v0.8.1: add ISO by URL, zero-touch admin bootstrap

Ease-of-use pass inspired by Bootimus (Dnsmasq-PXE is a manual dnsmasq setup guide — nothing to adopt; OpenPXE already replaces that stack). Add ISO by URL: - New http-api `fetch` module: a small FetchJobs registry + a background streaming download (reqwest) that pipes a remote .iso through the same UploadHandle + introspection path as an upload, so a URL-fetched image classifies and gains boot entries identically. Progress is polled by the Storage view and rendered as rows, mirroring uploads. - Routes POST/GET/DELETE /api/isos/fetch. http/https only; .iso-only filename derived from Content-Disposition / URL basename with path traversal stripped; 16 GiB cap; cancel; credential-stripped URL display. Operator-gated, no boot-time outbound — offline boot is untouched. - Storage upload card gains an "Or add by URL" field with progress + cancel. Zero-touch admin bootstrap: - OPENPXE_ADMIN_USERNAME + OPENPXE_ADMIN_PASSWORD (or _PASSWORD_FILE for Docker/K8s secrets) auto-create the admin on first run, so a fresh container is usable with no setup wizard. Seeds the first run only — a lingering env var can't reset a rotated password. Tests: URL parse / filename / Content-Disposition unit tests + a wiremock end-to-end fetch-into-store integration test. clippy/fmt/node clean. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
v0.8.0: dep prune, memtest introspection fix, concurrent uploads, x-api-key
2026-07-16 15:56:27 -04:00 · 2026-06-21 23:35:42 -04:00 · 2026-06-14 08:15:43 -04:00 · 2026-06-12 17:04:01 -04:00 · 2026-06-12 15:21:14 -04:00 · 2026-06-09 22:44:19 -04:00
31 changed files with 3326 additions and 723 deletions
@@ -175,45 +175,6 @@ dependencies = [
 "password-hash",
 ]

-[[package]]
-name = "asn1-rs"
-version = "0.7.2"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "b7f43a50ac4fdca5df8e885c21b835997f0a1cdee65494a6847694a98652d9d8"
-dependencies = [
- "asn1-rs-derive",
- "asn1-rs-impl",
- "displaydoc",
- "nom 7.1.3",
- "num-traits",
- "rusticata-macros",
- "thiserror",
- "time",
-]
-
-[[package]]
-name = "asn1-rs-derive"
-version = "0.6.0"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "3109e49b1e4909e9db6515a30c633684d68cdeaa252f215214cb4fa1a5bfee2c"
-dependencies = [
- "proc-macro2",
- "quote",
- "syn",
- "synstructure",
-]
-
-[[package]]
-name = "asn1-rs-impl"
-version = "0.2.0"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "7b18050c2cd6fe86c3a76584ef5e0baf286d038cda203eb6223df2cc413565f7"
-dependencies = [
- "proc-macro2",
- "quote",
- "syn",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "assert-json-diff"
 version = "2.0.2"
@@ -1144,20 +1105,6 @@ dependencies = [
 "zeroize",
 ]

-[[package]]
-name = "der-parser"
-version = "10.0.0"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "07da5016415d5a3c4dd39b11ed26f915f52fc4e0dc197d87908bc916e51bc1a6"
-dependencies = [
- "asn1-rs",
- "displaydoc",
- "nom 7.1.3",
- "num-bigint",
- "num-traits",
- "rusticata-macros",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "der_derive"
 version = "0.7.3"
@@ -2445,7 +2392,7 @@ dependencies = [
 "httpdate",
 "idna",
 "mime",
- "nom 8.0.0",
+ "nom",
 "percent-encoding",
 "quoted_printable",
 "rustls",
@@ -2564,12 +2511,6 @@ dependencies = [
 "unicase",
 ]

-[[package]]
-name = "minimal-lexical"
-version = "0.2.1"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "68354c5c6bd36d73ff3feceb05efa59b6acb7626617f4962be322a825e61f79a"
-
 [[package]]
 name = "miniz_oxide"
 version = "0.8.9"
@@ -2702,16 +2643,6 @@ dependencies = [
 "libc",
 ]

-[[package]]
-name = "nom"
-version = "7.1.3"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "d273983c5a657a70a3e8f2a01329822f3b8c8172b73826411a55751e404a0a4a"
-dependencies = [
- "memchr",
- "minimal-lexical",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "nom"
 version = "8.0.0"
@@ -2803,15 +2734,6 @@ dependencies = [
 "libc",
 ]

-[[package]]
-name = "oid-registry"
-version = "0.8.1"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "12f40cff3dde1b6087cc5d5f5d4d65712f34016a03ed60e9c08dcc392736b5b7"
-dependencies = [
- "asn1-rs",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "once_cell"
 version = "1.21.4"
@@ -2836,7 +2758,7 @@ checksum = "c08d65885ee38876c4f86fa503fb49d7b507c2b62552df7c70b2fce627e06381"

 [[package]]
 name = "openpxe"
-version = "0.7.2"
+version = "0.8.1"
 dependencies = [
 "anyhow",
 "axum",
@@ -2848,17 +2770,15 @@ dependencies = [
 "openpxe-ipxe-assets",
 "openpxe-iso-store",
 "openpxe-tftp",
- "serde",
 "time",
 "tokio",
- "toml",
 "tracing",
 "tracing-subscriber",
 ]

 [[package]]
 name = "openpxe-core"
-version = "0.7.2"
+version = "0.8.1"
 dependencies = [
 "anyhow",
 "base64",
@@ -2867,7 +2787,6 @@ dependencies = [
 "figment",
 "flate2",
 "parking_lot",
- "quick-xml",
 "rcgen",
 "roxmltree",
 "serde",
@@ -2880,29 +2799,26 @@ dependencies = [
 "tracing",
 "tracing-subscriber",
 "uuid",
- "x509-parser",
 ]

 [[package]]
 name = "openpxe-dhcp-proxy"
-version = "0.7.2"
+version = "0.8.1"
 dependencies = [
 "anyhow",
- "bytes",
 "dhcproto",
 "openpxe-core",
 "parking_lot",
 "serde_json",
 "socket2",
 "tempfile",
- "thiserror",
 "tokio",
 "tracing",
 ]

 [[package]]
 name = "openpxe-http-api"
-version = "0.7.2"
+version = "0.8.1"
 dependencies = [
 "anyhow",
 "axum",
@@ -2910,7 +2826,6 @@ dependencies = [
 "bergshamra",
 "bytes",
 "futures",
- "hyper",
 "image",
 "insta",
 "lettre",
@@ -2924,7 +2839,6 @@ dependencies = [
 "serde",
 "serde_json",
 "tempfile",
- "thiserror",
 "time",
 "tokio",
 "tokio-stream",
@@ -2938,17 +2852,16 @@ dependencies = [

 [[package]]
 name = "openpxe-ipxe-assets"
-version = "0.7.2"
+version = "0.8.1"
 dependencies = [
 "openpxe-core",
 "rust-embed",
- "thiserror",
 "tracing",
 ]

 [[package]]
 name = "openpxe-iso-store"
-version = "0.7.2"
+version = "0.8.1"
 dependencies = [
 "anyhow",
 "bcrypt",
@@ -2967,31 +2880,26 @@ dependencies = [
 "serde_json",
 "sha2 0.10.9",
 "tempfile",
- "thiserror",
 "time",
 "tokio",
- "tokio-util",
 "tracing",
- "uuid",
 ]

 [[package]]
 name = "openpxe-tftp"
-version = "0.7.2"
+version = "0.8.1"
 dependencies = [
 "anyhow",
- "bytes",
 "openpxe-core",
 "openpxe-ipxe-assets",
 "socket2",
- "thiserror",
 "tokio",
 "tracing",
 ]

 [[package]]
 name = "openpxe-webui"
-version = "0.7.2"
+version = "0.8.1"

 [[package]]
 name = "p256"
@@ -3438,15 +3346,6 @@ version = "2.0.1"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "a993555f31e5a609f617c12db6250dedcac1b0a85076912c436e6fc9b2c8e6a3"

-[[package]]
-name = "quick-xml"
-version = "0.40.1"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "2474bd2e5029e7ccb6abb2ba48cf2383a333851dedf495901544281590c7da7f"
-dependencies = [
- "memchr",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "quinn"
 version = "0.11.9"
@@ -3933,15 +3832,6 @@ dependencies = [
 "semver",
 ]

-[[package]]
-name = "rusticata-macros"
-version = "4.1.0"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "faf0c4a6ece9950b9abdb62b1cfcf2a68b3b67a10ba445b3bb85be2a293d0632"
-dependencies = [
- "nom 7.1.3",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "rustix"
 version = "1.1.4"
@@ -5644,23 +5534,6 @@ dependencies = [
 "tls_codec",
 ]

-[[package]]
-name = "x509-parser"
-version = "0.18.1"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "d43b0f71ce057da06bc0851b23ee24f3f86190b07203dd8f567d0b706a185202"
-dependencies = [
- "asn1-rs",
- "data-encoding",
- "der-parser",
- "lazy_static",
- "nom 7.1.3",
- "oid-registry",
- "rusticata-macros",
- "thiserror",
- "time",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "yansi"
 version = "1.0.1"
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ members = [
 ]

 [workspace.package]
-version = "0.7.2"
+version = "0.8.1"
 edition = "2021"
 rust-version = "1.95"
 license = "MIT OR Apache-2.0"
@@ -82,8 +82,6 @@ lettre = { version = "0.11", default-features = false, features = ["smtp-transpo
 # SP layer (AuthnRequest, metadata parse, SAMLResponse semantics) on top.
 bergshamra = "0.5"
 roxmltree = "0.21"
-quick-xml = "0.40"
-x509-parser = "0.18"
 # flate2 default backend is miniz_oxide (pure Rust) — do NOT enable the
 # zlib/zlib-ng C backends, which would break the musl-static build.
 flate2 = "1.1"
@@ -65,7 +65,10 @@ OpenPXE collapses that whole stack into **one statically-linked binary in one co
  hierarchy — generated fresh on every request from current settings.

