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Author SHA1 Message Date
Miles Ward 90a23a8c96 docs(runbook): apply OpenPXE rebrand to network-boot runbook
The Linux network-boot runbook landed on origin/main while the v0.3.0
rebrand was in flight on local main. Runs the same string-rewrite
pass: PXEForge → OpenPXE, Gated → Queued, /api/gate → /api/queue,
PXEFORGE_ env vars → OPENPXE_, container path under
/var/lib/openpxe.
2026-05-06 14:14:09 -04:00
Miles Ward e3452fe976 v0.3.0 — rebrand: PXEForge → OpenPXE, Gated → Queued Deployment
Full rename to match the openpxe.com brand. The product now reads as a
polished open-source project rather than a personal-tool nickname:
the anvil/forge metaphor is gone, replaced with the rainbow-horizon
brand mark from the marketing site.

## Naming changes

**PXEForge → OpenPXE** everywhere it's user-visible or developer-
facing:
- All 8 crate package names (`pxeforge-*` → `openpxe-*`).
- The bin crate dir + binary (`crates/pxeforge` → `crates/openpxe`,
  `bin = "openpxe"`).
- Env vars: `PXEFORGE_*` → `OPENPXE_*` (no compat shim — pre-beta).
- Tracing targets: `pxeforge::*` → `openpxe::*`.
- Prometheus metrics: `pxeforge_*` → `openpxe_*` (pre-beta; nobody
  has dashboards on these yet).
- Container image: `gitea.milesward.dev/mward4/openpxe:0.3.0`.
- All in-tree paths: `/var/lib/openpxe/{isos,work,smb}`,
  `/usr/share/openpxe/ipxe`, `/etc/openpxe/...`.
- Unraid template renamed `pxeforge.xml` → `openpxe.xml`.
- README, NEXT_PHASE.md, architecture.md, comments, and the WebUI
  brand string.

**Gated Deployment → Queued Deployment** as the user-facing concept:
- `Settings::TimeoutAction::GatedDeployment` →
  `QueuedDeployment` (with `#[serde(alias = "gated_deployment")]`
  so v0.2.0 settings.json files keep deserializing).
- Rust types: `Gate` → `QueueEntry`, `GateQueue` → `DeploymentQueue`,
  `GateInner` → `QueueEntryInner`.
- File: `crates/core/src/gate.rs` → `crates/core/src/queue.rs`.
- HTTP routes: `/api/gate/*` → `/api/queue/*`. The JSON list key
  flipped from `"gates"` to `"entries"` to match.
- iPXE shortcut: `/boot/_gate.ipxe` → `/boot/_queue.ipxe`. The
  top-level menu's item id is now `queue` instead of `gate`.
- WebUI sidebar tab: "Forge Gate" → "Queue".
- Field on `AppState`: `gates` → `queue`.

## Brand assets

The anvil + forging-sparks logos are dropped:
- `logo.svg` is now a 24×24 medallion filled with the
  `rainbow-horizon` gradient from openpxe.com (sliding hue rotation
  via SMIL on the gradient stops, no JS needed).
- `anvil-forge.svg` renamed to `loader.svg` and rebuilt as a 64×64
  louder version of the same disc — used for page-load transitions
  and the imaging-progress widget. Adds a subtle scale pulse and a
  white inner-glow so it has dimensionality on either theme.

## CSS rename

- `.forge-progress` → `.queue-progress`
- `.forge-progress .anvil` → `.queue-progress .mark`
- `@keyframes forge-sheen` → `queue-sheen`
- `.loader .anvil` → `.loader .mark`
- "Heating the forge…" loader text → "Loading…"

The rest of the layout is untouched. Light/dark theme tokens and the
sidebar/topbar structure carry over from v0.2.0 unchanged — the
brief was "keeping the UI similar."

## Validation

- `cargo build --workspace` — clean.
- `cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets` — no warnings.
- `cargo test --workspace` — **66 tests passing**, same as v0.2.0.
- Local smoke run against the rebuilt release binary verifies:
  - `/boot.ipxe` emits `Queued Deployment` + `item queue` + chains
    `/boot/_queue.ipxe`
  - `/api/queue` returns `{count, entries}`
  - `/metrics` emits `openpxe_queue_count` (renamed)
  - `/assets/logo.svg` and `/assets/loader.svg` serve the new
    rainbow brand SVGs
  - `/api/status` reports version `0.3.0`

## Migration notes for operators on v0.2.0

- Container image path changed: pull
  `gitea.milesward.dev/mward4/openpxe:0.3.0` (not `pxeforge:`).
- Bind mounts: `/var/lib/openpxe/{isos,work,smb}` (not `pxeforge`).
  Move the host path or update the template.
- Env vars: replace `PXEFORGE_*` with `OPENPXE_*`. The Unraid
  template at `deploy/unraid/openpxe.xml` is already updated.
- `settings.json` carries over transparently — the
  `gated_deployment` value is accepted as an alias.
- HTTP API: any external scripts that hit `/api/gate/*` need to
  switch to `/api/queue/*`. The JSON envelope key is `entries`
  instead of `gates`.
2026-05-06 14:13:38 -04:00
503432756 c607f2e31c docs: add Linux network-boot runbook 2026-04-30 11:35:47 -04:00
Miles Ward 5206fae877 docs: add Phase 6 recommendations punch-list
Three tiers (must-do / round-out / large lifts), plus a "what I'd
skip" section calling out things from Tinkerbell and Bootimus that
don't pull their weight at PXEForge's scale (custom DHCP server,
pluggable backend abstraction, LLM-translated UI strings).

