Option<DeployProfile> {
let guard = self.inner.read();
guard
.values()
.find(|g| g.mac == mac)
.map(|g| g.profile.clone())
.filter(|p| !p.is_empty())
}
/// Operator assigns an ISO entry (boot_entry id) to one or more clients.
/// Returns the number of queue entries that were updated. Entries not in the
/// queue are silently skipped.
+3 -32
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@
//! appended as the `SAMLRequest` query parameter. AuthnRequests are sent
//! unsigned in this release (the IdP must not require client signatures).
use std::fmt::Write as _;
use std::io::Write as _;
use base64::Engine;
@@ -15,6 +14,7 @@ use time::format_description::well_known::Rfc3339;
use time::OffsetDateTime;
use super::{SamlError, SpParams};
use crate::encoding::{pct_encode, xml_escape};
const NS_PROTOCOL: &str = "urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol";
const NS_ASSERTION: &str = "urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion";
@@ -79,37 +79,8 @@ fn deflate_base64(xml: &str) -> Result<String, SamlError> {
Ok(base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD.encode(compressed))
}
/// Percent-encode a query-string component (RFC 3986 unreserved set passes
/// through; everything else is `%XX`).
fn pct_encode(s: &str) -> String {
let mut out = String::with_capacity(s.len() * 3);
for b in s.bytes() {
match b {
b'A'..=b'Z' | b'a'..=b'z' | b'0'..=b'9' | b'-' | b'_' | b'.' | b'~' => {
out.push(b as char);
}
_ => {
let _ = write!(out, "%{b:02X}");
}
}
}
out
}
fn xml_escape(s: &str) -> String {
let mut out = String::with_capacity(s.len());
for c in s.chars() {
match c {
'&' => out.push_str("&amp;"),
'<' => out.push_str("&lt;"),
'>' => out.push_str("&gt;"),
'"' => out.push_str("&quot;"),
'\'' => out.push_str("&apos;"),
_ => out.push(c),
}
}
out
}
// `pct_encode` + `xml_escape` now live in `openpxe_core::encoding` (v0.5.4)
// — imported above.
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
+2 -15
View File
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
use base64::Engine;
use super::{SamlError, SpParams};
use crate::encoding::xml_escape;
/// SAML 2.0 binding URIs.
pub const BINDING_REDIRECT: &str = "urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:bindings:HTTP-Redirect";
@@ -148,21 +149,7 @@ fn node_text(n: &roxmltree::Node<'_, '_>) -> String {
.collect()
}
/// Minimal XML attribute/text escaping for the values we interpolate.
fn xml_escape(s: &str) -> String {
let mut out = String::with_capacity(s.len());
for c in s.chars() {
match c {
'&' => out.push_str("&amp;"),
'<' => out.push_str("&lt;"),
'>' => out.push_str("&gt;"),
'"' => out.push_str("&quot;"),
'\'' => out.push_str("&apos;"),
_ => out.push(c),
}
}
out
}
// `xml_escape` now lives in `openpxe_core::encoding` (v0.5.4) — imported above.
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
+30
View File
@@ -73,6 +73,23 @@ impl SsoConfig {
}
}
/// The minimal, non-sensitive slice of the SSO config that the **pre-auth**
/// login screen needs to render the "Sign in with …" button. Carries only
/// the display affordances — never the metadata XML/URL or entity ID, which
/// stay behind the auth-gated `/api/sso`. Served as part of the public
/// `/api/me` so the button renders reliably whether or not anyone is signed
/// in (v0.5.9: fixes the button vanishing because `/api/sso` 401s pre-auth).
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct SsoLoginInfo {
/// True only when SSO is *usable* (enabled AND a metadata source is
/// present) — i.e. clicking the button will actually reach an IdP.
pub enabled: bool,
/// Button label, e.g. "STC AD". Empty falls back to "SSO" in the UI.
pub idp_name: String,
/// Optional IdP logo rendered on the button. Empty = no image.
pub idp_logo_url: String,
}
/// In-memory + on-disk SSO settings registry.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct SsoStore {
@@ -111,6 +128,19 @@ impl SsoStore {
self.inner.read().clone()
}
/// Public, non-sensitive descriptor for the login screen. Safe to
/// expose pre-auth — it's exactly what the "Sign in with …" button
/// keys off, with no metadata/entity-ID leakage. v0.5.9.
#[must_use]
pub fn login_info(&self) -> SsoLoginInfo {
let cfg = self.inner.read();
SsoLoginInfo {
enabled: cfg.is_usable(),
idp_name: cfg.idp_name.clone(),
idp_logo_url: cfg.idp_logo_url.clone(),
}
}
/// Replace the whole config in one shot. Light validation: metadata
/// XML and URL are length-capped so an operator can't OOM us by
/// pasting a 10 GiB blob; the IdP UI tab clamps the input visually,
+3 -5
View File
@@ -181,10 +181,7 @@ mod tests {
Ipv4Addr::new(192, 168, 1, 255)
);
assert_eq!(
subnet_broadcast(
Ipv4Addr::new(10, 5, 3, 7),
Ipv4Addr::new(255, 255, 0, 0)
),
subnet_broadcast(Ipv4Addr::new(10, 5, 3, 7), Ipv4Addr::new(255, 255, 0, 0)),
Ipv4Addr::new(10, 5, 255, 255)
);
}
@@ -196,7 +193,8 @@ mod tests {
// and confirm send_magic transmits the exact 102-byte packet.
let rx = UdpSocket::bind(SocketAddrV4::new(Ipv4Addr::LOCALHOST, 0)).unwrap();
let port = rx.local_addr().unwrap().port();
rx.set_read_timeout(Some(std::time::Duration::from_secs(2))).unwrap();
rx.set_read_timeout(Some(std::time::Duration::from_secs(2)))
.unwrap();
let packet = magic_packet([0x0a, 0x1b, 0x2c, 0x3d, 0x4e, 0x5f]);
let sent = send_magic(&packet, &[Ipv4Addr::LOCALHOST], port).unwrap();
+1
View File
@@ -18,3 +18,4 @@ tracing.workspace = true
thiserror.workspace = true
anyhow.workspace = true
bytes.workspace = true
parking_lot.workspace = true
+237
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,237 @@
//! Automatic per-MAC NIC driver-mode escalation (v0.6.1).
//!
//! OpenPXE serves the firmware-net iPXE build (`snponly`/`undionly`) by
//! default — it's the most reliable choice for chainloading because the
//! firmware just proved its network works by downloading the NBP. A minority
//! of NICs have a missing or buggy firmware UNDI/SNP stack; those clients
//! TFTP the binary fine, but then iPXE can't bring the link up, so the
//! tell-tale second DHCP DISCOVER carrying the `iPXE` user-class never arrives
//! and the machine eventually re-PXE-boots.
//!
//! We detect exactly that: a *fresh* firmware DISCOVER from a MAC whose
//! previous firmware attempt was never confirmed by an iPXE handoff means the
//! firmware-net build failed → escalate that MAC to [`DriverMode::Builtin`]
//! (iPXE's own NIC drivers). The decision is sticky — once a MAC settles on a
//! mode that completes the handoff, later boots go straight to it. There is no
//! operator toggle; it just works, and the default (firmware) path is
//! unchanged so hardware that already boots never regresses.
use openpxe_core::DriverMode;
use parking_lot::Mutex;
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::time::{Duration, Instant};
/// Multiple DISCOVERs within this window belong to the *same* boot (DHCP
/// retransmits, plus the :4011 PXE Boot Server query that follows the :67
/// DISCOVER). They must not be mistaken for a failed-and-retried boot.
const SAME_BOOT_DEBOUNCE: Duration = Duration::from_secs(8);
/// Forget a MAC's state after this long with no activity, so a transient
/// escalation doesn't pin a client to Builtin forever and the map stays
/// bounded over a long-running deployment.
const ENTRY_TTL: Duration = Duration::from_mins(30);
/// Hard cap on tracked MACs. Past this we evict the least-recently-seen
/// entry — escalation is best-effort, never a memory-growth vector.
const MAX_ENTRIES: usize = 4096;
/// How often (at most) the whole map is swept for expired entries.
/// Correctness doesn't depend on the sweep — a stale entry is also
/// detected inline when its MAC next appears — so the sweep only bounds
/// memory for MACs that never return, and amortizing it keeps the
/// per-packet path O(1) instead of O(map).
const PRUNE_INTERVAL: Duration = Duration::from_mins(1);
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy)]
struct Entry {
mode: DriverMode,
/// True once we've served `mode` and are waiting for the iPXE handoff to
/// confirm it worked. A *new* boot arriving while this is still true means
/// the previous attempt failed and we should escalate.
awaiting_confirm: bool,
last_seen: Instant,
}
#[derive(Debug)]
struct Inner {
map: HashMap<String, Entry>,
/// When the last full TTL sweep ran — see [`PRUNE_INTERVAL`].
last_prune: Instant,
}
impl Default for Inner {
fn default() -> Self {
Self {
map: HashMap::new(),
last_prune: Instant::now(),
}
}
}
/// Tracks per-MAC driver-mode escalation. Cheap to share via `Arc`.
#[derive(Debug, Default)]
pub struct DriverEscalation {
inner: Mutex<Inner>,
}
impl DriverEscalation {
#[must_use]
pub fn new() -> Self {
Self::default()
}
/// Decide the driver mode for a firmware (PXEClient/HTTPClient) boot from
/// `mac`. `primary` is true for the main DHCP DISCOVER (:67) and false for
/// the PXE Boot Server query (:4011); only the primary path drives
/// escalation, and only when it's clearly a *new* boot (outside the
/// same-boot debounce). The :4011 path just echoes the current mode.
pub fn mode_for_firmware_attempt(&self, mac: &str, primary: bool) -> DriverMode {
self.decide_at(mac, primary, Instant::now())
}
/// Record that `mac` completed the iPXE handoff (a DISCOVER carrying the
/// `iPXE` user-class). The mode we last served worked, so stop awaiting
/// confirmation and keep it sticky for next time.
pub fn mark_ipxe_success(&self, mac: &str) {
self.confirm_at(mac, Instant::now());
}
fn decide_at(&self, mac: &str, primary: bool, now: Instant) -> DriverMode {
let mut g = self.inner.lock();
if now.duration_since(g.last_prune) >= PRUNE_INTERVAL {
g.map
.retain(|_, e| now.duration_since(e.last_seen) < ENTRY_TTL);
g.last_prune = now;
}
// Inline staleness check: a MAC whose entry outlived the TTL starts
// fresh even when the amortized sweep above hasn't caught it yet.
if g.map
.get(mac)
.is_some_and(|e| now.duration_since(e.last_seen) >= ENTRY_TTL)
{
g.map.remove(mac);
}
match g.map.get_mut(mac) {
None => {
g.map.insert(
mac.to_owned(),
Entry {
mode: DriverMode::Firmware,
// Only the primary DISCOVER opens a confirmation window.
awaiting_confirm: primary,
last_seen: now,
},
);
if g.map.len() > MAX_ENTRIES {
evict_oldest(&mut g.map);
}
DriverMode::Firmware
}
Some(entry) => {
let recent = now.duration_since(entry.last_seen) < SAME_BOOT_DEBOUNCE;
if primary && !recent {
// A genuinely new boot. If the previous attempt was never
// confirmed, the firmware-net build failed → escalate to
// the all-drivers build. Builtin is the most capable build
// we have, so it's the single escalation target (and a MAC
// already on Builtin simply stays there).
if entry.awaiting_confirm {
entry.mode = DriverMode::Builtin;
}
entry.awaiting_confirm = true;
}
entry.last_seen = now;
entry.mode
}
}
}
fn confirm_at(&self, mac: &str, now: Instant) {
let mut g = self.inner.lock();
if let Some(e) = g.map.get_mut(mac) {
e.awaiting_confirm = false;
e.last_seen = now;
}
}
}
fn evict_oldest(map: &mut HashMap<String, Entry>) {
if let Some(oldest) = map
.iter()
.min_by_key(|(_, e)| e.last_seen)
.map(|(k, _)| k.clone())
{
map.remove(&oldest);
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn firmware_first_then_escalates_on_unconfirmed_retry() {
let e = DriverEscalation::new();
let t0 = Instant::now();
// Boot 1, primary DISCOVER: firmware.
assert_eq!(e.decide_at("aa", true, t0), DriverMode::Firmware);
// Same boot's :4011 query (+1s, within debounce): still firmware, no escalation.
assert_eq!(
e.decide_at("aa", false, t0 + Duration::from_secs(1)),
DriverMode::Firmware
);
// Firmware net failed → no iPXE handoff → machine re-PXE-boots much
// later: escalate to builtin drivers.
assert_eq!(
e.decide_at("aa", true, t0 + Duration::from_mins(1)),
DriverMode::Builtin
);
}
#[test]
fn builtin_is_sticky_after_success() {
let e = DriverEscalation::new();
let t0 = Instant::now();
assert_eq!(e.decide_at("bb", true, t0), DriverMode::Firmware);
assert_eq!(
e.decide_at("bb", true, t0 + Duration::from_mins(1)),
DriverMode::Builtin
);
// Builtin worked this time — confirm the handoff.
e.confirm_at("bb", t0 + Duration::from_secs(61));
// Next cold boot goes straight to builtin (no wasted firmware attempt).
assert_eq!(
e.decide_at("bb", true, t0 + Duration::from_mins(2)),
DriverMode::Builtin
);
}
#[test]
fn confirmed_firmware_never_escalates() {
let e = DriverEscalation::new();
let t0 = Instant::now();
assert_eq!(e.decide_at("cc", true, t0), DriverMode::Firmware);
// snponly worked: handoff confirmed.
e.confirm_at("cc", t0 + Duration::from_secs(2));
// A later boot stays on firmware — no spurious escalation.
assert_eq!(
e.decide_at("cc", true, t0 + Duration::from_mins(5)),
DriverMode::Firmware
);
}
#[test]
fn stale_entry_is_forgotten_and_resets_to_firmware() {
let e = DriverEscalation::new();
let t0 = Instant::now();
assert_eq!(e.decide_at("dd", true, t0), DriverMode::Firmware);
assert_eq!(
e.decide_at("dd", true, t0 + Duration::from_mins(1)),
DriverMode::Builtin
);
// After the TTL with no activity the entry is pruned → fresh firmware.
let later = t0 + Duration::from_mins(1) + ENTRY_TTL + Duration::from_secs(1);
assert_eq!(e.decide_at("dd", true, later), DriverMode::Firmware);
}
}
+2
View File
@@ -17,7 +17,9 @@
//! clients silently drop them.
#![forbid(unsafe_code)]
pub mod escalation;
pub mod reply;
pub mod server;
pub use escalation::DriverEscalation;
pub use server::DhcpProxyServer;
+14 -5
View File
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
//! pass, or the HTTP URL of the boot script once iPXE has chained.
use dhcproto::v4::{DhcpOption, Message, MessageType, Opcode, OptionCode};
use openpxe_core::{ClientArch, FirmwareClass};
use openpxe_core::{ClientArch, DriverMode, FirmwareClass};
use std::net::Ipv4Addr;
/// Where the reply directs the client next.
@@ -31,6 +31,11 @@ pub struct ReplyContext<'a> {
pub our_ip: Ipv4Addr,
pub arch: ClientArch,
pub class: FirmwareClass,
/// Which iPXE network backend to advertise for this client. The DHCP
/// proxy fills this from the automatic per-MAC escalation state: normally
/// [`DriverMode::Firmware`], escalated to [`DriverMode::Builtin`] for a
/// MAC whose firmware-net boot failed to chainload (v0.6.1).
pub driver_mode: DriverMode,
/// Public base URL (scheme://host[:port]) used in HTTP directives.
pub public_base_url: &'a str,
}
@@ -52,9 +57,13 @@ pub fn decide(ctx: &ReplyContext<'_>) -> BootDirective {
},
FirmwareClass::HttpClient => {
// UEFI HTTP boot: client wants an http:// URL in option 67
// pointing at an EFI executable. We serve ipxe.efi over HTTP;
// it'll then do the same script-fetch the iPXE path does.
let name = ctx.arch.ipxe_bootfile().unwrap_or("snponly.efi");
// pointing at an EFI executable. We serve the iPXE EFI build for
// the negotiated driver mode over HTTP; it'll then do the same
// script-fetch the iPXE path does.
let name = ctx
.arch
.ipxe_bootfile_mode(ctx.driver_mode)
.unwrap_or("snponly.efi");
BootDirective::HttpScript {
url: format!(
"{}/ipxe/{}",
@@ -63,7 +72,7 @@ pub fn decide(ctx: &ReplyContext<'_>) -> BootDirective {
),
}
}
FirmwareClass::PxeClient => match ctx.arch.ipxe_bootfile() {
FirmwareClass::PxeClient => match ctx.arch.ipxe_bootfile_mode(ctx.driver_mode) {
Some(name) => BootDirective::TftpIpxe {
filename: name.to_string(),
},
+36 -7
View File
@@ -1,10 +1,11 @@
//! UDP listener loop for the DHCP proxy. Accepts on :67 (and :4011 on a
//! second socket) and dispatches each datagram through the pure reply logic.
use crate::escalation::DriverEscalation;
use crate::reply::{build_reply, decide, BootDirective, ReplyContext};
use dhcproto::v4::{DhcpOption, Message, OptionCode};
use dhcproto::{Decodable, Decoder, Encodable, Encoder};
use openpxe_core::{ClientArch, ClientEvent, ClientRegistry, FirmwareClass};
use openpxe_core::{ClientArch, ClientEvent, ClientRegistry, DriverMode, FirmwareClass};
use socket2::{Domain, Protocol, Socket, Type};
use std::net::{IpAddr, Ipv4Addr, SocketAddr, SocketAddrV4};
use std::sync::Arc;
@@ -18,6 +19,9 @@ pub struct DhcpProxyServer {
public_base_url: String,
clients: Arc<ClientRegistry>,
metrics: openpxe_core::Metrics,
/// Automatic per-MAC NIC driver-mode escalation (v0.6.1). Shared across
/// the :67 and :4011 listener tasks via the server `Arc`.
escalation: DriverEscalation,
}
impl DhcpProxyServer {
@@ -38,6 +42,7 @@ impl DhcpProxyServer {
public_base_url,
clients,
metrics,
escalation: DriverEscalation::new(),
}
}
@@ -126,11 +131,30 @@ impl DhcpProxyServer {
},
);
// Automatic NIC driver-mode selection (v0.6.1). The default is
// firmware-net (snponly/undionly). A successful iPXE handoff confirms
// the current mode works for this MAC; a fresh firmware boot whose
// predecessor never handed off escalates the MAC to iPXE's built-in
// NIC drivers. No operator toggle — the firmware path is unchanged so
// hardware that already boots never regresses.
let driver_mode = match class {
FirmwareClass::IpxeUserClass => {
self.escalation.mark_ipxe_success(&mac);
DriverMode::Firmware // unused: this path serves the HTTP script
}
FirmwareClass::PxeClient | FirmwareClass::HttpClient => self
.escalation
.mode_for_firmware_attempt(&mac, label == "67"),
// Unreachable: FirmwareClass::Other returned above.
