Files
OpenPXE/crates/iso-store/src/store.rs
T
Miles Ward 9c6903351f v0.3.1: per-ISO boot password gate
Operators can now lock individual ISOs behind a password set in the
WebUI. Picking a locked image at the PXE menu prompts the operator on
the client console; the boot script is only released after a correct
match. The plaintext never leaves the request — server stores bcrypt
hashes, scripts never echo the candidate.

## Backend

- New optional `password_hash: Option<String>` on `IsoMeta`. Skipped
  during serialize when None, so existing meta.json files don't grow
  a noisy `null` field.
- `IsoStore::set_password(id, Some("pw"))` hashes via bcrypt
  `DEFAULT_COST` (10 — fast enough for an interactive iPXE prompt,
  expensive enough to be hostile to brute force on a leaked
  meta.json). `set_password(id, None)` and `set_password(id, Some(""))`
  both clear.
- `IsoStore::verify_password` returns Ok(true) when no password is
  set, so the gate stays open for the common case.
- `IsoMeta::is_password_protected()` predicate the HTTP layer + UI
  share.
- NFS-sourced ISOs persist their hash in memory only — the share is
  the source of truth for those, and it doesn't carry hash sidecars.

## HTTP API

- `PUT /api/isos/:id/password` body `{ "password": "..." }` to set,
  `{ "password": null }` (or empty string) to clear.
- `DELETE /api/isos/:id/password` for the explicit clear.
- Both 204 on success, 404 for unknown ids.
- `/boot/<entry>.ipxe` now intercepts:
  - no `?token=`        -> render password-prompt script
  - `?token=<wrong>`    -> render auth-fail script (sleeps 2s, chains
                           back to the entry which re-prompts)
  - `?token=<correct>`  -> render the real boot script
  - ISO without password ignores token entirely (per-MAC bookmarks
    still work without changes).

## iPXE prompt

`render_password_prompt`:
- `set password ` then `read --secret password` — accepts input
  without echoing.
- Empty input chains back to the main menu (lets the operator back
  out of a misclick).
- Submit chains `?token=${password:uristring}`. The `:uristring`
  modifier URL-encodes the value, so passwords with `&`, `?`, `=`,
  spaces, etc. survive transport.

`render_password_failed`:
- Single line saying so + 2s sleep, then re-chains the entry.
- Server-side WARN log records the entry id only, never the
  candidate value (verified in smoke test).

## UI

Storage tab's image table grows an `Auth` column showing
`protected` / `open`, plus a 🔒 next to the filename when locked.
Per-row "Set password" / "Password ✎" button toggles an inline
editor in the next table row containing:
- a "Password protect this image" checkbox
- a `<input type=password autocomplete=new-password>` (hidden when
  the checkbox is off)
- a Save button

Save calls PUT or DELETE on `/api/isos/:id/password` based on the
checkbox state and clears the input field before re-rendering, so
the plaintext doesn't sit in the DOM longer than needed.

## Menu indicator

`render_family_menu` adds a `*` prefix immediately before the size
box on protected entries — ASCII only because some firmware menu
consoles mangle non-ASCII glyphs. Looks like:

  item --key 1 win11_test-winpe *[ 5234 MB] Windows 11 Test ISO

## Tests

74 passing across the workspace (was 66 in v0.3.0):
- 3 new store unit tests (bcrypt round-trip, unknown-id error,
  meta.json persistence across restart)
- 2 new ipxe_script unit tests (prompt/auth-fail invariants:
  read --secret, uristring, no candidate echo)
- 3 new HTTP integration tests (full gate flow upload-set-prompt-
  fail-success-clear, null/empty bodies, 404 on unknown id)

cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets clean.

Local smoke verified upload + lock + prompt + auth-fail + correct +
menu indicator + log scrub on a real release binary.