 #### ISO management & remote libraries
- **Drag-and-drop chunked uploads** that don't 502 on multi-GB images.
+- **Drag-and-drop chunked uploads** that don't 502 on multi-GB images — drop several at once
+  and they upload concurrently.
+- **Add by URL** — paste an ISO link and the server streams it straight into storage and
+  auto-detects it, with progress; no download-then-reupload.
 - **Automatic introspection** — detects the distro family and generates the right
  kernel+initrd or Windows `wimboot` chain. No manual config.
 - **Remote ISO libraries, streamed on demand** (no local cache) over **SMB, NFS, or SFTP** —
@@ -88,6 +91,9 @@ OpenPXE collapses that whole stack into **one statically-linked binary in one co
 - **Prometheus `/metrics`**, a built-in operator **terminal**, live tracing log, and
  `/healthz` · `/readyz` probes.
 - **Layered config** — defaults → TOML file → `OPENPXE_*` env, in that order.
+- **Zero-touch first run** — set `OPENPXE_ADMIN_USERNAME` + `OPENPXE_ADMIN_PASSWORD` and a
+  fresh container comes up with the admin already created, no setup wizard. Automate the rest
+  from scripts/Postman with a per-install **API key** (`x-api-key`), shown in Settings → Advanced.

 ## Built in Rust

@@ -236,6 +242,8 @@ All settings have defaults and layer **defaults → TOML (`--config` / `OPENPXE_
 | `OPENPXE_ISO_DIR` | `/var/lib/openpxe/isos` | Uploaded ISOs |
 | `OPENPXE_WORK_DIR` | `/var/lib/openpxe/work` | Scratch, settings, share + branding state |
 | `OPENPXE_LOG` | `info,openpxe=info` | `tracing` filter |
+| `OPENPXE_ADMIN_USERNAME` | — | First-run only: with `OPENPXE_ADMIN_PASSWORD`, auto-creates the admin so no setup wizard is needed. Ignored once an admin exists. |
+| `OPENPXE_ADMIN_PASSWORD` | — | First-run admin password. Use `OPENPXE_ADMIN_PASSWORD_FILE` to read it from a file (Docker/K8s secret). |

 ## OpenShift

@@ -27,13 +27,11 @@ tokio = { workspace = true, features = ["sync", "rt", "macros", "time"] }
 bcrypt.workspace = true

 # v0.5.1: pure-Rust SAML 2.0 SP. bergshamra = XML-DSig verify + exclusive
-# c14n (no OpenSSL/C). roxmltree/quick-xml parse + build SAML XML;
-# x509-parser pulls the IdP signing cert out of metadata; flate2+base64
-# encode the HTTP-Redirect binding's SAMLRequest.
+# c14n (no OpenSSL/C), plus IdP signing-cert extraction from metadata.
+# roxmltree parses the SAML/metadata XML; flate2+base64 encode the
+# HTTP-Redirect binding's SAMLRequest.
 bergshamra.workspace = true
 roxmltree.workspace = true
-quick-xml.workspace = true
-x509-parser.workspace = true
 flate2.workspace = true
 base64.workspace = true

@@ -0,0 +1,158 @@
+//! Operator API key — a single persisted secret that authenticates
+//! programmatic `/api/*` callers (Postman, scripts, CI) via the
+//! `x-api-key` header, as an alternative to the browser session cookie.
+//!
+//! Generated on first load and persisted to `<work_dir>/api_key.json` so
+//! it survives restarts — an operator pastes it into their client once.
+//! Regenerable from Settings → Advanced; the previous key stops working
+//! the moment a new one is minted. Grants the same access as a logged-in
+//! operator (the middleware treats a valid key exactly like a session).
+
+use parking_lot::RwLock;
+use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
+use std::path::PathBuf;
+use std::sync::Arc;
+use uuid::Uuid;
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+struct ApiKeyFile {
+    key: String,
+}
+
+/// Persisted operator API key. Cheap to clone (Arc-shared); contention is
+/// nil (read on every authenticated request, written only on regenerate).
+#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
+pub struct ApiKeyStore {
+    path: Arc<PathBuf>,
+    inner: Arc<RwLock<String>>,
+}
+
+impl ApiKeyStore {
+    /// Load the stored key, minting + persisting a fresh one on first run
+    /// (or when the file is missing / corrupt / empty).
+    #[must_use]
+    pub fn load_or_init(work_dir: &std::path::Path) -> Self {
+        let path = work_dir.join("api_key.json");
+        let key = match std::fs::read_to_string(&path) {
+            Ok(text) => serde_json::from_str::<ApiKeyFile>(&text)
+                .map(|f| f.key)
+                .ok()
+                .filter(|k| !k.is_empty())
+                .unwrap_or_else(generate_key),
+            Err(_) => generate_key(),
+        };
+        let store = Self {
+            path: Arc::new(path),
+            inner: Arc::new(RwLock::new(key)),
+        };
+        // Land a first-run (or repaired) key on disk immediately so it's
+        // stable across the very next restart.
+        store.persist();
+        store
+    }
+
+    #[must_use]
+    pub fn current(&self) -> String {
+        self.inner.read().clone()
+    }
+
+    /// Constant-time comparison against the stored key. An empty candidate
+    /// never matches, so a blank/absent header can't authenticate.
+    #[must_use]
+    pub fn verify(&self, candidate: &str) -> bool {
+        if candidate.is_empty() {
+            return false;
+        }
+        ct_eq(self.inner.read().as_bytes(), candidate.as_bytes())
+    }
+
+    /// Mint a fresh key, persist it, and return it. The previous key is
+    /// invalid the instant this returns.
+    #[must_use]
+    pub fn regenerate(&self) -> String {
+        let key = generate_key();
+        self.inner.write().clone_from(&key);
+        self.persist();
+        tracing::info!(target: "openpxe::auth", "operator API key regenerated");
+        key
+    }
+
+    fn persist(&self) {
+        let body = match serde_json::to_vec_pretty(&ApiKeyFile {
+            key: self.current(),
+        }) {
+            Ok(b) => b,
+            Err(e) => {
+                tracing::warn!(target: "openpxe::auth", "serialize api_key.json: {e}");
+                return;
+            }
+        };
+        if let Some(parent) = self.path.parent() {
+            let _ = std::fs::create_dir_all(parent);
+        }
+        let tmp = self.path.with_extension("json.tmp");
+        if let Err(e) = std::fs::write(&tmp, body) {
+            tracing::warn!(target: "openpxe::auth", "write api_key.json tmp: {e}");
+            return;
+        }
+        if let Err(e) = std::fs::rename(&tmp, self.path.as_path()) {
+            tracing::warn!(target: "openpxe::auth", "rename api_key.json: {e}");
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// 128 random bits as 32 lowercase hex chars — unambiguous to copy-paste
+/// into an `x-api-key` header. UUID v4 is already our CSPRNG-backed source
+/// for session ids, so no new dependency.
+fn generate_key() -> String {
+    Uuid::new_v4().simple().to_string()
+}
+
+/// Length-checked constant-time byte compare — keeps key verification from
+/// leaking the matched-prefix length via timing. A 128-bit random secret
+/// isn't practically timing-attackable over a network, but the check is
+/// four lines, so we keep it.
+fn ct_eq(a: &[u8], b: &[u8]) -> bool {
+    if a.len() != b.len() {
+        return false;
+    }
+    let mut diff = 0u8;
+    for (x, y) in a.iter().zip(b.iter()) {
+        diff |= x ^ y;
+    }
+    diff == 0
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+    use tempfile::tempdir;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn generates_persists_and_reloads() {
+        let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
+        let s = ApiKeyStore::load_or_init(dir.path());
+        let k = s.current();
+        assert_eq!(k.len(), 32, "32 hex chars = 128 bits");
+        assert!(s.verify(&k));
+        assert!(!s.verify("wrong"));
+        assert!(!s.verify(""), "blank header must not authenticate");
+        // Reload from disk → same key (survives restart).
+        let s2 = ApiKeyStore::load_or_init(dir.path());
+        assert_eq!(s2.current(), k);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn regenerate_invalidates_old() {
+        let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
+        let s = ApiKeyStore::load_or_init(dir.path());
+        let old = s.current();
+        let new = s.regenerate();
+        assert_ne!(old, new);
+        assert!(s.verify(&new));
+        assert!(!s.verify(&old), "old key must stop working");
+        // Persisted: a reload sees the new key.
+        let s2 = ApiKeyStore::load_or_init(dir.path());
+        assert_eq!(s2.current(), new);
+    }
+}
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
 //! runtime settings, and the Queued Deployment queue.
 #![forbid(unsafe_code)]

+pub mod api_key;
 pub mod arch;
 pub mod auth;
 pub mod boot_log;
@@ -23,6 +24,7 @@ pub mod settings;
 pub mod sso;
 pub mod wol;