FirmwareClass::Other => DriverMode::Firmware,
};
let ctx = ReplyContext {
request: &request,
our_ip: self.our_ip,
arch,
class,
driver_mode,
public_base_url: &self.public_base_url,
};
let directive = decide(&ctx);
@@ -154,7 +178,7 @@ impl DhcpProxyServer {
sock.send_to(&out, dest).await?;
tracing::info!(
target: "openpxe::dhcp",
mac=%mac, arch=arch.as_str(), class=?class, dest=%dest, directive=?directive,
mac=%mac, arch=arch.as_str(), class=?class, driver=?driver_mode, dest=%dest, directive=?directive,
"PXE reply sent"
);
Ok(())
@@ -213,11 +237,16 @@ fn bind_udp(bind: IpAddr, port: u16, broadcast: bool) -> anyhow::Result<UdpSocke
}
fn format_mac(chaddr: &[u8]) -> String {
let take = chaddr.iter().take(6).copied().collect::<Vec<_>>();
take.iter()
.map(|b| format!("{b:02x}"))
.collect::<Vec<_>>()
.join(":")
use std::fmt::Write;
// One allocation — this runs for every PXE datagram we answer.
let mut s = String::with_capacity(17);
for (i, b) in chaddr.iter().take(6).enumerate() {
if i > 0 {
s.push(':');
}
let _ = write!(s, "{b:02x}");
}
s
}
/// Walk raw DHCP options looking for option 93 (Client System Architecture)
+6 -2
View File
@@ -33,8 +33,6 @@ thiserror.workspace = true
anyhow.workspace = true
bytes.workspace = true
futures.workspace = true
mime.workspace = true
mime_guess.workspace = true
uuid.workspace = true
# v0.4.5 Forms auth: lock-free session store and cookie helpers.
parking_lot.workspace = true
@@ -61,3 +59,9 @@ image = { version = "0.25", default-features = false, features = ["png"] }
# replay, and IdP-initiated-gating flows exercise real signatures.
rcgen = "0.13"
bergshamra = { workspace = true }
# v0.5.4: snapshot the generated iPXE menu so any unintended drift (a
# dropped line, reordered item) is caught and reviewed, not silently shipped.
insta = "1.40"
# v0.5.4: stand up a mock HTTP server to exercise the SAML metadata-URL
# fetch path (previously untested because it did a real network GET).
wiremock = "0.6"
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
+43 -10
View File
@@ -154,10 +154,15 @@ pub fn session_cookie(session: &str) -> String {
fn parse_cookie(headers: &axum::http::HeaderMap) -> Option<String> {
// `Cookie: a=b; c=d` parsing — small enough not to drag in a crate.
// Two-step strip (name, then '=') keeps this allocation-free per
// candidate and can't match a longer cookie name sharing the prefix.
let raw = headers.get(header::COOKIE)?.to_str().ok()?;
for part in raw.split(';') {
let part = part.trim();
if let Some(v) = part.strip_prefix(&format!("{SESSION_COOKIE}=")) {
if let Some(v) = part
.strip_prefix(SESSION_COOKIE)
.and_then(|rest| rest.strip_prefix('='))
{
return Some(v.to_string());
}
}
@@ -246,7 +251,14 @@ pub async fn api_setup(State(state): State<AppState>, Json(body): Json<SetupBody
)
.into_response();
}
match state.admin.bootstrap(&body.username, &body.password) {
// bcrypt hashing is ~100-200 ms of pure CPU (and `bootstrap` also
// persists to disk synchronously) — keep it off the async workers.
let admin = state.admin.clone();
let result =
tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || admin.bootstrap(&body.username, &body.password))
.await
.unwrap_or_else(|e| Err(openpxe_core::Error::Other(e.into())));
match result {
Ok(pub_) => {
let session = state.sessions.create(&pub_.username);
login_response(StatusCode::CREATED, &pub_, &session)
@@ -271,8 +283,13 @@ pub struct LoginBody {
pub async fn api_login(State(state): State<AppState>, Json(body): Json<LoginBody>) -> Response {
// Brief, deliberately vague — "invalid credentials" rather than
// "no such user" / "wrong password". Same anti-enumeration posture
// as Sonarr/Radarr.
let pub_ = match state.admin.verify(&body.username, &body.password) {
// as Sonarr/Radarr. The bcrypt verify is ~100-200 ms of pure CPU on
// an unauthenticated endpoint, so it runs on the blocking pool.
let admin = state.admin.clone();
let verdict = tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || admin.verify(&body.username, &body.password))
.await
.unwrap_or_else(|e| Err(openpxe_core::Error::Other(e.into())));
let pub_ = match verdict {
Ok(Some(u)) => u,
Ok(None) => {
return (
@@ -317,8 +334,14 @@ pub async fn api_me(State(state): State<AppState>, headers: axum::http::HeaderMa
// screens can render the FleetDM-style full-width custom logo (and
// cache-bust it) without an extra round trip. `/api/me` is public,
// and the logo asset is public, so this leaks nothing sensitive.
let has_custom_logo = state.branding.has_logo();
let has_custom_logo = state.branding.has_any_web_logo();
let logo_rev = state.branding.logo_rev();
// v0.5.9: ship the non-sensitive SSO descriptor with every /api/me so
// the pre-auth login screen can render the "Sign in with …" button
// reliably. Previously the button keyed off the auth-gated /api/sso,
// which 401s when logged out — the button only survived on a stale
// in-memory config and vanished on any fresh login-page load.
let sso = state.sso.login_info();
if !state.admin.is_configured() {
return (
StatusCode::OK,
@@ -327,6 +350,7 @@ pub async fn api_me(State(state): State<AppState>, headers: axum::http::HeaderMa
"authenticated": false,
"has_custom_logo": has_custom_logo,
"logo_rev": logo_rev,
"sso": sso,
})),
)
.into_response();
@@ -343,6 +367,7 @@ pub async fn api_me(State(state): State<AppState>, headers: axum::http::HeaderMa
"session_user": u,
"has_custom_logo": has_custom_logo,
"logo_rev": logo_rev,
"sso": sso,
})),
)
.into_response(),
@@ -353,6 +378,7 @@ pub async fn api_me(State(state): State<AppState>, headers: axum::http::HeaderMa
"authenticated": false,
"has_custom_logo": has_custom_logo,
"logo_rev": logo_rev,
"sso": sso,
})),
)
.into_response(),
@@ -385,11 +411,18 @@ pub async fn api_update_credentials(
)
.into_response();
}
let result = state.admin.update_credentials(
&body.current_password,
body.new_username.as_deref(),
body.new_password.as_deref(),
);
// Two bcrypt operations (verify current + hash new) plus a sync disk
// persist — run the lot on the blocking pool.
let admin = state.admin.clone();
let result = tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || {
admin.update_credentials(
&body.current_password,
body.new_username.as_deref(),
body.new_password.as_deref(),
)
})
.await
.unwrap_or_else(|e| Err(openpxe_core::Error::Other(e.into())));
match result {
Ok(pub_) => {
state.sessions.revoke_all();
+92
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
//! Uniform HTTP error mapping for the API layer (v0.5.4).
//!
//! Before this, ~40 handlers in `app.rs` hand-wrote
//! `match … { Err(e) => (StatusCode::…, format!("{e}")).into_response() }`,
//! and the `openpxe_core::Error` → status mapping drifted between them
//! (e.g. `Invalid` → 400 in most places, 404 in one). [`AppError`] wraps
//! `openpxe_core::Error` so a handler can return `Result<T, AppError>` and
//! `?` its way out, getting one consistent status + body. The body stays
//! plain-text (matching the previous `(StatusCode, String)` responses) so
//! existing clients and tests see no shape change; 5xx detail is logged
//! and returned verbatim exactly as before.
//!
//! Handlers with *intentional* domain-specific statuses (e.g. a duplicate
//! share → 409, a still-open chunked upload → 409) keep their explicit
//! returns — `AppError` is for the common case, not a straitjacket.
use axum::http::StatusCode;
use axum::response::{IntoResponse, Response};
use openpxe_core::Error as CoreError;
/// Newtype over [`openpxe_core::Error`] with a uniform [`IntoResponse`].
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct AppError(pub CoreError);
impl From<CoreError> for AppError {
fn from(e: CoreError) -> Self {
AppError(e)
}
}
impl From<std::io::Error> for AppError {
fn from(e: std::io::Error) -> Self {
AppError(CoreError::Io(e))
}
}
impl AppError {
/// The HTTP status this error maps to. Public so handlers (and tests)
/// can reason about the mapping in one place.
#[must_use]
pub fn status(&self) -> StatusCode {
match self.0 {
CoreError::NotFound(_) => StatusCode::NOT_FOUND,
CoreError::Invalid(_) => StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST,
CoreError::Config(_) | CoreError::Io(_) | CoreError::Other(_) => {
StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR
}
}
}
}
impl IntoResponse for AppError {
fn into_response(self) -> Response {
let status = self.status();
// Match the prior hand-written responses: the 4xx arms returned the
// bare inner message (not the `Display` prefix), so a UI showing
// `await r.text()` reads "metadata too long", not "invalid input:
// metadata too long". 5xx keeps the full `Display` string.
let body = match &self.0 {
CoreError::Invalid(m) | CoreError::NotFound(m) => m.clone(),
other => other.to_string(),
};
if status.is_server_error() {
// Log the full detail server-side; the body still carries it
// (unchanged from the prior `format!("{e}")` behaviour), but the
// log line is what an operator greps for.
tracing::error!(target: "openpxe::http", error = %self.0, "request failed");
}
(status, body).into_response()
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn status_mapping_is_consistent() {
assert_eq!(
AppError(CoreError::NotFound("x".into())).status(),
StatusCode::NOT_FOUND
);
assert_eq!(
AppError(CoreError::Invalid("x".into())).status(),
StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST
);
assert_eq!(
AppError(CoreError::Config("x".into())).status(),
StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR
);
}
}
+57 -13
View File
@@ -61,16 +61,24 @@ pub fn render_menu(isos: &[IsoMeta], settings: &Settings, base_url: &str) -> Str
// returns a full-screen 1024×768 PNG now — the operator's logo on a
// dark field, or a default OpenPXE mark when none is uploaded. The
// `--top 290` reserves the top band (where the logo paints) so the
// menu text lands below it. On an iPXE build *with* `IMAGE_PNG` +
// `CONSOLE_FRAMEBUFFER` (our x86_64 UEFI binaries, built from source
// — see deploy/docker/Dockerfile) this paints the background and
// overlays the menu. On a build *without* PNG support (the fetched
// BIOS/i386/arm64 binaries) the whole `console --picture …` command
// fails and the `|| console` resets to a clean full-screen text
// menu. Either way there's no ASCII placeholder anymore.
// menu text lands below it.
//
// v0.5.7: gate the whole command behind `iseq ${platform} efi`.
// `console --picture` needs IMAGE_PNG + CONSOLE_FRAMEBUFFER, which
// only our from-source UEFI binaries carry (x86_64/arm64 UEFI — see
// deploy/docker/Dockerfile). The fetched BIOS `undionly.kpxe` has
// neither, and on legacy BIOS the `--picture` attempt misbehaves
// *before* the trailing `|| console` fallback can recover (it tries
// to set a framebuffer mode the BIOS console can't honour). Guarding
// on platform means BIOS clients never issue the command at all —
// they drop straight to the plain text menu — while UEFI clients
// still get the graphical background. A PNG-less UEFI build (e.g. the
// upstream i386-efi baseline) still falls back gracefully through the
// same `|| console`. No operator toggle needed; mixed BIOS+UEFI
// fleets each get the right treatment automatically.
let _ = writeln!(
s,
"console --picture {base}/branding/pxe-logo --top 290 || console"
"iseq ${{platform}} efi && console --picture {base}/branding/pxe-logo --top 290 || console"
);
// Map iPXE's ${{buildarch}} + ${{platform}} into the human form the
// user asked for (e.g. "x86 BIOS", "x86_64 UEFI", "arm64 UEFI").
@@ -101,12 +109,13 @@ pub fn render_menu(isos: &[IsoMeta], settings: &Settings, base_url: &str) -> Str
} else {
let _ = writeln!(s, "item --gap -- (no Linux ISOs uploaded)");
}
if settings.windows_enabled && has_family(isos, is_windows_family) {
// v0.5.8: Windows just works — no Settings toggle. Show the Windows
// installers submenu whenever a Windows ISO is present; entries boot
// via HTTP sanboot of the raw ISO, so no SMB/extraction is required.
if has_family(isos, is_windows_family) {
let _ = writeln!(s, "item windows Windows Installers >");
} else if settings.windows_enabled {
let _ = writeln!(s, "item --gap -- (no Windows ISOs uploaded)");
} else {
let _ = writeln!(s, "item --gap -- (Windows support disabled in Settings)");
let _ = writeln!(s, "item --gap -- (no Windows ISOs uploaded)");
}
let _ = writeln!(
s,
@@ -460,8 +469,21 @@ pub fn render_queue_entry(base_url: &str) -> String {
}
/// Per-entry boot script (same as Phase 1, with extra_kernel_args appended).
///
/// `unattended_args` (v0.5.2) carries the per-host unattended-install
/// kernel arguments (`inst.ks=…`, `auto=true … url=…`, or
/// `autoinstall ds=nocloud-net;s=…`) when the requesting MAC has a
/// deployment profile with an answer file selected. It's appended to the
/// Linux kernel command line after the operator's global extra args, and
/// ignored for Windows (wimboot) / sanboot entries which don't take a
/// kernel cmdline.
#[must_use]
pub fn render_entry(entry: &BootEntry, settings: &Settings, base_url: &str) -> String {
pub fn render_entry(
entry: &BootEntry,
settings: &Settings,
base_url: &str,
unattended_args: Option<&str>,
) -> String {
let mut s = String::new();
let base = base_url.trim_end_matches('/');
let _ = writeln!(s, "#!ipxe");
@@ -477,6 +499,12 @@ pub fn render_entry(entry: &BootEntry, settings: &Settings, base_url: &str) -> S
cmdline.push(' ');
cmdline.push_str(settings.extra_kernel_args.trim());
}
if let Some(extra) = unattended_args {
if !extra.trim().is_empty() {
cmdline.push(' ');
cmdline.push_str(extra.trim());
}
}
let _ = writeln!(s, "kernel {base}/{kernel_url} {cmdline}");
for u in initrd_urls {
let _ = writeln!(s, "initrd {base}/{u}");
@@ -674,6 +702,22 @@ mod password_tests {
assert!(s.contains("arm64 UEFI"), "{s}");
}
// v0.5.4: a full snapshot of the rendered top menu. The fragment
// `assert!`s above check specific invariants; this catches *any* other
// drift (a reordered item, a dropped line, changed spacing) so it's
// reviewed deliberately. The OpenPXE version is filtered out so the
// snapshot doesn't churn on every release bump.
#[test]
fn render_menu_snapshot() {
// Normalize the compile-time version so the snapshot doesn't churn
// on every release bump (no insta `filters` feature needed).
let rendered = render_menu(&[], &Settings::default(), "http://10.0.0.5").replace(
concat!("OpenPXE v", env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION")),
"OpenPXE vX.Y.Z",
);
insta::assert_snapshot!(rendered);
}
#[test]
fn generated_scripts_do_not_emit_bare_or_trailing_fallbacks() {
let settings = Settings::default();
+1
View File
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
pub mod app;
pub mod auth;
pub mod error;
pub mod ipxe_script;
pub mod iso_fs;
pub mod log_stream;
+5 -1
View File
@@ -105,7 +105,11 @@ async fn send_email(cfg: &NotifyConfig, subject: &str, body: &str) -> Result<(),
.trim()
.parse()
.map_err(|e| format!("invalid To address '{}': {e}", cfg.smtp_to))?)
.subject(if subject.is_empty() { "OpenPXE" } else { subject })
.subject(if subject.is_empty() {
"OpenPXE"
} else {
subject
})
.body(body.to_string())
.map_err(|e| format!("could not build email: {e}"))?;
+32
View File
@@ -336,3 +336,35 @@ fn redirect_with_session(location: &str, session: &str) -> Response {
IntoResponse::into_response,
)
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use wiremock::matchers::method;
use wiremock::{Mock, MockServer, ResponseTemplate};
// v0.5.4: exercise the SAML metadata-URL fetch against a mock server —
// previously this path did a real network GET and had no coverage.