The big-ticket Tier-1 item is the real-hardware validation matrix —
everything currently passes CI tests but nothing has been booted by
real firmware yet.
2026-04-30 02:30:05 -04:00
Miles Ward 6d3d636fad v0.2.0 — pre-beta: per-MAC bindings, /metrics, themes, animated forge
This is the bulk pre-beta cleanup pass. Bumps the workspace to 0.2.0.
Test count is 56 -> 66 (+10), clippy is fully clean across the
workspace (was several dozen warnings).

## New features

**Per-MAC host bindings** (Tinkerbell smee pattern). New
`HostBindings` registry maps a MAC -> preferred boot target, persisted
to <work_dir>/hosts.json. The DHCP reply now embeds `?mac=${mac}` in
the boot.ipxe URL; iPXE substitutes the literal MAC client-side, so
the HTTP layer can short-circuit straight to the bound target instead
of rendering the menu. Reserved menu shortcuts (`_local`, `_gate`,
`_tools_menu`) are valid targets too. New /api/hosts CRUD + a Hosts
tab in the sidebar.

**Prometheus `/metrics`** endpoint. Tiny lock-free implementation —
just AtomicU64s and a Display impl, no `prometheus` / `metrics-rs`
dep. Counters: DHCP replies (per arch label), DHCP declined, TFTP
transfers (per status), TFTP bytes, HTTP requests (per route).
Gauges: ISO count, client count, gate count, gate-imaging, NFS active
mounts, uptime, build info. Plain text exposition format,
text/plain;version=0.0.4 content-type, no auth (all metric values are
non-sensitive counts).

**Light + dark themes**. CSS tokens on `:root` and
`:root[data-theme=light]`, swap by toggle button (top-right) or `T`
hotkey. Persisted in localStorage; pre-paint inline script avoids
dark<->light flash. Light palette designed against the Netbox Labs
reference screenshot — near-white surfaces, soft grey dividers,
accent unchanged for brand consistency. Terminal pane stays dark in
both themes (it's a console, that's the right read).

**Animated SVG logo + forge widget**. New `logo.svg` is a refined
silver/grey anvil. New `anvil-forge.svg` adds rising sparks and a
pulsing underglow via SMIL — pure SVG, no GIF, no JS animation loop.
Used:
  - in the **forge progress** widget on Dashboard + Forge Gate, paired
    with a `linear-gradient(warn -> accent)` bar with a moving sheen;
    goes idle (greyscale, no sheen) at zero imaging load
  - in the page-load `<div class=loader>` that replaces the old
    "Loading..." text

## Code cleanup pass

`cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets` is now warning-free. Spot
fixes across the tree:
  - `format!()`-into-`String` -> `std::fmt::Write::write!`
  - manual reverse comparators -> `Reverse`
  - `map_or(false, ...)` -> `is_some_and`
  - redundant closures -> method references
  - `r#"..."#` raw strings without `"` -> `r"..."`
  - `std::io::Error::new(Other, ...)` -> `Error::other`
  - `as i32` on `c.id()` -> `cast_signed()`
  - merged identical match arms

## Windows workflow validation

New integration test synthesizes an ISO9660 with the SOURCES\\BOOT.WIM
sentinel, uploads it, asserts:
  1. introspection labels it `windows_pe` with has_boot_wim=true,
  2. the boot entry is `BootKind::Wimboot` with all five canonical
     files (bootmgr, bootmgr.efi, bcd, boot.sdi, boot.wim),
  3. the rendered iPXE script chains wimboot with `initrd --name`
     entries for each file, and
  4. NO trust-store strings appear in the rendered output: bcdedit,
     testsigning, certutil, httpdisk, and test-signed are all
     explicitly forbidden as a hard guarantee.

WinPE bootstrap (startnet.cmd) picks up the Bootimus v0.1.58 lessons:
explicit `net start Workstation` before `net use` to avoid the SMB
client lazy-init race, and surfaces errors instead of blind retries.

## Docs

architecture.md gains a "Phase 5" section explaining the host-bindings
+ metrics + theming + Windows-test work, plus a refreshed "deferred
to Phase 6" list (real-hardware integration, autounattend library,
distro profile manifest, WoL trigger, syslog receiver, IPv6).
README updates the status line, the "what it does" list, and adds
the new Hosts/Terminal tab names.
2026-04-30 02:28:10 -04:00
Miles Ward 083277faae Add Unraid quickstart: build-and-publish script + Docker template
Three paths from "Gitea-on-Unraid + a built repo" to "Unraid pulls
PXEForge by tag":

1. scripts/build-and-publish-unraid.sh — one-shot run on the Unraid
   host. Clones from local Gitea (http://localhost:3000), runs the
   iPXE fetch, docker build, docker login + push to Gitea's container
   registry. Token never lands in the host's ~/.docker/config.json:
   we set DOCKER_CONFIG to a tempdir and rm -rf it on exit. Token
   never lands in `ps`/bash history either: --password-stdin.

2. deploy/unraid/pxeforge.xml — Docker template for the Unraid UI.
   Forces NetworkType=host (PXE needs raw L2 broadcast — bridge mode
   doesn't work, full stop), declares the right cap-add, and surfaces
   PXEFORGE_PUBLIC_IP / PXEFORGE_LOG as configurable variables.

3. deploy/unraid/README.md — three documented paths (registry, compose
   from cloned repo, docker load from tarball) and the gotchas that
   actually bite (DHCP collision, host networking, perms on
   /mnt/user/appdata, NFS-needs-CAP_SYS_ADMIN).

The build host I'm running on can't reach Unraid right now (LAN moved
to a different subnet) and the Cloudflare WAF skip rule on
gitea.milesward.dev doesn't yet cover /v2/* or /git-{upload,receive}-pack
paths, so the publish has to happen from the Unraid host itself for now.
This commit is what makes that one-shot.
2026-04-30 00:02:29 -04:00
Miles Ward cc309da062 Initial commit: PXEForge Phases 1-4
Container-native PXE boot server in Rust, designed as a clean-room
alternative to iVentoy that never touches the client OS trust store.
This is the first commit of the project; it lands the full output of
Phases 1, 2, 3, and 4 in one shot.