+pub use api_key::ApiKeyStore;
 pub use arch::{ClientArch, DriverMode, FirmwareClass};
 pub use auth::{AdminAccount, AdminPublic, AdminStore};
 pub use boot_log::{BootEvent, BootLog};
@@ -15,9 +15,7 @@ tokio.workspace = true
 socket2.workspace = true
 dhcproto.workspace = true
 tracing.workspace = true
-thiserror.workspace = true
 anyhow.workspace = true
-bytes.workspace = true
 parking_lot.workspace = true
 # v0.7.1: learned driver modes persist to <work_dir>/driver_modes.json.
 serde_json.workspace = true
@@ -25,11 +25,9 @@ time.workspace = true
 axum.workspace = true
 tower.workspace = true
 tower-http.workspace = true
-hyper.workspace = true
 serde.workspace = true
 serde_json.workspace = true
 tracing.workspace = true
-thiserror.workspace = true
 anyhow.workspace = true
 bytes.workspace = true
 futures.workspace = true
@@ -49,6 +47,10 @@ base64.workspace = true
 tokio = { workspace = true, features = ["macros", "rt", "rt-multi-thread", "time"] }
 tower = { workspace = true }
 tempfile = "3.12"
+# v0.7.4: probe-based introspection verifies kernel paths against the
+# real ISO9660 tree, so the full-flow tests synthesize images with the
+# shared test builder instead of label-only blobs.
+openpxe-iso-store = { workspace = true, features = ["test-image"] }
 serde_json = { workspace = true }
 time = { workspace = true }
 # v0.4.61: integration tests need to generate real PNG bytes for the
@@ -19,7 +19,6 @@ use crate::ipxe_script::{
    render_entry, render_family_menu, render_local_hdd, render_menu, render_nic_info,
    render_queue_entry, render_shell, render_tools_menu, render_util,
 };
-use crate::iso_fs;
 use crate::log_stream;
 use crate::state::AppState;
 use crate::terminal;
@@ -36,6 +35,7 @@ use openpxe_core::{
    LogoSlot, NotifyConfig, Settings, SsoConfig, ALLOWED_LOGO_MIMES, MAX_LOGO_BYTES,
 };
 use openpxe_ipxe_assets::asset_slice;
+use openpxe_iso_store::iso_fs;
 use openpxe_iso_store::{
    render_template, IsoCategory, IsoMeta, IsoSource, NfsAddRequest, SftpAddRequest, SmbAddRequest,
    SmbState, UnattendedKind, UnattendedMeta,
@@ -94,6 +94,17 @@ pub fn build_router(state: AppState) -> Router {
        // JSON API.
        .route("/api/isos", get(api_list_isos).post(api_upload_iso))
        .route("/api/isos/{id}", delete(api_delete_iso))
+        // v0.8.1: add ISO by URL — server-side streaming download + progress
+        // polling. Static `fetch` coexists with `{id}` above (matchit
+        // prioritizes the literal), same as `/api/queue/join` vs `{entry_id}`.
+        .route(
+            "/api/isos/fetch",
+            get(crate::fetch::api_iso_fetch_list).post(crate::fetch::api_iso_fetch_start),
+        )
+        .route(
+            "/api/isos/fetch/{id}",
+            delete(crate::fetch::api_iso_fetch_cancel),
+        )
        .route("/api/uploads", post(api_upload_begin))
        .route(
            "/api/uploads/{upload_id}",
@@ -147,6 +158,14 @@ pub fn build_router(state: AppState) -> Router {
        .route("/api/logout", post(auth_api::api_logout))
        .route("/api/me", get(auth_api::api_me))
        .route("/api/me/credentials", put(auth_api::api_update_credentials))
+        // v0.8.0: operator API key surface (read current + regenerate).
+        // Gated by require_auth like the rest of /api/*; a logged-in
+        // operator or an x-api-key holder can read/rotate it.
+        .route("/api/api-key", get(auth_api::api_api_key_get))
+        .route(
+            "/api/api-key/regenerate",
+            post(auth_api::api_api_key_regenerate),
+        )
        // SAML SSO configuration (FleetDM-shaped). Gated behind auth — the
        // operator pastes their IdP metadata, Entity ID, and toggles here.
        .route("/api/sso", get(api_sso_get).put(api_sso_put))
@@ -1087,16 +1106,17 @@ async fn iso_file(
    State(state): State<AppState>,
    AxumPath((id, path)): AxumPath<(String, String)>,
 ) -> Response {
-    // In-ISO file extraction is only supported for local ISOs — it
-    // needs random-access reads into the ISO9660 directory tree, which
-    // smbclient's whole-file streaming can't do efficiently. SMB-
-    // sourced ISOs use the raw streaming endpoint above instead.
-    let Some(iso_path) = state.iso_store.iso_path_for(&id) else {
+    let Some(meta) = state.iso_store.get(&id) else {
+        return (StatusCode::NOT_FOUND, "no such iso").into_response();
+    };
+    let in_path = format!("/{path}");
+    match &meta.source {
+        IsoSource::Local => {
+            let Some(iso_path) = state.iso_store.local_path(&meta) else {
                return (StatusCode::NOT_FOUND, "no such iso").into_response();
            };
            let p = iso_path.clone();
-    let in_path = format!("/{path}");
-    let loc = tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || iso_fs::lookup(&p, &in_path))
+            let loc = tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || iso_fs::lookup_local(&p, &in_path))
                .await
                .ok()
                .flatten();
@@ -1108,6 +1128,82 @@ async fn iso_file(
                Err(e) => (StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR, format!("{e}")).into_response(),
            }
        }
+        // v0.7.4: remote ISOs serve in-ISO files too — the same ISO9660
+        // walk runs over NFS READ3 / SFTP seek-reads, then the located
+        // byte range streams through the share manager. This is what
+        // makes the verified kernel/initrd boot entries on share-hosted
+        // Linux ISOs actually bootable.
+        IsoSource::Nfs {
+            share_id,
+            relative_path,
+        } => {
+            match state
+                .nfs_shares
+                .locate_in_iso(share_id, relative_path, &in_path)
+                .await
+            {
+                Ok(Some(loc)) => {
+                    match state
+                        .nfs_shares
+                        .stream_iso(share_id, relative_path, loc.offset, Some(loc.length))
+                        .await
+                    {
+                        Ok(stream) => in_iso_stream_response(Body::from_stream(stream), loc.length),
+                        Err(e) => {
+                            (StatusCode::BAD_GATEWAY, format!("nfs stream: {e}")).into_response()
+                        }
+                    }
+                }
+                Ok(None) => (StatusCode::NOT_FOUND, "not found inside iso").into_response(),
+                Err(e) => (StatusCode::BAD_GATEWAY, format!("nfs lookup: {e}")).into_response(),
+            }
+        }
+        IsoSource::Sftp {
+            share_id,
+            relative_path,
+        } => {
+            match state
+                .sftp_shares
+                .locate_in_iso(share_id, relative_path, &in_path)
+                .await
+            {
+                Ok(Some(loc)) => {
+                    match state
+                        .sftp_shares
+                        .stream_iso(share_id, relative_path, loc.offset, Some(loc.length))
+                        .await
+                    {
+                        Ok(stream) => in_iso_stream_response(Body::from_stream(stream), loc.length),
+                        Err(e) => {
+                            (StatusCode::BAD_GATEWAY, format!("sftp stream: {e}")).into_response()
+                        }
+                    }
+                }
+                Ok(None) => (StatusCode::NOT_FOUND, "not found inside iso").into_response(),
+                Err(e) => (StatusCode::BAD_GATEWAY, format!("sftp lookup: {e}")).into_response(),
+            }
+        }
+        // smbclient streams sequentially — no seeks, no ISO9660 walk.
+        // SMB ISOs never emit kernel entries, so nothing requests this.
+        IsoSource::Smb { .. } => (
+            StatusCode::NOT_FOUND,
+            "in-ISO files are not available for SMB-sourced ISOs",
+        )
+            .into_response(),
+    }
+}
+
+/// 200 response wrapping an in-ISO byte-range stream from a share
+/// manager. Content-Length is the located file's length — the stream is
+/// already bounded to exactly that range.
+fn in_iso_stream_response(body: Body, length: u64) -> Response {
+    Response::builder()
+        .status(StatusCode::OK)
+        .header(header::CONTENT_TYPE, "application/octet-stream")
+        .header(header::CONTENT_LENGTH, length)
+        .body(body)
+        .unwrap()
+}

 async fn stream_file_range(
    path: &std::path::Path,
@@ -1772,6 +1868,12 @@ async fn api_docs() -> Json<serde_json::Value> {
                     "summary": "Clear an ISO's boot password."},
                    {"method": "PUT", "path": "/api/isos/{id}/category",
                     "summary": "Set the menu category. Body: { \"category\": \"os\" | \"tools\" }."},
+                    {"method": "POST", "path": "/api/isos/fetch",
+                     "summary": "Add an ISO by URL. Body: { \"url\", \"filename\"? }. The server streams the .iso into storage and introspects it. Returns { fetch_id }."},
+                    {"method": "GET", "path": "/api/isos/fetch",
+                     "summary": "Poll URL-fetch progress — [{ id, filename, url, downloaded, total, state }]. Completed jobs are returned once."},
+                    {"method": "DELETE", "path": "/api/isos/fetch/{id}",
+                     "summary": "Cancel an in-flight URL fetch, or dismiss a finished/failed one."},
                ],
            },
            {
@@ -1867,6 +1969,10 @@ async fn api_docs() -> Json<serde_json::Value> {
                     "summary": "Auth status — { setup_required, authenticated, user }. Always 200."},
                    {"method": "PUT", "path": "/api/me/credentials",
                     "summary": "Rotate the admin's credentials. Body: { current_password, new_username?, new_password? }. Revokes all other sessions on success."},
+                    {"method": "GET", "path": "/api/api-key",
+                     "summary": "Return the operator API key + the header to send it in (x-api-key). That header authenticates API calls without a browser session — full operator access."},
+                    {"method": "POST", "path": "/api/api-key/regenerate",
+                     "summary": "Mint a fresh API key, invalidating the previous one immediately."},
                ],
            },
            {
@@ -52,6 +52,12 @@ const SESSION_TTL: Duration = Duration::from_hours(24);
 /// to avoid collisions with anything else sharing the host.
 pub const SESSION_COOKIE: &str = "openpxe_session";