#[tokio::test]
async fn fetch_metadata_returns_body_on_200() {
let server = MockServer::start().await;
let xml = "<EntityDescriptor>idp</EntityDescriptor>";
Mock::given(method("GET"))
.respond_with(ResponseTemplate::new(200).set_body_string(xml))
.mount(&server)
.await;
let got = fetch_metadata(&server.uri()).await.expect("fetch ok");
assert_eq!(got, xml);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn fetch_metadata_errors_on_non_2xx() {
let server = MockServer::start().await;
Mock::given(method("GET"))
.respond_with(ResponseTemplate::new(503))
.mount(&server)
.await;
let err = fetch_metadata(&server.uri()).await.unwrap_err();
assert!(matches!(err, SamlError::Metadata(_)), "got {err:?}");
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
---
source: crates/http-api/src/ipxe_script.rs
expression: rendered
---
#!ipxe
# OpenPXE top-level menu - auto-generated, do not edit
set base-url http://10.0.0.5
set esc:hex 1b
set cls ${esc:string}[2J
iseq ${platform} efi && console --picture http://10.0.0.5/branding/pxe-logo --top 290 || console
set arch-label ${buildarch} ${platform}
iseq ${buildarch} i386 && iseq ${platform} pcbios && set arch-label x86 BIOS || iseq ${buildarch} x86_64 && iseq ${platform} efi && set arch-label x86_64 UEFI || iseq ${buildarch} arm64 && iseq ${platform} efi && set arch-label arm64 UEFI || true
:menu
menu OpenPXE - network boot menu
item --gap
item --gap -- ------------------------- Default -------------------------
item local Boot from Local HDD
item --gap -- ----------------------- Installers -----------------------
item --gap -- (no Linux ISOs uploaded)
item --gap -- (no Windows ISOs uploaded)
item --gap -- -------------------------- Tools --------------------------
item tools Tools >
item --gap -- ---------------------- Queued Deployment ---------------------
item queue Queued Deployment (join queue)
item --gap
item --key x exit Exit iPXE
item --gap
item --gap -- OpenPXE vX.Y.Z - ${arch-label}
choose --default queue --timeout 600000 target || goto menu
iseq ${target} local && chain http://10.0.0.5/boot/_local.ipxe || goto menu
iseq ${target} linux && chain http://10.0.0.5/boot/_linux_menu.ipxe || goto menu
iseq ${target} windows && chain http://10.0.0.5/boot/_windows_menu.ipxe || goto menu
iseq ${target} tools && chain http://10.0.0.5/boot/_tools_menu.ipxe || goto menu
iseq ${target} queue && chain http://10.0.0.5/boot/_queue.ipxe || goto menu
iseq ${target} exit && exit || goto menu
goto menu
+25 -1
View File
@@ -5,10 +5,16 @@ use openpxe_core::{
AdminStore, BootLog, BrandingStore, ClientRegistry, DeploymentQueue, HostBindings, LogBus,
Metrics, NotifyStore, SettingsStore, SsoStore,
};
use openpxe_iso_store::{IsoStore, NfsShareManager, SmbManager, SmbShareManager};
use openpxe_iso_store::{
IsoStore, NfsShareManager, SftpShareManager, SmbManager, SmbShareManager, UnattendedStore,
};
use std::sync::Arc;
use time::OffsetDateTime;
/// Cached composited PXE boot-menu background: `(logo_rev, encoded PNG)`.
/// See `AppState::pxe_bg_cache`.
pub type PxeBgCache = Arc<parking_lot::Mutex<Option<(u64, bytes::Bytes)>>>;
#[derive(Clone)]
pub struct AppState {
pub iso_store: IsoStore,
@@ -27,6 +33,12 @@ pub struct AppState {
/// operator hasn't uploaded anything, the WebUI serves the bundled
/// rainbow-horizon mark.
pub branding: BrandingStore,
/// v0.6.2: cache of the composited PXE boot-menu background PNG,
/// keyed on the branding logo revision. Composing costs ~50-200 ms
/// of image decode/encode and **every** booting client fetches it
/// for `console --picture` — caching makes that one compose per
/// logo change instead of one per boot.
pub pxe_bg_cache: PxeBgCache,
/// Forms-auth admin record + first-run bootstrap state. When
/// `admin.is_configured() == false`, the auth middleware passes
/// every request through and `/api/me` reports `setup_required`.
@@ -67,6 +79,18 @@ pub struct AppState {
/// In-process (no subprocess); supports HTTP Range requests on
/// NFS-sourced ISOs because NFSv3 READ3 takes an explicit offset.
pub nfs_shares: NfsShareManager,
/// v0.5.5: SFTP-over-SSH share manager — pure-Rust userspace
/// consumer via `russh` + `russh-sftp` (ring backend, no OpenSSL).
/// Ships alongside SMB/NFS as the third remote-library protocol.
/// In-process (no subprocess, no kernel mount); supports HTTP Range
/// requests because SFTP opens a seekable file handle. Authenticates
/// the server's SSH host key on a trust-on-first-use basis.
pub sftp_shares: SftpShareManager,
/// v0.5.2: uploaded unattended-install answer files (Kickstart /
/// Preseed / Autoinstall / Windows answer files). Served on demand to
/// booting clients with per-host hostname/IP/MAC templating; lives in
/// its own directory, never the ISO listing or PXE menu.
pub unattended: UnattendedStore,
/// Browser chunked upload state. Multipart uploads still go straight
/// through `IsoStore`, but the UI uses sessions so large ISO transfers
/// can show deterministic progress and leave visible partial files.
+123 -12
View File
@@ -96,6 +96,8 @@ async fn dispatch(state: &AppState, argv: &[String]) -> Result<String, String> {
"share" | "smb-share" => smb_share_command(state, tail).await,
"smb" => smb_command(state, tail).await,
"nfs" => nfs_share_command(state, tail).await,
// v0.5.5: SFTP-over-SSH remote shares (in-process russh client).
"sftp" => sftp_share_command(state, tail).await,
"log" => log_command(state, tail),
"whoami" => Ok("operator".to_string()),
"echo" => Ok(tail.join(" ")),
@@ -118,17 +120,21 @@ fn status_text(s: &AppState) -> String {
// v0.4.67: NFSv3 sources too.
let nfs_shares = s.nfs_shares.list();
let nfs_reachable = nfs_shares.iter().filter(|m| m.reachable).count();
// v0.5.5: SFTP-over-SSH sources too.
let sftp_shares = s.sftp_shares.list();
let sftp_reachable = sftp_shares.iter().filter(|m| m.reachable).count();
format!(
"OpenPXE {ver}\n\
base url: {base}\n\
interface: {nic}\n\
uptime: {up}\n\
isos: {n_isos} (local: {n_local}, smb: {n_smb}, nfs: {n_nfs})\n\
isos: {n_isos} (local: {n_local}, smb: {n_smb}, nfs: {n_nfs}, sftp: {n_sftp})\n\
clients: {n_clients}\n\
queue: {n_entries}\n\
smb server: {smb}\n\
smb shares: {n_smb_total} configured ({n_smb_active} reachable)\n\
nfs shares: {n_nfs_total} configured ({n_nfs_active} reachable)\n",
nfs shares: {n_nfs_total} configured ({n_nfs_active} reachable)\n\
sftp shares: {n_sftp_total} configured ({n_sftp_active} reachable)\n",
ver = env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION"),
base = s.public_base_url,
nic = if s.nic_name.is_empty() {
@@ -150,6 +156,10 @@ fn status_text(s: &AppState) -> String {
.iter()
.filter(|i| matches!(i.source, openpxe_iso_store::IsoSource::Nfs { .. }))
.count(),
n_sftp = isos
.iter()
.filter(|i| matches!(i.source, openpxe_iso_store::IsoSource::Sftp { .. }))
.count(),
n_clients = clients.len(),
n_entries = queue_entries.len(),
smb = smb.map_or_else(|| "(disabled)".into(), |s| format!("{s:?}")),
@@ -157,6 +167,8 @@ fn status_text(s: &AppState) -> String {
n_smb_active = smb_reachable,
n_nfs_total = nfs_shares.len(),
n_nfs_active = nfs_reachable,
n_sftp_total = sftp_shares.len(),
n_sftp_active = sftp_reachable,
)
}
@@ -177,6 +189,8 @@ fn isos_text(s: &AppState) -> String {
openpxe_iso_store::IsoSource::Smb { share_id, .. } => format!("smb:{share_id}"),
// v0.4.67: NFSv3 via in-process nfs3_client.
openpxe_iso_store::IsoSource::Nfs { share_id, .. } => format!("nfs:{share_id}"),
// v0.5.5: SFTP-over-SSH via in-process russh.
openpxe_iso_store::IsoSource::Sftp { share_id, .. } => format!("sftp:{share_id}"),
};
let _ = writeln!(
out,
@@ -321,11 +335,9 @@ async fn smb_share_command(s: &AppState, args: &[String]) -> Result<String, Stri
}
Some("add") => {
// share add //server/share [guest|user:password]
let target = args
.get(1)
.ok_or_else(|| {
"usage: share add //server/share [guest|user:password]".to_string()
})?;
let target = args.get(1).ok_or_else(|| {
"usage: share add //server/share [guest|user:password]".to_string()
})?;
// Accept either `//server/share` (UNC-style) or
// `server:share` (shorter to type).
let stripped = target.trim_start_matches('/').trim_start_matches('\\');
@@ -401,11 +413,7 @@ async fn nfs_share_command(s: &AppState, args: &[String]) -> Result<String, Stri
return Ok("(no NFS shares configured)".into());
}
let mut out = String::new();
let _ = writeln!(
out,
"{:<24} {:<7} {:<6} TARGET",
"ID", "STATUS", "ISOS"
);
let _ = writeln!(out, "{:<24} {:<7} {:<6} TARGET", "ID", "STATUS", "ISOS");
for m in shares {
let status = if m.reachable { "ok" } else { "down" };
let _ = writeln!(
@@ -476,6 +484,104 @@ async fn nfs_share_command(s: &AppState, args: &[String]) -> Result<String, Stri
}
}
// ── sftp (v0.5.5) ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
//
// Parallel to nfs_share_command. The terminal `add` only supports
// password auth — pasting a multiline PEM private key through the
// terminal is impractical, so key-based shares are added via the WebUI.
async fn sftp_share_command(s: &AppState, args: &[String]) -> Result<String, String> {
match args.first().map(String::as_str) {
None | Some("list") => {
let shares = s.sftp_shares.list();
if shares.is_empty() {
return Ok("(no SFTP shares configured)".into());
}
let mut out = String::new();
let _ = writeln!(out, "{:<24} {:<7} {:<6} TARGET", "ID", "STATUS", "ISOS");
for m in shares {
let status = if m.reachable { "ok" } else { "down" };
let _ = writeln!(
out,
"{:<24} {:<7} {:<6} {}@{}:{}",
truncate(&m.id, 24),
status,
m.iso_count,
m.username,
m.server,
m.export,
);
if let Some(e) = m.last_error {
let _ = writeln!(out, " error: {e}");
}
if let Some(h) = m.last_hint {
let _ = writeln!(out, " hint: {h}");
}
}
Ok(out)
}
Some("add") => {
// sftp add <user>@<server>:<export> <password> [port]
let target = args.get(1).ok_or_else(|| {
"usage: sftp add <user>@<server>:<export> <password> [port] \
(key auth: use the WebUI)"
.to_string()
})?;
let password = args
.get(2)
.ok_or_else(|| "a password is required (key auth: use the WebUI)".to_string())?;
let (user, rest) = target
.split_once('@')
.ok_or_else(|| "target must be 'user@server:/export'".to_string())?;
let (server, export) = rest
.split_once(':')
.ok_or_else(|| "target must be 'user@server:/export'".to_string())?;
let port = args.get(3).and_then(|s| s.parse::<u16>().ok());
let req = openpxe_iso_store::SftpAddRequest {
server: server.to_string(),
export: export.to_string(),
username: Some(user.to_string()),
port,
password: Some(password.clone()),
private_key: None,
passphrase: None,
};
match s.sftp_shares.add(req).await {
Ok(m) => Ok(format!("added {} ({} isos)", m.id, m.iso_count)),
Err(e) => {
let mut out = format!("add failed: {}", e.error);
if let Some(h) = e.hint {
out.push_str("\nhint: ");
out.push_str(&h);
}
Err(out)
}
}
}
Some("remove") => {
let id = args
.get(1)
.ok_or_else(|| "usage: sftp remove <id>".to_string())?;
match s.sftp_shares.remove(id).await {
Ok(()) => Ok(format!("removed {id}")),
Err(e) => Err(format!("remove failed: {e}")),
}
}
Some("scan") => {
let id = args
.get(1)
.ok_or_else(|| "usage: sftp scan <id>".to_string())?;
match s.sftp_shares.rescan(id).await {
Ok(n) => Ok(format!("re-scanned {id}: {n} isos")),
Err(e) => Err(format!("scan failed: {e}")),
}
}
Some(other) => Err(format!(
"unknown sftp subcommand: {other}\ntry: sftp [list|add|remove|scan]"
)),
}
}
// ── smb ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
#[allow(clippy::unused_async)]
@@ -622,6 +728,11 @@ OpenPXE terminal — available commands:
nfs remove <id> forget an NFS share
nfs scan <id> re-list an NFS share for new ISOs
sftp list list configured SFTP-over-SSH shares
sftp add <user>@<srv>:<export> <pass> [port] add an SFTP share (key auth: WebUI)
sftp remove <id> forget an SFTP share
sftp scan <id> re-list an SFTP share for new ISOs
smb status outbound Samba state (Windows install media)
smb start | stop | reload control the outbound smbd
+12 -8
View File
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
use bytes::Bytes;
use openpxe_core::{Error, Result};
use openpxe_iso_store::{IsoMeta, IsoStore, UploadHandle};
use parking_lot::RwLock;
use serde::Serialize;
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::sync::Arc;
@@ -19,7 +20,11 @@ const DEFAULT_CHUNK_SIZE: u64 = 8 * 1024 * 1024;
#[derive(Clone, Default)]
pub struct UploadSessions {
inner: Arc<Mutex<HashMap<String, Arc<Mutex<UploadSession>>>>>,
// v0.5.4: the registry is a sync `parking_lot::RwLock` — it's only ever
// briefly read/inserted/removed to look up a session, never held across
// an `.await`. The per-session lock below stays a `tokio::sync::Mutex`
// because `write_chunk` / `finish` are awaited while it's held.
inner: Arc<RwLock<HashMap<String, Arc<Mutex<UploadSession>>>>>,
}
struct UploadSession {
@@ -67,8 +72,7 @@ impl UploadSessions {
};
self.inner
.lock()
.await
.write()
.insert(upload_id.clone(), Arc::new(Mutex::new(session)));
Ok(UploadStarted {
@@ -88,7 +92,7 @@ impl UploadSessions {
chunk: Bytes,
complete: bool,
) -> Result<UploadAppend> {
let Some(session_lock) = self.inner.lock().await.get(upload_id).cloned() else {
let Some(session_lock) = self.inner.read().get(upload_id).cloned() else {
return Err(Error::Invalid(format!("no such upload '{upload_id}'")));
};
@@ -119,7 +123,7 @@ impl UploadSessions {
if let Err(e) = handle.write_chunk(&chunk).await {
let handle = session.handle.take();
drop(session);
self.inner.lock().await.remove(upload_id);
self.inner.write().remove(upload_id);
if let Some(handle) = handle {
let _ = handle.abort().await;
}
@@ -156,11 +160,11 @@ impl UploadSessions {
let meta = match handle.finish(store).await {
Ok(meta) => meta,
Err(e) => {
self.inner.lock().await.remove(upload_id);
self.inner.write().remove(upload_id);
return Err(e);
}
};
self.inner.lock().await.remove(upload_id);
self.inner.write().remove(upload_id);
Ok(UploadAppend::Complete {
offset: new_offset,
iso: Box::new(meta),
@@ -168,7 +172,7 @@ impl UploadSessions {
}
pub async fn abort(&self, upload_id: &str) -> Result<()> {
let Some(session_lock) = self.inner.lock().await.remove(upload_id) else {
let Some(session_lock) = self.inner.write().remove(upload_id) else {
return Err(Error::Invalid(format!("no such upload '{upload_id}'")));
};
let mut session = session_lock.lock().await;
+298 -30
View File
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ use axum::body::Body;
use axum::http::{header, Request, StatusCode};
use openpxe_core::{ClientRegistry, DeploymentQueue, HostBindings, LogBus, Metrics, SettingsStore};
use openpxe_http_api::{build_router, AppState};
use openpxe_iso_store::{IsoStore, NfsShareManager, SmbShareManager};
use openpxe_iso_store::{IsoStore, NfsShareManager, SftpShareManager, SmbShareManager};
use tempfile::tempdir;
use tower::ServiceExt;
@@ -96,6 +96,9 @@ async fn build_state() -> (AppState, tempfile::TempDir) {
let settings = SettingsStore::load_or_default(dir.path());
let smb_shares = SmbShareManager::new(dir.path(), iso_store.clone());
let nfs_shares = NfsShareManager::new(dir.path(), iso_store.clone());
let sftp_shares = SftpShareManager::new(dir.path(), iso_store.clone());
let unattended = openpxe_iso_store::UnattendedStore::new(dir.path().join("unattended"));
unattended.ensure_dir().await.unwrap();
let log_bus = LogBus::new(64);
let hosts = HostBindings::load_or_default(dir.path());
let boot_log = openpxe_core::BootLog::load_or_default(dir.path());
@@ -113,6 +116,7 @@ async fn build_state() -> (AppState, tempfile::TempDir) {
hosts,
boot_log,
branding,
pxe_bg_cache: openpxe_http_api::state::PxeBgCache::default(),
admin,
sessions,
sso,
@@ -122,6 +126,8 @@ async fn build_state() -> (AppState, tempfile::TempDir) {
smb: None,
smb_shares,
nfs_shares,
sftp_shares,
unattended,
uploads: openpxe_http_api::uploads::UploadSessions::default(),
log_bus,
started_at: time::OffsetDateTime::now_utc(),
@@ -688,7 +694,7 @@ async fn log_recent_returns_buffered_lines() {
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn windows_iso_renders_clean_wimboot_script_with_no_trust_store_writes() {
async fn windows_iso_renders_clean_sanboot_script_with_no_trust_store_writes() {
// Synthesize an ISO with a Windows volume label + the sources/boot.wim
// sentinel so introspection labels it WindowsPe with has_boot_wim.
let mut buf = vec![0u8; 32 * 2048];
@@ -758,38 +764,35 @@ async fn windows_iso_renders_clean_wimboot_script_with_no_trust_store_writes() {
"introspection should detect sources/boot.wim sentinel"
);
// The boot entry should be a wimboot kind with the canonical 5-file
// chain documented in the LinusTechTips iPXE-Windows guide.
