Files
OpenPXE/crates/core/src/saml/authn_request.rs
T
Miles WardandClaude Opus 4.8 674a69f93b v0.5.4: code-cleanup pass (AppError, figment config, encoding dedup, typed status, deps)
Final cleanup before hardware testing. No behaviour changes; 248 tests green,
clippy clean.

#1  AppError newtype (http-api/src/error.rs) with one IntoResponse mapping
    (NotFound→404, Invalid→400, _→500) + From<core::Error>/From<io::Error>.
    Converted the clearly-safe handlers (sso_put, unattended_upload,
    branding_clear) to `?`; intentionally left handlers with bespoke
    status semantics (Invalid→404 on category, 409 on duplicate share /
    open upload) explicit so no asserted status changes.
#2  figment-based Config::load (defaults → TOML → env). Keeps the historical
    flat OPENPXE_* names (Unraid/entrypoint compatible) AND adds the nested
    OPENPXE_SECTION__FIELD form; now covers every field (apply_env had
    silently skipped unattended_dir + bind addrs). 6 Jail tests prove
    backward-compat. Removed the hand-rolled apply_env.
#3  thiserror 1→2; dropped unused mime/mime_guess/once_cell deps.
#4  Re-evaluated: Duration::from_hours/from_mins are stable on the pinned
    1.95 toolchain and clippy prefers them — kept the readable form
    (the "unstable" premise didn't hold; MSRV is intentionally 1.95).
#5  insta snapshot of the rendered iPXE menu (version-filtered) + wiremock
    coverage of the SAML metadata-URL fetch (200 + non-2xx).
#6  api_status → typed StatusResponse struct (was a 25-key json! blob) with
    a full_flow guard test asserting every UI key + the started_at string
    shape. Deferred the /api/docs typed conversion (lowest value, highest
    churn, zero functional benefit).
#7  pct_encode/xml_escape de-duplicated into openpxe_core::encoding (were
    copied across app.rs + the SAML modules). No new crates.
#8  UploadSessions registry → parking_lot::RwLock (sync, never held across
    .await); per-session lock stays tokio::Mutex.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-06-03 03:33:05 -04:00