## Operational notes

- HTTP, not HTTPS — token rides in the query string. Acceptable on
  a trusted boot VLAN; do NOT expose OpenPXE to untrusted networks
  with this feature relied on for security. Reverse-proxy in front
  of OpenPXE will end up with the token in access logs.
- bcrypt cost is `DEFAULT_COST` (10). One verify takes ~50ms on
  modern x86, which is the worst-case latency added to a correct
  boot. Tunable via the bcrypt crate if needed.
2026-05-06 22:35:11 -04:00

593 lines
21 KiB
Rust

//! On-disk ISO store with sidecar metadata files.
use crate::entry::{BootEntry, BootKind, KernelArgs};
use crate::introspect::{introspect, DistroFamily, IntrospectionReport};
use bytes::Bytes;
use parking_lot::RwLock;
use openpxe_core::{Error, Result};
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
use std::sync::Arc;
use time::OffsetDateTime;
use tokio::io::AsyncWriteExt;
/// Where the bytes for an ISO actually live.
///
/// The default is `Local` — uploaded ISOs sit in `<iso_dir>/<id>.iso`.
/// `Nfs` entries point at a file inside a remote share that the
/// `NfsManager` is keeping mounted. We resolve the on-disk path lazily
/// in [`IsoStore::iso_path_for`] using the `nfs_root` set at startup.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(tag = "kind", rename_all = "snake_case")]
pub enum IsoSource {
#[default]
Local,
Nfs {
mount_id: String,
/// Path relative to the mount point — typically just the filename.
relative_path: String,
},
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct IsoMeta {
/// Stable slug used in URLs (derived from the uploaded filename).
pub id: String,
pub filename: String,
pub size_bytes: u64,
pub sha256_hex: Option<String>,
#[serde(with = "time::serde::rfc3339")]
pub uploaded_at: OffsetDateTime,
pub introspection: IntrospectionReport,
/// Boot entries this ISO currently exposes in the PXE menu. Usually one,
/// occasionally two (BIOS + UEFI variant for some RHEL ISOs).
pub boot_entries: Vec<BootEntry>,
/// Source of the bytes — local upload (default) or NFS mount.
/// Old `meta.json` files without this field deserialize as `Local`.
#[serde(default)]
pub source: IsoSource,
/// Optional bcrypt hash of an operator-set password. When present,
/// `/boot/<entry>.ipxe` returns a `read --secret` prompt instead of
/// the boot script until the client chains back with the correct
/// `?token=...`. We never store, log, or transmit the plaintext.
/// Skipped on serialize when None to keep meta.json clean for
/// the common no-password case.
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
pub password_hash: Option<String>,
}
impl IsoMeta {
/// Convenience predicate the HTTP layer + UI can both use.
#[must_use]
pub fn is_password_protected(&self) -> bool {
self.password_hash
.as_deref()
.map(str::trim)
.is_some_and(|h| !h.is_empty())
}
}
pub struct UploadHandle {
pub id: String,
pub partial_path: PathBuf,
final_path: PathBuf,
filename: String,
hasher: Sha256,
bytes_written: u64,
file: tokio::fs::File,
}
impl UploadHandle {
pub async fn write_chunk(&mut self, chunk: &Bytes) -> Result<()> {
self.file.write_all(chunk).await?;
self.hasher.update(chunk);
self.bytes_written += chunk.len() as u64;
Ok(())
}
/// Flush, close, and atomically rename to the final path. Returns the
/// final `IsoMeta` including introspection results.
pub async fn finish(mut self, store: &IsoStore) -> Result<IsoMeta> {
self.file.flush().await?;
self.file.sync_all().await?;
drop(self.file);
tokio::fs::rename(&self.partial_path, &self.final_path).await?;
let hash = hex::encode(self.hasher.finalize());
let introspection = {
let p = self.final_path.clone();
tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || introspect(&p))
.await
.map_err(|e| Error::Other(e.into()))?
};
let boot_entries = generate_boot_entries(&self.id, &self.filename, &introspection);
let meta = IsoMeta {
id: self.id.clone(),
filename: self.filename,
size_bytes: self.bytes_written,
sha256_hex: Some(hash),
uploaded_at: OffsetDateTime::now_utc(),
introspection,
boot_entries,
source: IsoSource::Local,
password_hash: None,
};
store.persist_meta(&meta).await?;
store.insert(meta.clone());
Ok(meta)
}
pub async fn abort(self) -> Result<()> {
drop(self.file);
let _ = tokio::fs::remove_file(&self.partial_path).await;
Ok(())
}
}
#[derive(Debug, Default)]
struct Inner {
isos: HashMap<String, IsoMeta>,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct IsoStore {
iso_dir: Arc<PathBuf>,
/// Where NFS mounts land on disk. Set at startup via
/// [`IsoStore::set_nfs_root`]; required for resolving any
/// `IsoSource::Nfs` entry.
nfs_root: Arc<RwLock<Option<PathBuf>>>,
inner: Arc<RwLock<Inner>>,
}
impl IsoStore {
pub fn new(iso_dir: PathBuf) -> Self {
Self {
iso_dir: Arc::new(iso_dir),
nfs_root: Arc::new(RwLock::new(None)),
inner: Arc::new(RwLock::new(Inner::default())),
}
}
/// Tell the store where NFS mounts live. Without this set,
/// `IsoSource::Nfs` entries cannot be resolved to a file path.
pub fn set_nfs_root(&self, root: PathBuf) {
*self.nfs_root.write() = Some(root);
}
pub async fn ensure_dirs(&self) -> Result<()> {
tokio::fs::create_dir_all(self.iso_dir.as_path()).await?;
Ok(())
}
/// Scan the ISO directory on startup and load any sidecar `.meta.json`
/// files. ISOs without metadata are introspected lazily — we don't block
/// startup on potentially many GB of scanning.
pub async fn load_from_disk(&self) -> Result<()> {
self.ensure_dirs().await?;
let mut entries = tokio::fs::read_dir(self.iso_dir.as_path()).await?;
while let Some(e) = entries.next_entry().await? {
let p = e.path();
if p.extension().and_then(|s| s.to_str()) != Some("json") { continue; }
if !p
.file_name()
.and_then(|s| s.to_str())
.is_some_and(|n| n.ends_with(".meta.json"))
{
continue;
}
if let Ok(text) = tokio::fs::read_to_string(&p).await {
if let Ok(meta) = serde_json::from_str::<IsoMeta>(&text) {
self.insert(meta);
}
}
}
Ok(())
}
fn insert(&self, meta: IsoMeta) {
self.inner.write().isos.insert(meta.id.clone(), meta);
}
async fn persist_meta(&self, meta: &IsoMeta) -> Result<()> {
let path = self.meta_path(&meta.id);
let text = serde_json::to_string_pretty(meta).map_err(|e| Error::Other(e.into()))?;
tokio::fs::write(path, text).await?;
Ok(())
}
fn meta_path(&self, id: &str) -> PathBuf {
self.iso_dir.join(format!("{id}.meta.json"))
}
fn iso_path(&self, id: &str) -> PathBuf {
self.iso_dir.join(format!("{id}.iso"))
}
pub async fn begin_upload(&self, filename: &str) -> Result<UploadHandle> {
self.ensure_dirs().await?;
let id = slugify(filename);
let final_path = self.iso_path(&id);
if final_path.exists() {
return Err(Error::Invalid(format!("iso '{id}' already exists")));
}
let partial_path = self.iso_dir.join(format!("{id}.partial"));
let file = tokio::fs::File::create(&partial_path).await?;
Ok(UploadHandle {
id,
partial_path,
final_path,
filename: filename.to_string(),
hasher: Sha256::new(),
bytes_written: 0,
file,
})
}
/// Readiness probe — is the backing directory reachable? Distinct from
/// "is there content in it", to avoid an empty store failing health.
#[must_use]
pub fn list_ok(&self) -> bool {
std::fs::read_dir(self.iso_dir.as_path()).is_ok()
}
#[must_use]
pub fn list(&self) -> Vec<IsoMeta> {
let g = self.inner.read();
let mut v: Vec<_> = g.isos.values().cloned().collect();
// Newest-first by upload time.