// v0.5.8: Windows boots via iPXE HTTP sanboot of the raw ISO — no SMB,
// no extraction, no in-ISO file serving, no operator toggle. The boot
// entry is a `san_boot_iso` kind pointing at the raw image.
let entry = &meta["boot_entries"][0];
assert_eq!(entry["kind"]["kind"], "wimboot");
let files = entry["kind"]["files"].as_array().unwrap();
let names: Vec<&str> = files.iter().map(|f| f[0].as_str().unwrap()).collect();
assert!(names.contains(&"bootmgr"));
assert!(names.contains(&"bootmgr.efi"));
assert!(names.contains(&"bcd"));
assert!(names.contains(&"boot.sdi"));
assert!(names.contains(&"boot.wim"));
assert_eq!(entry["kind"]["kind"], "san_boot_iso");
let iso_url = entry["kind"]["iso_url"].as_str().unwrap();
assert!(
std::path::Path::new(iso_url)
.extension()
.is_some_and(|e| e.eq_ignore_ascii_case("iso")),
"sanboot should target the raw ISO, got: {iso_url}"
);
// Render the entry script and verify:
// 1. It uses wimboot
// 2. All 5 files are referenced via `initrd --name`
// 3. NO trust-store / driver / testsigning operations slip in
// 1. It uses `sanboot` against the raw ISO over HTTP
// 2. NO trust-store / driver / testsigning operations slip in
let entry_id = entry["id"].as_str().unwrap();
let url = format!("/boot/{entry_id}.ipxe");
let (s, body) = get(&app, &url).await;
assert_eq!(s, StatusCode::OK);
let script = String::from_utf8(body).unwrap();
assert!(script.contains("kernel "), "missing kernel line:\n{script}");
assert!(
script.contains("ipxe/wimboot"),
"missing wimboot loader:\n{script}"
script.contains("sanboot"),
"missing sanboot line:\n{script}"
);
assert!(
script.contains(&format!("/{iso_url}")),
"sanboot should reference the raw ISO url:\n{script}"
);
for tag in ["bootmgr", "bootmgr.efi", "bcd", "boot.sdi", "boot.wim"] {
assert!(
script.contains(&format!("initrd --name {tag}")),
"missing `initrd --name {tag}` line:\n{script}"
);
}
// Hard guarantees we never want to see in any client-facing script.
let lower = script.to_lowercase();
for forbidden in [
@@ -1488,7 +1491,8 @@ async fn api_docs_lists_known_endpoints() {
"/api/isos",
"/api/isos/:id/category",
"/api/storage/disk",
"/api/branding/logo",
"/api/branding/logo/:slot",
"/api/unattended",
"/api/boot-log",
"/metrics",
] {
@@ -1509,7 +1513,7 @@ async fn branding_clear_when_no_logo_is_no_content() {
.oneshot(
Request::builder()
.method("DELETE")
.uri("/api/branding/logo")
.uri("/api/branding/logo/dark")
.body(Body::empty())
.unwrap(),
)
@@ -1532,6 +1536,60 @@ async fn status_exposes_custom_logo_flag() {
);
}
/// v0.5.4 guard: the typed `StatusResponse` must keep every key the WebUI
/// (`crates/webui/src/app.js`) reads off `/api/status`. If a refactor drops
/// or renames one, the dashboard silently breaks — this catches it.
#[tokio::test]
async fn status_contract_has_all_ui_keys() {
let (state, _dir) = build_state().await;
let app = build_router(state);
let (s, body) = get(&app, "/api/status").await;
assert_eq!(s, StatusCode::OK);
let v: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body).unwrap();
for key in [
"version",
"public_base_url",
"iso_count",
"client_count",
"queue_count",
"imaging_count",
"waiting_count",
"ipxe_assets",
"settings",
"smb_share_count",
"smb_share_reachable",
"nfs_share_count",
"nfs_share_reachable",
"host_bindings",
"custom_logo",
"branding",
"unattended_count",
"uptime_secs",
"started_at",
"nic_name",
"subnet_mask",
"gateway",
] {
assert!(
v.get(key).is_some(),
"/api/status missing UI key '{key}': {v}"
);
}
// Nested branding presence the Settings tab reads.
for key in ["light", "dark", "client", "rev"] {
assert!(
v["branding"].get(key).is_some(),
"/api/status branding missing '{key}': {v}"
);
}
// started_at must remain an RFC3339 string (the UI does fmtUptime on
// uptime_secs but renders started_at as text), not a serialized struct.
assert!(
v["started_at"].is_string(),
"started_at should serialize as a string: {v}"
);
}
async fn put_json(router: &axum::Router, path: &str, body: &str) -> (StatusCode, Vec<u8>) {
let res = router
.clone()
@@ -1950,6 +2008,7 @@ async fn pxe_background_falls_back_to_default_for_svg_upload() {
state
.branding
.set_logo(
openpxe_core::LogoSlot::Client,
"image/svg+xml",
"svg",
br#"<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" viewBox="0 0 8 8"/>"#,
@@ -1985,7 +2044,10 @@ async fn pxe_logo_composes_to_1024x768_png() {
// the iPXE menu always paints at consistent dimensions.
let (state, _dir) = build_state().await;
let png = tiny_png();
state.branding.set_logo("image/png", "png", &png).unwrap();
state
.branding
.set_logo(openpxe_core::LogoSlot::Client, "image/png", "png", &png)
.unwrap();
let app = build_router(state);
let res = app
.clone()
@@ -2025,7 +2087,10 @@ async fn pxe_logo_endpoint_is_public_after_admin_setup() {
// auth allowlist gates `/api/*` only.
let (state, _dir) = build_state().await;
let png = tiny_png();
state.branding.set_logo("image/png", "png", &png).unwrap();
state
.branding
.set_logo(openpxe_core::LogoSlot::Client, "image/png", "png", &png)
.unwrap();
let app = build_router(state);
// Configure an admin so the middleware kicks in.
let (s, _, _) = post_collect(
@@ -2040,6 +2105,201 @@ async fn pxe_logo_endpoint_is_public_after_admin_setup() {
assert_eq!(s, StatusCode::OK);
}
// ─── v0.5.2: unattended files + deployment profiles ─────────────────────────
async fn post_multipart(
router: &axum::Router,
path: &str,
ct: &str,
body: Vec<u8>,
) -> (StatusCode, Vec<u8>) {
let res = router
.clone()
.oneshot(
Request::builder()
.method("POST")
.uri(path)
.header("content-type", ct)
.body(Body::from(body))
.unwrap(),
)
.await
.unwrap();
let status = res.status();
let body = axum::body::to_bytes(res.into_body(), usize::MAX)
.await
.unwrap()
.to_vec();
(status, body)
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn unattended_upload_list_serve_and_template() {
let (state, _dir) = build_state().await;
let app = build_router(state);
let ks = b"install\nnetwork --hostname={{HOSTNAME}} --ip={{IP}}\n%packages\n@core\n%end\n";
let (ct, body) = multipart_iso_body("rocky.ks", ks);
let (s, b) = post_multipart(&app, "/api/unattended", &ct, body).await;
assert_eq!(s, StatusCode::CREATED, "{}", String::from_utf8_lossy(&b));
let m: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_slice(&b).unwrap();
assert_eq!(m["kind"], "kickstart");
let id = m["id"].as_str().unwrap().to_string();
let (s, b) = get(&app, "/api/unattended").await;
assert_eq!(s, StatusCode::OK);
let v: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_slice(&b).unwrap();
assert_eq!(v["files"].as_array().unwrap().len(), 1);
// Public serve substitutes the query tokens.
let (s, b) = get(
&app,
&format!("/unattended/{id}?hostname=node7&ip=10.0.0.7"),
)
.await;
assert_eq!(s, StatusCode::OK);
let text = String::from_utf8_lossy(&b);
assert!(text.contains("--hostname=node7"), "got: {text}");
assert!(text.contains("--ip=10.0.0.7"), "got: {text}");
assert!(!text.contains("{{"), "tokens left unrendered: {text}");
// Delete.
let res = app
.clone()
.oneshot(
Request::builder()
.method("DELETE")
.uri(format!("/api/unattended/{id}"))
.body(Body::empty())
.unwrap(),
)
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::NO_CONTENT);
let (_, b) = get(&app, "/api/unattended").await;
let v: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_slice(&b).unwrap();
assert_eq!(v["files"].as_array().unwrap().len(), 0);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn unattended_upload_rejects_bad_type() {
let (state, _dir) = build_state().await;
let app = build_router(state);
let (ct, body) = multipart_iso_body("evil.sh", b"#!/bin/sh\n");
let (s, _) = post_multipart(&app, "/api/unattended", &ct, body).await;
assert_eq!(s, StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn host_pin_with_unattended_injects_kickstart_arg() {
let (state, _dir) = build_state().await;
let app = build_router(state.clone());
// Upload a Linux ISO → synthesises the `fake-alpine-linux` LinuxKernel entry.
let (ct, body) = multipart_iso_body("fake-alpine.iso", &fake_alpine_iso());
let (s, _) = post_multipart(&app, "/api/isos", &ct, body).await;
assert_eq!(s, StatusCode::CREATED);
// Upload a kickstart.
let (ct, body) = multipart_iso_body("ks.ks", b"install\n%packages\n@core\n%end\n");
let (s, b) = post_multipart(&app, "/api/unattended", &ct, body).await;
assert_eq!(s, StatusCode::CREATED);
let ks_id = serde_json::from_slice::<serde_json::Value>(&b).unwrap()["id"]
.as_str()
.unwrap()
.to_string();
// Pin a MAC to the Linux entry with the unattended profile.
let mac = "aa:bb:cc:dd:ee:01";
let pin = format!(
r#"{{"mac":"{mac}","target":"fake-alpine-linux","label":"lab","auto_hostname":"node7","auto_ip":"10.0.0.7","unattended_file":"{ks_id}"}}"#
);
let (s, b) = post_json(&app, "/api/hosts", &pin).await;
assert_eq!(s, StatusCode::CREATED, "{}", String::from_utf8_lossy(&b));
// Boot the entry as that MAC; the kernel line should carry inst.ks=.
let (s, b) = get(&app, &format!("/boot/fake-alpine-linux.ipxe?mac={mac}")).await;
assert_eq!(s, StatusCode::OK);
let script = String::from_utf8_lossy(&b);
assert!(
script.contains("inst.ks="),
"no kickstart arg injected:\n{script}"
);
assert!(
script.contains("hostname=node7"),
"hostname not passed:\n{script}"
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn host_pin_rejects_unknown_unattended_file() {
let (state, _dir) = build_state().await;
let app = build_router(state.clone());
let (ct, body) = multipart_iso_body("fake-alpine.iso", &fake_alpine_iso());
let (s, _) = post_multipart(&app, "/api/isos", &ct, body).await;
assert_eq!(s, StatusCode::CREATED);
let pin = r#"{"mac":"aa:bb:cc:dd:ee:02","target":"fake-alpine-linux","unattended_file":"does-not-exist"}"#;
let (s, _) = post_json(&app, "/api/hosts", pin).await;
assert_eq!(s, StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn host_pin_rejects_bad_auto_ip() {
let (state, _dir) = build_state().await;
let app = build_router(state.clone());
let (ct, body) = multipart_iso_body("fake-alpine.iso", &fake_alpine_iso());
let (s, _) = post_multipart(&app, "/api/isos", &ct, body).await;
assert_eq!(s, StatusCode::CREATED);
let pin = r#"{"mac":"aa:bb:cc:dd:ee:03","target":"fake-alpine-linux","auto_ip":"not-an-ip"}"#;
let (s, _) = post_json(&app, "/api/hosts", pin).await;
assert_eq!(s, StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn per_theme_logo_and_favicon_serve() {
let (state, _dir) = build_state().await;
// Light slot only; dark falls back to it, favicon stays bundled.
let png = tiny_png();
state
.branding
.set_logo(openpxe_core::LogoSlot::Light, "image/png", "png", &png)
.unwrap();
let app = build_router(state);
// Light theme → the uploaded PNG.
let (s, b) = get(&app, "/assets/logo.svg?theme=light").await;
assert_eq!(s, StatusCode::OK);
assert!(b.starts_with(b"\x89PNG"), "light slot should serve the PNG");
// Dark theme → falls back to the light PNG (only slot set).
let (s, b) = get(&app, "/assets/logo.svg?theme=dark").await;
assert_eq!(s, StatusCode::OK);
assert!(
b.starts_with(b"\x89PNG"),
"dark should fall back to light PNG"
);
// Favicon is always the bundled SVG, never the custom raster.
let (s, b) = get(&app, "/assets/favicon.svg").await;
assert_eq!(s, StatusCode::OK);
let txt = String::from_utf8_lossy(&b);
assert!(txt.contains("<svg"), "favicon must be the bundled SVG mark");
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn branding_slot_rejects_unknown_and_client_svg() {
let (state, _dir) = build_state().await;
let app = build_router(state);
// Unknown slot name → 400.
let (ct, body) = multipart_iso_body("logo.png", &tiny_png());
let (s, _) = post_multipart(&app, "/api/branding/logo/sideways", &ct, body).await;
assert_eq!(s, StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST);
// SVG into the client (PXE) slot → 400 (raster-only).
let svg = br#"<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"/>"#;
let boundary = "----OpenPxeTestBoundary1234";
let mut b = Vec::new();
b.extend_from_slice(format!("--{boundary}\r\n").as_bytes());
b.extend_from_slice(b"Content-Disposition: form-data; name=\"file\"; filename=\"l.svg\"\r\n");
b.extend_from_slice(b"Content-Type: image/svg+xml\r\n\r\n");
b.extend_from_slice(svg);
b.extend_from_slice(format!("\r\n--{boundary}--\r\n").as_bytes());
let ct = format!("multipart/form-data; boundary={boundary}");
let (s, _) = post_multipart(&app, "/api/branding/logo/client", &ct, b).await;
assert_eq!(s, StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST);
}
// ─── v0.5.1: SAML SSO flow ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
//
// The core crate exhaustively tests signature verification + semantic
@@ -2145,8 +2405,16 @@ fn urlencode(s: &str) -> String {
}
_ => {
out.push('%');
out.push(char::from_digit((b >> 4) as u32, 16).unwrap().to_ascii_uppercase());
out.push(char::from_digit((b & 0xf) as u32, 16).unwrap().to_ascii_uppercase());
out.push(
char::from_digit((b >> 4) as u32, 16)
.unwrap()
.to_ascii_uppercase(),
);
out.push(
char::from_digit((b & 0xf) as u32, 16)
.unwrap()
.to_ascii_uppercase(),
);
}
}
}
+51 -37
View File
@@ -6,43 +6,40 @@
//! missing, that architecture simply won't have PXE support — we log at
//! startup and serve what we have.
//!
//! Filename convention (matches `ClientArch::ipxe_bootfile`):
//! Filename convention (matches `ClientArch::ipxe_bootfile_mode`):
//!
//! DriverMode::Firmware (default — reuse the firmware UNDI/SNP NIC stack):
//! - `undionly.kpxe` — Legacy x86 BIOS
//! - `snponly-i386.efi` — IA32 UEFI
//! - `snponly.efi` — x86_64 UEFI
//! - `snponly-arm32.efi` — ARM32 UEFI
//! - `snponly-arm64.efi` — ARM64 UEFI
//! - `ipxe.efi` (fallback) — UEFI with bundled drivers, if snponly fails on a NIC
//!
//! DriverMode::Builtin (v0.6.1 automatic fallback — iPXE's own NIC drivers,
//! advertised when a firmware-net boot fails to chainload):
//! - `ipxe.pxe` — Legacy x86 BIOS
//! - `ipxe-i386.efi` — IA32 UEFI
//! - `ipxe.efi` — x86_64 UEFI (built from source with PNG)
//! - `ipxe-arm64.efi` — ARM64 UEFI
//!
//! - `wimboot` — Windows boot shim (fetched separately for WIM chains)
#![forbid(unsafe_code)]
use openpxe_core::ClientArch;
use openpxe_core::{ClientArch, DriverMode};
use rust_embed::Embed;
#[derive(Embed)]
#[folder = "../../assets/ipxe/"]
#[include = "*.kpxe"]
#[include = "*.efi"]
#[include = "*.pxe"]
#[include = "wimboot"]
pub struct IpxeAssets;
/// Return the embedded iPXE binary for `arch`, or `None` if we didn't bundle
/// one for that architecture.
#[must_use]
pub fn bootfile_bytes(arch: ClientArch) -> Option<Vec<u8>> {
let name = arch.ipxe_bootfile()?;
IpxeAssets::get(name).map(|f| f.data.into_owned())
}
/// Return a named asset directly (e.g. `wimboot`, or a fallback `ipxe.efi`).
#[must_use]
pub fn asset_bytes(name: &str) -> Option<Vec<u8>> {
IpxeAssets::get(name).map(|f| f.data.into_owned())
}
/// Same as [`asset_bytes`] but returns the embedded slice directly,
/// avoiding the heap copy when the caller only needs to read the
/// payload. Falls back to None for unknown names.
/// Return a named embedded asset (e.g. `snponly.efi`, `wimboot`) as a
/// `Cow` over the embedded bytes. In release builds the data is borrowed
/// straight from the binary's rodata — **zero copy** — which matters
/// because the TFTP and HTTP serving paths hit this for every boot
/// (`ipxe.efi` is ~1 MiB). Debug builds read from disk and return Owned.
#[must_use]
pub fn asset_slice(name: &str) -> Option<std::borrow::Cow<'static, [u8]>> {
IpxeAssets::get(name).map(|f| f.data)
@@ -56,25 +53,42 @@ pub fn list_assets() -> Vec<String> {
.collect()
}
/// Log at startup which iPXE binaries are present and which are missing.
/// Log at startup which iPXE binaries are present and which are missing, for
/// both driver modes. The Firmware-mode binaries are required for PXE on each
/// arch; the Builtin-mode binaries are the optional automatic NIC-driver
/// fallback (v0.6.1) — without one, escalation simply can't help that arch.
pub fn log_availability() {
let have: std::collections::HashSet<String> = list_assets().into_iter().collect();
let needed = [
(ClientArch::LegacyX86, "undionly.kpxe"),
(ClientArch::Ia32Uefi, "snponly-i386.efi"),
(ClientArch::X64Uefi, "snponly.efi"),
// ARM32 UEFI deferred — no upstream snponly binary published.
(ClientArch::Arm64Uefi, "snponly-arm64.efi"),
let arches = [
ClientArch::LegacyX86,
ClientArch::Ia32Uefi,
ClientArch::X64Uefi,
// ARM32 UEFI deferred — no upstream binary published in either mode.
