diff --git a/.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-08-08-windows-acl-restricted-token-sandbox.i18n.yaml b/.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-08-08-windows-acl-restricted-token-sandbox.i18n.yaml index ec56bf132a..89e9e156f9 100644 --- a/.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-08-08-windows-acl-restricted-token-sandbox.i18n.yaml +++ b/.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-08-08-windows-acl-restricted-token-sandbox.i18n.yaml @@ -12,8 +12,8 @@ en: 125dea7427047966 zh: 1e459b1106597695 /agent-note-windows-sandbox-rung-raw-acl-restricted-tokens-over-mxc-and-appcontainer/acl-diagnosis-and-recovery: - en: 9ba5676ed8dd6367 - zh: 9a8670e5bece9a14 + en: a5bcdf2a6133abfe + zh: 477d4915d61945e3 /agent-note-windows-sandbox-rung-raw-acl-restricted-tokens-over-mxc-and-appcontainer/how-the-restriction-works-why-no-new-identity: en: ac9b3d800889ea39 zh: 9db1065b6027f65f diff --git a/.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-08-08-windows-acl-restricted-token-sandbox.md b/.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-08-08-windows-acl-restricted-token-sandbox.md index 89f2725d64..c1cf8c7faf 100644 --- a/.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-08-08-windows-acl-restricted-token-sandbox.md +++ b/.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-08-08-windows-acl-restricted-token-sandbox.md @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ The bundled diagnosis skill runs its preserving ACL repairs outside the confined A repair backs up before mutation and verifies effective access or the resulting ACEs. One invocation performs every repair it can prove, so a single sandbox failure needs one approval instead of a diagnosis followed by a repair: it adds the caller's full-control ACE to the chain directories that lack effective `WRITE_DAC` or `WRITE_OWNER`, and removes explicit package allow ACEs at their sources. The authorized root itself may be modified and restored, so a workspace root can repair and roll itself back, and recovery artifacts are one DACL record plus one copy of the restoring script per modified object. When the requested directory is one the caller cannot provision — the object a provisioning error names — that same invocation also examines its subtree for explicit package allow ACEs through a bounded walk that reports truncation, because the conflicting entry often sits below the reported root. Failed invocations restore attempted changes in reverse order and remain failures: continuing after a failed change would remove access without establishing the prerequisite. Inherited package entries are repaired at their explicit sources, preserving inheritance; incomplete or out-of-scope sources prevent mutation. Labels and denies remain untouched because removing them could defeat the backend's confinement or an intentional user policy. -Both extracted and recovery scripts are user-writable, so this workflow never recommends elevating them. Missing unconfined WRITE_DAC stops the workflow for permission-policy review. Automatic recovery can itself fail and cannot survive process termination; reports retain pending recovery commands rather than promising an atomic transaction. The operator keeps those artifacts until verification of the original confined operation succeeds. +Both extracted and recovery scripts are user-writable, so this workflow never recommends elevating them. Missing unconfined WRITE_DAC stops the workflow for permission-policy review. Automatic recovery can itself fail and cannot survive process termination; reports retain pending recovery commands rather than promising an atomic transaction. Because tool output keeps only its tail, every record is also written to a report file under the output directory and the run ends with a recap line, so the decisions survive truncation. The operator keeps those artifacts until verification of the original confined operation succeeds. ## How the restriction works (why no new identity) diff --git a/.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-08-08-windows-acl-restricted-token-sandbox.zh.md b/.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-08-08-windows-acl-restricted-token-sandbox.zh.md index 64a9da5f27..c7ca1c3632 100644 --- a/.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-08-08-windows-acl-restricted-token-sandbox.zh.md +++ b/.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-08-08-windows-acl-restricted-token-sandbox.zh.md @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ Status: implemented 修复在修改前备份，并验证有效权限或生成的 ACE。一次调用会完成它能证明的全部修复，因此单个沙箱失败只需一次批准，而不必先诊断再修复：为链路上缺少有效 `WRITE_DAC` 或 `WRITE_OWNER` 的目录添加调用者自身的完全控制 ACE，并在来源处移除显式的包允许 ACE。授权根目录本身也可以被修改和恢复，因此工作区根目录能自我修复并回滚；恢复产物为每个被修改对象一份 DACL 记录和一份恢复脚本副本。当请求的目录正是调用者无法授权的那一个——即授权失败错误所指向的对象——同一次调用还会通过受上限约束、并在截断时如实报告的遍历，检查其子树中的显式包允许 ACE，因为冲突条目常常位于被报告的根目录之下。失败调用按相反顺序恢复尝试修改的内容，且仍视为失败：某次修改失败后继续操作，会在前置条件尚未满足时移除访问权限。继承的包条目从显式来源处修复，保持继承不变；来源信息不完整或超出范围时不做修改。标签与拒绝条目保持不变，因为移除它们可能破坏后端隔离或用户有意设置的策略。 -提取的脚本和恢复脚本均可由用户写入，因此此流程绝不建议提权运行它们。不受限调用者缺少 WRITE_DAC 时，流程停止并交由权限策略审查处理。自动恢复本身也可能失败，且无法跨进程终止继续执行；报告保留待执行的恢复命令，不承诺原子事务。操作者应保留这些文件，直到原始受限操作验证成功。 +提取的脚本和恢复脚本均可由用户写入，因此此流程绝不建议提权运行它们。不受限调用者缺少 WRITE_DAC 时，流程停止并交由权限策略审查处理。自动恢复本身也可能失败，且无法跨进程终止继续执行；报告保留待执行的恢复命令，不承诺原子事务。由于工具输出只保留末尾部分，全部记录还会写入输出目录下的报告文件，运行结束时给出一行摘要，使判定在截断后仍然可见。操作者应保留这些文件，直到原始受限操作验证成功。 ## How the restriction works (why no new identity) diff --git a/packages/sandbox/sandbox-windows-acl/README.i18n.yaml b/packages/sandbox/sandbox-windows-acl/README.i18n.yaml index 4afd46cb7a..4b2ec75127 100644 --- a/packages/sandbox/sandbox-windows-acl/README.i18n.yaml +++ b/packages/sandbox/sandbox-windows-acl/README.i18n.yaml @@ -27,8 +27,8 @@ en: 289e65bddf20dd79 zh: 7ff72ed64c4b4d1c /deepseek-ai-dsh-sandbox-windows-acl/use-this-package/failures-and-recovery: - en: d542be9907e66e61 - zh: e1c5ebbe55ee75ae + en: 7fc0707debb1e67c + zh: e3b5529bf82f868e /deepseek-ai-dsh-sandbox-windows-acl/understand-the-implementation: en: c2cde86c85c2c619 zh: a29a114e591f9d3f diff --git a/packages/sandbox/sandbox-windows-acl/README.md b/packages/sandbox/sandbox-windows-acl/README.md index 71e9adb41a..dbb5fdef78 100644 --- a/packages/sandbox/sandbox-windows-acl/README.md +++ b/packages/sandbox/sandbox-windows-acl/README.md @@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ A denial this backend cannot explain is diagnosed by the `diagnose-windows-sandb One run diagnoses and repairs. The script has no modes: it reads the requested path and every ancestor, adds the signed-in user's full-control allow ACE to chain directories that lack effective `WRITE_DAC` or `WRITE_OWNER`, and removes explicit package allow ACEs at their sources, ancestor first, verifying each change by re-reading it. Repairs preserve denies, owner, inheritance and SACL, and back up each changed DACL. An object is modified only when it is `-AllowRoot` or strictly inside it, so a workspace root can repair itself; reparse paths and managed application trees are refused, and a repair needs effective `WRITE_DAC`. Failed repairs restore attempted changes in reverse order and exit nonzero. Follow the [bundled skill](assets/diagnose-windows-sandbox-acl/SKILL.md) for the single command, original-operation verification and recovery. -Every run prints `REPORT` JSON records of observations, actions, reasons and verification, then a summary with all inspected paths, findings, actions, recovery commands and `nextAction`; unknown observations remain unknown. `-Out ` receives two files per change: the DACL the object owned before that change and the independent script that restores it. Action completion records API execution; verification records the observed result. The [recovery decisions](../../../.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-08-08-windows-acl-restricted-token-sandbox.md#acl-diagnosis-and-recovery) explain resource ownership and rollback limits. +Every run prints `REPORT` JSON records of observations, actions, reasons and verification, then a final `RECAP` line carrying the verdicts, changes, verifications, refusals and scans, and a summary with the counts, recovery commands and `nextAction`; unknown observations remain unknown. The same run writes every record to `-Out\acl-report-*.jsonl`, because tool output keeps only its tail. `-Out` also receives two recovery files per change: the DACL the object owned before that change and the independent script that restores it. Action completion records API execution; verification records the observed result. The [recovery decisions](../../../.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-08-08-windows-acl-restricted-token-sandbox.md#acl-diagnosis-and-recovery) explain resource ownership and rollback limits. Inspection visits the requested object and each ancestor through the filesystem root. Each ACL observation's `path` identifies the inspected object; the classification's `details.packageObjects` lists objects carrying package allow ACEs without establishing the cause of the original failure. Each package removal is verified per object by comparing the recorded own ACEs with the re-read DACL, so a deny that shares the removed allow's SID remains visible in the verification details. diff --git a/packages/sandbox/sandbox-windows-acl/README.zh.md b/packages/sandbox/sandbox-windows-acl/README.zh.md index cb5b0ba4e5..bf6669168b 100644 --- a/packages/sandbox/sandbox-windows-acl/README.zh.md +++ b/packages/sandbox/sandbox-windows-acl/README.zh.md @@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ rmSync(tempDir, { recursive: true, force: true }) 一次运行同时完成诊断与修复。脚本没有模式开关：它读取请求路径及每一级祖先，为链路上缺少有效 `WRITE_DAC` 或 `WRITE_OWNER` 的目录补上当前用户的完全控制允许 ACE，并从祖先开始在其来源移除显式包允许 ACE，每处改动都通过重新读取来验证。修复保留拒绝条目、所有者、继承和 SACL，并备份每个被修改的 DACL。仅当对象就是 `-AllowRoot` 或严格位于其内部时才会被修改，因此工作区根目录可以自我修复；重解析路径和受管理的应用目录会被拒绝，修复需要有效的 `WRITE_DAC`。修复失败时按相反顺序恢复尝试修改的内容，并以非零状态退出。单条命令、原始操作验证及恢复流程见[内置技能](assets/diagnose-windows-sandbox-acl/SKILL.md)。 -每次执行都会打印包含观察、操作、原因和验证结果的 `REPORT` JSON 记录，随后给出包含全部分析路径、发现、操作、恢复命令和 `nextAction` 的摘要；未知观察保持未知。`-Out ` 为每次改动写入两个文件：该对象在本次改动前拥有的 DACL，以及用于恢复它的独立脚本。操作完成记录 API 执行情况，验证记录实际观察到的结果。[恢复决策](../../../.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-08-08-windows-acl-restricted-token-sandbox.zh.md#acl-diagnosis-and-recovery) 说明资源归属和回滚限制。 +每次执行都会打印包含观察、操作、原因和验证结果的 `REPORT` JSON 记录，最后给出一行 `RECAP`（判定、改动、验证、拒绝与扫描结果）以及含计数、恢复命令和 `nextAction` 的摘要；未知观察保持未知。同一次执行还会把全部记录写入 `-Out\acl-report-*.jsonl`，因为工具输出只保留末尾部分。`-Out` 同时为每次改动写入两个恢复文件：该对象在本次改动前拥有的 DACL，以及用于恢复它的独立脚本。操作完成记录 API 执行情况，验证记录实际观察到的结果。[恢复决策](../../../.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-08-08-windows-acl-restricted-token-sandbox.zh.md#acl-diagnosis-and-recovery) 说明资源归属和回滚限制。 检查会从请求对象逐级访问祖先，直到文件系统根目录。每条 ACL 观察的 `path` 标识实际检查的对象；分类结果的 `details.packageObjects` 列出包含包允许 ACE 的对象，但不能据此确认原始失败的原因。每次包 ACE 移除都按对象验证：把记录下来的自身 ACE 与重新读取的 DACL 比对，因此与被移除允许项共用 SID 的拒绝条目仍会出现在验证详情中。 diff --git a/packages/sandbox/sandbox-windows-acl/assets/diagnose-windows-sandbox-acl/SKILL.md b/packages/sandbox/sandbox-windows-acl/assets/diagnose-windows-sandbox-acl/SKILL.md index 2aafc626b8..7566a6c461 100644 --- a/packages/sandbox/sandbox-windows-acl/assets/diagnose-windows-sandbox-acl/SKILL.md +++ b/packages/sandbox/sandbox-windows-acl/assets/diagnose-windows-sandbox-acl/SKILL.md @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ description: 'Use on Windows for unexpected DSH sandbox access denials: workspac # Diagnose Windows sandbox ACL failures -**Write every approval request in plain words, in the user's language.** The approval prompt is the only thing the user reads before widening access, so it must stand alone: which folder the script touches, that it adds the signed-in user's own full-control entry where a required right is missing and removes foreign package entries, that file contents and owners are not changed, and that each change can be undone with the recovery command the script prints. Keep error codes, `WRITE_DAC`/`WRITE_OWNER`, `S-1-15-2-*` SIDs, `icacls`, verdict names and switches out of the request — they belong in the report you write afterwards. Ask once, for one command. +**Write every approval request in plain words, in the user's language.