## Phase 1 — protocol stack

- 8-crate workspace (core, dhcp-proxy, tftp, http-api, iso-store,
  ipxe-assets, webui, pxeforge bin).
- DHCP proxy (RFC 4578): replies with boot info only, never leases —
  sidesteps CAP_NET_RAW. Architecture-aware bootfile selection from
  option 93 (BIOS, IA32, x64-UEFI alias 0x0007/0x0009, ARM64).
- TFTP server with full OACK negotiation: blksize, tsize, windowsize.
  Without it a 1 MiB iPXE binary takes 2000 packets and unusably long.
- Two-stage iPXE chain: firmware PXE -> TFTP iPXE binary -> iPXE
  re-DHCPs with user-class iPXE -> HTTP /boot.ipxe -> kernel+initrd.
- HTTP server (axum) with byte-Range ISO streaming and an in-place
  ISO9660 lookup so kernel/initrd are served from inside the ISO
  without ever extracting it to disk.
- Linux ISOs boot via kernel+initrd extraction (memdisk/sanboot fail
  for >1-2 GiB modern distros). Distro-family detection drives the
  cmdline (Debian/Ubuntu, RHEL/Fedora, openSUSE, Arch, Alpine).

## Phase 2 — UX + Windows

- Hierarchical PXE menu (Default / Installers / Tools / Gated
  Deployment) generated from settings — no hand-written .ipxe paths
  surface in the UI. Number-key + letter hotkeys, BIOS+UEFI variants
  for some RHEL ISOs.
- Gated Deployment "horse-race" queue: clients join, operator picks
  one ISO, every gate launches simultaneously via tokio::sync::Notify.
- Bootimus-pattern Windows: WimPatcher injects a CRLF startnet.cmd
  into boot.wim so vanilla WinPE net-uses an SMB share and runs
  setup.exe. All Microsoft-signed; no test certs, no testsigning,
  no httpdisk.sys. SmbManager supervises smbd start/stop/SIGHUP.
- Netbox-style dark UI, fully offline (no CDN, no external fonts).

## Phase 3 — MVP hardening

- TFTP retransmit rewrite with explicit window tracking — UEFI SNP
  clients no longer hang on files that end mid-window. 4 new tests.
- DHCP broadcast-flag honored per RFC 2131 §4.1.
- Multi-arch container (linux/amd64 + linux/arm64). Entrypoint chowns
  bind-mounts as root then drops to uid 10001 via gosu.
- /healthz + /readyz split from /api/status — readyz fails if no
  iPXE binaries are bundled.
- pxeforge seed --from <path> CLI: same pipeline as web upload (slug,
  sha256, introspection, boot-entry).
- All timestamps RFC 3339 (browser Date couldn't parse the 9-tuple).
- Gate poll retains assignment until operator releases — clients that
  retry on transient network errors reuse the assignment instead of
  falling back to the menu.
- Custom OpenShift SCC: hostNetwork + NET_BIND_SERVICE only, no
  NET_RAW.

## Phase 4 — UI restructure + remote storage

- Web UI rebuilt around six tabs inspired by the iVentoy layout:
  Dashboard / Network / Forge Gate / Storage / Terminal / About.
  Old "Monitoring/Content/Configuration" sidebar groups are gone.
- NFS share manager (crates/iso-store/src/nfs.rs): mount NFSv3 or
  NFSv4.1 shares as ISO sources instead of uploading every file
  into the PVC. New IsoSource enum on IsoMeta lets the store resolve
  Local vs NFS lazily. Persisted to <work_dir>/nfs.json; failed
  mounts surface in the UI rather than blocking startup.
- Dockerfile gains nfs-common + iproute2; mounting NFS in-container
  also requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN. Documented in docs/architecture.md.
- LogBus + tracing layer in core: 500-line ring buffer + broadcast
  channel feed an SSE endpoint at /api/log/stream.
- Operator terminal at /api/terminal: whitelisted commands (status,
  isos, clients, gate, nfs, smb, log) — deliberately not a shell.
  Output mirrored onto the LogBus so the live tail and the terminal
  pane share one timeline.
- Network tab: read-only nic_name / subnet_mask / gateway probed
  from `ip` at startup; only DNS server is editable. Editing IP/mask
  on a hot UI would silently break PXE for every client mid-boot.
- Bootimus parity (releases v0.1.55 -> v0.1.62): amber row tint on
  un-bootable ISOs with inline reasons, dashboard "won't boot" panel.

## Tests

56 tests passing across the workspace:
- 16 core (LogBus, gate, settings, arch, client)
- 1 dhcp-proxy (raw option-93 extraction)
- 8 http-api unit (range parsing, terminal split/format)
- 13 http-api integration (gated deployment, range, settings, NFS,
  terminal, log SSE, network endpoint, ui assets, no-external-urls)
- 12 iso-store (introspect, slugify, smb, windows wim, NFS options)
- 6 tftp (RRQ parsing, plan_window edges)

