Three features, all zero-toggle and principle-clean (single static musl
binary, container-first, no test certs, no client trust-store changes).
Secure Boot via signed shim+GRUB (automatic):
- The v0.6.1 escalation ladder gains a third rung: Firmware -> Builtin
-> Shim. Secure-Boot firmware downloads our unsigned iPXE but refuses
to execute it — indistinguishable from a failed chainload — so after
two unconfirmed attempts the MAC is offered Fedora's Microsoft-signed
shimx64.efi, which loads the signed GRUB, which fetches a
server-rendered grub.cfg. Fully signed chain, SB stays on.
- scripts/fetch-shim.sh pulls shim-x64/grub2-efi-x64 (+aa64 best-effort)
from the official Fedora 43 packages and ships the EFI binaries
byte-for-byte unmodified; Dockerfile fetch stage gained rpm2cpio/cpio.
- New grub_script renderer (Linux kernel entries only — signed GRUB only
boots signed kernels; sanboot/wimboot have no signed equivalent and
are omitted with an explanatory menu line).
- TFTP server gains a DynamicAsset hook for server-rendered names
(grub.cfg); HTTP serves the same config under /ipxe/grub.cfg for
native UEFI HTTP Boot chains. Arch-aware fallback walks back down the
ladder where no shim exists (BIOS, IA32).
Boot rules + decision webhook (open 'Matrix Boot'):
- Ordered first-match-wins rules over MAC prefix + client arch (the DHCP
proxy now bakes arch into the boot.ipxe chain URL), generalizing
per-MAC pins. Persisted to boot_rules.json; GET/PUT /api/boot-rules;
rules editor + webhook field on the Hosts tab.
- Optional pixiecore-style webhook: unmatched boots GET
<url>?mac=&arch= and 200 {"target":"id"} chains to it. Fail-open
with a 2s budget — a dead endpoint can never block PXE.
- Decision order: exact pin -> rules -> webhook -> menu. Empty config
is byte-for-byte the previous behavior.
Tokenized answer files (the post-WDS/CVE-2026-0386 hardening):
- Every generated unattended URL (inst.ks / preseed url / autoinstall
seed) now carries a 4h boot-scoped token; /unattended/{id} and the
cloud-init seed routes require it (or an operator session) once an
admin exists. Stops answer-file credential harvesting by anything
else on the network. No toggle; setup-mode installs stay open.
Validation: clippy clean, fmt clean, 290 workspace tests green
(+18 new across boot_tokens, boot_rules, arch ladder, escalation,
grub renderer, and four new full-flow integration tests).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
139 lines
4.8 KiB
Rust
139 lines
4.8 KiB
Rust
//! One-time(ish) access tokens for unattended answer files (v0.7.0).
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//!
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//! Why: answer files routinely embed credentials (local admin passwords,
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//! domain-join accounts, root hashes). Serving them to anyone who can
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//! GET `/unattended/<id>` is exactly the exposure that got WDS
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//! hands-free deployment disabled upstream (CVE-2026-0386 hardening
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//! guidance). OpenPXE generates every answer-file URL it injects into a
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//! boot chain, so it can scope each URL to the boot that requested it:
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//! when a boot script is rendered, a short-lived token is minted and
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//! appended; the serving endpoint requires it (or a logged-in operator
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//! session, so browser testing keeps working).
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//!
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//! Deliberately multi-use within the TTL rather than strictly one-shot:
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//! real installers fetch the same file more than once (initramfs +
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//! installer stage, cloud-init retries), and the token's job is to stop
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//! *unrelated* hosts from harvesting credentials, not to count fetches.
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//!
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//! In-memory only. A server restart invalidates outstanding tokens —
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//! acceptable because a restart also interrupts the ISO streaming an
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//! in-flight install depends on, and the next boot mints fresh ones.