** The approval prompt is all the user reads before widening access, so it must stand alone: which folder the script touches, that it adds the signed-in user's full-control entry where a right is missing and removes foreign package entries, that file contents and owners are unchanged, and that each change can be undone with the printed recovery command. Keep error codes, `WRITE_DAC`/`WRITE_OWNER`, `S-1-15-2-*` SIDs, `icacls`, verdict names and switches out of the request; they belong in the report. Ask once, for one command. ## One command diagnoses and repairs @@ -13,9 +13,9 @@ The script has no modes. `-Path`, `-AllowRoot` and `-Out` read the path and ever - directories on that chain that lack effective `WRITE_DAC` or `WRITE_OWNER` receive a full-control allow ACE for the signed-in user, because DSH cannot provision its workspace grant without them; - explicit AppContainer package allow ACEs (`S-1-15-2-*`, except the well-known groups ending in 1 or 2) are removed at their sources, ancestor first, which also removes those packages' access; -- when the requested directory is one the sandbox cannot provision — the state its provisioning error reports on the workspace root — or it is the authorized root itself, explicit package allow ACEs anywhere under it are collected in the same run, so a conflicting entry deeper in the tree needs no second request. That walk is bounded and reports `truncated` and any directory it could not read; if it was truncated, pass the still-failing deeper path once more. +- when the requested directory is one the sandbox cannot provision — the state its provisioning error reports on the workspace root — or it is the authorized root, explicit package allow ACEs under it are collected in the same run, so a deeper conflicting entry needs no second request. That bounded walk reports `truncated` and unreadable directories; if truncated, pass the still-failing deeper path once more. -Every change is backed up first and then verified by re-reading it. `-AllowRoot` bounds all of it: an object is changed only when it is that directory or strictly inside it, so a workspace root can repair itself. Never split this into a diagnostic call and a repair call, never ask twice for one repair, and never pass a mode switch that does not exist. +Every change is backed up first and verified by re-reading it. `-AllowRoot` bounds all of it: an object is changed only when it is that directory or strictly inside it, so a workspace root can repair itself. Never split this into a diagnostic call and a repair call, never ask twice for one repair, and never pass a mode switch that does not exist. ```powershell & '\scripts\diagnose-windows-sandbox-acl.ps1' -Path '' -AllowRoot '' -Out '' @@ -26,22 +26,20 @@ Substitute full, quoted paths. Keep `-Out` persistent and user-owned, preferably ## Decide whether diagnosis applies -Diagnose an unexpected denial of workspace writes, listing, or reads the signed-in user should plainly have. Root-only failure and uniform failure are both eligible. - -Stop and explain expected denials instead: writes outside the workspace, any write in `read-only`, piped grandchild `spawn EPERM`, or ConstrainedLanguage errors for .NET/COM/reflection. Those need no ACL repair. +Diagnose an unexpected denial of workspace writes, listing, or reads the signed-in user should plainly have. Root-only failure and uniform failure are both eligible. Stop and explain expected denials instead: writes outside the workspace, any write in `read-only`, piped grandchild `spawn EPERM`, or ConstrainedLanguage errors for .NET/COM/reflection. ## Run it 1. Repeat the failing operation once in the current sandbox. If it succeeds, there is nothing to repair. 2. If it fails, run the command above confined once, if the sandbox starts at all. A writable `-Out` is enough; `read-only` refuses one. -3. When sandbox setup itself fails — the error names the workspace root or `SetNamedSecurityInfoW` — every confined call fails before your command runs, so do not retry confined. Request approval for that one command through the normal path and run it unconfined. Unconfined does not elevate the Windows token; it only lifts the file sandbox. +3. When sandbox setup itself fails — the error names the workspace root or `SetNamedSecurityInfoW` — every confined call fails before your command runs, so do not retry confined. Request approval for that one command and run it unconfined. Unconfined does not elevate the Windows token. 4. If approval is refused, unavailable, or forbidden by policy, report the path as undiagnosed and stop. ## Read the output -The script prints a `REPORT` JSON record for every observation, decision, action, verification and recovery, then `SUMMARY FIXED= GRANTED= REFUSED= RESTORED=`. Read all of it; nothing is summarized away. +The script prints a `REPORT` record for every observation, decision, action, verification and recovery, then a final `RECAP` line, the report path and `SUMMARY FIXED= GRANTED= REFUSED= RESTORED=`. Tool output keeps only its tail, so read the `RECAP` line: it carries the verdicts, changes, verifications, refusals and scans. The complete record set is in the `acl-report-*.jsonl` file whose path the run prints; read specific records when the recap is not enough, and quote what you rely on. -Each record has `kind`, `operation`, `path`, `status`, `reason`, `details`. `completed` actions only confirm API execution: trust the `verification` records, which report `verified` or `failed` for each `grant` and each package removal. Decide from `details.nextAction`: +Trust the `verification` records; `completed` actions only confirm API execution. Decide from `details.nextAction`: | `nextAction` | Meaning | |---|---| @@ -49,21 +47,20 @@ Each record has `kind`, `operation`, `path`, `status`, `reason`, `details`. `com | `stop` | Nothing was repaired, or a refusal ended the run. Report and stop. | | `restore_pending_then_stop` | Rollback was not verified. Run the printed recovery commands in order, then stop. | -A deny ACE's presence alone does not establish causation; the script never removes one. DSH provisions `S-1-4-*` grants and an Everyone `DeleteSubdirectoriesAndFiles` deny: both are expected, not conflicts. A deny that blocks the repair ends the run without a repair — `REPAIR_REFUSED`, or `GRANT_FAILED` — and the script then restores what it attempted. - -Each change leaves two files in `-Out`: `acl-backup-.json` (the DACL the object owned before that change) and `acl-backup-.json.ps1` (the script that restores it). The run prints the matching `ROLLBACK pwsh -NoProfile -File ... -Restore ...