cargo build --workspace and cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets
both finish clean (warnings only, no errors).
2026-04-29 02:47:00 -04:00
9 changed files with 28 additions and 608 deletions
+16
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"Bash(cargo check *)",
"Bash(cargo build *)",
"Bash(cargo clippy *)",
"Bash(cargo fmt *)",
"Bash(cargo tree *)",
"Bash(cargo doc *)",
"Bash(cargo test --workspace --lib)",
"Bash(cargo test --workspace)",
"Bash(cargo --version)",
"Bash(rustc --version)"
]
}
}
+1 -2
View File
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ members = [
]
[workspace.package]
version = "0.3.1"
version = "0.3.0"
edition = "2021"
rust-version = "1.80"
license = "MIT OR Apache-2.0"
@@ -53,7 +53,6 @@ uuid = { version = "1.10", features = ["v4", "serde"] }
time = { version = "0.3", features = ["serde", "serde-human-readable", "formatting", "macros"] }
sha2 = "0.10"
hex = "0.4"
bcrypt = "0.15"
once_cell = "1.19"
parking_lot = "0.12"
rust-embed = { version = "8.5", features = ["include-exclude"] }
+1 -117
View File
@@ -61,12 +61,6 @@ pub fn build_router(state: AppState) -> Router {
// JSON API.
.route("/api/isos", get(api_list_isos).post(api_upload_iso))
.route("/api/isos/:id", delete(api_delete_iso))
// v0.3.1: per-ISO password gate. PUT body `{ "password": "..." }`
// sets, `{ "password": null }` (or DELETE) clears.
.route(
"/api/isos/:id/password",
axum::routing::put(api_set_iso_password).delete(api_clear_iso_password),
)
.route("/api/clients", get(api_list_clients))
.route("/api/status", get(api_status))
.route("/api/settings", get(api_get_settings).put(api_put_settings))
@@ -191,19 +185,9 @@ struct BootMenuParams {
mac: Option<String>,
}
#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
struct BootSubParams {
/// iPXE-supplied password token. Sent by the prompt script as
/// `?token=${password:uristring}` so special chars survive URL
/// encoding. Absent on the first request — that's how we know the
/// client hasn't been prompted yet.
token: Option<String>,
}
async fn boot_sub(
State(state): State<AppState>,
AxumPath(filename): AxumPath<String>,
Query(p): Query<BootSubParams>,
) -> Response {
// `/boot/<name>.ipxe` where `<name>` is either one of our reserved
// submenu names (prefixed `_`) or a boot entry id.
@@ -219,56 +203,11 @@ async fn boot_sub(
"_util" => render_util(base),
"_shell" => render_shell(base),
"_nic" => render_nic_info(base),
"_queue" => render_queue_entry(base),
"_queue" => render_queue_entry(base),
other => {
for iso in &isos {
for entry in &iso.boot_entries {
if entry.id == other {
// Password gate. If the ISO has a password set
// we block the actual boot script behind it:
// - no token -> render a prompt
// - wrong token -> render auth-fail
// - correct token -> serve the boot script
// ISO without a password ignores the token
// entirely, so per-MAC bookmarks stay simple.
if iso.is_password_protected() {
match p.token.as_deref() {
None | Some("") => {
return text_plain(crate::ipxe_script::render_password_prompt(
&entry.id, &iso.filename, base,
));
}
Some(token) => match state.iso_store.verify_password(&iso.id, token) {
Ok(true) => { /* fall through to render the entry */ }
Ok(false) => {
// Don't log the candidate — just the
// mac (when iPXE supplies one) and
// the entry id, so an operator can
// see brute-force attempts in the
// live log.
tracing::warn!(
target: "openpxe::http::boot",
entry = %other,
"wrong password supplied for protected boot entry"
);
return text_plain(
crate::ipxe_script::render_password_failed(
&entry.id, base,
),
);
}
Err(e) => {
tracing::error!(
target: "openpxe::http::boot",
entry = %other, error = %e,
"password verify failed unexpectedly"
);
return (StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
"password check failed").into_response();
}
},
}
}
return text_plain(render_entry(entry, &settings, base));
}
}
@@ -410,61 +349,6 @@ async fn api_delete_iso(
}
}
#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
struct SetPasswordBody {
/// Plaintext password. `null` or empty/whitespace clears the
/// password (same as a DELETE on this resource). The server hashes
/// with bcrypt before persisting; the plaintext is never stored.
password: Option<String>,
}
async fn api_set_iso_password(
State(state): State<AppState>,
AxumPath(id): AxumPath<String>,
Json(body): Json<SetPasswordBody>,
) -> Response {
match state
.iso_store
.set_password(&id, body.password.as_deref())
.await
{
Ok(()) => {
let now_protected = state
.iso_store
.get(&id)
.is_some_and(|m| m.is_password_protected());
// We deliberately do not log the password value, only
// whether the ISO ended up protected.
tracing::info!(
target: "openpxe::http::iso",
iso = %id, protected = now_protected,
"iso password updated"
);
StatusCode::NO_CONTENT.into_response()
}
Err(pxeforge_error_invalid) if matches!(pxeforge_error_invalid, openpxe_core::Error::Invalid(_)) => {
(StatusCode::NOT_FOUND, format!("{pxeforge_error_invalid}")).into_response()
}
Err(e) => (StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR, format!("{e}")).into_response(),
}
}
async fn api_clear_iso_password(
State(state): State<AppState>,
AxumPath(id): AxumPath<String>,
) -> Response {
match state.iso_store.set_password(&id, None).await {
Ok(()) => {
tracing::info!(
target: "openpxe::http::iso",
iso = %id, "iso password cleared"
);
StatusCode::NO_CONTENT.into_response()
}
Err(e) => (StatusCode::NOT_FOUND, format!("{e}")).into_response(),