+/// Header an API client sends to authenticate without a browser session.
+/// Matches the de-facto `x-api-key` convention operators already use with
+/// other appliances. A valid key grants the same access as a logged-in
+/// operator. See [`crate::state::AppState::api_key`].
+pub const API_KEY_HEADER: &str = "x-api-key";
+
 #[derive(Debug, Clone)]
 struct Session {
    username: String,
@@ -223,14 +229,19 @@ pub async fn require_auth(
    if is_public_path(path) {
        return next.run(req).await;
    }
-    // Authenticated path. The cookie must be present, map to a live
-    // session, and the TTL refresh happens as a side-effect.
-    let token = parse_cookie(req.headers());
-    if let Some(t) = token {
-        if state.sessions.touch(&t).is_some() {
+    // Authenticated path: either a live operator session cookie (the
+    // browser) or the x-api-key header (scripts / Postman). Touching the
+    // cookie refreshes its idle TTL as a side-effect.
+    let session_ok =
+        parse_cookie(req.headers()).is_some_and(|t| state.sessions.touch(&t).is_some());
+    let key_ok = req
+        .headers()
+        .get(API_KEY_HEADER)
+        .and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
+        .is_some_and(|k| state.api_key.verify(k));
+    if session_ok || key_ok {
        return next.run(req).await;
    }
-    }
    (
        StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED,
        Json(json!({ "error": "authentication required" })),
@@ -447,6 +458,28 @@ pub async fn api_update_credentials(
    }
 }