ClientArch::Arm64Uefi,
];
for (arch, name) in needed {
if have.contains(name) {
tracing::info!(target: "openpxe::ipxe", "bundled iPXE for {}: {}", arch.as_str(), name);
} else {
tracing::warn!(
target: "openpxe::ipxe",
"MISSING iPXE binary for {}: {} — clients of this arch will not PXE boot",
arch.as_str(), name
);
for arch in arches {
for mode in [DriverMode::Firmware, DriverMode::Builtin] {
let Some(name) = arch.ipxe_bootfile_mode(mode) else {
continue;
};
if have.contains(name) {
tracing::info!(
target: "openpxe::ipxe",
"bundled iPXE for {} [{mode:?}]: {name}", arch.as_str()
);
} else if mode == DriverMode::Firmware {
tracing::warn!(
target: "openpxe::ipxe",
"MISSING iPXE binary for {} [{mode:?}]: {name} — clients of this arch will not PXE boot",
arch.as_str()
);
} else {
tracing::info!(
target: "openpxe::ipxe",
"no built-in-driver fallback for {} [{mode:?}]: {name} — auto NIC driver escalation unavailable for this arch",
arch.as_str()
);
}
}
}
}
+4
View File
@@ -39,6 +39,10 @@ image = { version = "0.25", default-features = false, features = ["png", "jpeg",
# kernel mount. See crates/iso-store/src/nfs_share.rs for usage.
nfs3_client = { workspace = true }
nfs3_types = { workspace = true }
# v0.5.5: pure-Rust SSH/SFTP client (ring backend) for the SFTP remote
# share path. See crates/iso-store/src/sftp_share.rs for usage.
russh = { workspace = true }
russh-sftp = { workspace = true }
# Needed for the Stream trait that wraps the mpsc receiver feeding
# NFS read-loop bytes into axum's Body::from_stream.
futures = { workspace = true }
+5 -3
View File
@@ -25,9 +25,11 @@ pub enum BootKind {
wimboot_url: String,
files: Vec<(String, String)>,
},
/// Last-resort: SAN-boot the ISO as an emulated CD. Only works for small
/// ISOs (<~1 GiB) and older distros. Kept for completeness, not the
/// default.
/// SAN-boot the raw ISO as an emulated CD (iPXE `sanboot`). The emulated
/// CD is backed by on-demand HTTP range reads, so ISO size is *not* a
/// constraint — this is the primary path for Windows (v0.5.8) and for any
/// El Torito-bootable image we don't special-case: ESXi/VMvisor
/// installers, BSDs, firmware/diagnostic tools, custom spins (v0.6.0).
SanBootIso { iso_url: String },
}
+215 -11
View File
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use std::io::{Read, Seek, SeekFrom};
use std::path::Path;
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize, Default)]
#[serde(rename_all = "snake_case")]
pub enum DistroFamily {
DebianUbuntu,
@@ -22,10 +22,22 @@ pub enum DistroFamily {
Arch,
Alpine,
WindowsPe,
#[default]
Unknown,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
/// Bumped whenever the introspection logic changes in a way that should
/// re-classify already-uploaded ISOs. On startup the store re-runs
/// `introspect` on any *local* ISO whose persisted report predates this
/// revision (see `IsoStore::load_from_disk`), so an upgrade fixes stale
/// metadata — e.g. a Windows 11 ISO tagged `Unknown` by an older binary —
/// without the operator having to delete and re-upload it.
///
/// rev 1 (v0.5.9): added El Torito boot-catalog detection + broadened
/// Windows (UDF/UTF-16) detection becomes retroactive.
pub const INTROSPECT_REV: u32 = 1;
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct IntrospectionReport {
pub family: DistroFamily,
pub volume_label: Option<String>,
@@ -35,17 +47,28 @@ pub struct IntrospectionReport {
pub initrd_paths: Vec<String>,
/// True if `sources/boot.wim` present — Windows install media.
pub has_boot_wim: bool,
/// True if the ISO carries an El Torito boot catalog — i.e. it is
/// bootable by BIOS/UEFI firmware and therefore by iPXE `sanboot`
/// (emulated CD). This is the authoritative "can this boot at all?"
/// signal for ISOs we can't classify as Linux or Windows (BSDs, ESXi,
/// firmware tools, custom spins). A *data* ISO (e.g. a VMware vCenter
/// appliance bundle) has no boot catalog and reports `false`. v0.5.9.
#[serde(default)]
pub el_torito: bool,
/// Revision of the introspection logic that produced this report. Old
/// `meta.json` files without the field deserialize as 0, which is
/// below [`INTROSPECT_REV`], triggering a one-time re-introspect on
/// the next startup. v0.5.9.
#[serde(default)]
pub introspect_rev: u32,
}
/// Probe an ISO file on disk. Never fails — on unrecoverable IO error we log
/// and return an `Unknown` family so the uploader still sees a record.
pub fn introspect(path: &Path) -> IntrospectionReport {
let mut report = IntrospectionReport {
family: DistroFamily::Unknown,
volume_label: None,
kernel_path: None,
initrd_paths: Vec::new(),
has_boot_wim: false,
introspect_rev: INTROSPECT_REV,
..Default::default()
};
let Ok(mut f) = std::fs::File::open(path) else {
@@ -68,6 +91,11 @@ pub fn introspect(path: &Path) -> IntrospectionReport {
}
}
// Does the ISO have an El Torito boot catalog? This is what decides
// whether an ISO we *can't* otherwise classify is bootable at all —
// a bootable ISO sanboots; a data/appliance ISO (no catalog) can't.
report.el_torito = detect_el_torito(&mut f);
// Cheap content scan: read the first ~64 MiB, look for signature filenames.
// This is enough to identify `sources/boot.wim` (Windows) and common
// kernel/initrd paths for the major Linux distros.
@@ -75,7 +103,13 @@ pub fn introspect(path: &Path) -> IntrospectionReport {
let scan_bytes = 64 * 1024 * 1024;
let mut buf = vec![0u8; 1024 * 1024];
let mut read_total = 0usize;
let mut haystack = Vec::with_capacity(scan_bytes.min(32 * 1024 * 1024));
// Size the haystack to what will actually be read — the scan cap or
// the file itself, whichever is smaller — so the fill never reallocs
// and a small ISO doesn't reserve the full 64 MiB.
let file_len = f.metadata().map_or(usize::MAX, |m| {
usize::try_from(m.len()).unwrap_or(usize::MAX)
});
let mut haystack = Vec::with_capacity(scan_bytes.min(file_len));
while read_total < scan_bytes {
let n = f.read(&mut buf).unwrap_or(0);
if n == 0 {
@@ -85,12 +119,37 @@ pub fn introspect(path: &Path) -> IntrospectionReport {
read_total += n;
}
// `sources/boot.wim` is the definitive Windows-install-media marker
// when the ISO exposes ASCII (ISO9660/Joliet) names. `contains_ascii`
// is case-insensitive, so one form covers BOOT.WIM / boot.wim and the
// backslash variant.
if contains_ascii(&haystack, b"sources/boot.wim")
|| contains_ascii(&haystack, b"SOURCES/BOOT.WIM")
|| contains_ascii(&haystack, b"SOURCES\\BOOT.WIM")
|| contains_ascii(&haystack, b"sources\\boot.wim")
{
report.has_boot_wim = true;
if report.family == DistroFamily::Unknown {
report.family = DistroFamily::WindowsPe;
}
// v0.5.8: broaden Windows detection. Modern Windows 10/11 ISOs are
// UDF — filenames are stored as UTF-16 (so the ASCII scan above misses
// them) and the volume label is a cryptic Microsoft string (so
// `family_from_label` misses it too). Booting is via HTTP sanboot of
// the raw ISO (no boot.wim extraction), so we only need the *family*.
// Catch the common cases: well-known Windows markers in either ASCII
// or UTF-16LE within the first 16 MiB, plus a filename hint.
if report.family == DistroFamily::Unknown {
let head = &haystack[..haystack.len().min(16 * 1024 * 1024)];
let ascii_markers: [&[u8]; 4] = [
b"bootmgr",
b"sources/install.wim",
b"sources/install.esd",
b"efi/microsoft",
];
let utf16_markers = ["bootmgr", "boot.wim", "install.wim", "microsoft"];
let looks_windows = ascii_markers.iter().any(|m| contains_ascii(head, m))
|| utf16_markers.iter().any(|m| contains_utf16le_ci(head, m))
|| filename_looks_windows(path);
if looks_windows {
report.family = DistroFamily::WindowsPe;
}
}
@@ -158,6 +217,83 @@ fn contains_ascii(haystack: &[u8], needle: &[u8]) -> bool {
.any(|w| w.eq_ignore_ascii_case(needle))
}
/// Case-insensitive search for an ASCII string encoded as UTF-16LE — the
/// way UDF (and thus modern Windows ISOs) store filenames. Each character
/// is two bytes: the ASCII low byte (compared case-insensitively) followed
/// by a 0 high byte. v0.5.8.
fn contains_utf16le_ci(haystack: &[u8], ascii: &str) -> bool {
let n = ascii.len();
if n == 0 || haystack.len() < n * 2 {
return false;
}
let lower: Vec<u8> = ascii.bytes().map(|b| b.to_ascii_lowercase()).collect();
haystack.windows(n * 2).any(|w| {
lower
.iter()
.enumerate()
.all(|(i, &c)| w[i * 2 + 1] == 0 && w[i * 2].to_ascii_lowercase() == c)
})
}
/// Filename heuristic: a stock Windows ISO almost always carries an obvious
/// token in its name (e.g. `..._windows_11_...`, `Win10`, `winserver`).
/// Used only as a last-resort family hint when the content scan and volume
/// label are inconclusive. v0.5.8.
fn filename_looks_windows(path: &Path) -> bool {
let name = path
.file_name()
.and_then(|s| s.to_str())
.unwrap_or("")
.to_ascii_lowercase();
const TOKENS: [&str; 6] = [
"windows",
"winpe",
"win10",
"win11",
"winserver",
"win-server",
];
TOKENS.iter().any(|t| name.contains(t))
}
/// The boot-system identifier string in an El Torito Boot Record Volume
/// Descriptor (offset 7, NUL-padded to 32 bytes).
const EL_TORITO_ID: &[u8] = b"EL TORITO SPECIFICATION";
/// Detect an El Torito boot catalog — the marker that an ISO is bootable
/// by BIOS/UEFI firmware (and thus by iPXE `sanboot`).
///
/// The ISO9660 Volume Descriptor Set starts at LBA 16 (offset 0x8000) and
/// runs one 2048-byte descriptor per sector until a Set Terminator
/// (type 0xFF). A Boot Record descriptor (type 0x00) whose 32-byte boot
/// system identifier reads "EL TORITO SPECIFICATION" means the image
/// declares an El Torito boot catalog. We only confirm its presence — we
/// don't parse the catalog (sanboot/the firmware does that). The walk is
/// capped so a malformed/huge image can't spin us. v0.5.9.
fn detect_el_torito(f: &mut std::fs::File) -> bool {
let mut vd = [0u8; 2048];
for lba in 16u64..32 {
if f.seek(SeekFrom::Start(lba * 2048)).is_err() || f.read_exact(&mut vd).is_err() {
return false;
}
// Every descriptor in the set carries the "CD001" magic; once it's
// missing we've walked off the end of a valid set.
if &vd[1..6] != b"CD001" {
return false;
}
match vd[0] {
// Boot Record descriptor carrying the El Torito signature.
0x00 if vd[7..7 + EL_TORITO_ID.len()] == *EL_TORITO_ID => return true,
// Volume Descriptor Set Terminator — nothing bootable found.
0xFF => return false,
// Any other descriptor (incl. a non-El-Torito boot record) —
// keep walking the set.
_ => {}
}
}
false
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
@@ -179,4 +315,72 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(family_from_label("ARCH_202604"), DistroFamily::Arch);
assert_eq!(family_from_label("weird-custom"), DistroFamily::Unknown);
}
#[test]
fn utf16le_marker_matches_case_insensitively() {
// "boot.wim" encoded UTF-16LE, mixed case — UDF stores Windows
// filenames this way, which the ASCII scan can't see.
let s = "BOOT.WIM";
let utf16: Vec<u8> = s.bytes().flat_map(|b| [b, 0]).collect();
let mut hay = vec![0u8; 8];
hay.extend_from_slice(&utf16);
hay.extend_from_slice(&[1, 2, 3]);
assert!(contains_utf16le_ci(&hay, "boot.wim"));
assert!(contains_utf16le_ci(&hay, "Boot.Wim"));
assert!(!contains_utf16le_ci(&hay, "install.wim"));
// An ASCII (not UTF-16) occurrence must NOT match the UTF-16 scan.
assert!(!contains_utf16le_ci(b"boot.wim plain ascii", "boot.wim"));
}
#[test]
fn el_torito_boot_catalog_detected() {
let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
// Helper: stamp a 2048-byte descriptor at `lba` with type + magic.
let stamp = |img: &mut [u8], lba: usize, ty: u8| {
let off = lba * 2048;
img[off] = ty;
img[off + 1..off + 6].copy_from_slice(b"CD001");
};
// Bootable image: PVD @16, El Torito Boot Record @17, terminator @18.
let mut boot = vec![0u8; 2048 * 19];
stamp(&mut boot, 16, 0x01);
stamp(&mut boot, 17, 0x00);
boot[17 * 2048 + 7..17 * 2048 + 7 + EL_TORITO_ID.len()].copy_from_slice(EL_TORITO_ID);
stamp(&mut boot, 18, 0xFF);
let bp = dir.path().join("boot.iso");
std::fs::write(&bp, &boot).unwrap();
let mut f = std::fs::File::open(&bp).unwrap();
assert!(
detect_el_torito(&mut f),
"El Torito boot record should match"
);
// Data/appliance image: PVD @16, terminator @17, no boot record.
let mut data = vec![0u8; 2048 * 18];
stamp(&mut data, 16, 0x01);
stamp(&mut data, 17, 0xFF);
let dp = dir.path().join("data.iso");
std::fs::write(&dp, &data).unwrap();
let mut f2 = std::fs::File::open(&dp).unwrap();
assert!(!detect_el_torito(&mut f2), "data ISO has no boot catalog");
}
#[test]
fn filename_hint_catches_windows_isos() {
use std::path::Path;
assert!(filename_looks_windows(Path::new(
"en-us_windows_11_iot_enterprise_ltsc_2024_x64_dvd.iso"
)));
assert!(filename_looks_windows(Path::new(
"Win10_22H2_English_x64.iso"
)));
assert!(filename_looks_windows(Path::new("winserver2022.iso")));
assert!(!filename_looks_windows(Path::new(
"ubuntu-24.04-desktop.iso"
)));
assert!(!filename_looks_windows(Path::new(
"Rocky-9.4-x86_64-dvd.iso"
)));
}
}
+14 -2
View File
@@ -20,9 +20,11 @@ pub mod entry;
pub mod introspect;
pub mod nfs_share;
pub mod pxe_logo;
pub mod sftp_share;
pub mod smb;
pub mod smb_share;
pub mod store;
pub mod unattended;
pub mod windows;
pub use entry::{BootEntry, BootKind, KernelArgs};
@@ -39,8 +41,18 @@ pub use smb_share::{SmbAddRequest, SmbShare, SmbShareError, SmbShareManager, Smb
// "works in any container" property as SMB, plus support for HTTP
// Range requests because NFSv3 READ3 takes an explicit offset.
pub use nfs_share::{NfsAddRequest, NfsShare, NfsShareError, NfsShareManager, NfsStream};
// v0.5.5: SFTP-over-SSH remote shares via the pure-Rust `russh` +
// `russh-sftp` crates (ring backend — no OpenSSL, no new C deps). Like
// NFS, supports HTTP Range requests because SFTP opens a seekable file
// handle. See crates/iso-store/src/sftp_share.rs.
pub use sftp_share::{
SftpAddRequest, SftpAuthKind, SftpShare, SftpShareError, SftpShareManager, SftpStream,
};
pub use store::{
generate_boot_entries_for, slugify_str, IsoCategory, IsoMeta, IsoSource, IsoStore,
UploadHandle,
generate_boot_entries_for, slugify_str, IsoCategory, IsoMeta, IsoSource, IsoStore, UploadHandle,
};
pub use unattended::{
classify as classify_unattended, render_template, UnattendedKind, UnattendedMeta,
UnattendedStore, MAX_UNATTENDED_BYTES,
};
pub use windows::{WimPatcher, WinPatchState};
+19 -26
View File
@@ -57,14 +57,14 @@
//! UI to ask for. (If a future server needs Kerberos or non-default
//! uid mapping we can add those, but for ISO read access nobody does.)
use crate::introspect::{DistroFamily, IntrospectionReport};
use crate::introspect::IntrospectionReport;
use crate::store::{generate_boot_entries_for, slugify_str, IsoSource, IsoStore};
use bytes::Bytes;
use nfs3_client::tokio::TokioConnector;
use nfs3_client::Nfs3ConnectionBuilder;
use nfs3_types::nfs3::{
self as nfs3, diropargs3, entry3, filename3, nfs_fh3, GETATTR3args, LOOKUP3args,
Nfs3Result, READ3args, READDIR3args,
self as nfs3, diropargs3, entry3, filename3, nfs_fh3, GETATTR3args, LOOKUP3args, Nfs3Result,
READ3args, READDIR3args,
};
use nfs3_types::rpc::{auth_unix, opaque_auth};
use nfs3_types::xdr_codec::Opaque;
@@ -220,10 +220,7 @@ impl NfsShareManager {
/// Register an NFS share. Validates, probes connectivity by
/// performing a real MOUNT3 + READDIR3, and registers the
/// resulting ISOs with the store.
pub async fn add(
&self,
req: NfsAddRequest,
) -> std::result::Result<NfsShare, NfsShareError> {
pub async fn add(&self, req: NfsAddRequest) -> std::result::Result<NfsShare, NfsShareError> {
let server = normalize_server(&req.server);
let export = req.export.trim().to_string();
if server.is_empty() {
@@ -258,7 +255,9 @@ impl NfsShareManager {
if let Err(e) = self.rescan_inner(&id).await {
let m = self.get(&id);
return Err(NfsShareError {
error: m.as_ref().and_then(|m| m.last_error.clone())
error: m
.as_ref()
.and_then(|m| m.last_error.clone())
.unwrap_or_else(|| e.to_string()),
stderr: String::new(),
hint: m.and_then(|m| m.last_hint),
@@ -333,8 +332,7 @@ impl NfsShareManager {
return Err(Error::Invalid(format!("invalid filename '{filename}'")));
}
let (tx, rx) =
tokio::sync::mpsc::channel::<std::io::Result<Bytes>>(STREAM_BUFFER_DEPTH);
let (tx, rx) = tokio::sync::mpsc::channel::<std::io::Result<Bytes>>(STREAM_BUFFER_DEPTH);
let server = share.server.clone();
let export = share.export.clone();
let port = share.port;
@@ -358,16 +356,11 @@ impl NfsShareManager {
if let Err(e) = result {
// Best-effort signal of the error to the consumer.