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use parking_lot::Mutex;
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use std::collections::HashMap;
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use std::time::{Duration, Instant};
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use uuid::Uuid;
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/// Long enough to cover a slow OS install end-to-end (the answer file is
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/// fetched early, but cloud-init can re-read late), short enough that a
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/// leaked URL goes stale the same afternoon.
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const TOKEN_TTL: Duration = Duration::from_hours(4);
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/// Hard cap on outstanding tokens; past it the oldest is evicted. Tokens
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/// are minted once per boot-script render, so this only matters under
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/// abuse, and serving must never become a memory-growth vector.
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const MAX_TOKENS: usize = 4096;
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#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
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struct Grant {
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file_id: String,
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issued: Instant,
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}
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/// In-memory token table. Cheap to clone (`Arc`-shared).
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#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default)]
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pub struct BootTokens {
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inner: std::sync::Arc<Mutex<HashMap<String, Grant>>>,
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}
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impl BootTokens {
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#[must_use]
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pub fn new() -> Self {
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Self::default()
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}
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/// Mint a token granting access to unattended file `file_id` for the
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/// next [`TOKEN_TTL`]. Returns the opaque token value to embed in the
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/// generated URL.
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#[must_use]
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pub fn mint(&self, file_id: &str) -> String {
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self.mint_at(file_id, Instant::now())
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}
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/// Is `token` a live grant for `file_id`?
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#[must_use]
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pub fn check(&self, token: &str, file_id: &str) -> bool {
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self.check_at(token, file_id, Instant::now())
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}
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fn mint_at(&self, file_id: &str, now: Instant) -> String {
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let token = Uuid::new_v4().simple().to_string();
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let mut g = self.inner.lock();
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g.retain(|_, gr| now.duration_since(gr.issued) < TOKEN_TTL);
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if g.len() >= MAX_TOKENS {
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if let Some(oldest) = g
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.iter()
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.min_by_key(|(_, gr)| gr.issued)
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.map(|(k, _)| k.clone())
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{
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g.remove(&oldest);
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}
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}
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g.insert(
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token.clone(),
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Grant {
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file_id: file_id.to_string(),
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issued: now,
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},
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);
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token
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}
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fn check_at(&self, token: &str, file_id: &str, now: Instant) -> bool {
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let g = self.inner.lock();
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g.get(token)
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.is_some_and(|gr| gr.file_id == file_id && now.duration_since(gr.issued) < TOKEN_TTL)
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}
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}
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod tests {
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use super::*;
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#[test]
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fn mint_then_check_round_trip() {
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let t = BootTokens::new();
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let tok = t.mint("ks-1");
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assert!(t.check(&tok, "ks-1"));
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// Multi-use within TTL: a second fetch still passes.
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assert!(t.check(&tok, "ks-1"));
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// Wrong file id never passes, even with a live token.
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assert!(!t.check(&tok, "ks-2"));
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// Unknown token never passes.
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assert!(!t.check("nope", "ks-1"));
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}
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#[test]
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fn token_expires_after_ttl() {
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let t = BootTokens::new();
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let now = Instant::now();
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let tok = t.mint_at("ks-1", now);
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let just_before = TOKEN_TTL.checked_sub(Duration::from_secs(1)).unwrap();
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assert!(t.check_at(&tok, "ks-1", now + just_before));
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assert!(!t.check_at(&tok, "ks-1", now + TOKEN_TTL + Duration::from_secs(1)));
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}
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#[test]
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fn table_is_capped() {
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let t = BootTokens::new();
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let now = Instant::now();
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let first = t.mint_at("f", now);
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for i in 0..MAX_TOKENS {
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let _ = t.mint_at(&format!("f{i}"), now + Duration::from_secs(1));
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}
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// The oldest grant was evicted to stay within the cap.
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assert!(!t.check_at(&first, "f", now + Duration::from_secs(2)));
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assert!(t.inner.lock().len() <= MAX_TOKENS);
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}
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}
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