+/// Return the current operator API key plus the header to send it in.
+/// Gated by the auth middleware, so only a logged-in operator (or a
+/// caller already holding the key) can read it.
+pub async fn api_api_key_get(State(state): State<AppState>) -> Response {
+    (
+        StatusCode::OK,
+        Json(json!({ "key": state.api_key.current(), "header": API_KEY_HEADER })),
+    )
+        .into_response()
+}
+
+/// Mint a fresh operator API key, invalidating the previous one, and
+/// return it. Same gating as the GET.
+pub async fn api_api_key_regenerate(State(state): State<AppState>) -> Response {
+    let key = state.api_key.regenerate();
+    (
+        StatusCode::OK,
+        Json(json!({ "key": key, "header": API_KEY_HEADER })),
+    )
+        .into_response()
+}
+
 #[derive(Debug, Serialize)]
 struct LoginPayload<'a> {
    user: &'a AdminPublic,
@@ -0,0 +1,485 @@
+//! Server-side "add ISO by URL" — stream a remote `.iso` straight into the
+//! store, reusing the chunked-upload handle + introspection pipeline so a
+//! URL-fetched image classifies and gains boot entries exactly like an
+//! uploaded one. A small in-memory job registry tracks progress; the web UI
+//! polls it and renders rows just like browser uploads.
+//!
+//! This is operator-initiated and auth-gated (`/api/*`), never runs at boot,
+//! and adds no CDN assets — so it doesn't touch OpenPXE's offline-boot
+//! guarantee. On an air-gapped network it simply goes unused (upload
+//! instead). It's the same class of optional outbound the server already
+//! makes for webhooks and the update check.
+
+use crate::state::AppState;
+use axum::{
+    extract::{Path, State},
+    http::{header, StatusCode},
+    response::{IntoResponse, Response},
+    Json,
+};
+use futures::StreamExt;
+use openpxe_core::{Error, Result};
+use openpxe_iso_store::IsoStore;
+use parking_lot::Mutex;
+use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
+use serde_json::json;
+use std::collections::HashMap;
+use std::sync::Arc;
+use std::time::{Duration, Instant};
+use uuid::Uuid;
+
+/// Hard ceiling on a URL-fetched image — matches the HTTP upload body cap
+/// (`DefaultBodyLimit` in `app.rs`).
+const MAX_ISO_BYTES: u64 = 16 * 1024 * 1024 * 1024;
+
+/// How long a finished-with-error job lingers so the operator can read the
+/// failure before it's swept. Successful jobs are read-once (see
+/// [`FetchJobs::snapshot`]).
+const FAILED_TTL: Duration = Duration::from_mins(10);
+
+#[derive(Clone)]
+enum Phase {
+    Downloading,
+    Done { iso_id: String },
+    Failed { error: String },
+    Canceled,
+}
+
+struct Job {
+    /// Best-known target filename (provisional from the URL, refined once
+    /// the response headers arrive).
+    filename: String,
+    /// Display-safe source URL — any `user:pass@` userinfo is stripped so
+    /// the UI/logs never echo embedded credentials.
+    url: String,
+    downloaded: u64,
+    /// Total bytes from `Content-Length`, or `0` when the server didn't
+    /// send one (progress then shows bytes-so-far without a percentage).
+    total: u64,
+    phase: Phase,
+    cancel: bool,
+    finished_at: Option<Instant>,
+}
+
+/// One row in the fetch-progress list the UI polls.
+#[derive(Serialize)]
+pub struct JobDto {
+    id: String,
+    filename: String,
+    url: String,
+    downloaded: u64,
+    total: u64,
+    /// `downloading` | `done` | `failed` | `canceled`.
+    state: &'static str,
+    #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
+    iso_id: Option<String>,
+    #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
+    error: Option<String>,
+}
+
+/// In-memory registry of in-flight and recently-finished URL fetches.
+/// Cheap to clone (Arc-shared); contention is nil (a handful of jobs, brief
+/// per-chunk progress bumps).
+#[derive(Clone, Default)]
+pub struct FetchJobs {
+    inner: Arc<Mutex<HashMap<String, Arc<Mutex<Job>>>>>,
+}
+
+impl FetchJobs {
+    /// Validate the URL, register a job, and spawn the background download.
+    /// Returns the job id. Fails fast on a bad/unsupported URL so the POST
+    /// gets an immediate error instead of a job that dies a moment later.
+    pub fn start(
+        &self,
+        store: IsoStore,
+        raw_url: &str,
+        filename_hint: Option<&str>,
+    ) -> Result<String> {
+        let (url, display) = parse_and_sanitize(raw_url)?;
+        // Provisional filename for the first render; the task refines it
+        // from Content-Disposition / the post-redirect URL.
+        let provisional = filename_hint
+            .map(sanitize_filename)
+            .or_else(|| basename(&url))
+            .unwrap_or_else(|| "download.iso".to_string());
+
+        let id = Uuid::new_v4().simple().to_string();
+        let job = Arc::new(Mutex::new(Job {
+            filename: provisional,
+            url: display,
+            downloaded: 0,
+            total: 0,
+            phase: Phase::Downloading,
+            cancel: false,
+            finished_at: None,
+        }));
+        self.inner.lock().insert(id.clone(), job.clone());
+
+        let hint = filename_hint.map(str::to_string);
+        tokio::spawn(async move {
+            if let Err(e) = download(&store, &job, url, hint).await {
+                let mut g = job.lock();
+                // A cancel flips the phase itself; don't overwrite it.
+                if !matches!(g.phase, Phase::Canceled) {
+                    g.phase = Phase::Failed {
+                        error: format!("{e}"),
+                    };
+                }
+                g.finished_at = Some(Instant::now());
+            }
+        });
+        Ok(id)
+    }
+
+    /// Snapshot every job for the UI, then sweep the terminal ones:
+    /// `Done`/`Canceled` are **read-once** (removed after this call, so the
+    /// UI reacts to completion exactly once and never loops on a lingering
+    /// "done" row), while `Failed` is retained until [`FAILED_TTL`] so the
+    /// error stays visible.
+    pub fn snapshot(&self) -> Vec<JobDto> {
+        let mut g = self.inner.lock();
+        let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(g.len());
+        for (id, job) in g.iter() {
+            let j = job.lock();
+            let (state, iso_id, error) = match &j.phase {
+                Phase::Downloading => ("downloading", None, None),
+                Phase::Done { iso_id } => ("done", Some(iso_id.clone()), None),
+                Phase::Failed { error } => ("failed", None, Some(error.clone())),
+                Phase::Canceled => ("canceled", None, None),
+            };
+            out.push(JobDto {
+                id: id.clone(),
+                filename: j.filename.clone(),
+                url: j.url.clone(),
+                downloaded: j.downloaded,
+                total: j.total,
+                state,
+                iso_id,
+                error,
+            });
+        }
+        let now = Instant::now();
+        g.retain(|_, job| {
+            let j = job.lock();
+            match &j.phase {
+                Phase::Downloading => true,
+                Phase::Done { .. } | Phase::Canceled => false, // read-once
+                Phase::Failed { .. } => j
+                    .finished_at
+                    .is_none_or(|t| now.duration_since(t) < FAILED_TTL),
+            }
+        });
+        out
+    }
+
+    /// Cancel an in-flight download, or dismiss a terminal one. Returns
+    /// `true` if a job with that id existed.
+    pub fn cancel(&self, id: &str) -> bool {
+        let g = self.inner.lock();
+        let Some(job) = g.get(id) else { return false };
+        let mut j = job.lock();
+        if matches!(j.phase, Phase::Downloading) {
+            j.cancel = true; // the download loop checks this each chunk
+        } else {
+            drop(j);
+            drop(g);
+            self.inner.lock().remove(id);
+        }
+        true
+    }
+}
+
+/// The background download: GET the URL, derive + validate the filename,
+/// then stream the body through an `UploadHandle` (which hashes, writes the
+/// `.partial`, and on `finish` renames + introspects).
+async fn download(
+    store: &IsoStore,
+    job: &Arc<Mutex<Job>>,
+    url: reqwest::Url,
+    filename_hint: Option<String>,
+) -> Result<()> {
+    let client = reqwest::Client::builder()
+        .connect_timeout(Duration::from_secs(15))
+        .user_agent(concat!("OpenPXE/", env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION")))
+        .build()
+        .map_err(|e| Error::Other(e.into()))?;
+
+    let resp = client
+        .get(url)
+        .send()
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| Error::Invalid(format!("request failed: {e}")))?;
+    if !resp.status().is_success() {
+        return Err(Error::Invalid(format!("server returned {}", resp.status())));
+    }
+
+    let cd = resp
+        .headers()
+        .get(header::CONTENT_DISPOSITION)
+        .and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok());
+    let filename = pick_filename(filename_hint.as_deref(), cd, resp.url())?;
+    let total = resp.content_length().unwrap_or(0);
+    if total > MAX_ISO_BYTES {
+        return Err(Error::Invalid(format!(
+            "declared size {total} exceeds the {MAX_ISO_BYTES}-byte cap"
+        )));
+    }
+    {
+        let mut g = job.lock();
+        g.filename.clone_from(&filename);
+        g.total = total;
+    }
+
+    let mut handle = store.begin_upload(&filename).await?;
+    let mut stream = resp.bytes_stream();
+    let mut received: u64 = 0;
+    while let Some(item) = stream.next().await {
+        if job.lock().cancel {
+            let _ = handle.abort().await;
+            job.lock().phase = Phase::Canceled;
+            job.lock().finished_at = Some(Instant::now());
+            return Ok(());
+        }
+        let chunk = item.map_err(|e| Error::Invalid(format!("transfer error: {e}")))?;
+        received += chunk.len() as u64;
+        if received > MAX_ISO_BYTES {
+            let _ = handle.abort().await;
+            return Err(Error::Invalid(format!(
+                "download exceeded the {MAX_ISO_BYTES}-byte cap"
+            )));
+        }
+        if let Err(e) = handle.write_chunk(&chunk).await {
+            let _ = handle.abort().await;
+            return Err(e);
+        }
+        job.lock().downloaded = received;
+    }
+
+    let meta = handle.finish(store).await?;
+    tracing::info!(
+        target: "openpxe::http::fetch",
+        filename = %filename, bytes = received, family = ?meta.introspection.family,
+        "fetched ISO from URL"
+    );
+    let mut g = job.lock();
+    g.downloaded = received;
+    g.phase = Phase::Done { iso_id: meta.id };
+    g.finished_at = Some(Instant::now());
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+/// Parse the URL, require an `http`/`https` scheme (no `file:`/`gopher:`/…),
+/// and return it alongside a credential-stripped display form.
+fn parse_and_sanitize(raw: &str) -> Result<(reqwest::Url, String)> {
+    let url = reqwest::Url::parse(raw.trim())
+        .map_err(|_| Error::Invalid("not a valid URL".to_string()))?;
+    if !matches!(url.scheme(), "http" | "https") {
+        return Err(Error::Invalid(
+            "only http:// and https:// URLs are accepted".to_string(),
+        ));
+    }
+    let mut display = url.clone();
+    let _ = display.set_username("");
+    let _ = display.set_password(None);
+    Ok((url, display.to_string()))
+}
+
+/// Choose the target filename: explicit hint > `Content-Disposition` >
+/// post-redirect URL basename. Must end in `.iso` (case-insensitive).
+fn pick_filename(
+    explicit: Option<&str>,
+    content_disposition: Option<&str>,
+    final_url: &reqwest::Url,
+) -> Result<String> {
+    let candidate = explicit
+        .map(sanitize_filename)
+        .or_else(|| content_disposition.and_then(filename_from_disposition))
+        .or_else(|| basename(final_url))
+        .ok_or_else(|| Error::Invalid("could not determine a filename".to_string()))?;
+    if !candidate.to_ascii_lowercase().ends_with(".iso") {
+        return Err(Error::Invalid(format!(
+            "URL does not point at an .iso (got '{candidate}')"
+        )));
+    }
+    Ok(candidate)
+}
+
+/// Last path segment of a URL, percent-decoded and reduced to a bare
+/// filename. `None` for a pathless URL.
+fn basename(url: &reqwest::Url) -> Option<String> {
+    let seg = url.path_segments()?.next_back()?;
+    if seg.is_empty() {
+        return None;
+    }
+    let decoded = percent_decode(seg);
+    Some(sanitize_filename(&decoded))
+}
+
+/// Pull `filename="x.iso"` (or bare `filename=x.iso`) out of a
+/// `Content-Disposition` header. RFC 5987 `filename*` is ignored — the
+/// common case is enough, and the URL basename is the fallback.
+fn filename_from_disposition(cd: &str) -> Option<String> {
+    let idx = cd.to_ascii_lowercase().find("filename=")?;
+    let rest = &cd[idx + "filename=".len()..];
+    let val = rest.trim_start().trim_start_matches('"');
+    let end = val.find(['"', ';']).unwrap_or(val.len());
+    let name = val[..end].trim();
+    if name.is_empty() {
+        None
+    } else {
+        Some(sanitize_filename(name))
+    }
+}
+
+/// Reduce any path-ish string to a safe bare filename: last component only,
+/// no `/`, `\`, or NULs. Prevents a crafted `Content-Disposition`/URL from
+/// escaping the ISO directory.
+fn sanitize_filename(s: &str) -> String {
+    s.rsplit(['/', '\\'])
+        .next()
+        .unwrap_or(s)
+        .replace('\0', "")
+        .trim()
+        .to_string()
+}
+
+/// Minimal percent-decoding for a single path segment (enough for `%20`
+/// spaces in an ISO name); leaves malformed escapes untouched.
+fn percent_decode(s: &str) -> String {
+    let bytes = s.as_bytes();
+    let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(bytes.len());
+    let mut i = 0;
+    while i < bytes.len() {
+        if bytes[i] == b'%' && i + 2 < bytes.len() {
+            if let (Some(h), Some(l)) = (hexval(bytes[i + 1]), hexval(bytes[i + 2])) {
+                out.push(h << 4 | l);
+                i += 3;
+                continue;
+            }
+        }
+        out.push(bytes[i]);
+        i += 1;
+    }
+    String::from_utf8_lossy(&out).into_owned()
+}
+
+fn hexval(b: u8) -> Option<u8> {
+    match b {
+        b'0'..=b'9' => Some(b - b'0'),
+        b'a'..=b'f' => Some(b - b'a' + 10),
+        b'A'..=b'F' => Some(b - b'A' + 10),
+        _ => None,
+    }
+}
+
+// ── Handlers ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+#[derive(Deserialize)]
+pub struct FetchBody {
+    pub url: String,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub filename: Option<String>,
+}
+
+/// `POST /api/isos/fetch` — start a URL download.
+pub async fn api_iso_fetch_start(
+    State(state): State<AppState>,
+    Json(body): Json<FetchBody>,
+) -> Response {
+    match state
+        .fetch_jobs
+        .start(state.iso_store.clone(), &body.url, body.filename.as_deref())
+    {
+        Ok(id) => (StatusCode::ACCEPTED, Json(json!({ "fetch_id": id }))).into_response(),
+        Err(Error::Invalid(msg)) => {
+            (StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST, Json(json!({ "error": msg }))).into_response()
+        }
+        Err(e) => (
+            StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
+            Json(json!({ "error": format!("{e}") })),
+        )
+            .into_response(),
+    }
+}
+
+/// `GET /api/isos/fetch` — poll progress. Successful jobs appear once.
+pub async fn api_iso_fetch_list(State(state): State<AppState>) -> Response {
+    (
+        StatusCode::OK,
+        Json(json!({ "jobs": state.fetch_jobs.snapshot() })),
+    )
+        .into_response()
+}
+
+/// `DELETE /api/isos/fetch/{id}` — cancel an in-flight download or dismiss a
+/// finished/failed row.
+pub async fn api_iso_fetch_cancel(
+    State(state): State<AppState>,
+    Path(id): Path<String>,
+) -> Response {
+    if state.fetch_jobs.cancel(&id) {
+        StatusCode::NO_CONTENT.into_response()
+    } else {
+        (
+            StatusCode::NOT_FOUND,
+            Json(json!({ "error": "no such fetch job" })),
+        )
+            .into_response()
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn scheme_is_restricted_and_credentials_are_stripped() {
+        assert!(parse_and_sanitize("file:///etc/passwd").is_err());
+        assert!(parse_and_sanitize("gopher://x/1").is_err());
+        assert!(parse_and_sanitize("not a url").is_err());
+        let (_, display) = parse_and_sanitize("https://user:[email protected]/a.iso").unwrap();
+        assert!(
+            !display.contains("secret"),
+            "credentials must be stripped: {display}"
+        );
+        assert!(display.starts_with("https://example.com/"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn filename_prefers_explicit_then_disposition_then_url() {
+        let u = reqwest::Url::parse("https://example.com/path/final.iso").unwrap();
+        // Explicit wins, and path traversal is stripped.
+        assert_eq!(
+            pick_filename(Some("../../evil/custom.iso"), None, &u).unwrap(),
+            "custom.iso"
+        );
+        // Content-Disposition next.
+        assert_eq!(
+            pick_filename(None, Some(r#"attachment; filename="rescue.iso""#), &u).unwrap(),
+            "rescue.iso"
+        );
+        // URL basename fallback (with percent-decoding).
+        let sp = reqwest::Url::parse("https://example.com/System%20Rescue.iso").unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(pick_filename(None, None, &sp).unwrap(), "System Rescue.iso");
+        // Non-.iso is rejected.
+        assert!(pick_filename(
+            None,
+            None,
+            &reqwest::Url::parse("https://x/y.tar.gz").unwrap()
+        )
+        .is_err());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn disposition_parsing_handles_quotes_and_bare() {
+        assert_eq!(
+            filename_from_disposition(r#"attachment; filename="a.iso"; size=1"#).as_deref(),
+            Some("a.iso")
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            filename_from_disposition("inline; filename=b.iso").as_deref(),
+            Some("b.iso")
+        );
+        assert_eq!(filename_from_disposition("attachment").as_deref(), None);
+    }
+}
@@ -1,135 +0,0 @@
-//! Minimal read-only ISO9660 lookup. Given an uploaded ISO file and an
-//! in-ISO path (e.g. `/casper/vmlinuz`), locate the file and return a
-//! `(start_byte, length_bytes)` pair so the HTTP handler can stream just
-//! that range from the on-disk ISO without full extraction.
-//!
-//! We only implement what we need: the Primary Volume Descriptor and Rock
-//! Ridge / Joliet extensions are ignored. Paths are matched case-insensitive
-//! against plain ISO9660 filenames (uppercase, `;1` version suffix stripped).
-//! This is sufficient for the kernel/initrd and wimboot files we serve;
-//! if a requested path isn't found, the handler returns 404 and the user
-//! can still download the whole ISO via `/iso/<id>.iso`.
-
-use std::io::{Read, Seek, SeekFrom};
-use std::path::Path;
-
-const SECTOR: u64 = 2048;
-
-#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
-pub struct FileLocation {
-    pub offset: u64,
-    pub length: u64,
-}
-
-/// Look up `in_iso_path` (leading slash optional, case-insensitive) in the
-/// ISO at `iso_path`. Returns None on any parsing or IO failure.
-pub fn lookup(iso_path: &Path, in_iso_path: &str) -> Option<FileLocation> {
-    let mut f = std::fs::File::open(iso_path).ok()?;
-    let root = read_root_directory(&mut f)?;
-    let components: Vec<&str> = in_iso_path
-        .trim_start_matches('/')
-        .split('/')
-        .filter(|c| !c.is_empty())
-        .collect();
-    if components.is_empty() {
-        return None;
-    }
-    walk(&mut f, root.offset, root.length, &components)
-}
-
-fn read_root_directory(f: &mut std::fs::File) -> Option<FileLocation> {
-    // Primary Volume Descriptor at LBA 16.
-    let mut pvd = [0u8; 2048];
-    f.seek(SeekFrom::Start(16 * SECTOR)).ok()?;
-    f.read_exact(&mut pvd).ok()?;
-    if pvd[0] != 0x01 || &pvd[1..6] != b"CD001" {
-        return None;
-    }
-    // Root directory record is at offset 156, length 34.
-    let rec = &pvd[156..156 + 34];
-    let (offset, length) = parse_dir_record_ext(rec)?;
-    Some(FileLocation {
-        offset: offset * SECTOR,
-        length,
-    })
-}
-
-/// Walk components down the directory tree starting at `dir_offset`.
-fn walk(
-    f: &mut std::fs::File,
-    dir_offset: u64,
-    dir_len: u64,
-    components: &[&str],
-) -> Option<FileLocation> {
-    let mut dir = vec![0u8; dir_len as usize];
-    f.seek(SeekFrom::Start(dir_offset)).ok()?;
-    f.read_exact(&mut dir).ok()?;
-
-    let target = components[0];
-    let rest = &components[1..];
-    let mut i = 0;
-    while i < dir.len() {
-        let len = dir[i] as usize;
-        if len == 0 {
-            // Padding to sector boundary.
-            let next = (i / SECTOR as usize + 1) * SECTOR as usize;
-            if next <= i {
-                break;
-            }
-            i = next;
-            continue;
-        }
-        if i + len > dir.len() {
-            break;
-        }
-        let rec = &dir[i..i + len];
-        let name = dir_record_name(rec);
-        let is_dir = (rec.get(25).copied().unwrap_or(0) & 0x02) != 0;
-        // Skip "." (0x00) and ".." (0x01) pseudo-entries.
-        let is_pseudo = matches!(rec.get(32).copied(), Some(1))
-            && rec.get(33).copied() == Some(0x00)
-            || matches!(rec.get(32).copied(), Some(1)) && rec.get(33).copied() == Some(0x01);
-        if !is_pseudo && name.eq_ignore_ascii_case(target) {
-            let (child_off, child_len) = parse_dir_record_ext(rec)?;
-            if rest.is_empty() && !is_dir {
-                return Some(FileLocation {
-                    offset: child_off * SECTOR,
-                    length: child_len,
-                });
-            } else if !rest.is_empty() && is_dir {
-                return walk(f, child_off * SECTOR, child_len, rest);
-            }
-        }
-        i += len;
-    }
-    None
-}
-
-/// Extract (extent LBA, data length in bytes) from a directory record.
-/// Layout per ISO9660: bytes 2..10 extent LBA (LE+BE duplicate), 10..18
-/// data length (LE+BE duplicate). We trust the little-endian copy.
-fn parse_dir_record_ext(rec: &[u8]) -> Option<(u64, u64)> {
-    if rec.len() < 34 {
-        return None;
-    }
-    let lba = u32::from_le_bytes(rec[2..6].try_into().ok()?) as u64;
-    let len = u32::from_le_bytes(rec[10..14].try_into().ok()?) as u64;
-    Some((lba, len))
-}
-
-/// Extract the identifier from a directory record, stripping ISO9660's
-/// `;1` version suffix.
-fn dir_record_name(rec: &[u8]) -> String {
-    let name_len = *rec.get(32).unwrap_or(&0) as usize;
-    if name_len == 0 || rec.len() < 33 + name_len {
-        return String::new();
-    }
-    let raw = &rec[33..33 + name_len];
-    let s = String::from_utf8_lossy(raw).to_string();
-    // Strip `;N` version suffix.
-    if let Some(i) = s.rfind(';') {
-        s[..i].to_string()
-    } else {
-        s
-    }
-}
@@ -9,16 +9,17 @@
 //!     and Linux kernel/initrd, without having to
 //!     re-extract on every request)
 //!
-//! The `<id>/<path>` handler uses a read-only ISO9660 shim (see `iso_fs`)
-//! that lseeks into the ISO on disk — so we never keep extracted copies.
+//! The `<id>/<path>` handler uses the read-only ISO9660 walker from
+//! `openpxe_iso_store::iso_fs` — seeking into the image wherever it
+//! lives (local disk, NFS, SFTP), so we never keep extracted copies.
 #![forbid(unsafe_code)]