}
}
async fn api_upload_iso(
State(state): State<AppState>,
mut multipart: Multipart,
+1 -91
View File
@@ -110,15 +110,10 @@ pub fn render_family_menu(isos: &[IsoMeta], base_url: &str, is_windows: bool) ->
for entry in &iso.boot_entries {
let size_label = fmt_size_mib(iso.size_bytes);
let key = hotkey_for_index(count);
// Visual hint: a leading `*` marks password-protected entries.
// ASCII only — iPXE's menu console mangles non-ASCII on some
// firmwares.
let lock = if iso.is_password_protected() { "*" } else { " " };
let _ = writeln!(
s, "item {}{} {}[{:>6}] {}",
s, "item {}{} [{:>6}] {}",
key,
entry.id,
lock,
size_label,
escape_label(&entry.title),
);
@@ -330,88 +325,3 @@ fn has_family(isos: &[IsoMeta], pred: fn(DistroFamily) -> bool) -> bool {
fn escape_label(s: &str) -> String {
s.chars().map(|c| match c { '\n' | '\r' => ' ', c => c }).collect()
}
/// Render the password-prompt script for a protected boot entry.
///
/// Flow on the client:
/// 1. iPXE clears any leftover ${password}, prints a banner naming the
/// ISO so the operator knows what they're being asked for.
/// 2. `read --secret password` accepts input without echoing it to
/// the screen.
/// 3. An empty input bails back to the main menu (lets the operator
/// back out of a misclick).
/// 4. Otherwise the script chains the same /boot/<id>.ipxe URL but
/// with `?token=${password:uristring}`. iPXE's `:uristring`
/// modifier URL-encodes the value so `&`, `?`, `=`, spaces, etc.
/// survive transport.
/// 5. The server replies with either the boot script (correct
/// password) or [`render_password_failed`] (wrong password). On
/// transport failure we fall back to the main menu.
#[must_use]
pub fn render_password_prompt(entry_id: &str, iso_filename: &str, base_url: &str) -> String {
let base = base_url.trim_end_matches('/');
let label = escape_label(iso_filename);
let mut s = String::new();
let _ = writeln!(s, "#!ipxe");
let _ = writeln!(s, "# OpenPXE password prompt for {label}");
let _ = writeln!(s, "echo");
let _ = writeln!(s, "echo ==========================================");
let _ = writeln!(s, "echo This image requires a password");
let _ = writeln!(s, "echo {label}");
let _ = writeln!(s, "echo (enter alone returns to main menu)");
let _ = writeln!(s, "echo ==========================================");
let _ = writeln!(s, "set password ");
let _ = writeln!(s, "read --secret password");
let _ = writeln!(s, "iseq ${{password}} \"\" && chain {base}/boot.ipxe || goto submit");
let _ = writeln!(s, ":submit");
let _ = writeln!(s, "echo Verifying...");
let _ = writeln!(
s,
"chain {base}/boot/{entry_id}.ipxe?token=${{password:uristring}} || chain {base}/boot.ipxe"
);
s
}
/// Render the "wrong password" script. Tells the operator, sleeps for
/// two seconds (gives the eye time to register the message and dampens
/// brute-force rate without help from the server), and chains back to
/// the same entry — which sends them through the prompt flow again.
#[must_use]
pub fn render_password_failed(entry_id: &str, base_url: &str) -> String {
let base = base_url.trim_end_matches('/');
let mut s = String::new();
let _ = writeln!(s, "#!ipxe");
let _ = writeln!(s, "echo");
let _ = writeln!(s, "echo Wrong password.");
let _ = writeln!(s, "sleep 2");
let _ = writeln!(s, "chain {base}/boot/{entry_id}.ipxe || chain {base}/boot.ipxe");
s
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod password_tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn prompt_uses_secret_read_and_uri_escape() {
let s = render_password_prompt("alpha-linux", "Alpha Test.iso", "http://10.0.0.5");
assert!(s.starts_with("#!ipxe\n"));
assert!(s.contains("read --secret password"));
assert!(s.contains("Alpha Test.iso"));
// URI-string modifier on the var so passwords with `&`/spaces survive.
assert!(s.contains("token=${password:uristring}"));
// Empty enter sends back to the main menu, not back into the prompt
// (avoids a wedged client if the operator chose by mistake).
assert!(s.contains("&& chain http://10.0.0.5/boot.ipxe || goto submit"));
// Never log/echo the value.
assert!(!s.contains("echo ${password"));
}
#[test]
fn failed_chains_back_to_entry() {
let s = render_password_failed("alpha-linux", "http://10.0.0.5");
assert!(s.contains("Wrong password."));
// Re-target the entry so the prompt flow runs again.
assert!(s.contains("chain http://10.0.0.5/boot/alpha-linux.ipxe"));
}
}
-130
View File
@@ -672,133 +672,3 @@ async fn network_endpoint_exposes_dns_round_trip() {
let v: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_slice(&b).unwrap();
assert_eq!(v["dns_server"], "10.0.0.1");
}
// ─── v0.3.1: per-ISO password gate ────────────────────────────────────────
#[tokio::test]
async fn iso_password_gate_blocks_until_correct_token() {
let (state, _dir) = build_state().await;
let app = build_router(state);
// Upload a synthetic Alpine ISO so we have a real boot entry id to
// protect. Upload filename "fake-alpine.iso" -> id "fake-alpine",
// boot entry id "fake-alpine-linux".
let iso = fake_alpine_iso();
let (ct, body) = multipart_iso_body("fake-alpine.iso", &iso);
let res = app
.clone()
.oneshot(
Request::builder()
.method("POST").uri("/api/isos")
.header("content-type", ct)
.body(Body::from(body)).unwrap()).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::CREATED);
// 1. With NO password set, /boot/<id>.ipxe returns the boot script
// immediately and the lock indicator is NOT in the menu.