v.sort_by_key(|m| std::cmp::Reverse(m.uploaded_at));
v
}
#[must_use]
pub fn get(&self, id: &str) -> Option<IsoMeta> {
self.inner.read().isos.get(id).cloned()
}
/// Resolve an ISO id to its on-disk path, if any. For local entries
/// this is `<iso_dir>/<id>.iso`; for NFS entries it's
/// `<nfs_root>/<mount_id>/<relative_path>`. Returns None if the file
/// is missing or the source isn't resolvable (e.g. NFS share
/// unmounted).
pub fn iso_path_for(&self, id: &str) -> Option<PathBuf> {
let meta = self.get(id)?;
let path = match &meta.source {
IsoSource::Local => self.iso_path(id),
IsoSource::Nfs {
mount_id,
relative_path,
} => {
let root = self.nfs_root.read().clone()?;
root.join(mount_id).join(relative_path)
}
};
if path.exists() {
Some(path)
} else {
None
}
}
/// Delete an ISO and its sidecar metadata. Only acts on local ISOs;
/// for NFS-backed ISOs the operator must remove the file from the
/// share or unmount the NFS share entirely.
pub async fn delete(&self, id: &str) -> Result<()> {
let meta = self.get(id);
let is_local = matches!(meta.as_ref().map(|m| &m.source), Some(IsoSource::Local) | None);
if is_local {
let iso = self.iso_path(id);
let meta_path = self.meta_path(id);
let _ = tokio::fs::remove_file(&iso).await;
let _ = tokio::fs::remove_file(&meta_path).await;
}
self.inner.write().isos.remove(id);
Ok(())
}
/// Register an externally-sourced ISO (e.g. NFS-mounted). Used by
/// `NfsManager` after walking a freshly-mounted share. We do **not**
/// persist a `meta.json` on disk for these — the source of truth is
/// the share itself, and the NFS manager re-scans on startup.
pub fn register_external(
&self,
id: String,
filename: String,
size_bytes: u64,
introspection: IntrospectionReport,
boot_entries: Vec<BootEntry>,
source: IsoSource,
) {
let meta = IsoMeta {
id: id.clone(),
filename,
size_bytes,
sha256_hex: None,
uploaded_at: OffsetDateTime::now_utc(),
introspection,
boot_entries,
source,
password_hash: None,
};
self.inner.write().isos.insert(id, meta);
}
/// Drop every entry that belongs to `mount_id`. Used by the NFS
/// manager when an operator removes a share, or before re-scanning
/// to clean out stale entries.
pub fn drop_external_source(&self, mount_id: &str) {
let mut g = self.inner.write();
g.isos.retain(|_, m| {
!matches!(&m.source, IsoSource::Nfs { mount_id: mid, .. } if mid == mount_id)
});
}
/// Set or clear an ISO's boot password.
///
/// `Some("plaintext")` hashes via bcrypt (cost 10 — fast enough for
/// an interactive iPXE prompt, slow enough to be hostile to brute
/// force on a leaked meta.json) and persists.
///
/// `None` removes the password — the next /boot/<id>.ipxe request
/// returns the script directly without a prompt.
///
/// We never store, log, or transmit the plaintext.
pub async fn set_password(&self, id: &str, password: Option<&str>) -> Result<()> {
let new_hash = match password {
None => None,
Some(pw) => {
let pw = pw.trim();
if pw.is_empty() {
None
} else {
let h = bcrypt::hash(pw, bcrypt::DEFAULT_COST)
.map_err(|e| Error::Other(e.into()))?;
Some(h)
}
}
};
// Update in-memory + grab a clone for persistence outside the lock.
let updated = {
let mut g = self.inner.write();
let m = g
.isos
.get_mut(id)
.ok_or_else(|| Error::Invalid(format!("no such iso '{id}'")))?;
m.password_hash = new_hash;
m.clone()
};
// NFS-sourced ISOs have no on-disk meta.json — skip persistence
// for them (the password lives in memory until the manager
// re-scans the share, then it's gone). Document this in the API
// handler so the operator knows.
if matches!(updated.source, IsoSource::Local) {
self.persist_meta(&updated).await?;
}
Ok(())
}