 pub mod app;
 pub mod auth;
 pub mod error;
+pub mod fetch;
 pub mod grub_script;
 pub mod ipxe_script;
-pub mod iso_fs;
 pub mod log_stream;
 pub mod notify;
 pub mod saml_routes;
@@ -1,8 +1,9 @@
 use crate::auth::SessionStore;
+use crate::fetch::FetchJobs;
 use crate::saml_routes::SamlRuntime;
 use crate::uploads::UploadSessions;
 use openpxe_core::{
-    AdminStore, BootLog, BootRulesStore, BootTokens, BrandingStore, ClientRegistry,
+    AdminStore, ApiKeyStore, BootLog, BootRulesStore, BootTokens, BrandingStore, ClientRegistry,
    DeploymentQueue, HostBindings, LogBus, Metrics, NotifyStore, SettingsStore, SsoStore,
 };
 use openpxe_iso_store::{
@@ -55,6 +56,11 @@ pub struct AppState {
    /// process restart (sessions are tied to UI state, not persisted —
    /// matches Sonarr/Radarr behaviour).
    pub sessions: SessionStore,
+    /// v0.8.0: persisted operator API key. A request carrying a matching
+    /// `x-api-key` header authenticates exactly like an operator session,
+    /// so scripts / Postman can drive `/api/*` without a browser login.
+    /// Generated on first run; regenerable from Settings → Advanced.
+    pub api_key: ApiKeyStore,
    /// SAML SSO configuration (persisted IdP metadata, Entity ID, toggles).
    pub sso: SsoStore,
    /// v0.5.1: in-memory SAML runtime state — outstanding AuthnRequest IDs
@@ -103,6 +109,10 @@ pub struct AppState {
    /// through `IsoStore`, but the UI uses sessions so large ISO transfers
    /// can show deterministic progress and leave visible partial files.
    pub uploads: UploadSessions,
+    /// v0.8.1: server-side "add ISO by URL" jobs. Background downloads
+    /// streamed straight into the store (reusing the upload handle +
+    /// introspection); the Storage view polls their progress.
+    pub fetch_jobs: FetchJobs,
    /// Live log bus consumed by the Terminal tab via SSE. Operator-issued
    /// terminal commands also push synthetic lines onto it so the tail
    /// shows them inline.
@@ -18,23 +18,16 @@ use openpxe_iso_store::{IsoStore, NfsShareManager, SftpShareManager, SmbShareMan
 use tempfile::tempdir;
 use tower::ServiceExt;