// If the receiver has already dropped we just exit.
let _ = tx
.send(Err(std::io::Error::other(e.to_string())))
.await;
let _ = tx.send(Err(std::io::Error::other(e.to_string()))).await;
}
});
Ok(NfsStream {
rx,
_task: task,
})
Ok(NfsStream { rx, _task: task })
}
// ── internals ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -399,13 +392,7 @@ impl NfsShareManager {
// Same approach as SMB: no real introspection over the
// network in v0.4.67. The boot-entry generator falls back
// to filename-based sanboot detection.
let report = IntrospectionReport {
family: DistroFamily::Unknown,
volume_label: None,
kernel_path: None,
initrd_paths: Vec::new(),
has_boot_wim: false,
};
let report = IntrospectionReport::default();
let boot_entries = generate_boot_entries_for(&iso_id, &entry.filename, &report);
let source = IsoSource::Nfs {
share_id: share.id.clone(),
@@ -988,8 +975,14 @@ mod tests {
// the allow-list and the secure/insecure angle.
let h = hint_for("connect failed: MNT3ERR_ACCES").unwrap();
let lc = h.to_lowercase();
assert!(lc.contains("insecure") || lc.contains("privileged"), "got: {h}");
assert!(lc.contains("allow") || lc.contains("permission"), "got: {h}");
assert!(
lc.contains("insecure") || lc.contains("privileged"),
"got: {h}"
);
assert!(
lc.contains("allow") || lc.contains("permission"),
"got: {h}"
);
}
#[test]
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
+12 -31
View File
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@
//! streaming. A follow-up release can add libsmbclient-based seek if
//! a real workload needs it.
use crate::introspect::{DistroFamily, IntrospectionReport};
use crate::introspect::IntrospectionReport;
use crate::store::{generate_boot_entries_for, slugify_str, IsoSource, IsoStore};
use openpxe_core::{Error, Result};
use parking_lot::Mutex;
@@ -231,10 +231,7 @@ impl SmbShareManager {
/// Add or refresh a share. Validates the input, writes a creds
/// file, probes connectivity, and scans for ISOs.
pub async fn add(
&self,
req: SmbAddRequest,
) -> std::result::Result<SmbShare, SmbShareError> {
pub async fn add(&self, req: SmbAddRequest) -> std::result::Result<SmbShare, SmbShareError> {
let server = normalize_server(&req.server);
let share = req.share.trim().trim_start_matches('/').to_string();
if server.is_empty() {
@@ -309,7 +306,9 @@ impl SmbShareManager {
if let Err(e) = self.rescan_inner(&id).await {
let m = self.get(&id);
return Err(SmbShareError {
error: m.as_ref().and_then(|m| m.last_error.clone())
error: m
.as_ref()
.and_then(|m| m.last_error.clone())
.unwrap_or_else(|| e.to_string()),
stderr: String::new(),
hint: m.and_then(|m| m.last_hint),
@@ -365,11 +364,7 @@ impl SmbShareManager {
/// throttling concurrent smbclients) would need to await without
/// changing the call sites.
#[allow(clippy::unused_async)]
pub async fn stream_iso(
&self,
share_id: &str,
filename: &str,
) -> Result<SmbStream> {
pub async fn stream_iso(&self, share_id: &str, filename: &str) -> Result<SmbStream> {
let share = self
.get(share_id)
.ok_or_else(|| Error::Invalid(format!("no such SMB share '{share_id}'")))?;
@@ -377,9 +372,7 @@ impl SmbShareManager {
// share root. smbclient itself accepts only filenames at the
// share root in our `get` form, but belt-and-suspenders.
if filename.contains('/') || filename.contains('\\') || filename.contains("..") {
return Err(Error::Invalid(format!(
"invalid filename '{filename}'"
)));
return Err(Error::Invalid(format!("invalid filename '{filename}'")));
}
let creds = share
.creds_path
@@ -470,13 +463,7 @@ impl SmbShareManager {
// and the operator gets *something* bootable. A follow-up
// release can do a bounded `smbclient get` of the first
// 64 KiB for real detection.
let report = IntrospectionReport {
family: DistroFamily::Unknown,
volume_label: None,
kernel_path: None,
initrd_paths: Vec::new(),
has_boot_wim: false,
};
let report = IntrospectionReport::default();
let boot_entries = generate_boot_entries_for(&iso_id, &entry.filename, &report);
let source = IsoSource::Smb {
share_id: share.id.clone(),
@@ -543,10 +530,7 @@ impl SmbShareManager {
} else {
String::new()
};
return Err((
format!("could not exec smbclient: {e}"),
stderr,
));
return Err((format!("could not exec smbclient: {e}"), stderr));
}
};
if !output.status.success() {
@@ -757,10 +741,7 @@ fn parse_ls_iso(out: &str) -> Vec<SmbListEntry> {
/// Pre-flight TCP probe to `server:port`. Format matches v0.4.64 NFS
/// probe so the UI banner reads consistently.
async fn tcp_probe(
server: &str,
port: u16,
) -> std::result::Result<(), (String, String)> {
async fn tcp_probe(server: &str, port: u16) -> std::result::Result<(), (String, String)> {
use tokio::net::TcpStream;
let addr = format!("{server}:{port}");
match tokio::time::timeout(PROBE_TIMEOUT, TcpStream::connect(&addr)).await {
@@ -937,8 +918,8 @@ mod tests {
// exec error in `error` plus an empty `stderr`. The
// SmbShareError constructor's hint_for fallback checks error
// too, so this pattern needs to translate as well.
let h2 = hint_for("could not exec smbclient: No such file or directory (os error 2)")
.unwrap();
let h2 =
hint_for("could not exec smbclient: No such file or directory (os error 2)").unwrap();
assert!(h2.contains("smbclient"));
}
+158 -39
View File
@@ -24,6 +24,10 @@ use tokio::io::AsyncWriteExt;
/// `nfs3_client` crate (in-process, no subprocess). Same "works in
/// any container" property as SMB, plus Range requests work because
/// NFSv3 READ3 takes an explicit offset.
/// `Sftp` (v0.5.5) — remote SFTP-over-SSH share, streamed via the
/// pure-Rust `russh` + `russh-sftp` crates (in-process). Like NFS it
/// supports HTTP Range requests because SFTP opens a seekable file
/// handle (`SSH_FXP_READ` at offset).
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(tag = "kind", rename_all = "snake_case")]
pub enum IsoSource {
@@ -42,6 +46,13 @@ pub enum IsoSource {
/// Filename at the export root.
relative_path: String,
},
/// v0.5.5: SFTP-over-SSH via the in-process `russh` + `russh-sftp`
/// crates.
Sftp {
share_id: String,
/// Filename at the export root.
relative_path: String,
},
}
/// Where the ISO lands in the PXE menu hierarchy.
@@ -212,7 +223,8 @@ impl IsoStore {
continue;
}
if let Ok(text) = tokio::fs::read_to_string(&p).await {
if let Ok(meta) = serde_json::from_str::<IsoMeta>(&text) {
if let Ok(mut meta) = serde_json::from_str::<IsoMeta>(&text) {
self.reintrospect_if_stale(&mut meta).await;
self.insert(meta);
}
}
@@ -220,6 +232,46 @@ impl IsoStore {
Ok(())
}
/// v0.5.9: re-run introspection on a *local* ISO whose persisted report
/// predates the current logic. ISOs uploaded by an older binary carry a
/// stale family/boot profile — most visibly a Windows 11 ISO tagged
/// `Unknown` before the UDF/El-Torito detection landed, which then shows
/// as "won't boot" forever. Re-probing on startup fixes them in place,
/// no delete-and-re-upload. Bounded: only `Local` sources (we have the
/// bytes locally) below [`introspect::INTROSPECT_REV`], so it runs at
/// most once per ISO per upgrade. The probe reads up to ~64 MiB, so we
/// push it onto the blocking pool to keep the async runtime responsive.
async fn reintrospect_if_stale(&self, meta: &mut IsoMeta) {
if !matches!(meta.source, IsoSource::Local)
|| meta.introspection.introspect_rev >= crate::introspect::INTROSPECT_REV
{
return;
}
let path = self.iso_path(&meta.id);
if !path.exists() {
return;
}
let Ok(fresh) = tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || introspect(&path)).await else {
tracing::warn!(target: "openpxe::iso", id = %meta.id, "re-introspect task failed");
return;
};
let before = meta.introspection.family;
meta.introspection = fresh;
meta.boot_entries = generate_boot_entries(&meta.id, &meta.filename, &meta.introspection);
if let Err(e) = self.persist_meta(meta).await {
tracing::warn!(target: "openpxe::iso", id = %meta.id, "re-introspect persist: {e}");
return;
}
tracing::info!(
target: "openpxe::iso",
id = %meta.id,
from = ?before,
to = ?meta.introspection.family,
el_torito = meta.introspection.el_torito,
"re-introspected stale ISO metadata"
);
}
fn insert(&self, meta: IsoMeta) {
self.inner.write().isos.insert(meta.id.clone(), meta);
}
@@ -290,20 +342,29 @@ impl IsoStore {
/// SMB sources or when the file is missing.
pub fn iso_path_for(&self, id: &str) -> Option<PathBuf> {
let meta = self.get(id)?;
self.local_path(&meta)
}
/// Same resolution as [`Self::iso_path_for`], but for a meta the
/// caller already holds — skips the second registry lock + deep
/// clone, which matters on the per-range-request ISO serving path
/// (a sanboot install issues hundreds of those).
#[must_use]
pub fn local_path(&self, meta: &IsoMeta) -> Option<PathBuf> {
match &meta.source {
IsoSource::Local => {
let path = self.iso_path(id);
let path = self.iso_path(&meta.id);
if path.exists() {
Some(path)
} else {
None
}
}
// SMB and NFS sources have no local path — they're
// SMB, NFS, and SFTP sources have no local path — they're
// streamed in-process. Callers must inspect the source
// kind first and dispatch to the appropriate share
// manager.
IsoSource::Smb { .. } | IsoSource::Nfs { .. } => None,
IsoSource::Smb { .. } | IsoSource::Nfs { .. } | IsoSource::Sftp { .. } => None,
}
}
@@ -363,9 +424,9 @@ impl IsoStore {
pub fn drop_external_source(&self, share_id: &str) {
let mut g = self.inner.write();
g.isos.retain(|_, m| match &m.source {
IsoSource::Smb { share_id: sid, .. } | IsoSource::Nfs { share_id: sid, .. } => {
sid != share_id
}
IsoSource::Smb { share_id: sid, .. }
| IsoSource::Nfs { share_id: sid, .. }
| IsoSource::Sftp { share_id: sid, .. } => sid != share_id,
IsoSource::Local => true,
});
}
@@ -546,22 +607,22 @@ fn generate_boot_entries(id: &str, filename: &str, r: &IntrospectionReport) -> V
.clone()
.unwrap_or_else(|| filename.to_string());
match r.family {
DistroFamily::WindowsPe if r.has_boot_wim => {
// Standard wimboot chain. Paths are in-ISO; the HTTP layer maps
// `iso/<id>/<path>` to on-disk extraction via ISO9660 lookup.
let base = format!("iso/{id}");
DistroFamily::WindowsPe => {
// v0.5.8: boot Windows directly via iPXE HTTP sanboot. iPXE
// exposes the raw ISO as an emulated CD backed by on-demand
// HTTP range reads, and Windows Setup boots from it. This
// replaces the old wimboot+SMB chain, which (a) needed an SMB
// server the host often can't provide (port 445 collisions),
// (b) served in-ISO files via an ISO9660 lookup that failed on
// UDF-only Windows 11 ISOs, and (c) required an operator
// toggle. sanboot needs none of that — just the HTTP port,
// which works in any environment. The unmodified, stock ISO is
// served at iso/<id>.iso; nothing is injected into Windows.
vec![BootEntry {
id: format!("{id}-winpe"),
title: format!("{title} (Windows / wimboot)"),
kind: BootKind::Wimboot {
wimboot_url: "ipxe/wimboot".to_string(),
files: vec![
("bootmgr".into(), format!("{base}/bootmgr")),
("bootmgr.efi".into(), format!("{base}/bootmgr.efi")),
("bcd".into(), format!("{base}/boot/bcd")),
("boot.sdi".into(), format!("{base}/boot/boot.sdi")),
("boot.wim".into(), format!("{base}/sources/boot.wim")),
],
id: format!("{id}-windows"),
title: format!("{title} (Windows)"),
kind: BootKind::SanBootIso {
iso_url: format!("iso/{id}.iso"),
},
}]
}
@@ -587,15 +648,33 @@ fn generate_boot_entries(id: &str, filename: &str, r: &IntrospectionReport) -> V
}]
}
_ => {
// Last-resort SAN boot. Won't work for large modern ISOs, but
// lets the ISO at least appear in the menu.
vec![BootEntry {
id: format!("{id}-sanboot"),
title: format!("{title} (SAN boot — may fail for >1GiB ISOs)"),
kind: BootKind::SanBootIso {
iso_url: format!("iso/{id}.iso"),
},
}]
// No Windows-install media and no Linux kernel/initrd. Decide
// whether the ISO is bootable at all (v0.6.0):
// * `el_torito` — it carries a boot catalog, so iPXE sanboots
// the raw image as an emulated CD: BSDs, ESXi/VMvisor
// installers, firmware tools, custom spins. The emulated CD
// is backed by HTTP range reads, so ISO size is a non-issue
// (this is the same path Windows uses since v0.5.8) — hence
// no more "may fail for >1GiB ISOs" disclaimer.
// * `introspect_rev == 0` — a remote-share ISO we couldn't
// introspect (SMB/NFS/SFTP listings don't seek into the ISO).
// Offer sanboot optimistically rather than hide a
// likely-bootable installer.
// Otherwise it's a local image we *did* introspect and found to
// carry no boot catalog — a data/appliance ISO (e.g. a VMware
// vCenter Server Appliance bundle). It genuinely cannot boot, so
// we expose no menu entry; the dashboard flags it instead.
if r.el_torito || r.introspect_rev == 0 {
vec![BootEntry {
id: format!("{id}-sanboot"),
title,
kind: BootKind::SanBootIso {
iso_url: format!("iso/{id}.iso"),
},
}]
} else {
Vec::new()
}
}
}
}
@@ -659,13 +738,59 @@ mod tests {
// good.
let s = linux_cmdline(DistroFamily::DebianUbuntu, "ubuntu-24-04");
assert!(s.contains("boot=casper"), "{s}");
assert!(s.contains("iso-url=${base-url}/iso/ubuntu-24-04.iso"), "{s}");
assert!(
s.contains("iso-url=${base-url}/iso/ubuntu-24-04.iso"),
"{s}"
);
assert!(s.contains("ds=nocloud"), "{s}");
assert!(s.contains("ip=dhcp"), "{s}");
assert!(!s.contains("netboot=url"), "legacy option leaked: {s}");
assert!(!s.contains(" --- "), "stray ---: {s}");
}
#[test]
fn boot_entries_respect_el_torito_and_source() {
use crate::introspect::INTROSPECT_REV;
// ESXi / VMvisor installer shape: bootable (carries an El Torito
// catalog) but not classifiable as Windows or Linux. Must yield a
// single sanboot entry so it's selectable + boots via emulated CD.
let esxi = IntrospectionReport {
family: DistroFamily::Unknown,
volume_label: Some("ESXI-7.0U3".into()),
el_torito: true,
introspect_rev: INTROSPECT_REV,
..Default::default()
};
let e = generate_boot_entries("esxi", "VMware-VMvisor-Installer-7.0U3n.iso", &esxi);
assert_eq!(e.len(), 1, "ESXi should get exactly one boot entry");
assert!(matches!(e[0].kind, BootKind::SanBootIso { .. }));
// Clean title — no stale ">1GiB may fail" disclaimer.
assert!(!e[0].title.contains("may fail"), "title: {}", e[0].title);
// VCSA / data-appliance shape: locally introspected (rev set), no
// boot catalog, not Windows/Linux. Genuinely unbootable → no entry,
// so it stays out of the iPXE menu (the dashboard flags it instead).
let vcsa = IntrospectionReport {
family: DistroFamily::Unknown,
el_torito: false,
introspect_rev: INTROSPECT_REV,
..Default::default()
};
assert!(
generate_boot_entries("vcsa", "VMware-VCSA-all-8.0.iso", &vcsa).is_empty(),
"data/appliance ISO must produce no boot entry"
);
// Remote-share ISO: never introspected (rev 0, no random access over
// SMB/NFS/SFTP). Assume bootable and offer sanboot rather than hide a
// likely-bootable installer.
let remote = IntrospectionReport::default();
let r = generate_boot_entries("remote", "unknown-remote.iso", &remote);
assert_eq!(r.len(), 1, "remote (uninspected) ISO keeps a sanboot entry");
assert!(matches!(r[0].kind, BootKind::SanBootIso { .. }));
}
fn fake_meta(id: &str) -> IsoMeta {
IsoMeta {
id: id.into(),
@@ -673,13 +798,7 @@ mod tests {
size_bytes: 0,
sha256_hex: None,
uploaded_at: OffsetDateTime::now_utc(),
introspection: IntrospectionReport {
family: DistroFamily::Unknown,
volume_label: None,
kernel_path: None,
initrd_paths: vec![],
has_boot_wim: false,
},
introspection: IntrospectionReport::default(),
boot_entries: vec![],
source: IsoSource::Local,
password_hash: None,
+412
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,412 @@
//! Unattended-install answer-file store (v0.5.2).
//!
//! Operators upload the answer file their installer expects — a RHEL/
//! Fedora **Kickstart**, a Debian **Preseed**, an Ubuntu **Autoinstall**
//! cloud-init user-data, or a Windows **answer file** (`autounattend.xml`)
//! — and OpenPXE serves it on demand to the booting machine. Files live
//! in their own directory (`<unattended_dir>/`), deliberately *not* under
//! `iso_dir`, so they never appear in the ISO listing or the PXE menu.
//!