` command. +A deny ACE's presence alone does not establish causation; the script never removes one. DSH provisions `S-1-4-*` grants and an Everyone `DeleteSubdirectoriesAndFiles` deny: both are expected, not conflicts. A deny that blocks the repair ends the run without a repair — `REPAIR_REFUSED`, or `GRANT_FAILED` — and the script then restores what it attempted. Each change leaves two files in `-Out` (`acl-backup-.json` and its `.ps1`), and the run prints the matching `ROLLBACK` command. ## After a repair Repeat the original failed operation in the original confined context. A repair that verified is not undone because the original operation fails for a further reason: continue from the new observations. If a deeper path is still denied, run the same one command on that path — again one call, one approval. -**Stop after any failed or refused repair, or any failed verification.** The script already restored that invocation's attempted changes; do not repeat the repair, do not continue to another one, and never remove a deny ACE by hand. Restore earlier successful invocations in reverse order with their exact printed commands, then report. +**Stop after any failed or refused repair, or any failed verification.** The script already restored that invocation's attempted changes; do not repeat it or continue to another repair. Restore earlier successful invocations in reverse order with their printed commands, then report. + +**When the run stops, hand the user a decision, not silence.** Say which object and which ACE or missing right still blocks the operation, what was changed and rolled back, the recovery commands in order, and the report path. Unblock the user by switching this session to full access temporarily: say that confinement is off for it and that this is a workaround, not a repair. Then ask the user to send feedback with this session so the unhandled scenario reaches us; only what reaches this conversation travels with it, so read the report and quote what matters. ## Never - edit ACLs by hand, change an owner, erase a deny, or replace child permissions recursively; -- write probe files or run the script elevated, through UAC or `runas`; the script and its recovery copies are user-writable; -- widen `-AllowRoot` to reach an ancestor, or repair a purely inherited copy instead of its explicit source (the single command handles both); -- repeat a denied or failed call. +- run the script elevated, through UAC or `runas`; it and its recovery copies are user-writable; +- widen `-AllowRoot` to reach an ancestor, or repeat a denied or failed call. -Report concisely in the user's language: observations and the paths analyzed (including relevant ancestors), what was changed and why, verification results, the recovery command, and the next step. Label any authorized unconfined run as such, not as a successful sandbox repair. +Report in the user's language: analyzed paths, changes and why, verification, recovery commands, next step. Label an authorized unconfined run as such, not as a sandbox repair. diff --git a/packages/sandbox/sandbox-windows-acl/assets/diagnose-windows-sandbox-acl/scripts/diagnose-windows-sandbox-acl.ps1 b/packages/sandbox/sandbox-windows-acl/assets/diagnose-windows-sandbox-acl/scripts/diagnose-windows-sandbox-acl.ps1 index f024b56a4c..fc6c90b9b3 100644 --- a/packages/sandbox/sandbox-windows-acl/assets/diagnose-windows-sandbox-acl/scripts/diagnose-windows-sandbox-acl.ps1 +++ b/packages/sandbox/sandbox-windows-acl/assets/diagnose-windows-sandbox-acl/scripts/diagnose-windows-sandbox-acl.ps1 @@ -81,7 +81,14 @@ function Write-Report { param([string]$Kind, [string]$Operation, [string]$Target, [string]$Status, [string]$Reason, $Details = @{}) $record = [ordered]@{ kind = $Kind; operation = $Operation; path = $Target; status = $Status; reason = $Reason; details = $Details } if ($Kind -eq 'observation' -and $Status -in @('unknown', 'unreadable', 'partial')) { $script:observationFailures++ } + $script:reports.Add($record) $json = $record | ConvertTo-Json -Depth 12 -Compress + # The complete record set also lands in the report file: tool output is truncated to its + # tail, so a long run's early records survive only there. + if ($null -ne $script:reportWriter) { + try { $script:reportWriter.WriteLine($json); $script:reportWriter.Flush() } + catch [System.IO.IOException] { $script:reportWriter = $null } + } [Console]::Out.WriteLine('REPORT ' + $json) } function Invoke-ReportedOperation { @@ -382,7 +389,7 @@ function Restore-SavedDacl { } function Get-ObjectFacts { - param([string]$FullPath, [string]$MeSid) + param([string]$FullPath, [string]$MeSid, [switch]$CompactRecord) $facts = [ordered]@{ Object = $FullPath Readable = $false @@ -450,7 +457,10 @@ function Get-ObjectFacts { } Write-Report observation inspect_acl $FullPath $(if ($facts.Errors.Count) { 'partial' } else { 'read' }) 'Read the ACL and check effective WRITE_DAC and WRITE_OWNER; observed ACEs alone do not identify which rule caused a denial.' @{ owner = $facts.Owner; writeDac = $facts.HasWriteDac; writeOwner = $facts.HasWriteOwner - aces = $facts.Aces; nativeListing = @($facts.AclLines | ForEach-Object { $_.Trim() } | Where-Object { $_ }); lowLabel = $facts.LowLabel; errors = $facts.Errors + # A re-read after a change repeats an ACL this run already recorded: keep the + # full ACE list in memory, but do not print it twice. + aces = $(if ($CompactRecord) { @() } else { $facts.Aces }); acesOmitted = [bool]$CompactRecord + lowLabel = $facts.LowLabel; errors = $facts.Errors } return $facts } @@ -472,6 +482,9 @@ function Get-Ancestors { $operations = [System.Collections.Generic.List[object]]::new() $recoveries = [System.Collections.Generic.List[object]]::new() +$reports = [System.Collections.Generic.List[object]]::new() +$reportPath = $null +$reportWriter = $null $requestedPaths = @() $rollbackStatus = 'not-needed' $fixed = 0 @@ -492,6 +505,16 @@ try { if (-not $AllowRoot) { throw [System.ArgumentException]::new('Every modification requires -AllowRoot') } if (-not $Restore -and -not $Out) { throw [System.ArgumentException]::new('A repair requires -Out for its recovery artifacts') } if ($Restore -and $Path.Count -ne 1) { throw [System.ArgumentException]::new('-Restore requires exactly one -Path') } + if ($Out) { + Invoke-ReportedOperation prepare_report $Out 'Create the recovery directory and a new JSONL report that keeps every record, because tool output is truncated to its tail.' files { + $directory = [System.IO.Path]::GetFullPath($Out) + [System.IO.Directory]::CreateDirectory($directory) | Out-Null + $script:reportPath = Join-Path $directory ('acl-report-{0}.jsonl' -f [guid]::NewGuid().ToString('N')) + $stream = [System.IO.File]::Open($script:reportPath, [System.IO.FileMode]::CreateNew, [System.IO.FileAccess]::Write) + $script:reportWriter = [System.IO.StreamWriter]::new($stream, [System.Text.UTF8Encoding]::new($false)) + foreach ($record in $script:reports) { $script:reportWriter.WriteLine(($record | ConvertTo-Json -Depth 12 -Compress)) } + } + } $identity = Get-CurrentIdentity $meSid = $identity.User.Value Invoke-ReportedOperation initialize '' 'Load read-only access checks and DACL-only writes before inspecting permissions.' none { Initialize-NativeApi } @@ -633,7 +656,7 @@ try { Invoke-ReportedOperation grant_dacl $object "WRITE_DAC or WRITE_OWNER is missing; add a FullControl allow ACE for $meSid while preserving deny ACEs, owner and SACL." acl { [Dsh.TokenInfo]::SetDacl($object, $grantAcl.GetSecurityDescriptorSddlForm([System.Security.AccessControl.AccessControlSections]::Access)) } - $grantAfter = Get-ObjectFacts -FullPath $object -MeSid $meSid + $grantAfter = Get-ObjectFacts -FullPath $object -MeSid $meSid -CompactRecord $factsByPath[$object] = $grantAfter $verified = $grantAfter.Readable -and $grantAfter.Errors.Count -eq 0 -and $grantAfter.HasWriteDac -and $grantAfter.HasWriteOwner Write-Report verification grant $object $(if ($verified) { 'verified' } else { 'failed' }) 'The DACL write completed; recheck effective access before claiming that provisioning can succeed. On failure, restore this invocation and stop.' @{ @@ -682,7 +705,7 @@ try { # A package deny can share the removed allow's SID; only allow ACEs were removed. foreach ($packagePath in $packageTargets) { $fixBefore = $factsByPath[$packagePath] - $fixAfter = Get-ObjectFacts -FullPath $packagePath -MeSid $meSid + $fixAfter = Get-ObjectFacts -FullPath $packagePath -MeSid $meSid -CompactRecord # Compare the object's own ACEs as sorted sets: listing order and inherited # entries follow the parent, so neither proves a collateral change. $rowOf = { param($ace) '{0}|{1}|{2}|{3}|{4}' -f $ace.type, $ace.sid, $ace.rights, $ace.inheritance, $ace.propagation } @@ -734,12 +757,31 @@ try { [array]::Reverse($pending) $repaired = ($fixed + $granted) -gt 0 $nextAction = if ($rollbackStatus -eq 'failed') { 'restore_pending_then_stop' } elseif ($exitCode -ne 0 -or $observationFailures -gt 0) { 'stop' } elseif ($repaired) { 'verify_original_confined_operation' } else { 'stop' } - Write-Line ('SUMMARY FIXED={0} GRANTED={1} REFUSED={2} RESTORED={3}' -f $fixed, $granted, $refused, $restored) + # The tool keeps only the tail of stdout. Recapitulate the decisions here so the + # records a reader needs survive truncation; the report file holds every record. + $recap = [ordered]@{ + verdicts = @($reports | Where-Object { $_.operation -eq 'classify' } | ForEach-Object { + @{ path = $_.path; verdict = $_.status; writeDac = $_.details['writeDac']; writeOwner = $_.details['writeOwner']; packageObjects = $_.details['packageObjects'] } + }) + changes = @($reports | Where-Object { $_.kind -eq 'action' -and $_.details['effect'] -eq 'acl' -and $_.status -eq 'completed' } | ForEach-Object { @{ operation = $_.operation; path = $_.path } }) + verifications = @($reports | Where-Object { $_.kind -eq 'verification' } | ForEach-Object { @{ operation = $_.operation; path = $_.path; status = $_.status } }) + refusals = @($reports | Where-Object { $_.kind -eq 'decision' -and $_.status -eq 'refused' } | ForEach-Object { @{ path = $_.path; reason = $_.reason } }) + scans = @($reports | Where-Object { $_.operation -eq 'subtree_scan' } | ForEach-Object { + @{ path = $_.path; visited = $_.details['visited']; packageSources = @($_.details['packageSources']); truncated = $_.details['truncated']; unreadable = $_.details['unreadable'] } + }) + report = $reportPath + } $status = if ($exitCode -ne 0) { 'failed' } elseif ($observationFailures -gt 0) { 'partial' } else { 'completed' } Write-Report summary $mode $currentPath $status 'Operation completion records API execution; verification records the observed result. Only rerunning the original confined operation can confirm its failure is resolved.' @{ exitCode = $exitCode; fixed = $fixed; granted = $granted; refused = $refused; restored = $restored operations = @($operations.ToArray()); recoveries = @($recoveries.ToArray()); automaticRollback = $true; observationFailures = $observationFailures - rollback = $rollbackStatus; rollbackCommands = $pending; nextAction = $nextAction; scanTruncated = $scanTruncated + rollback = $rollbackStatus; rollbackCommands = $pending; nextAction = $nextAction; scanTruncated = $scanTruncated; report = $reportPath } + # Last on stdout, after the summary record: whatever the tool truncates, the tail + # still carries the decisions, the report path and the counts. + Write-Line ('RECAP ' + ($recap | ConvertTo-Json -Depth 8 -Compress)) + if ($reportPath) { Write-Line ('REPORT_FILE {0}' -f $reportPath) } + Write-Line ('SUMMARY FIXED={0} GRANTED={1} REFUSED={2} RESTORED={3}' -f $fixed, $granted, $refused, $restored) + if ($reportWriter) { $reportWriter.Dispose() } } exit $exitCode diff --git a/packages/sandbox/sandbox-windows-acl/tests/diagnose-script.spec.ts b/packages/sandbox/sandbox-windows-acl/tests/diagnose-script.spec.ts index 3e5dec5c71..4ccf770fe0 100644 --- a/packages/sandbox/sandbox-windows-acl/tests/diagnose-script.spec.ts +++ b/packages/sandbox/sandbox-windows-acl/tests/diagnose-script.spec.ts @@ -204,10 +204,12 @@ describe.skipIf(!isWin32 || !pwshAvailable())('diagnose-windows-sandbox-acl scri expect(normalized(target, aclLines(target))).toEqual(before.filter(line => !line.includes(PACKAGE_SID))) const files = readdirSync(out) - expect(files).toHaveLength(2) + // One recovery pair for the change, plus the report file that keeps every record. + expect(files).toHaveLength(3) const recordFile = files.find(file => file.endsWith('.json'))! expect(files).toEqual(expect.arrayContaining([recordFile, `${recordFile}.ps1`])) expect(recordFile).toMatch(/^acl-backup-[0-9a-f]{32}\.json$/u) + expect(files.filter(file => /^acl-report-[0-9a-f]{32}\.jsonl$/u.test(file))).toHaveLength(1) expect(files.some(file => file.endsWith('.txt'))).toBe(false) const record = JSON.parse(readFileSync(join(out, recordFile), 'utf8')) as Record expect(Object.keys(record).sort()).toEqual(['Dacl', 'Observed', 'Path', 'Protected']) @@ -682,7 +684,7 @@ exit $LASTEXITCODE } }) - it('reports a backup failure without attempting an ACL write', () => { + it('reports an