-/// Build a tiny valid ISO9660 blob with volume label "ALPINE-TEST" so
-/// introspection identifies it as Alpine.
+/// Build a tiny Alpine-shaped ISO9660 image: volume label "ALPINE-TEST"
+/// plus the real `/boot/vmlinuz-lts` + `/boot/initramfs-lts` tree.
+/// v0.7.4's probe-based introspection verifies those paths exist before
+/// emitting a kernel boot entry — a label-only blob no longer counts.
 fn fake_alpine_iso() -> Vec<u8> {
-    let mut buf = vec![0u8; 32 * 2048];
-    let off = 16 * 2048;
-    buf[off] = 0x01;
-    buf[off + 1..off + 6].copy_from_slice(b"CD001");
-    buf[off + 6] = 0x01;
-    let label = b"ALPINE-TEST".to_vec();
-    let mut padded = label.clone();
-    padded.resize(32, b' ');
-    buf[off + 40..off + 40 + 32].copy_from_slice(&padded);
-    let term = 17 * 2048;
-    buf[term] = 0xFF;
-    buf[term + 1..term + 6].copy_from_slice(b"CD001");
-    buf[term + 6] = 0x01;
-    buf
+    openpxe_iso_store::iso_fs::testiso::TestIsoBuilder::new("ALPINE-TEST")
+        .el_torito(true)
+        .file("/boot/vmlinuz-lts", b"fake-kernel-bytes")
+        .file("/boot/initramfs-lts", b"fake-initramfs-bytes")
+        .build()
 }

 fn multipart_iso_body(filename: &str, bytes: &[u8]) -> (String, Vec<u8>) {
@@ -106,6 +99,7 @@ async fn build_state() -> (AppState, tempfile::TempDir) {
    let admin = openpxe_core::AdminStore::load_or_default(dir.path());
    let sso = openpxe_core::SsoStore::load_or_default(dir.path());
    let notify = openpxe_core::NotifyStore::load_or_default(dir.path());
+    let api_key = openpxe_core::ApiKeyStore::load_or_init(dir.path());
    let sessions = openpxe_http_api::auth::SessionStore::default();
    let metrics = Metrics::new();
    let state = AppState {
@@ -121,6 +115,7 @@ async fn build_state() -> (AppState, tempfile::TempDir) {
        pxe_bg_cache: openpxe_http_api::state::PxeBgCache::default(),
        admin,
        sessions,
+        api_key,
        sso,
        saml: openpxe_http_api::saml_routes::SamlRuntime::default(),
        notify,
@@ -131,6 +126,7 @@ async fn build_state() -> (AppState, tempfile::TempDir) {
        sftp_shares,
        unattended,
        uploads: openpxe_http_api::uploads::UploadSessions::default(),
+        fetch_jobs: openpxe_http_api::fetch::FetchJobs::default(),
        log_bus,
        started_at: time::OffsetDateTime::now_utc(),
        public_base_url: "http://127.0.0.1".into(),
@@ -142,6 +138,109 @@ async fn build_state() -> (AppState, tempfile::TempDir) {
    (state, dir)
 }

+#[tokio::test]
+async fn api_key_authenticates_gated_endpoints() {
+    // v0.8.0: the x-api-key header authenticates /api/* like an operator
+    // session. The middleware only enforces once an admin is configured
+    // (before that everything is open), so bootstrap one first.
+    let (state, _dir) = build_state().await;
+    state
+        .admin
+        .bootstrap("admin", "correct-horse-battery-staple")
+        .unwrap();
+    let key = state.api_key.current();
+    let app = build_router(state);
+
+    // No credentials → 401.
+    let res = app
+        .clone()
+        .oneshot(
+            Request::builder()
+                .uri("/api/isos")
+                .body(Body::empty())
+                .unwrap(),
+        )
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED, "no auth must 401");
+
+    // Wrong key → 401.
+    let res = app
+        .clone()
+        .oneshot(
+            Request::builder()
+                .uri("/api/isos")
+                .header("x-api-key", "not-the-key")
+                .body(Body::empty())
+                .unwrap(),
+        )
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED, "wrong key must 401");
+
+    // Correct key → 200 (operator-equivalent access).
+    let res = app
+        .oneshot(
+            Request::builder()
+                .uri("/api/isos")
+                .header("x-api-key", key)
+                .body(Body::empty())
+                .unwrap(),
+        )
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::OK, "valid key must authenticate");
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn fetch_iso_by_url_downloads_into_store() {
+    // v0.8.1: add-ISO-by-URL. Serve a real ISO over HTTP, POST its URL, poll
+    // the fetch registry until the background download finishes, then assert
+    // the image landed in the store (classified like an upload).
+    use wiremock::matchers::{method, path};
+    use wiremock::{Mock, MockServer, ResponseTemplate};
+
+    let (state, _dir) = build_state().await;
+    let app = build_router(state);
+
+    let iso = fake_alpine_iso();
+    let server = MockServer::start().await;
+    Mock::given(method("GET"))
+        .and(path("/rescue.iso"))
+        .respond_with(ResponseTemplate::new(200).set_body_bytes(iso))
+        .mount(&server)
+        .await;
+    let url = format!("{}/rescue.iso", server.uri());
+
+    let (code, _) = post_json(&app, "/api/isos/fetch", &format!(r#"{{"url":"{url}"}}"#)).await;
+    assert_eq!(code, StatusCode::ACCEPTED, "fetch should start");
+
+    // Bounded poll for completion (the download runs on a spawned task).
+    let mut done = false;
+    for _ in 0..100 {
+        let (_, body) = get(&app, "/api/isos/fetch").await;
+        let v: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body).unwrap();
+        let jobs = v["jobs"].as_array().cloned().unwrap_or_default();
+        assert!(
+            !jobs.iter().any(|j| j["state"] == "failed"),
+            "fetch failed: {jobs:?}"
+        );
+        if jobs.iter().any(|j| j["state"] == "done") {
+            done = true;
+            break;
+        }
+        tokio::time::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_millis(50)).await;
+    }
+    assert!(done, "fetch did not complete in time");
+
+    // The fetched ISO is now in the store under the URL basename.
+    let (_, body) = get(&app, "/api/isos").await;
+    assert!(
+        String::from_utf8_lossy(&body).contains("rescue.iso"),
+        "fetched ISO should appear in /api/isos"
+    );
+}
+
 #[tokio::test]
 async fn health_and_ready_endpoints() {
    let (state, _dir) = build_state().await;
@@ -1248,9 +1347,10 @@ async fn chunked_upload_writes_progressively_and_finishes_iso() {
                .method("POST")
                .uri("/api/uploads")
                .header("content-type", "application/json")
-                .body(Body::from(
-                    r#"{"filename":"chunked-alpine.iso","size_bytes":65536}"#,
-                ))
+                .body(Body::from(format!(
+                    r#"{{"filename":"chunked-alpine.iso","size_bytes":{}}}"#,
+                    iso.len()
+                )))
                .unwrap(),
        )
        .await
@@ -13,4 +13,3 @@ workspace = true
 openpxe-core.workspace = true
 rust-embed.workspace = true
 tracing.workspace = true
-thiserror.workspace = true
@@ -12,16 +12,13 @@ workspace = true
 [dependencies]
 openpxe-core.workspace = true
 tokio = { workspace = true }
-tokio-util = { workspace = true }
 serde.workspace = true
 serde_json.workspace = true
 tracing.workspace = true
-thiserror.workspace = true
 anyhow.workspace = true
 sha2.workspace = true
 hex.workspace = true
 bcrypt.workspace = true
-uuid.workspace = true
 time.workspace = true
 parking_lot.workspace = true
 bytes.workspace = true
@@ -49,3 +46,11 @@ futures = { workspace = true }

 [dev-dependencies]
 tempfile = "3.12"
+
+[features]
+# v0.7.4: exposes the in-memory ISO9660 test-image builder
+# (`iso_fs::testiso`) to other crates' integration tests, so http-api's
+# full-flow tests can synthesize ISOs with real directory trees — the
+# probe-based introspection no longer classifies label-only blobs.
+# Never enabled in production builds.
+test-image = []
@@ -1,16 +1,33 @@
 //! ISO introspection — identify the distro family and locate kernel/initrd.
 //!
-//! We avoid a full ISO9660/Joliet/Rock-Ridge parser by reading a small number
-//! of well-known files via `isoinfo` (from cdrtools/genisoimage) when it's on
-//! the path. As a pure-Rust fallback we do a crude scan: read the volume
-//! descriptor at offset 0x8000 to grab the volume label, and grep for known
-//! filenames by scanning raw sectors — good enough to tell Debian from RHEL
-//! most of the time, without shelling out.
+//! v0.7.4 rewrite: detection is **probe-based**. Instead of grepping raw
+//! sectors for filename strings (which false-positived — any Linux ISO
+//! shipping GRUB/syslinux chainload modules contains the literal
+//! "bootmgr", so gparted-live classified as Windows), we walk the
+//! ISO9660 directory tree via [`crate::iso_fs`] and check whether the
+//! well-known boot files actually exist. The same probes run over local
+//! files and remote NFS/SFTP shares — remote ISOs finally classify
+//! instead of registering as `Unknown`.
 //!
-//! The returned `IntrospectionReport` is what `BootEntry`s get generated from.
+//! Layered, first-decisive-answer-wins:
+//!   1. PVD volume label → family hint.
+//!   2. El Torito boot-catalog presence (the "bootable at all" signal).
+//!   3. `/sources/boot.wim` directory probe → Windows install media.
+//!   4. Linux probe table → verified kernel+initrd paths. A probe match
+//!      both classifies the family and (for the families whose boot
+//!      arguments we render) yields kernel paths that are *known to
+//!      exist* — no more guessed paths that 404 at boot.
+//!   5. Bulk byte scan for UDF Windows markers — local images only
+//!      (modern Windows ISOs hide their tree from ISO9660; remote scans
+//!      skip this so a share rescan doesn't stream 16 MiB per ISO).
+//!   6. Filename tokens — the last-resort hint, and the only signal
+//!      available for SMB shares (smbclient cannot seek).
+//!
+//! The returned `IntrospectionReport` is what `BootEntry`s get generated
+//! from.