let (_, body) = get(&app, "/boot/fake-alpine-linux.ipxe").await;
let s = String::from_utf8(body).unwrap();
assert!(s.contains("kernel "), "expected boot script, got:\n{s}");
let (_, lm) = get(&app, "/boot/_linux_menu.ipxe").await;
let lm = String::from_utf8(lm).unwrap();
assert!(lm.contains("fake-alpine-linux"));
assert!(!lm.contains("fake-alpine-linux *["),
"expected no lock marker in menu before password set:\n{lm}");
// 2. Set a password.
let res = app.clone().oneshot(
Request::builder()
.method("PUT")
.uri("/api/isos/fake-alpine/password")
.header("content-type", "application/json")
.body(Body::from(r#"{"password":"hunter2"}"#)).unwrap()
).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::NO_CONTENT);
// The menu now shows the lock marker (`*` prefix on the size box).
let (_, lm) = get(&app, "/boot/_linux_menu.ipxe").await;
let lm = String::from_utf8(lm).unwrap();
assert!(lm.contains("fake-alpine-linux *["),
"expected lock marker in menu after password set:\n{lm}");
// 3. Without a token, /boot/<id>.ipxe now returns the password
// PROMPT script (read --secret), not the boot script.
let (_, body) = get(&app, "/boot/fake-alpine-linux.ipxe").await;
let s = String::from_utf8(body).unwrap();
assert!(s.contains("read --secret password"),
"expected prompt script with no token, got:\n{s}");
assert!(!s.contains("kernel "), "should not include kernel line yet");
// 4. Wrong token -> "Wrong password." script that chains back to the entry.
let (_, body) = get(&app, "/boot/fake-alpine-linux.ipxe?token=wrongpw").await;
let s = String::from_utf8(body).unwrap();
assert!(s.contains("Wrong password."), "expected auth-fail script, got:\n{s}");
assert!(s.contains("/boot/fake-alpine-linux.ipxe"));
assert!(!s.contains("kernel "));
// Critical: the WRONG token must NEVER be echoed back in the script.
assert!(!s.contains("wrongpw"), "wrong token must not appear in response");
// 5. Correct token -> real boot script.
let (_, body) = get(&app, "/boot/fake-alpine-linux.ipxe?token=hunter2").await;
let s = String::from_utf8(body).unwrap();
assert!(s.contains("kernel "), "expected boot script with correct token, got:\n{s}");
// Don't echo the password into the boot script either.
assert!(!s.contains("hunter2"), "correct password must not leak into boot script");
// 6. Clear the password (DELETE).
let res = app.clone().oneshot(
Request::builder()
.method("DELETE")
.uri("/api/isos/fake-alpine/password")
.body(Body::empty()).unwrap()
).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::NO_CONTENT);
// Boot is open again, no lock indicator.
let (_, body) = get(&app, "/boot/fake-alpine-linux.ipxe").await;
let s = String::from_utf8(body).unwrap();
assert!(s.contains("kernel "), "expected boot script after clear, got:\n{s}");
let (_, lm) = get(&app, "/boot/_linux_menu.ipxe").await;
let lm = String::from_utf8(lm).unwrap();
assert!(!lm.contains("fake-alpine-linux *["));
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn iso_password_set_then_clear_via_null_body() {
let (state, _dir) = build_state().await;
let app = build_router(state);
// Upload + set + clear via `{"password": null}` (alternative to DELETE).
let iso = fake_alpine_iso();
let (ct, body) = multipart_iso_body("fake-alpine.iso", &iso);
let res = app.clone().oneshot(
Request::builder().method("POST").uri("/api/isos")
.header("content-type", ct)
.body(Body::from(body)).unwrap()).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::CREATED);
for body in [r#"{"password":"x"}"#, r#"{"password":null}"#, r#"{"password":""}"#] {
let res = app.clone().oneshot(
Request::builder().method("PUT")
.uri("/api/isos/fake-alpine/password")
.header("content-type", "application/json")
.body(Body::from(body.to_string())).unwrap()).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::NO_CONTENT, "body={body}");
}
// After the empty string, the entry should be unprotected.
let (_, b) = get(&app, "/boot/fake-alpine-linux.ipxe").await;
let s = String::from_utf8(b).unwrap();
assert!(s.contains("kernel "), "should be unprotected after empty pw, got:\n{s}");
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn set_password_for_unknown_iso_returns_404() {
let (state, _dir) = build_state().await;
let app = build_router(state);
let res = app.clone().oneshot(
Request::builder().method("PUT")
.uri("/api/isos/does-not-exist/password")
.header("content-type", "application/json")
.body(Body::from(r#"{"password":"x"}"#)).unwrap()).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::NOT_FOUND);
}
-1
View File
@@ -20,7 +20,6 @@ thiserror.workspace = true
anyhow.workspace = true
sha2.workspace = true
hex.workspace = true
bcrypt.workspace = true
uuid.workspace = true
time.workspace = true
parking_lot.workspace = true
-162
View File
@@ -48,25 +48,6 @@ pub struct IsoMeta {
/// Old `meta.json` files without this field deserialize as `Local`.
#[serde(default)]
pub source: IsoSource,
/// Optional bcrypt hash of an operator-set password. When present,
/// `/boot/<entry>.ipxe` returns a `read --secret` prompt instead of
/// the boot script until the client chains back with the correct
/// `?token=...`. We never store, log, or transmit the plaintext.
/// Skipped on serialize when None to keep meta.json clean for
/// the common no-password case.
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
pub password_hash: Option<String>,
}
impl IsoMeta {
/// Convenience predicate the HTTP layer + UI can both use.
#[must_use]
pub fn is_password_protected(&self) -> bool {
self.password_hash