//! Storage mirrors [`crate::store::IsoStore`]: in-memory map authoritative
//! for the process, sidecar `*.meta.json` on disk is the source of truth on
//! restart. The raw answer file sits beside it as `<id>.file`.
//!
//! Templating is applied at *serve* time, not store time — see
//! [`render_template`]. The stored bytes are exactly what the operator
//! uploaded; per-host hostname/IP/MAC values are substituted into a copy
//! when the file is fetched for a specific client.
use crate::store::slugify_str;
use openpxe_core::{Error, Result};
use parking_lot::RwLock;
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::path::PathBuf;
use std::sync::Arc;
use time::OffsetDateTime;
/// Disk + memory cap for one answer file. Kickstarts/preseeds/cloud-init
/// configs are a few KB; 1 MiB is a comfortable ceiling that still bounds
/// abuse.
pub const MAX_UNATTENDED_BYTES: usize = 1024 * 1024;
/// Which installer the answer file targets. Drives the kernel-argument
/// injection in the boot chain.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Default, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(rename_all = "snake_case")]
pub enum UnattendedKind {
/// RHEL / Fedora / CentOS / AlmaLinux / Rocky — `inst.ks=<url>`.
Kickstart,
/// Debian / older Ubuntu — `auto=true priority=critical url=<url>`.
Preseed,
/// Ubuntu 20.04+ Subiquity autoinstall — cloud-init NoCloud:
/// `autoinstall ds=nocloud-net;s=<url>/`.
Autoinstall,
/// Windows Setup answer file (`autounattend.xml`). Served, not
/// auto-injected (Windows reads it from media/USB, not a kernel arg).
AnswerFile,
/// Couldn't classify — stored + served, no auto-injection.
#[default]
Unknown,
}
impl UnattendedKind {
#[must_use]
pub fn label(self) -> &'static str {
match self {
UnattendedKind::Kickstart => "Kickstart",
UnattendedKind::Preseed => "Preseed",
UnattendedKind::Autoinstall => "Autoinstall",
UnattendedKind::AnswerFile => "Answer file",
UnattendedKind::Unknown => "Unknown",
}
}
}
/// Lowercase file extension (no dot), or `None` if there isn't one.
fn ext_lower(filename: &str) -> Option<String> {
std::path::Path::new(filename)
.extension()
.and_then(|e| e.to_str())
.map(str::to_ascii_lowercase)
}
/// Classify an upload from its filename + a peek at its content. Best
/// effort: extension first, then a content sniff to disambiguate the
/// `.cfg` case (both Kickstart and Preseed use it).
#[must_use]
pub fn classify(filename: &str, content: &[u8]) -> UnattendedKind {
let lower_name = filename.to_ascii_lowercase();
let ext = ext_lower(filename);
let text = String::from_utf8_lossy(&content[..content.len().min(8192)]);
let looks_preseed = text.contains("d-i ") || text.contains("preseed/");
let looks_kickstart = text.contains("%packages")
|| text.contains("\nlang ")
|| text.contains("\nkeyboard ")
|| text.contains("bootloader --")
|| text.starts_with("install");
let looks_cloud_init = text.contains("autoinstall")
|| text.contains("#cloud-config")
|| text.contains("version: 1");
match ext.as_deref() {
Some("ks") => return UnattendedKind::Kickstart,
Some("seed") => return UnattendedKind::Preseed,
Some("xml") => return UnattendedKind::AnswerFile,
Some("yaml" | "yml") => return UnattendedKind::Autoinstall,
Some("cfg") => {
return if looks_kickstart && !looks_preseed {
UnattendedKind::Kickstart
} else {
UnattendedKind::Preseed
};
}
_ => {}
}
if lower_name == "user-data" {
return UnattendedKind::Autoinstall;
}
// No recognised extension — fall back to content sniffing.
if looks_cloud_init {
UnattendedKind::Autoinstall
} else if looks_kickstart {
UnattendedKind::Kickstart
} else if looks_preseed {
UnattendedKind::Preseed
} else {
UnattendedKind::Unknown
}
}
/// True if the filename carries an extension we accept for upload. We
/// also accept the bare `user-data` name (cloud-init NoCloud convention).
#[must_use]
pub fn is_accepted_filename(filename: &str) -> bool {
if filename.trim().eq_ignore_ascii_case("user-data") {
return true;
}
matches!(
ext_lower(filename).as_deref(),
Some("ks" | "cfg" | "seed" | "yaml" | "yml" | "xml")
)
}
/// Sidecar metadata for a stored answer file.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct UnattendedMeta {
/// URL-safe slug, unique within the store.
pub id: String,
/// Original upload filename, shown in the UI.
pub filename: String,
pub kind: UnattendedKind,
pub size_bytes: u64,
#[serde(with = "time::serde::rfc3339")]
pub uploaded_at: OffsetDateTime,
}
#[derive(Debug, Default)]
struct Inner {
files: HashMap<String, UnattendedMeta>,
}
/// In-memory + on-disk answer-file registry. Cheap to clone.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct UnattendedStore {
dir: Arc<PathBuf>,
inner: Arc<RwLock<Inner>>,
}
impl UnattendedStore {
#[must_use]
pub fn new(dir: PathBuf) -> Self {
Self {
dir: Arc::new(dir),
inner: Arc::new(RwLock::new(Inner::default())),
}
}
pub async fn ensure_dir(&self) -> Result<()> {
tokio::fs::create_dir_all(self.dir.as_path()).await?;
Ok(())
}
/// Scan the directory on startup, loading every `*.meta.json` sidecar.
pub async fn load_from_disk(&self) -> Result<()> {
self.ensure_dir().await?;
let mut entries = tokio::fs::read_dir(self.dir.as_path()).await?;
while let Some(e) = entries.next_entry().await? {
let p = e.path();
let is_meta = p
.file_name()
.and_then(|s| s.to_str())
.is_some_and(|n| n.ends_with(".meta.json"));
if !is_meta {
continue;
}
if let Ok(text) = tokio::fs::read_to_string(&p).await {
if let Ok(meta) = serde_json::from_str::<UnattendedMeta>(&text) {
self.inner.write().files.insert(meta.id.clone(), meta);
}
}
}
Ok(())
}
fn data_path(&self, id: &str) -> PathBuf {
self.dir.join(format!("{id}.file"))
}
fn meta_path(&self, id: &str) -> PathBuf {
self.dir.join(format!("{id}.meta.json"))
}
/// Mint a unique slug from the upload filename's stem.
fn unique_id(&self, filename: &str) -> String {
let stem = filename.rsplit_once('.').map_or(filename, |(s, _)| s);
let base = {
let s = slugify_str(stem);
if s.is_empty() {
"unattended".to_string()
} else {
s
}
};
let g = self.inner.read();
if !g.files.contains_key(&base) {
return base;
}
for n in 1.. {
let candidate = format!("{base}-{n}");
if !g.files.contains_key(&candidate) {
return candidate;
}
}
unreachable!("u64 ids exhausted")
}
/// Store an uploaded answer file. Validates type + size, classifies,
/// writes the bytes + a sidecar, and returns the new metadata.
pub async fn add(&self, filename: &str, bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<UnattendedMeta> {
if !is_accepted_filename(filename) {
return Err(Error::Invalid(format!(
"unsupported answer-file type '{filename}'. Accepted: .ks, .cfg, .seed, .yaml, .yml, .xml, user-data"
)));
}
if bytes.len() > MAX_UNATTENDED_BYTES {
return Err(Error::Invalid(format!(
"answer file too large ({} bytes, max {MAX_UNATTENDED_BYTES})",
bytes.len()
)));
}
self.ensure_dir().await?;
let kind = classify(filename, bytes);
let id = self.unique_id(filename);
let meta = UnattendedMeta {
id: id.clone(),
filename: filename.to_string(),
kind,
size_bytes: bytes.len() as u64,
uploaded_at: OffsetDateTime::now_utc(),
};
// Atomic data write: tmp -> rename.
let data = self.data_path(&id);
let tmp = data.with_extension("file.tmp");
tokio::fs::write(&tmp, bytes).await?;
tokio::fs::rename(&tmp, &data).await?;
let meta_text = serde_json::to_string_pretty(&meta).map_err(|e| Error::Other(e.into()))?;
tokio::fs::write(self.meta_path(&id), meta_text).await?;
self.inner.write().files.insert(id.clone(), meta.clone());
tracing::info!(
target: "openpxe::unattended",
id = %id, file = %filename, kind = ?kind, size = bytes.len(),
"unattended answer file stored"
);
Ok(meta)
}
#[must_use]
pub fn list(&self) -> Vec<UnattendedMeta> {
let g = self.inner.read();
let mut v: Vec<_> = g.files.values().cloned().collect();
v.sort_by_key(|m| std::cmp::Reverse(m.uploaded_at));
v
}
#[must_use]
pub fn get(&self, id: &str) -> Option<UnattendedMeta> {
self.inner.read().files.get(id).cloned()
}
/// Read the raw stored bytes for `id`.
pub async fn read(&self, id: &str) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
if !self.inner.read().files.contains_key(id) {
return Err(Error::NotFound(format!("no unattended file '{id}'")));
}
let bytes = tokio::fs::read(self.data_path(id)).await?;
Ok(bytes)
}
/// Remove a file + its sidecar. Returns true if something was removed.
pub async fn remove(&self, id: &str) -> bool {
let existed = self.inner.write().files.remove(id).is_some();
if existed {
let _ = tokio::fs::remove_file(self.data_path(id)).await;
let _ = tokio::fs::remove_file(self.meta_path(id)).await;
}
existed
}
#[must_use]
pub fn len(&self) -> usize {
self.inner.read().files.len()
}
#[must_use]
pub fn is_empty(&self) -> bool {
self.len() == 0
}
}
/// Substitute the per-host template tokens into an answer file at serve
/// time. Recognised tokens (case-sensitive, double-brace): `{{HOSTNAME}}`,
/// `{{IP}}`, `{{MAC}}`. Unset values render as an empty string so a
/// half-filled profile never leaves a literal `{{IP}}` in the file.
#[must_use]
pub fn render_template(
content: &str,
mac: Option<&str>,
hostname: Option<&str>,
ip: Option<&str>,
) -> String {
content
.replace("{{HOSTNAME}}", hostname.unwrap_or(""))
.replace("{{IP}}", ip.unwrap_or(""))
.replace("{{MAC}}", mac.unwrap_or(""))
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use tempfile::tempdir;
#[test]
fn classify_by_extension() {
assert_eq!(
classify(" subiquity.yaml", b""),
UnattendedKind::Autoinstall
);
assert_eq!(classify("ks.ks", b""), UnattendedKind::Kickstart);
assert_eq!(classify("preseed.seed", b""), UnattendedKind::Preseed);
assert_eq!(
classify("autounattend.xml", b"<xml/>"),
UnattendedKind::AnswerFile
);
assert_eq!(classify("user-data", b""), UnattendedKind::Autoinstall);
}
#[test]
fn classify_cfg_by_content() {
assert_eq!(
classify("answer.cfg", b"d-i debian-installer/locale string en_US"),
UnattendedKind::Preseed
);
assert_eq!(
classify("answer.cfg", b"install\n%packages\n@core\n%end\n"),
UnattendedKind::Kickstart
);
}
#[test]
fn accepted_filenames() {
assert!(is_accepted_filename("a.ks"));
assert!(is_accepted_filename("USER-DATA".to_lowercase().as_str()));
assert!(is_accepted_filename("autounattend.XML"));
assert!(!is_accepted_filename("evil.sh"));
assert!(!is_accepted_filename("image.iso"));
}
#[test]
fn template_substitutes_and_blanks_unset() {
let body = "ip={{IP}} host={{HOSTNAME}} mac={{MAC}}";
let out = render_template(body, Some("aa:bb"), Some("node1"), None);
assert_eq!(out, "ip= host=node1 mac=aa:bb");
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn add_list_read_remove_round_trip() {
let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
let s = UnattendedStore::new(dir.path().join("unattended"));
let meta = s
.add("rocky.ks", b"install\n%packages\n@core\n%end\n")
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(meta.kind, UnattendedKind::Kickstart);
assert_eq!(s.len(), 1);
let got = s.read(&meta.id).await.unwrap();
assert!(got.starts_with(b"install"));
// Survives a reload.
let s2 = UnattendedStore::new(dir.path().join("unattended"));
s2.load_from_disk().await.unwrap();
assert!(s2.get(&meta.id).is_some());
assert!(s2.remove(&meta.id).await);
assert!(s2.get(&meta.id).is_none());
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn rejects_bad_type_and_oversize() {
let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
let s = UnattendedStore::new(dir.path().join("unattended"));
assert!(s.add("evil.sh", b"#!/bin/sh").await.is_err());
let big = vec![b'x'; MAX_UNATTENDED_BYTES + 1];
assert!(s.add("big.ks", &big).await.is_err());
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn ids_are_unique() {
let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
let s = UnattendedStore::new(dir.path().join("unattended"));
let a = s.add("ks.ks", b"install").await.unwrap();
let b = s.add("ks.ks", b"install").await.unwrap();
assert_ne!(a.id, b.id);
}
}
+74 -7
View File
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ use openpxe_core::{
};
use openpxe_dhcp_proxy::DhcpProxyServer;
use openpxe_http_api::{build_router, AppState};
use openpxe_iso_store::{IsoStore, NfsShareManager, SmbManager, SmbShareManager};
use openpxe_iso_store::{IsoStore, NfsShareManager, SftpShareManager, SmbManager, SmbShareManager};
use openpxe_tftp::TftpServer;
use std::net::{Ipv4Addr, SocketAddr};
use std::path::PathBuf;
@@ -59,11 +59,10 @@ async fn main() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
init_tracing(log_bus.clone());
let cli = Cli::parse();
let mut config = match &cli.config {
Some(p) if p.exists() => Config::from_toml_file(p)?,
_ => Config::default(),
};
config.apply_env();
// v0.5.4: layered load via figment — defaults → optional TOML → env.
// The OPENPXE_* env layer keeps the historical flat names (see
// `Config::load`), so existing deployments are unaffected.
let config = Config::load(cli.config.as_deref())?;
// Dispatch subcommands before bringing up the server.
if let Some(cmd) = cli.command {
@@ -95,10 +94,25 @@ async fn main() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
}
},
};
let public_base_url = format!("http://{our_ip}");
// v0.5.6: the advertised base URL must carry the HTTP port. Every
// client-facing URL (the DHCP-proxy iPXE filename, UEFI HTTP boot,
// and the menu's kernel/initrd/ISO links) is derived from this one
// string, so omitting the port silently pointed PXE clients at :80 —
// breaking every non-80 deployment (e.g. the Unraid template's 4200,
// chosen to dodge the webGUI). See `build_public_base_url`.
let public_base_url = build_public_base_url(our_ip, config.server.http_port);
let iso_store = IsoStore::new(config.paths.iso_dir.clone());
iso_store.load_from_disk().await?;
// v0.5.2: unattended answer-file store (Kickstart/Preseed/Autoinstall/
// Windows answer files). Separate directory from the ISO store.
let unattended = openpxe_iso_store::UnattendedStore::new(config.paths.unattended_dir.clone());
if let Err(e) = unattended.load_from_disk().await {
tracing::warn!(
target: "openpxe::unattended",
"could not load unattended files on startup: {e}"
);
}
let clients = ClientRegistry::new();
let queue = DeploymentQueue::new();
let settings = SettingsStore::load_or_default(&config.paths.work_dir);
@@ -146,6 +160,19 @@ async fn main() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
);
}
// v0.5.5: SFTP-over-SSH share manager — pure-Rust in-process
// consumer via `russh` + `russh-sftp` (ring backend, no OpenSSL).
// The third remote-library protocol alongside SMB/NFS; like NFS it
// works in any container (no subprocess, no kernel mount) and
// supports HTTP Range requests because SFTP file handles seek.
let sftp_shares = SftpShareManager::new(&config.paths.work_dir, iso_store.clone());
if let Err(e) = sftp_shares.load_and_rescan().await {
tracing::warn!(
target: "openpxe::sftp",
"could not reload SFTP shares on startup: {e}"
);
}
// Sniff network details for the Network tab. None of these are
// required for PXE to work — they're informational, surfaced in the
// UI so an operator doesn't have to drop to a shell to find their
@@ -165,6 +192,7 @@ async fn main() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
hosts: hosts.clone(),
boot_log: boot_log.clone(),
branding: branding.clone(),
pxe_bg_cache: openpxe_http_api::state::PxeBgCache::default(),
admin: admin.clone(),
sessions: sessions.clone(),
sso: sso.clone(),
@@ -174,6 +202,8 @@ async fn main() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
smb: Some(smb.clone()),
smb_shares: smb_shares.clone(),
nfs_shares: nfs_shares.clone(),
sftp_shares: sftp_shares.clone(),
unattended: unattended.clone(),
uploads: openpxe_http_api::uploads::UploadSessions::default(),
log_bus: log_bus.clone(),
started_at: time::OffsetDateTime::now_utc(),
@@ -322,6 +352,20 @@ async fn seed_from_dir(
/// a loopback address (which would give every PXE client an unreachable
/// `http://127.0.0.1/...`). Users in multi-homed setups should set
/// `OPENPXE_PUBLIC_IP` explicitly.
/// Build the base URL advertised to PXE clients. The port is included
/// unless it's the HTTP default (80), keeping the common case clean
/// (`http://10.0.0.5`) while a remapped port (`http://10.0.0.5:4200`)
/// stays reachable. This is the single source of truth for every
/// client-facing URL — the DHCP-proxy iPXE filename, UEFI HTTP boot, and
/// the boot menu's kernel/initrd/ISO links all derive from it.
fn build_public_base_url(ip: Ipv4Addr, http_port: u16) -> String {
if http_port == 80 {
format!("http://{ip}")
} else {
format!("http://{ip}:{http_port}")
}
}
fn detect_primary_ipv4() -> Option<Ipv4Addr> {
// First try: route to the public internet. `UdpSocket::connect` to a
// well-known external address causes the OS to populate `local_addr`
@@ -455,3 +499,26 @@ fn prefix_to_dotted(prefix: u8) -> String {
mask & 0xff
)
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn public_base_url_includes_non_default_port() {
// The v0.5.6 regression guard: a remapped HTTP port (e.g. the
// Unraid template's 4200) MUST appear in the advertised URL, or
// PXE clients fetch :80 — the wrong service — and boot fails.
let ip: Ipv4Addr = "192.168.1.49".parse().unwrap();
assert_eq!(build_public_base_url(ip, 4200), "http://192.168.1.49:4200");
assert_eq!(build_public_base_url(ip, 8080), "http://192.168.1.49:8080");
}
#[test]
fn public_base_url_omits_default_port() {
// Port 80 stays clean (no `:80`) so the common case reads nicely
// and matches what every browser/iPXE assumes by default.
let ip: Ipv4Addr = "10.0.0.5".parse().unwrap();
assert_eq!(build_public_base_url(ip, 80), "http://10.0.0.5");
}
}
+30 -16
View File
@@ -7,12 +7,12 @@
//! `tftpd`/`in.tftpd` works and is why TFTP is awkward behind stateful NAT:
//! the ephemeral ports must be reachable from the client.