unusable output directory without attempting an ACL write', () => { const scratch = newScratch() try { const target = makeDir(scratch, 'backup-failure') @@ -694,7 +696,7 @@ exit $LASTEXITCODE const run = runScript(['-Path', target, '-AllowRoot', scratch, '-Out', outputFile]) expect(run.code).toBe(1) const entries = reports(run) - expect(entries).toContainEqual(containingObject({ kind: 'action', operation: 'backup', status: 'failed', details: containingObject({ error: anyValue(String) }) })) + expect(entries).toContainEqual(containingObject({ kind: 'action', operation: 'prepare_report', status: 'failed', details: containingObject({ error: anyValue(String) }) })) expect(entries.filter(entry => entry.kind === 'action' && entry.details.effect === 'acl')).toEqual([]) expect(sddlOf(target)).toBe(before) expect(readFileSync(outputFile, 'utf8')).toBe('Existing contents') @@ -720,7 +722,7 @@ function Get-Acl { param([string]$LiteralPath); throw [System.IO.IOException]::n details: containingObject({ error: containingString('ACL observation unavailable') }), })) expect(entries.at(-1)).toMatchObject({ kind: 'summary', status: 'partial', details: containingObject({ observationFailures: anyValue(Number) }) }) - expect(entries.filter(entry => entry.kind === 'action' && entry.details.effect !== 'none')).toEqual([]) + expect(entries.filter(entry => entry.kind === 'action' && entry.details.effect === 'acl')).toEqual([]) expect(sddlOf(target)).toBe(before) } finally { dispose(scratch) diff --git a/snapshots/session/windows-acl-skill/session.v4.jsonl b/snapshots/session/windows-acl-skill/session.v4.jsonl index 4fd37dee0f..f236ef3eb5 100644 --- a/snapshots/session/windows-acl-skill/session.v4.jsonl +++ b/snapshots/session/windows-acl-skill/session.v4.jsonl @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ {"type":"session/title","data":{"title":"Load the diagnose-windows-sandbox-acl sk","messageSeqs":[8],"source":{"kind":"fallback"}}} {"type":"assistant/message","data":{"turn":1,"step":1,"message":{"role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"reasoning","text":"Load the requested skill."},{"type":"tool-call","id":"call_skill_load","name":"skill","arguments":"{\"name\":\"diagnose-windows-sandbox-acl\"}"}],"source":{"kind":"model","provider":"deepseek-official","model":"deepseek-v4-flash"},"id":"{{message:5}}"},"usage":{"inputTokens":100,"outputTokens":20,"cacheReadTokens":0,"reasoningTokens":5},"stream":[{"type":"chunk","time":1788699430688,"chunk":{"type":"block-start","index":0,"blockType":"reasoning"}},{"type":"reasoning-chunks","time0":1788699430688,"index":0,"dt":[],"texts":["Load the requested skill."]},{"type":"chunk","time":1788699430688,"chunk":{"type":"block-start","index":1,"blockType":"tool-call"}},{"type":"tool-call-chunks","time0":1788699430688,"index":1,"dt":[],"id":"call_skill_load","name":"skill","args":["{\"name\":\"diagnose-windows-sandbox-acl\"}"]},{"type":"chunk","time":1788699430688,"chunk":{"type":"block-end","index":0,"block":{"type":"reasoning","text":"Load the requested skill."}}},{"type":"chunk","time":1788699430688,"chunk":{"type":"block-end","index":1,"block":{"type":"tool-call","id":"call_skill_load","name":"skill","arguments":"{\"name\":\"diagnose-windows-sandbox-acl\"}"}}},{"type":"chunk","time":1788699430688,"chunk":{"type":"usage","usage":{"inputTokens":100,"outputTokens":20,"cacheReadTokens":0,"reasoningTokens":5}}},{"type":"chunk","time":1788699430688,"chunk":{"type":"finish","reason":{"kind":"tool-calls"}}}]},"surfaceOp":"append"} {"type":"tool/call","data":{"turn":1,"step":1,"callId":"call_skill_load","name":"skill","arguments":"{\"name\":\"diagnose-windows-sandbox-acl\"}"}} -{"type":"tool/result","data":{"turn":1,"step":1,"message":{"role":"tool","source":{"kind":"tool","callId":"call_skill_load"},"toolCallId":"call_skill_load","content":[{"type":"text","text":"\n\nBase directory for this skill: {{cwd}}/.dsh/skills/diagnose-windows-sandbox-acl\nResolve relative paths mentioned by this skill against the base directory before using them. Load referenced resources only as needed.\n\n\n\n# Diagnose Windows sandbox ACL failures\n\n**Write every approval request in plain words, in the user's language.** The approval prompt is the only thing the user reads before widening access, so it must stand alone: which folder the script touches, that it adds the signed-in user's own full-control entry where a required right is missing and removes foreign package entries, that file contents and owners are not changed, and that each change can be undone with the recovery command the script prints. Keep error codes, `WRITE_DAC`/`WRITE_OWNER`, `S-1-15-2-*` SIDs, `icacls`, verdict names and switches out of the request — they belong in the report you write afterwards. Ask once, for one command.\n\n## One command diagnoses and repairs\n\nThe script has no modes. `-Path`, `-AllowRoot` and `-Out` read the path and every ancestor and repair what the observations prove, in the same run:\n\n- directories on that chain that lack effective `WRITE_DAC` or `WRITE_OWNER` receive a full-control allow ACE for the signed-in user, because DSH cannot provision its workspace grant without them;\n- explicit AppContainer package allow ACEs (`S-1-15-2-*`, except the well-known groups ending in 1 or 2) are removed at their sources, ancestor first, which also removes those packages' access;\n- when the requested directory is one the sandbox cannot provision — the state its provisioning error reports on the workspace root — or it is the authorized root itself, explicit package allow ACEs anywhere under it are collected in the same run, so a conflicting entry deeper in the tree needs no second request. That walk is bounded and reports `truncated` and any directory it could not read; if it was truncated, pass the still-failing deeper path once more.\n\nEvery change is backed up first and then verified by re-reading it. `-AllowRoot` bounds all of it: an object is changed only when it is that directory or strictly inside it, so a workspace root can repair itself. Never split this into a diagnostic call and a repair call, never ask twice for one repair, and never pass a mode switch that does not exist.