The seam answered one question — what is behind this environment-variable
name — and that shape cannot hold what an authorization grant is: a
multi-field, rotating value keyed by a provider id rather than by a POSIX
identifier. The Models page already works around the gap by inventing a
synthetic environment name (`MINIMAX_CN_API_KEY`) for a route the user added
by hand, because the store's key must look like one.
`CredentialKey` is `<scope>/<id>`, where the scope is the owning plugin's
registered name. The owner is in the key because a `grant` payload is written
in its owner's format: two plugins serving the same provider name would
otherwise read each other's payload, and a record left by an uninstalled
plugin could not be told from a live one. The `/` also keeps the grammar
disjoint from `CredentialRef`, so the key spaces cannot collide.
`CredentialRecord` is `api-key` (key and/or provider environment values) or
`grant` (an opaque, owner-owned payload). The asymmetry is deliberate: an api
key is the harness's own data, a grant is a package it carries for someone
else. `modifyRecord` is the only write path because a correct write depends
on the current value — a token refresh is read-decide-replace under one
cross-process lock, without which two processes rotating one refresh token
lose whichever wrote first.
`.credentials.yaml` becomes a versioned two-section document. The pre-release
flat layout is refused by name, with the entry count and the one edit needed,
rather than read as an empty store — which would surface as an authentication
failure on the first request instead of at load. A grant payload is admitted
in both directions, so a value the document could not read back exactly as
written is refused rather than stored lossily.
Replace per-plugin tapIndex regex edits with pure-data IndexInjection rows
collected fresh per render over one webserver/index-inject event. One table,
two renderers: the served form renders rows into index.html; a static worker
form ships the same rows over its boot payload. tapIndex survives as the
raw-HTML escape hatch, applied after row rendering; client-modules and
ui-theme move to the event, and the manifest global renders as
globalThis["__DSH_BOOT__"].
The client boot chain gains the seams a pre-injected transport needs: the
module loader takes loadBundle from the transport global by default, HTTP
prefetch stands down when a transport owns bundle bytes, the web-app bundle
can decline frontend serving, the gateway client installs a namespace's
whole method group inside its fiber apply so a parked dependent never
observes the service without its methods, and the dynamic-code precheck
gates through new Function so hosts without a real node:vm keep the
define-time parse gate.
The pending-question registry holds the awaiting tool call's own
resolve/reject, so it is host-process memory. events.mux replays every
still-pending question on reopen, which covers a browser reload or a
reconnect, but a host restart takes the awaiting turn with it and the
reopened Session offers no composer for that question.
An image with a side above the deployed routes' 2000px many-image bound
could be durably committed by read_image, ride every later request, and
permanently fail the session with provider 400s. Admission now enforces a
configurable maxImageDimension (default 2000) during the full decode, so
read_image surfaces a recoverable tool error naming the limit instead of
poisoning durable history; the Web composer gets dedicated copy for the
new IMAGE_DIMENSION_TOO_LARGE reason.
Fixes#2626
master introduced AttachmentStore.saveImages as the batch admission
(count/aggregate-byte/media-type limits, validate-all-before-save,
ordered commit). admitEncodedImages narrows to the shared wire entry:
canonical-base64 enforcement plus delegation to saveImages, keeping one
home for batch policy while both wire endpoints (prompt RPC and the
command executor) still call one function. Test doubles gain saveImages;
batch-limit error texts follow saveImages' wording.
A claimed slash command consumed only the text half of the composer
submission: /goal with reference images executed, cleared the draft, and
silently stranded the images in the rail. Model-visible attachment intent
had no route through the command plane.
The submission envelope is now modeled end to end. CommandDefinition
input.images declares acceptance; the declaration rides the descriptor to
every client, onto the minted CommandClaim, and into the input machine's
claim snapshot. commands.execute carries the submission's base64 images
and enforces the declaration in the executor: non-declaring commands, a
missing attachment store, and exceeded batch limits settle as logged
error results before the handler runs. Admission reuses the attachment
package's new admitEncodedImages, extracted from api-proxy's prompt path
so both wire endpoints share one limits/validation/commit sequence.
Producers own model visibility: /goal submits one user followup (image
blocks + a fixed reference line) after a successful create/edit so goal
rounds read the images from session history; /plan folds them into its
steered message. Grammar misfits (/goal pause, bare /plan, /plan off)
return direct errors and the composer keeps the images.
On the client, enter adjudication carries a SubmitEnvelope and every
command route that cannot consume images throws a localized refusal that
renders as one composer notice with draft and images retained; the
claimed pre-gate applies the same copy. An accepting claim serializes the
draft images, forwards them to commands.execute, and clears plus releases
them only on a success outcome.
The assembled web test roster gains the ui-input-trigger and ui-commands
plugins, mirroring the shipped composition, so slash submissions exercise
the command plane; a new keyless snapshot pins the refusal banner and the
accepting /goal flow over the built client graph.
Every release member now declares publishConfig.access: public, so the scope no
longer mixes levels: the 221 packages/*/* and apps/* manifests join the vendored
framework and the native packages.
check-workspace-constraints drops the per-sequence expectation and holds every
release member to public, which is what stops a member from drifting back.
Access is a property of the package, not of a version: the dsh packages already
published as restricted become world-readable at their next publication.
A plugin that registered a settings namespace could not reach the browser
configuration page: the api-proxy filtered every read and gated every
write through two hardcoded namespace lists, and the plugin configuration
section rendered an unordered list of cards carrying an opaque id rather
than the namespace they edit. Both gates lived in this repository, so a
user-authored plugin was configurable only by hand-editing settings.yaml.
The proxy now serves whatever ctx.settings.describe() returns and adds no
boundary of its own; a name no registration answers folds into the seam's
own settings-rejected, and the settings-not-exposed code retires. The
settings seam is untouched: which client may read a namespace, and which
page renders it, are facts about consumers.
settings.plugin.item becomes a keyed slot whose key is the namespace a
card edits, following tool.call.toolview. The section reads describe once
and dispatches the intersection of the slot ledger and the served set, so
a namespace another surface owns renders nothing without declaring
anything, and a card for an uncomposed plugin is never dispatched.