.as_deref()
.map(str::trim)
.is_some_and(|h| !h.is_empty())
}
}
pub struct UploadHandle {
@@ -113,7 +94,6 @@ impl UploadHandle {
introspection,
boot_entries,
source: IsoSource::Local,
password_hash: None,
};
store.persist_meta(&meta).await?;
store.insert(meta.clone());
@@ -309,7 +289,6 @@ impl IsoStore {
introspection,
boot_entries,
source,
password_hash: None,
};
self.inner.write().isos.insert(id, meta);
}
@@ -323,66 +302,6 @@ impl IsoStore {
!matches!(&m.source, IsoSource::Nfs { mount_id: mid, .. } if mid == mount_id)
});
}
/// Set or clear an ISO's boot password.
///
/// `Some("plaintext")` hashes via bcrypt (cost 10 — fast enough for
/// an interactive iPXE prompt, slow enough to be hostile to brute
/// force on a leaked meta.json) and persists.
///
/// `None` removes the password — the next /boot/<id>.ipxe request
/// returns the script directly without a prompt.
///
/// We never store, log, or transmit the plaintext.
pub async fn set_password(&self, id: &str, password: Option<&str>) -> Result<()> {
let new_hash = match password {
None => None,
Some(pw) => {
let pw = pw.trim();
if pw.is_empty() {
None
} else {
let h = bcrypt::hash(pw, bcrypt::DEFAULT_COST)
.map_err(|e| Error::Other(e.into()))?;
Some(h)
}
}
};
// Update in-memory + grab a clone for persistence outside the lock.
let updated = {
let mut g = self.inner.write();
let m = g
.isos
.get_mut(id)
.ok_or_else(|| Error::Invalid(format!("no such iso '{id}'")))?;
m.password_hash = new_hash;
m.clone()
};
// NFS-sourced ISOs have no on-disk meta.json — skip persistence
// for them (the password lives in memory until the manager
// re-scans the share, then it's gone). Document this in the API
// handler so the operator knows.
if matches!(updated.source, IsoSource::Local) {
self.persist_meta(&updated).await?;
}
Ok(())
}
/// Verify a candidate password against the stored bcrypt hash.
/// Returns:
/// - `Ok(true)` — match (or the ISO has no password set; gate is open)
/// - `Ok(false)` — mismatch
/// - `Err(_)` — id not found, or bcrypt error
pub fn verify_password(&self, id: &str, candidate: &str) -> Result<bool> {
let meta = self
.get(id)
.ok_or_else(|| Error::Invalid(format!("no such iso '{id}'")))?;
let Some(hash) = meta.password_hash else {
return Ok(true); // no password set — anyone can boot
};
bcrypt::verify(candidate, &hash).map_err(|e| Error::Other(e.into()))
}
}
fn slugify(filename: &str) -> String {
@@ -497,8 +416,6 @@ fn linux_cmdline(family: DistroFamily, id: &str) -> String {
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use crate::introspect::{DistroFamily, IntrospectionReport};
use tempfile::tempdir;
#[test]
fn slugify_basic() {
@@ -510,83 +427,4 @@ mod tests {
// If a path sneaks in, file_stem strips the directory — OK, not a hazard.
assert_eq!(slugify("/etc/passwd"), "passwd");
}
fn fake_meta(id: &str) -> IsoMeta {
IsoMeta {
id: id.into(),
filename: format!("{id}.iso"),
size_bytes: 0,
sha256_hex: None,
uploaded_at: OffsetDateTime::now_utc(),
introspection: IntrospectionReport {
family: DistroFamily::Unknown,
volume_label: None,
kernel_path: None,
initrd_paths: vec![],
has_boot_wim: false,
},
boot_entries: vec![],
source: IsoSource::Local,
password_hash: None,
}
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn password_round_trip_set_verify_clear() {
let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
let store = IsoStore::new(dir.path().to_path_buf());
store.ensure_dirs().await.unwrap();
store.inner.write().isos.insert("alpha".into(), fake_meta("alpha"));
// No password set — verify_password returns Ok(true) for any input.
assert!(store.verify_password("alpha", "anything").unwrap());
assert!(!store.get("alpha").unwrap().is_password_protected());
// Set a password.
store.set_password("alpha", Some("hunter2")).await.unwrap();
let m = store.get("alpha").unwrap();
assert!(m.is_password_protected());
assert!(m.password_hash.unwrap().starts_with("$2"));
// Verify correct + wrong.
assert!(store.verify_password("alpha", "hunter2").unwrap());
assert!(!store.verify_password("alpha", "wrong").unwrap());
assert!(!store.verify_password("alpha", "").unwrap());
// Clear by passing None or an empty string.
store.set_password("alpha", None).await.unwrap();
assert!(!store.get("alpha").unwrap().is_password_protected());
store.set_password("alpha", Some("again")).await.unwrap();
store.set_password("alpha", Some(" ")).await.unwrap();
assert!(!store.get("alpha").unwrap().is_password_protected());
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn set_password_for_unknown_id_errors() {
let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
let store = IsoStore::new(dir.path().to_path_buf());
store.ensure_dirs().await.unwrap();
let r = store.set_password("does-not-exist", Some("pw")).await;
assert!(matches!(r, Err(Error::Invalid(_))));
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn password_persists_via_meta_json_for_local_isos() {
// Hash makes it onto disk so it survives a restart.
let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
let store = IsoStore::new(dir.path().to_path_buf());
store.ensure_dirs().await.unwrap();
let meta = fake_meta("alpha");
store.persist_meta(&meta).await.unwrap();
store.insert(meta);
store.set_password("alpha", Some("s3cret")).await.unwrap();
// Re-load from disk and confirm the hash came back.
let store2 = IsoStore::new(dir.path().to_path_buf());
store2.load_from_disk().await.unwrap();
let reloaded = store2.get("alpha").expect("reloaded");