\n\n```powershell\n& '\\scripts\\diagnose-windows-sandbox-acl.ps1' -Path '' -AllowRoot '' -Out ''\nexit $LASTEXITCODE\n```\n\nSubstitute full, quoted paths. Keep `-Out` persistent and user-owned, preferably beside the failing workspace inside `-AllowRoot`; never use the skill resource directory, which is deleted when the skill unloads. Pass one path per invocation; do not repeat `-Path` or pass a comma-separated string to `pwsh -File`.\n\n## Decide whether diagnosis applies\n\nDiagnose an unexpected denial of workspace writes, listing, or reads the signed-in user should plainly have. Root-only failure and uniform failure are both eligible.\n\nStop and explain expected denials instead: writes outside the workspace, any write in `read-only`, piped grandchild `spawn EPERM`, or ConstrainedLanguage errors for .NET/COM/reflection. Those need no ACL repair.\n\n## Run it\n\n1. Repeat the failing operation once in the current sandbox. If it succeeds, there is nothing to repair.\n2. If it fails, run the command above confined once, if the sandbox starts at all. A writable `-Out` is enough; `read-only` refuses one.\n3. When sandbox setup itself fails — the error names the workspace root or `SetNamedSecurityInfoW` — every confined call fails before your command runs, so do not retry confined. Request approval for that one command through the normal path and run it unconfined. Unconfined does not elevate the Windows token; it only lifts the file sandbox.\n4. If approval is refused, unavailable, or forbidden by policy, report the path as undiagnosed and stop.\n\n## Read the output\n\nThe script prints a `REPORT` JSON record for every observation, decision, action, verification and recovery, then `SUMMARY FIXED= GRANTED= REFUSED= RESTORED=`. Read all of it; nothing is summarized away.\n\nEach record has `kind`, `operation`, `path`, `status`, `reason`, `details`. `completed` actions only confirm API execution: trust the `verification` records, which report `verified` or `failed` for each `grant` and each package removal. Decide from `details.nextAction`:\n\n| `nextAction` | Meaning |\n|---|---|\n| `verify_original_confined_operation` | Repairs verified; repeat the original operation confined. |\n| `stop` | Nothing was repaired, or a refusal ended the run. Report and stop. |\n| `restore_pending_then_stop` | Rollback was not verified. Run the printed recovery commands in order, then stop. |\n\nA deny ACE's presence alone does not establish causation; the script never removes one. DSH provisions `S-1-4-*` grants and an Everyone `DeleteSubdirectoriesAndFiles` deny: both are expected, not conflicts. A deny that blocks the repair ends the run without a repair — `REPAIR_REFUSED`, or `GRANT_FAILED` — and the script then restores what it attempted.\n\nEach change leaves two files in `-Out`: `acl-backup-.json` (the DACL the object owned before that change) and `acl-backup-.json.ps1` (the script that restores it). The run prints the matching `ROLLBACK pwsh -NoProfile -File ... -Restore ...` command.\n\n## After a repair\n\nRepeat the original failed operation in the original confined context. A repair that verified is not undone because the original operation fails for a further reason: continue from the new observations. If a deeper path is still denied, run the same one command on that path — again one call, one approval.\n\n**Stop after any failed or refused repair, or any failed verification.** The script already restored that invocation's attempted changes; do not repeat the repair, do not continue to another one, and never remove a deny ACE by hand. Restore earlier successful invocations in reverse order with their exact printed commands, then report.\n\n## Never\n\n- edit ACLs by hand, change an owner, erase a deny, or replace child permissions recursively;\n- write probe files or run the script elevated, through UAC or `runas`; the script and its recovery copies are user-writable;\n- widen `-AllowRoot` to reach an ancestor, or repair a purely inherited copy instead of its explicit source (the single command handles both);\n- repeat a denied or failed call.\n\nReport concisely in the user's language: observations and the paths analyzed (including relevant ancestors), what was changed and why, verification results, the recovery command, and the next step. Label any authorized unconfined run as such, not as a successful sandbox repair.\n\n"}],"isError":false,"id":"{{message:6}}"}},"sourceEventSeqs":[15],"surfaceOp":"append"} +{"type":"tool/result","data":{"turn":1,"step":1,"message":{"role":"tool","source":{"kind":"tool","callId":"call_skill_load"},"toolCallId":"call_skill_load","content":[{"type":"text","text":"\n\nBase directory for this skill: {{cwd}}/.dsh/skills/diagnose-windows-sandbox-acl\nResolve relative paths mentioned by this skill against the base directory before using them. Load referenced resources only as needed.\n\n\n\n# Diagnose Windows sandbox ACL failures\n\n**Write every approval request in plain words, in the user's language.** The approval prompt is all the user reads before widening access, so it must stand alone: which folder the script touches, that it adds the signed-in user's full-control entry where a right is missing and removes foreign package entries, that file contents and owners are unchanged, and that each change can be undone with the printed recovery command. Keep error codes, `WRITE_DAC`/`WRITE_OWNER`, `S-1-15-2-*` SIDs, `icacls`, verdict names and switches out of the request; they belong in the report. Ask once, for one command.\n\n## One command diagnoses and repairs\n\nThe script has no modes. `-Path`, `-AllowRoot` and `-Out` read the path and every ancestor and repair what the observations prove, in the same run:\n\n- directories on that chain that lack effective `WRITE_DAC` or `WRITE_OWNER` receive a full-control allow ACE for the signed-in user, because DSH cannot provision its workspace grant without them;\n- explicit AppContainer package allow ACEs (`S-1-15-2-*`, except the well-known groups ending in 1 or 2) are removed at their sources, ancestor first, which also removes those packages' access;\n- when the requested directory is one the sandbox cannot provision — the state its provisioning error reports on the workspace root — or it is the authorized root, explicit package allow ACEs under it are collected in the same run, so a deeper conflicting entry needs no second request. That bounded walk reports `truncated` and unreadable directories; if truncated, pass the still-failing deeper path once more.