//!
//! We only serve files from `openpxe_ipxe_assets::asset_bytes` — that is,
//! We only serve files from `openpxe_ipxe_assets::asset_slice` — that is,
//! the bundled iPXE binaries and wimboot. No filesystem is ever opened, so
//! `../` path traversal attempts simply return ENOENT.
use openpxe_core::{ClientEvent, ClientRegistry};
use openpxe_ipxe_assets::asset_bytes;
use openpxe_ipxe_assets::asset_slice;
use socket2::{Domain, Protocol, Socket, Type};
use std::net::{IpAddr, SocketAddr};
use std::sync::Arc;
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ use tokio::net::UdpSocket;
// TFTP opcodes.
const OP_RRQ: u16 = 1;
const OP_WRQ: u16 = 2;
const OP_DATA: u16 = 3;
const OP_ACK: u16 = 4;
const OP_ERROR: u16 = 5;
@@ -89,16 +90,34 @@ async fn handle_rrq(
metrics: openpxe_core::Metrics,
) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
let Some(req) = parse_rrq(&packet) else {
// Not a well-formed RRQ. A WRQ deserves an explicit refusal —
// legacy clients retry a silently-dropped write until they time
// out; an ERROR packet fails them fast with a readable reason.
if packet.len() >= 2 && u16::from_be_bytes([packet[0], packet[1]]) == OP_WRQ {
let sock = bind_udp(bind_ip, 0)?;
let _ = send_error(&sock, peer, ERR_ILLEGAL_OP, "writes not supported").await;
}
return Ok(());
};
let Request {
filename, options, ..
filename,
mode,
options,
} = req;
// Per-transfer ephemeral socket.
let sock = bind_udp(bind_ip, 0)?;
let Some(file_bytes) = asset_bytes(&filename) else {
// We serve binary boot artifacts; netascii line-ending translation
// would corrupt them. Refuse loudly instead of timing out silently —
// matters for legacy clients that default to netascii.
if !mode.eq_ignore_ascii_case("octet") {
let _ = send_error(&sock, peer, ERR_NOT_DEFINED, "only octet mode is supported").await;
tracing::info!(target: "openpxe::tftp", peer=%peer, %mode, "rejected non-octet transfer");
return Ok(());
}
let Some(file_bytes) = asset_slice(&filename) else {
let _ = send_error(&sock, peer, ERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND, "no such file").await;
tracing::info!(target: "openpxe::tftp", peer=%peer, file=%filename, "404");
clients.record(
@@ -262,7 +281,6 @@ async fn handle_rrq(
#[derive(Debug)]
struct Request {
filename: String,
#[allow(dead_code)]
mode: String,
options: Vec<(String, String)>,
}
@@ -393,17 +411,13 @@ fn bind_udp(bind: IpAddr, port: u16) -> anyhow::Result<UdpSocket> {
Ok(UdpSocket::from_std(std_sock)?)
}
#[allow(dead_code)]
const _UNUSED: (u16, u16) = (ERR_NOT_DEFINED, ERR_ILLEGAL_OP);
/// Pure-logic helper used by the unit tests below and (in a refactor) by
/// `handle_rrq`. Given a position in the file and the window, return the
/// (block_no, chunk_len) list this window will emit. Useful as a sanity
/// check that our windowing math matches the wire behavior the spec
/// requires — tested against edge cases (exact-blksize tail, short tail,
/// single-block window).
#[must_use]
pub fn plan_window(
/// Pure-logic mirror of `handle_rrq`'s windowing math, exercised by the
/// unit tests below. Given a position in the file and the window, return
/// the (block_no, chunk_len) list this window will emit — tested against
/// edge cases (exact-blksize tail, short tail, single-block window,
/// block-number wraparound).
#[cfg(test)]
fn plan_window(
total: usize,
offset: usize,
blksize: usize,
+72
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@@ -304,6 +304,14 @@ button.ghost { background: transparent; color: var(--fg); border: 1px solid var(
button.ghost:hover { background: var(--bg-panel-2); color: var(--fg); }
button.danger { background: transparent; color: var(--err); border: 1px solid color-mix(in srgb, var(--err) 35%, transparent); }
button.danger:hover { background: color-mix(in srgb, var(--err) 14%, transparent); color: var(--err); }
/* v0.5.3: unified spacing for a card's primary action button(s). Any
button that sits as a direct child of a card body (Save, Bind, Add,
Launch, ) gets the same gap above it so it never butts against the
form. Inline buttons inside table rows / toolbars / logo slots /
modal action bars are nested deeper, so the `>` keeps them untouched.
Adjacent action buttons on one row (e.g. Save + Send test) share the
margin and stay aligned. */
.card .body > button { margin-top: 16px; }
label.field {
display: grid; gap: 4px; margin-bottom: 14px;
@@ -840,3 +848,67 @@ tr.unbootable td:first-child { border-left: 3px solid var(--warn); }
border: 1px solid var(--border);
color: var(--fg-dim);
}
/* ── v0.5.2: three-slot branding (light / dark / client) ─────────── */
.logo-slots {
display: grid;
grid-template-columns: repeat(3, 1fr);
gap: 12px;
}
@media (max-width: 720px) { .logo-slots { grid-template-columns: 1fr; } }
.logo-slot {
display: flex; flex-direction: column; gap: 8px;
padding: 12px;
background: var(--bg-panel-2);
border: 1px solid var(--border);
border-radius: var(--radius);
}
.logo-slot-head { display: flex; align-items: center; justify-content: space-between; gap: 8px; }
.logo-slot-head .name { color: var(--fg); font-weight: 600; font-size: 13px; }
.logo-slot .swatch {
height: 64px;
display: flex; align-items: center; justify-content: center;
background: var(--bg); border: 1px solid var(--border);
border-radius: var(--radius);
}
.logo-slot .swatch img { max-width: 90%; max-height: 52px; object-fit: contain; }
.logo-slot-hint { color: var(--fg-dim); font-size: 11.5px; }
/* ── v0.5.2: login local/SSO separation ─────────────────────────── */
.auth-card .auth-divider {
display: flex; align-items: center; text-align: center;
color: var(--fg-dimmer); font-size: 11px; text-transform: uppercase;
letter-spacing: 0.08em;
margin: 16px 0 12px;
}
.auth-card .auth-divider::before,
.auth-card .auth-divider::after {
content: ""; flex: 1; height: 1px; background: var(--border-soft);
}
.auth-card .auth-divider span { padding: 0 10px; }
.auth-card .sso-block .sso-btn { margin-top: 0; }
.auth-card .sso-btn {
display: flex; align-items: center; justify-content: center; gap: 8px;
}
.auth-card .sso-btn .sso-logo { width: 16px; height: 16px; object-fit: contain; flex: none; }
/* ── v0.5.2: modal (queue Profile editor) ───────────────────────── */
.modal-overlay {
position: fixed; inset: 0; z-index: 200;
display: flex; align-items: center; justify-content: center;
background: rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.55);
padding: 24px;
}
.modal-box {
width: 100%; max-width: 520px;
background: var(--bg-panel);
border: 1px solid var(--border);
border-radius: var(--radius-lg);
box-shadow: var(--shadow-card);
padding: 22px;
}
.modal-box h2 { margin: 0 0 14px; font-size: 16px; font-weight: 600; color: var(--fg); }
.modal-actions {
display: flex; justify-content: flex-end; gap: 10px; margin-top: 18px;
}
.modal-actions .submit { width: auto; padding: 8px 18px; }
+564 -157
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+4 -1
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@@ -13,7 +13,10 @@
on the asset handlers, the practical caching window is one
version. -->
<link rel="stylesheet" href="/assets/app.css?v={{ASSET_VERSION}}" />
<link rel="icon" type="image/svg+xml" href="/assets/logo.svg?v={{ASSET_VERSION}}&r={{LOGO_REV}}" />
<!-- v0.5.2: favicon is pinned to the bundled OpenPXE mark (its own
endpoint, decoupled from operator branding) for tab-icon
continuity regardless of any uploaded light/dark/client logo. -->
<link rel="icon" type="image/svg+xml" href="/assets/favicon.svg?v={{ASSET_VERSION}}" />
<!-- Theme is read from localStorage *before* paint to avoid the
dark→light flash on every navigation. Falls back to the OS
preference and finally to dark. -->
+30 -26
View File
@@ -60,35 +60,41 @@ COPY deploy/ipxe/local/ deploy/ipxe/local/
RUN mkdir -p assets/ipxe && bash scripts/build-ipxe.sh /src/assets/ipxe
########## build openpxe ##########
FROM rust:${RUST_VERSION}-bookworm AS build
WORKDIR /src
# v0.4.5: build a fully static musl binary (matches Bootimus v0.1.70's
# move). The resulting `/openpxe` has no glibc dependency at all, which:
# - Lets the runtime stage be any Linux distro (we still ship Debian
# slim for the `samba` / `wimtools` / `nfs-common` shellouts, but a
# scratch/distroless variant becomes a one-line swap).
# - Cuts a class of "GLIBC_2.39 not found" surprises when running on
# older RHEL/Rocky hosts that don't match Debian 12's libc version.
# - Sidesteps cross-compilation snags (the binary is its own world).
# v0.5.2: cross-compile the Rust binary NATIVELY — no QEMU.
#
# x86_64-unknown-linux-musl is fully static by default (no extra
# RUSTFLAGS needed). musl-tools provides the linker.
# This stage is pinned to $BUILDPLATFORM (the builder's native arch — arm64
# on an Apple-Silicon Mac, amd64 in x86 CI), exactly like `ipxe-build`. The
# Rust compiler therefore runs at full native speed and emits an
# x86_64-unknown-linux-musl binary via `cargo-zigbuild`, which uses `zig cc`
# as the cross-linker (it bundles the musl sysroot for every target, so
# there's no fiddly cross-gcc toolchain to assemble).
#
# Why this replaced the old `FROM rust ... --platform=linux/amd64` build:
# that ran the *entire* compiler under QEMU x86_64 emulation on the arm64
# host. It was ~15x slower (a single crate took >20 min) and the emulated
# gcc/linker intermittently SIGSEGV'd or hung mid-link. Cross-compiling
# sidesteps emulation entirely — the build is minutes, not half an hour,
# and is deterministic.
#
# The output is still a fully static musl binary with no glibc dependency,
# so the runtime stage stays free to be any Linux distro.
FROM --platform=$BUILDPLATFORM rust:${RUST_VERSION}-bookworm AS build
WORKDIR /src
# zig (via the `ziglang` pip package — cargo-zigbuild auto-discovers it as
# `python3 -m ziglang`) supplies the x86_64 musl sysroot + linker.
# cargo-zigbuild is the thin cargo wrapper that wires zig in as the linker.
RUN apt-get update \
&& apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends musl-tools \
&& apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends python3 python3-pip \
&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/* \
&& rustup target add x86_64-unknown-linux-musl
&& rustup target add x86_64-unknown-linux-musl \
&& pip3 install --no-cache-dir --break-system-packages ziglang \
&& cargo install --locked cargo-zigbuild
# Copy the whole workspace in one go. We used to do a two-pass "cache-prime
# with stubs, then real build" dance for dep-compile reuse; that turned out
# to silently serve stale stub binaries when cargo's fingerprint didn't
# notice the source swap. A single build is ~1.5 min longer on cold cache
# but guarantees the binary reflects the sources we copied.
# Do not copy rust-toolchain.toml into the image. The local workspace pins
# developer tooling, but inside Docker we intentionally use the Rust version
# selected by the base image. Copying rust-toolchain.toml with
# `channel = "stable"` makes rustup download a second full toolchain during
# `cargo build`, which is slow and can exhaust small Colima/CI disks.
# the build, which is slow and can exhaust small Colima/CI disks.
COPY Cargo.toml Cargo.lock ./
COPY crates/ crates/
# Baseline binaries (BIOS / i386 / wimboot), then overlay the
@@ -100,13 +106,11 @@ COPY --from=fetch /src/assets/ipxe /src/assets/ipxe
COPY --from=ipxe-build /src/assets/ipxe/snponly.efi /src/assets/ipxe/snponly.efi
COPY --from=ipxe-build /src/assets/ipxe/ipxe.efi /src/assets/ipxe/ipxe.efi
# Cache cargo registry + target across builds. The mtime touch is
# belt-and-suspenders: cargo occasionally misses mtime-only changes on
# networked FS; this forces a fingerprint check.
# Cache cargo registry + target across builds. `cargo zigbuild` runs the
# native rustc (fast) and links for x86_64-musl with zig — no emulation.
RUN --mount=type=cache,target=/usr/local/cargo/registry \
--mount=type=cache,target=/src/target,sharing=locked \
find crates -name '*.rs' -exec touch {} + && \
cargo build --release --target x86_64-unknown-linux-musl --bin openpxe && \
cargo zigbuild --release --target x86_64-unknown-linux-musl --bin openpxe && \
cp target/x86_64-unknown-linux-musl/release/openpxe /openpxe && \
ls -l /openpxe
+21
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
<svg viewBox="0 0 24 24" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" role="img" aria-label="OpenPXE">
<title>OpenPXE</title>
<!-- Static README mark: the "rainbow-horizon" medallion from the web UI,
with the SMIL animation removed so it renders reliably as an <img>
on Gitea/GitHub. -->
<defs>
<linearGradient id="opxRainbow" x1="0" y1="0" x2="1" y2="0">
<stop offset="0%" stop-color="#330f1f"/>
<stop offset="12.56%" stop-color="#c83228"/>
<stop offset="25.06%" stop-color="#fb8841"/>
<stop offset="37.56%" stop-color="#d3dd92"/>
<stop offset="50.06%" stop-color="#59824f"/>
<stop offset="62.06%" stop-color="#002414"/>
<stop offset="74.06%" stop-color="#00143d"/>
<stop offset="86.06%" stop-color="#2874d7"/>
<stop offset="100%" stop-color="#99c2ff"/>
</linearGradient>
</defs>
<circle cx="12" cy="12" r="10.5" fill="url(#opxRainbow)"
stroke="rgba(0,0,0,0.18)" stroke-width="0.6"/>
</svg>

After

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+23 -7
View File
@@ -41,15 +41,31 @@ DEST="${1:-$ROOT/assets/ipxe}"
WORK="$(mktemp -d)"
trap 'rm -rf "$WORK"' EXIT
# Pinned upstream iPXE. Rolling master is fine functionally, but a pin
# keeps builds reproducible and protects against a transient master
# breakage. Bump deliberately.
# Pinned upstream iPXE. Rolling master is fine functionally, but a pin keeps
# builds reproducible, protects against a transient master breakage, and —
# crucially for the Docker image — busting this value invalidates the cached
# ipxe-build layer so an "update iPXE" release actually recompiles from the
# new upstream. Bump deliberately to a recent master commit.
#
# v0.6.1: ipxe/ipxe master @ 2026-06-09 (newer NIC drivers + EFI fixes;
# mirrors iVentoy 1.0.35 "Update iPXE").
IPXE_REPO="https://github.com/ipxe/ipxe.git"
IPXE_REF="${IPXE_REF:-master}"
IPXE_REF="${IPXE_REF:-95ffbf4745553e8a207922389929e1943c0237c0}"
echo ">> cloning iPXE ($IPXE_REF)"
git clone --depth 1 --branch "$IPXE_REF" "$IPXE_REPO" "$WORK/ipxe" 2>/dev/null \
|| git clone "$IPXE_REPO" "$WORK/ipxe"
echo ">> fetching iPXE ($IPXE_REF)"
# Shallow-fetch the exact ref: works for a full commit SHA (GitHub allows
# reachable-SHA1-in-want) and for branch/tag names. Fall back to a full
# clone + checkout if the server refuses a direct fetch of this ref.
git init -q "$WORK/ipxe"
git -C "$WORK/ipxe" remote add origin "$IPXE_REPO"
if git -C "$WORK/ipxe" fetch -q --depth 1 origin "$IPXE_REF"; then
git -C "$WORK/ipxe" checkout -q FETCH_HEAD
else
echo " direct fetch failed; falling back to full clone + checkout"
rm -rf "$WORK/ipxe"
git clone -q "$IPXE_REPO" "$WORK/ipxe"
git -C "$WORK/ipxe" checkout -q "$IPXE_REF"
fi
SRC="$WORK/ipxe/src"
echo ">> applying OpenPXE config overrides (PNG + framebuffer + console cmd)"
+9 -1
View File
@@ -29,11 +29,19 @@ mkdir -p "$DEST"
# Upstream uses arch-scoped subdirectories; we flatten to the names our
# ClientArch::ipxe_bootfile() expects.
declare -a MAP=(
# DriverMode::Firmware (default) — reuse the firmware UNDI/SNP NIC stack.
"undionly.kpxe=undionly.kpxe"
"snponly.efi=x86_64-efi/snponly.efi"
"snponly-i386.efi=i386-efi/snponly.efi"
"snponly-arm64.efi=arm64-efi/snponly.efi"
"ipxe.efi=x86_64-efi/ipxe.efi" # fallback with bundled drivers
# DriverMode::Builtin (v0.6.1 automatic fallback) — iPXE's own all-drivers
# builds, advertised by the DHCP proxy to a MAC whose firmware NIC stack
# failed to chainload. (x86_64 ipxe.efi is rebuilt from source with PNG in
# build-ipxe.sh and overlaid on top of this fetched baseline.)
"ipxe.efi=x86_64-efi/ipxe.efi"
"ipxe.pxe=ipxe.pxe"
"ipxe-i386.efi=i386-efi/ipxe.efi"
"ipxe-arm64.efi=arm64-efi/ipxe.efi"
)
BASE="https://boot.ipxe.org"