/// Verify a candidate password against the stored bcrypt hash.
/// Returns:
/// - `Ok(true)` — match (or the ISO has no password set; gate is open)
/// - `Ok(false)` — mismatch
/// - `Err(_)` — id not found, or bcrypt error
pub fn verify_password(&self, id: &str, candidate: &str) -> Result<bool> {
let meta = self
.get(id)
.ok_or_else(|| Error::Invalid(format!("no such iso '{id}'")))?;
let Some(hash) = meta.password_hash else {
return Ok(true); // no password set — anyone can boot
};
bcrypt::verify(candidate, &hash).map_err(|e| Error::Other(e.into()))
}
}
fn slugify(filename: &str) -> String {
let stem = Path::new(filename)
.file_stem()
.and_then(|s| s.to_str())
.unwrap_or("iso");
slugify_str(stem)
}
/// Slugify an arbitrary string to lowercase ASCII alphanumerics, hyphens,
/// and underscores. Public so the NFS manager can mint ids that follow the
/// same rules as upload-time ISO ids.
#[must_use]
pub fn slugify_str(input: &str) -> String {
input
.chars()
.map(|c| {
if c.is_ascii_alphanumeric() || c == '-' || c == '_' {
c.to_ascii_lowercase()
} else {
'-'
}
})
.collect::<String>()
.trim_matches('-')
.to_string()
}
/// Public wrapper around [`generate_boot_entries`] so the NFS manager can
/// build entries for shares it just scanned, using the same logic as the
/// upload pipeline. Re-exported via the crate root.
#[must_use]
pub fn generate_boot_entries_for(
id: &str,
filename: &str,
r: &IntrospectionReport,
) -> Vec<BootEntry> {
generate_boot_entries(id, filename, r)
}
/// Build `BootEntry`s from the introspection report. URLs are relative —
/// the HTTP layer rewrites them with the public base URL per request.
fn generate_boot_entries(id: &str, filename: &str, r: &IntrospectionReport) -> Vec<BootEntry> {
let title = r.volume_label.clone().unwrap_or_else(|| filename.to_string());
match r.family {
DistroFamily::WindowsPe if r.has_boot_wim => {
// Standard wimboot chain. Paths are in-ISO; the HTTP layer maps
// `iso/<id>/<path>` to on-disk extraction via ISO9660 lookup.
let base = format!("iso/{id}");
vec![BootEntry {
id: format!("{id}-winpe"),
title: format!("{title} (Windows / wimboot)"),
kind: BootKind::Wimboot {
wimboot_url: "ipxe/wimboot".to_string(),
files: vec![
("bootmgr".into(), format!("{base}/bootmgr")),
("bootmgr.efi".into(), format!("{base}/bootmgr.efi")),
("bcd".into(), format!("{base}/boot/bcd")),
("boot.sdi".into(), format!("{base}/boot/boot.sdi")),
("boot.wim".into(), format!("{base}/sources/boot.wim")),
],
},
}]
}
fam if r.kernel_path.is_some() => {
let base = format!("iso/{id}");
let kernel_url = format!("{base}{}", r.kernel_path.as_deref().unwrap_or(""));
let initrd_urls = r.initrd_paths.iter().map(|p| format!("{base}{p}")).collect();
let args = KernelArgs { cmdline: linux_cmdline(fam, id) };
vec![BootEntry {
id: format!("{id}-linux"),
title,
kind: BootKind::LinuxKernel { kernel_url, initrd_urls, args },
}]
}
_ => {
// Last-resort SAN boot. Won't work for large modern ISOs, but
// lets the ISO at least appear in the menu.
vec![BootEntry {
id: format!("{id}-sanboot"),
title: format!("{title} (SAN boot — may fail for >1GiB ISOs)"),
kind: BootKind::SanBootIso { iso_url: format!("iso/{id}.iso") },
}]
}
}
}
fn linux_cmdline(family: DistroFamily, id: &str) -> String {
// The HTTP layer resolves `${base-url}` at render time.
let iso_url = format!("${{base-url}}/iso/{id}.iso");
match family {
DistroFamily::DebianUbuntu => format!(
"boot=casper netboot=url url={iso_url} ip=dhcp ---"
),
DistroFamily::RhelFedora => format!(
"inst.repo={iso_url} inst.stage2={iso_url} ip=dhcp"
),
DistroFamily::OpenSuse => format!(
"install={iso_url} netsetup=dhcp"
),
DistroFamily::Arch => {