\n\nEvery change is backed up first and verified by re-reading it. `-AllowRoot` bounds all of it: an object is changed only when it is that directory or strictly inside it, so a workspace root can repair itself. Never split this into a diagnostic call and a repair call, never ask twice for one repair, and never pass a mode switch that does not exist.\n\n```powershell\n& '\\scripts\\diagnose-windows-sandbox-acl.ps1' -Path '' -AllowRoot '' -Out ''\nexit $LASTEXITCODE\n```\n\nSubstitute full, quoted paths. Keep `-Out` persistent and user-owned, preferably beside the failing workspace inside `-AllowRoot`; never use the skill resource directory, which is deleted when the skill unloads. Pass one path per invocation; do not repeat `-Path` or pass a comma-separated string to `pwsh -File`.\n\n## Decide whether diagnosis applies\n\nDiagnose an unexpected denial of workspace writes, listing, or reads the signed-in user should plainly have. Root-only failure and uniform failure are both eligible. Stop and explain expected denials instead: writes outside the workspace, any write in `read-only`, piped grandchild `spawn EPERM`, or ConstrainedLanguage errors for .NET/COM/reflection.\n\n## Run it\n\n1. Repeat the failing operation once in the current sandbox. If it succeeds, there is nothing to repair.\n2. If it fails, run the command above confined once, if the sandbox starts at all. A writable `-Out` is enough; `read-only` refuses one.\n3. When sandbox setup itself fails — the error names the workspace root or `SetNamedSecurityInfoW` — every confined call fails before your command runs, so do not retry confined. Request approval for that one command and run it unconfined. Unconfined does not elevate the Windows token.\n4. If approval is refused, unavailable, or forbidden by policy, report the path as undiagnosed and stop.\n\n## Read the output\n\nThe script prints a `REPORT` record for every observation, decision, action, verification and recovery, then a final `RECAP` line, the report path and `SUMMARY FIXED= GRANTED= REFUSED= RESTORED=`. Tool output keeps only its tail, so read the `RECAP` line: it carries the verdicts, changes, verifications, refusals and scans. The complete record set is in the `acl-report-*.jsonl` file whose path the run prints; read specific records when the recap is not enough, and quote what you rely on.\n\nTrust the `verification` records; `completed` actions only confirm API execution. Decide from `details.nextAction`:\n\n| `nextAction` | Meaning |\n|---|---|\n| `verify_original_confined_operation` | Repairs verified; repeat the original operation confined. |\n| `stop` | Nothing was repaired, or a refusal ended the run. Report and stop. |\n| `restore_pending_then_stop` | Rollback was not verified. Run the printed recovery commands in order, then stop. |\n\nA deny ACE's presence alone does not establish causation; the script never removes one. DSH provisions `S-1-4-*` grants and an Everyone `DeleteSubdirectoriesAndFiles` deny: both are expected, not conflicts. A deny that blocks the repair ends the run without a repair — `REPAIR_REFUSED`, or `GRANT_FAILED` — and the script then restores what it attempted. Each change leaves two files in `-Out` (`acl-backup-.json` and its `.ps1`), and the run prints the matching `ROLLBACK` command.\n\n## After a repair\n\nRepeat the original failed operation in the original confined context. A repair that verified is not undone because the original operation fails for a further reason: continue from the new observations. If a deeper path is still denied, run the same one command on that path — again one call, one approval.\n\n**Stop after any failed or refused repair, or any failed verification.** The script already restored that invocation's attempted changes; do not repeat it or continue to another repair. Restore earlier successful invocations in reverse order with their printed commands, then report.\n\n**When the run stops, hand the user a decision, not silence.** Say which object and which ACE or missing right still blocks the operation, what was changed and rolled back, the recovery commands in order, and the report path. Unblock the user by switching this session to full access temporarily: say that confinement is off for it and that this is a workaround, not a repair. Then ask the user to send feedback with this session so the unhandled scenario reaches us; only what reaches this conversation travels with it, so read the report and quote what matters.\n\n## Never\n\n- edit ACLs by hand, change an owner, erase a deny, or replace child permissions recursively;\n- run the script elevated, through UAC or `runas`; it and its recovery copies are user-writable;\n- widen `-AllowRoot` to reach an ancestor, or repeat a denied or failed call.\n\nReport in the user's language: analyzed paths, changes and why, verification, recovery commands, next step. Label an authorized unconfined run as such, not as a sandbox repair.\n\n"}],"isError":false,"id":"{{message:6}}"}},"sourceEventSeqs":[15],"surfaceOp":"append"} {"type":"step/end","data":{"turn":1,"step":1}} {"type":"step/start","data":{"turn":1,"step":2}} {"type":"assistant/message","data":{"turn":1,"step":2,"message":{"role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"reasoning","text":"The skill is loaded."},{"type":"text","text":"DONE"}],"source":{"kind":"model","provider":"deepseek-official","model":"deepseek-v4-flash"},"id":"{{message:7}}"},"usage":{"inputTokens":180,"outputTokens":10,"cacheReadTokens":0,"reasoningTokens":4},"stream":[{"type":"chunk","time":1788699430709,"chunk":{"type":"block-start","index":0,"blockType":"reasoning"}},{"type":"reasoning-chunks","time0":1788699430709,"index":0,"dt":[],"texts":["The skill is loaded."]},{"type":"chunk","time":1788699430709,"chunk":{"type":"block-start","index":1,"blockType":"text"}},{"type":"text-chunks","time0":1788699430709,"index":1,"dt":[],"texts":["DONE"]},{"type":"chunk","time":1788699430709,"chunk":{"type":"block-end","index":0,"block":{"type":"reasoning","text":"The skill is loaded."}}},{"type":"chunk","time":1788699430709,"chunk":{"type":"block-end","index":1,"block":{"type":"text","text":"DONE"}}},{"type":"chunk","time":1788699430709,"chunk":{"type":"usage","usage":{"inputTokens":180,"outputTokens":10,"cacheReadTokens":0,"reasoningTokens":4}}},{"type":"chunk","time":1788699430709,"chunk":{"type":"finish","reason":{"kind":"stop"}}}]},"surfaceOp":"append"}