The inheritable `Deny Everyone FILE_DELETE_CHILD` also reached FILES, and
0x40 is a member of FILE_ALL_ACCESS: measured against a real runner, a
Medium caller's CreateFileW(GENERIC_ALL) on every file, directory, and temp
root inside a granted root returned ACCESS_DENIED. The deny now carries
CONTAINER_INHERIT_ACE, so files keep working; a FullControl open of a
DIRECTORY inside a granted root stays denied and is pinned as the residual
cost of denying a right the full-access mask contains.
Also from the review:
- Leaks on fail-closed paths: the label ACL on both early SetEntriesInAclW
exits, the read descriptor when the label build fails, and the parsed
capability SID when either well-known-SID creation fails.
- `revokeWrite` keeps the shared Low label while another capability grant
remains on the directory, so two grants on one path stay independently
revocable; `hasExactLabel` delegates to hasExactEntry.
- The delete probe uses process.execPath, restrictTokenIntegrity guards a
zero-length SID, and verify/abi-probe.cpp covers the new constants
(compiled; static_asserts pass).
- Consumers updated in the same change: sandbox-local source comments and
README pair, pwsh-sandbox README pair, docs/subsystems/sandbox pair, and
the 2026-07-06 sandbox note pair no longer cite the Everyone-write
boundary as a current partial reason.
- New Agent Note records the mandatory-integrity decision, the deny scoping,
the standing label with its externality (other Low-integrity processes
running as the user, surviving the session), and the rejected
alternatives; the 2026-08-08 note cross-links it.
- New runner pins: NUL stays writable under the Low token, the FullControl
file/directory split, and the shared-label revoke. Per-file coverage back
to 100%.