"archiso_http_srv=${base-url}/iso/ archisobasedir=arch ip=dhcp copytoram".to_string()
}
DistroFamily::Alpine => format!(
"alpine_repo=${{base-url}}/iso/{id}/ modloop=${{base-url}}/iso/{id}/boot/modloop-lts ip=dhcp"
),
_ => "ip=dhcp".into(),
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use crate::introspect::{DistroFamily, IntrospectionReport};
use tempfile::tempdir;
#[test]
fn slugify_basic() {
// Upload filenames come from multipart parts (no path components);
// file_stem drops the extension, then non-alphanumerics become `-`.
assert_eq!(slugify("Ubuntu 24.04 Desktop.iso"), "ubuntu-24-04-desktop");
assert_eq!(slugify("Rocky-9.4-x86_64-dvd.iso"), "rocky-9-4-x86_64-dvd");
assert_eq!(slugify("arch.iso"), "arch");
// If a path sneaks in, file_stem strips the directory — OK, not a hazard.
assert_eq!(slugify("/etc/passwd"), "passwd");
}
fn fake_meta(id: &str) -> IsoMeta {
IsoMeta {
id: id.into(),
filename: format!("{id}.iso"),
size_bytes: 0,
sha256_hex: None,
uploaded_at: OffsetDateTime::now_utc(),
introspection: IntrospectionReport {
family: DistroFamily::Unknown,
volume_label: None,
kernel_path: None,
initrd_paths: vec![],
has_boot_wim: false,
},
boot_entries: vec![],
source: IsoSource::Local,
password_hash: None,
}
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn password_round_trip_set_verify_clear() {
let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
let store = IsoStore::new(dir.path().to_path_buf());
store.ensure_dirs().await.unwrap();
store.inner.write().isos.insert("alpha".into(), fake_meta("alpha"));
// No password set — verify_password returns Ok(true) for any input.
assert!(store.verify_password("alpha", "anything").unwrap());
assert!(!store.get("alpha").unwrap().is_password_protected());
// Set a password.
store.set_password("alpha", Some("hunter2")).await.unwrap();
let m = store.get("alpha").unwrap();
assert!(m.is_password_protected());
assert!(m.password_hash.unwrap().starts_with("$2"));
// Verify correct + wrong.
assert!(store.verify_password("alpha", "hunter2").unwrap());
assert!(!store.verify_password("alpha", "wrong").unwrap());
assert!(!store.verify_password("alpha", "").unwrap());
// Clear by passing None or an empty string.
store.set_password("alpha", None).await.unwrap();
assert!(!store.get("alpha").unwrap().is_password_protected());
store.set_password("alpha", Some("again")).await.unwrap();
store.set_password("alpha", Some(" ")).await.unwrap();
assert!(!store.get("alpha").unwrap().is_password_protected());
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn set_password_for_unknown_id_errors() {
let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
let store = IsoStore::new(dir.path().to_path_buf());
store.ensure_dirs().await.unwrap();
let r = store.set_password("does-not-exist", Some("pw")).await;
assert!(matches!(r, Err(Error::Invalid(_))));
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn password_persists_via_meta_json_for_local_isos() {
// Hash makes it onto disk so it survives a restart.
let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
let store = IsoStore::new(dir.path().to_path_buf());
store.ensure_dirs().await.unwrap();
let meta = fake_meta("alpha");
store.persist_meta(&meta).await.unwrap();
store.insert(meta);
store.set_password("alpha", Some("s3cret")).await.unwrap();
// Re-load from disk and confirm the hash came back.
let store2 = IsoStore::new(dir.path().to_path_buf());
store2.load_from_disk().await.unwrap();
let reloaded = store2.get("alpha").expect("reloaded");
assert!(reloaded.is_password_protected());
assert!(store2.verify_password("alpha", "s3cret").unwrap());
assert!(!store2.verify_password("alpha", "wrong").unwrap());
}
}