assert!(reloaded.is_password_protected());
assert!(store2.verify_password("alpha", "s3cret").unwrap());
assert!(!store2.verify_password("alpha", "wrong").unwrap());
}
}
+8 -104
View File
@@ -372,99 +372,12 @@
}
// ── ISO table (mixed local + NFS) ──
// Each row gets a "Password" cell that toggles a small inline
// editor (a checkbox + a password field + Save button) inside the
// *next* row of the table. Keeps the markup flat and avoids the
// overhead of a real modal.
const rowsAndEditors = [];
isos.forEach(i => {
const rows = isos.map(i => {
const b = bootability(i, settings);
const isNfs = i.source && i.source.kind === 'nfs';
const protectedNow = !!i.password_hash;
// The inline editor row is hidden by default; the Password
// button toggles its `display`. Pre-built so toggle is cheap.
const pwCheck = el('input', {type:'checkbox'});
pwCheck.checked = protectedNow;
const pwInput = el('input', {
type: 'password', spellcheck: 'false',
autocomplete: 'new-password', autocapitalize: 'off',
placeholder: protectedNow ? '(unchanged — type to replace)' : 'choose a password',
});
const pwInputWrap = el('label', {class:'field', style:'flex:1;margin:0'}, [
el('span', {class:'name'}, 'Password'),
pwInput,
]);
// Toggle the password field's visibility off when the checkbox
// is unchecked, so the operator's intent is unambiguous on Save.
const refreshFieldVisibility = () => {
pwInputWrap.style.display = pwCheck.checked ? '' : 'none';
};
pwCheck.onchange = refreshFieldVisibility;
const pwMsg = el('div', {class:'msg', style:'margin-top:6px'});
const pwSave = el('button', {style:'flex:none', onclick: async () => {
let resp;
if (pwCheck.checked) {
// Empty input + previously protected = keep the old password
// (operator just toggled the box on but didn't type). We
// detect this by sending the API only when the field has
// content; otherwise no-op + show hint.
if (!pwInput.value && !protectedNow) {
pwMsg.textContent = 'Enter a password to enable.';
pwMsg.className = 'msg err';
return;
}
if (!pwInput.value && protectedNow) {
pwMsg.textContent = 'Password unchanged.';
pwMsg.className = 'msg ok';
return;
}
resp = await putJSON(
'/api/isos/' + encodeURIComponent(i.id) + '/password',
{ password: pwInput.value });
} else {
resp = await fetch(
'/api/isos/' + encodeURIComponent(i.id) + '/password',
{method: 'DELETE'});
}
if (resp.ok || resp.status === 204) {
// Wipe the input field before re-rendering so the
// plaintext doesn't sit in DOM longer than necessary.
pwInput.value = '';
render('storage');
} else {
const t = await resp.text();
pwMsg.textContent = 'Save failed: ' + t;
pwMsg.className = 'msg err';
}
}}, 'Save password');
const editorCells = el('td', {colspan: '7', style:'background:var(--bg-panel-2);padding:14px 18px'}, [
el('div', {style:'display:flex;align-items:flex-end;gap:14px;flex-wrap:wrap'}, [
el('label', {class:'check', style:'flex:none;margin:0'}, [
pwCheck,
el('span', {}, 'Password protect this image'),
]),
pwInputWrap,
pwSave,
]),
el('div', {class:'msg', style:'margin-top:8px;font-size:11.5px'},
'Operators booting this ISO will be prompted on the PXE client. ' +
'Stored bcrypt-hashed; the plaintext never leaves the request.'),
pwMsg,
]);
const editorRow = el('tr', {style:'display:none'}, editorCells);
refreshFieldVisibility();
const tr = el('tr', b.ok ? {} : {class: 'unbootable'}, [
el('td', {}, [
el('div', {style:'display:flex;align-items:center;gap:8px'}, [
protectedNow ? el('span', {
title: 'Password protected',
style:'color:var(--accent);font-size:13px'
}, '🔒') : null,
el('span', {}, i.filename),
]),
el('div', {}, i.filename),
!b.ok ? el('div', {class:'row-warn'}, '⚠ ' + b.reason)
: (b.warn ? el('div', {class:'row-warn'}, '⚠ ' + b.warn) : null),
]),
@@ -473,35 +386,26 @@
el('td', {},
el('span', {class:'src-badge' + (isNfs ? ' nfs' : '')},
isNfs ? ('nfs:' + i.source.mount_id) : 'local')),
el('td', {},
protectedNow
? el('span', {class:'tag accent'}, 'protected')
: el('span', {class:'tag', style:'opacity:.55'}, 'open')),
el('td', {}, fmtAgo(i.uploaded_at)),
el('td', {style:'text-align:right;white-space:nowrap'}, [
el('button', {class:'ghost', style:'margin-right:6px', onclick: () => {
editorRow.style.display = (editorRow.style.display === 'none') ? '' : 'none';
}}, protectedNow ? 'Password ✎' : 'Set password'),
el('td', {style:'text-align:right'},
isNfs
? el('span', {class:'tag', style:'opacity:.6'}, 'on NFS')
? el('span', {class:'tag', style:'opacity:.6'}, 'manage on NFS share')
: el('button', {class:'danger', onclick: async () => {
if (!confirm('Remove this image?')) return;
await fetch('/api/isos/' + encodeURIComponent(i.id), {method:'DELETE'});
render('storage');
}}, 'Remove'),
]),
}}, 'Remove')),
]);
rowsAndEditors.push(tr, editorRow);
return tr;
});
const isoTable = isos.length
? el('table', {}, [
el('thead', {}, el('tr', {}, [
el('th',{},'Name'), el('th',{},'Type'),
el('th',{class:'num'},'Size'),
el('th',{},'Source'), el('th',{},'Auth'),
el('th',{},'Uploaded'), el('th',{},''),
el('th',{},'Source'), el('th',{},'Uploaded'), el('th',{},''),
])),
el('tbody', {}, rowsAndEditors),
el('tbody', {}, rows),
])
: el('div', {class:'empty'}, 'No images yet. Upload an ISO or mount an NFS share.');
+1 -1
View File
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@
<img src="/assets/logo.svg" alt="" />
<div>
<strong>OpenPXE</strong>
<div class="sub">v<span data-bind="version">0.3.1</span></div>
<div class="sub">v<span data-bind="version">0.3.0</span></div>
</div>
</div>
<nav>