160 lines
6.1 KiB
Rust

//! AuthnRequest construction + HTTP-Redirect binding encoding.
//!
//! For SP-initiated login we build an `<AuthnRequest>`, then encode it for the
//! HTTP-Redirect binding: raw DEFLATE (RFC 1951) → base64 → percent-encode,
//! appended as the `SAMLRequest` query parameter. AuthnRequests are sent
//! unsigned in this release (the IdP must not require client signatures).
use std::io::Write as _;
use base64::Engine;
use flate2::write::DeflateEncoder;
use flate2::Compression;
use time::format_description::well_known::Rfc3339;
use time::OffsetDateTime;
use super::{SamlError, SpParams};
use crate::encoding::{pct_encode, xml_escape};
const NS_PROTOCOL: &str = "urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol";
const NS_ASSERTION: &str = "urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion";
const NAMEID_EMAIL: &str = "urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.1:nameid-format:emailAddress";
const BINDING_POST: &str = "urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:bindings:HTTP-POST";
/// A built AuthnRequest, ready to redirect the browser to the IdP.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct AuthnRequest {
/// The request `ID` — the caller records this so the matching response's
/// `InResponseTo` can be correlated (replay/CSRF protection).
pub id: String,
/// The full IdP URL to 302 the browser to (includes `SAMLRequest` and,
/// when supplied, `RelayState`).
pub location: String,
}
/// Build an AuthnRequest targeting `idp_sso_url` and encode it for the
/// HTTP-Redirect binding. `relay_state`, if given, round-trips back to us via
/// the response (we use it to send the operator to their intended page).
pub fn build(
sp: &SpParams,
idp_sso_url: &str,
relay_state: Option<&str>,
) -> Result<AuthnRequest, SamlError> {
let id = format!("_{}", uuid::Uuid::new_v4().simple());
let issue_instant = OffsetDateTime::now_utc()
.replace_nanosecond(0)
.unwrap_or_else(|_| OffsetDateTime::now_utc())
.format(&Rfc3339)
.map_err(|e| SamlError::Timestamp(e.to_string()))?;
let xml = format!(
r#"<samlp:AuthnRequest xmlns:samlp="{NS_PROTOCOL}" xmlns:saml="{NS_ASSERTION}" ID="{id}" Version="2.0" IssueInstant="{instant}" Destination="{dest}" ProtocolBinding="{BINDING_POST}" AssertionConsumerServiceURL="{acs}"><saml:Issuer>{issuer}</saml:Issuer><samlp:NameIDPolicy Format="{NAMEID_EMAIL}" AllowCreate="true"/></samlp:AuthnRequest>"#,
instant = issue_instant,
dest = xml_escape(idp_sso_url),
acs = xml_escape(&sp.acs_url),
issuer = xml_escape(&sp.entity_id),
);
let encoded = deflate_base64(&xml)?;
let sep = if idp_sso_url.contains('?') { '&' } else { '?' };
let mut location = format!("{idp_sso_url}{sep}SAMLRequest={}", pct_encode(&encoded));
if let Some(rs) = relay_state {
location.push_str("&RelayState=");
location.push_str(&pct_encode(rs));
}
Ok(AuthnRequest { id, location })
}
/// Raw-DEFLATE then base64 — the HTTP-Redirect binding's `SAMLRequest` payload.
fn deflate_base64(xml: &str) -> Result<String, SamlError> {
let mut enc = DeflateEncoder::new(Vec::new(), Compression::default());
enc.write_all(xml.as_bytes())
.and_then(|()| enc.try_finish())
.map_err(|e| SamlError::Xml(format!("deflate: {e}")))?;
let compressed = enc
.finish()
.map_err(|e| SamlError::Xml(format!("deflate: {e}")))?;
Ok(base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD.encode(compressed))
}
// `pct_encode` + `xml_escape` now live in `openpxe_core::encoding` (v0.5.4)
// — imported above.
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use flate2::read::DeflateDecoder;
use std::io::Read;
fn sp() -> SpParams {
SpParams {
entity_id: "https://pxe.example.com".into(),
acs_url: "https://pxe.example.com/api/sso/acs".into(),
}
}
fn pct_decode(s: &str) -> Vec<u8> {
let bytes = s.as_bytes();
let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(bytes.len());
let mut i = 0;
while i < bytes.len() {
if bytes[i] == b'%' && i + 2 < bytes.len() {
let hi = (bytes[i + 1] as char).to_digit(16).unwrap();
let lo = (bytes[i + 2] as char).to_digit(16).unwrap();
out.push((hi * 16 + lo) as u8);
i += 3;
} else {
out.push(bytes[i]);
i += 1;
}
}
out
}
#[test]
fn id_is_ncname_and_location_has_request() {
let req = build(&sp(), "https://idp.example.com/sso", Some("/dashboard")).unwrap();
assert!(req.id.starts_with('_'));
assert!(req
.location
.starts_with("https://idp.example.com/sso?SAMLRequest="));
assert!(req.location.contains("&RelayState=%2Fdashboard"));
}
#[test]
fn redirect_payload_round_trips_to_our_authn_request() {
let req = build(&sp(), "https://idp.example.com/sso", None).unwrap();
// Pull SAMLRequest value out of the query string.
let q = req.location.split("SAMLRequest=").nth(1).unwrap();
let val = q.split('&').next().unwrap();
let compressed = base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD
.decode(pct_decode(val))
.unwrap();
let mut inflate = DeflateDecoder::new(&compressed[..]);
let mut xml = String::new();
inflate.read_to_string(&mut xml).unwrap();
let doc = roxmltree::Document::parse(&xml).unwrap();
let root = doc.root_element();
assert_eq!(root.tag_name().name(), "AuthnRequest");
assert_eq!(root.attribute("ID").unwrap(), req.id);
assert_eq!(
root.attribute("AssertionConsumerServiceURL").unwrap(),
"https://pxe.example.com/api/sso/acs"
);
let issuer = root
.descendants()
.find(|n| n.tag_name().name() == "Issuer")
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(issuer.text().unwrap(), "https://pxe.example.com");
}
#[test]
fn existing_query_uses_ampersand_separator() {
let req = build(&sp(), "https://idp.example.com/sso?foo=bar", None).unwrap();
assert!(req.location.contains("?foo=bar&SAMLRequest="));
}
}