+use crate::iso_fs::{self, CachingReadAt, FileReadAt, IsoReadAt, SECTOR};
 use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
-use std::io::{Read, Seek, SeekFrom};
 use std::path::Path;

 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize, Default)]
@@ -30,18 +47,35 @@ pub enum DistroFamily {
 /// re-classify already-uploaded ISOs. On startup the store re-runs
 /// `introspect` on any *local* ISO whose persisted report predates this
 /// revision (see `IsoStore::load_from_disk`), so an upgrade fixes stale
-/// metadata — e.g. a Windows 11 ISO tagged `Unknown` by an older binary —
-/// without the operator having to delete and re-upload it.
+/// metadata without the operator having to delete and re-upload.
 ///
 /// rev 1 (v0.5.9): added El Torito boot-catalog detection + broadened
-/// Windows (UDF/UTF-16) detection becomes retroactive.
-pub const INTROSPECT_REV: u32 = 1;
+/// Windows (UDF/UTF-16) detection.
+/// rev 2 (v0.7.4): probe-based detection. Fixes Linux live ISOs that
+/// classified as Windows via the raw "bootmgr" byte grep, verifies
+/// kernel/initrd paths exist before emitting them, and adds the Debian
+/// live / netinst / CoreOS shapes. Remote (NFS/SFTP) introspection
+/// caches key off this rev too, so the cache self-invalidates.
+/// rev 3 (v0.7.5): Joliet namespace fallback + gap-tolerant El Torito /
+/// descriptor scans. Without this bump, images the rev-2 logic flagged
+/// as data ISOs (mangled-primary appliance images, filler-sector boot
+/// records) would never re-probe and stay mislabeled.
+/// rev 4 (v0.8.0): dropped the over-broad "microsoft" UTF-16 bulk-scan
+/// marker that classified any Secure-Boot-signed non-Windows bootable
+/// (memtest86, signed BSDs, firmware tools) as Windows — the string
+/// lives in the FAT long-filename entries of their MS-signed EFI loader.
+/// The bump re-probes those so they drop the bogus Windows label.
+pub const INTROSPECT_REV: u32 = 4;

 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, Serialize, Deserialize)]
 pub struct IntrospectionReport {
    pub family: DistroFamily,
    pub volume_label: Option<String>,
-    /// Kernel path inside the ISO (e.g. `/casper/vmlinuz`, `/isolinux/vmlinuz`).
+    /// Kernel path inside the ISO (e.g. `/casper/vmlinuz`). v0.7.4: only
+    /// set when the path was verified to exist *and* the family's boot
+    /// arguments are known-good for direct kernel boot; families we can
+    /// only classify (Debian live, CoreOS live) leave it `None` so the
+    /// entry generator falls back to sanboot instead of a broken boot.
    pub kernel_path: Option<String>,
    /// Initrd path(s) inside the ISO. May be multiple for multi-initrd setups.
    pub initrd_paths: Vec<String>,
@@ -55,124 +89,245 @@ pub struct IntrospectionReport {
    /// appliance bundle) has no boot catalog and reports `false`. v0.5.9.
    #[serde(default)]
    pub el_torito: bool,
-    /// Revision of the introspection logic that produced this report. Old
-    /// `meta.json` files without the field deserialize as 0, which is
-    /// below [`INTROSPECT_REV`], triggering a one-time re-introspect on
-    /// the next startup. v0.5.9.
+    /// Revision of the introspection logic that produced this report.
+    /// `0` means "never introspected" (pre-v0.5.9 metadata, or a remote
+    /// ISO whose probe hasn't run / can't run) — the entry generator
+    /// treats those optimistically (sanboot) and the UI labels them.
    #[serde(default)]
    pub introspect_rev: u32,
 }

-/// Probe an ISO file on disk. Never fails — on unrecoverable IO error we log
-/// and return an `Unknown` family so the uploader still sees a record.
+/// One row of the Linux detection table.
+///
+/// `emit_kernel` distinguishes "we can boot this directly" from "we can
+/// only classify it". Families marked `false` have boot protocols our
+/// cmdline renderer doesn't speak yet (Debian-live `boot=live fetch=`,
+/// d-i netinst, CoreOS `coreos.live.rootfs_url=`) — for those the probe
+/// sets the family for the UI/menu but leaves `kernel_path` unset so the
+/// ISO keeps its (working) sanboot entry instead of gaining a broken
+/// kernel one. Strictly fewer broken boots than guessing.
+struct LinuxProbe {
+    family: DistroFamily,
+    kernel: &'static str,
+    initrd_candidates: &'static [&'static str],
+    emit_kernel: bool,
+}
+
+const LINUX_PROBES: &[LinuxProbe] = &[
+    // Ubuntu and friends (casper) — the classic direct-boot shape.
+    LinuxProbe {
+        family: DistroFamily::DebianUbuntu,
+        kernel: "/casper/vmlinuz",
+        initrd_candidates: &["/casper/initrd", "/casper/initrd.lz", "/casper/initrd.gz"],
+        emit_kernel: true,
+    },
+    // Debian-live derivatives: gparted-live, Clonezilla, Kali live, tails.
+    // Classification only — live-boot needs `boot=live fetch=<squashfs>`
+    // which we don't render yet; sanboot of these images works today.
+    LinuxProbe {
+        family: DistroFamily::DebianUbuntu,
+        kernel: "/live/vmlinuz",
+        initrd_candidates: &["/live/initrd.img", "/live/initrd"],
+        emit_kernel: false,
+    },
+    // Debian installer (netinst/DVD). Classification only for the same
+    // reason — d-i sanboots fine.
+    LinuxProbe {
+        family: DistroFamily::DebianUbuntu,
+        kernel: "/install.amd/vmlinuz",
+        initrd_candidates: &["/install.amd/initrd.gz"],
+        emit_kernel: false,
+    },
+    // Anaconda family: RHEL, CentOS, Alma, Rocky, Fedora — and their
+    // many derivatives (Cisco ISE, Nagios appliances, …). The CoreOS
+    // variant of this shape is special-cased after the table.
+    LinuxProbe {
+        family: DistroFamily::RhelFedora,
+        kernel: "/images/pxeboot/vmlinuz",
+        initrd_candidates: &["/images/pxeboot/initrd.img"],
+        emit_kernel: true,
+    },
+    LinuxProbe {
+        family: DistroFamily::OpenSuse,
+        kernel: "/boot/x86_64/loader/linux",
+        initrd_candidates: &["/boot/x86_64/loader/initrd"],
+        emit_kernel: true,
+    },
+    LinuxProbe {
+        family: DistroFamily::Arch,
+        kernel: "/arch/boot/x86_64/vmlinuz-linux",
+        initrd_candidates: &["/arch/boot/x86_64/initramfs-linux.img"],
+        emit_kernel: true,
+    },
+    LinuxProbe {
+        family: DistroFamily::Alpine,
+        kernel: "/boot/vmlinuz-lts",
+        initrd_candidates: &["/boot/initramfs-lts"],
+        emit_kernel: true,
+    },
+];
+
+/// CoreOS-style live images (RHCOS, FCOS, OpenShift agent ISOs) carry
+/// the anaconda pxeboot layout *plus* a rootfs image. Direct kernel boot
+/// of those requires `coreos.live.rootfs_url=` (and for agent ISOs, the
+/// ignition config embedded in the ISO device) — neither of which a
+/// plain `inst.repo=` cmdline provides. Their sanboot path works, so
+/// they classify as RHEL-family but keep the sanboot entry.
+const COREOS_ROOTFS: &str = "/images/pxeboot/rootfs.img";
+
+/// Probe an ISO file on disk. Never fails — on unrecoverable IO error we
+/// log and return an `Unknown` family so the uploader still sees a record.
 pub fn introspect(path: &Path) -> IntrospectionReport {
+    let filename = path
+        .file_name()
+        .map(|s| s.to_string_lossy().into_owned())
+        .unwrap_or_default();
+    let Ok(f) = std::fs::File::open(path) else {
+        tracing::warn!(target: "openpxe::iso", "cannot open ISO for introspection: {}", path.display());
+        return IntrospectionReport {
+            introspect_rev: INTROSPECT_REV,
+            ..Default::default()
+        };
+    };
+    let len = f.metadata().map_or(0, |m| m.len());
+    // `FileReadAt` completes every read inline (no real awaits), so this
+    // light-weight block_on never parks; callers already run us on the
+    // blocking pool.
+    futures::executor::block_on(introspect_reader(
+        &mut FileReadAt::new(f),
+        len,
+        &filename,
+        true,
+    ))
+}
+
+/// The detection core, generic over any random-access source. `total_len`
+/// is the image size (every caller knows it — file metadata locally, the
+/// share listing remotely) and bounds the bulk scan, since `IsoReadAt`
+/// reads are exact-or-error. `filename` feeds the last-resort token
+/// heuristics; `allow_bulk_scan` gates the 16 MiB UDF-Windows byte scan
+/// (local files only — remote shares would stream that much per ISO per
+/// rescan).
+pub async fn introspect_reader<R: IsoReadAt + Send>(
+    r: &mut R,
+    total_len: u64,
+    filename: &str,
+    allow_bulk_scan: bool,
+) -> IntrospectionReport {
    let mut report = IntrospectionReport {
        introspect_rev: INTROSPECT_REV,
        ..Default::default()
    };

-    let Ok(mut f) = std::fs::File::open(path) else {
-        tracing::warn!(target: "openpxe::iso", "cannot open ISO for introspection: {}", path.display());
-        return report;
-    };
-
-    // ISO9660 Primary Volume Descriptor at LBA 16 (offset 0x8000), 2048 bytes.
-    // Bytes 40..72 are the Volume Identifier (space-padded, d-characters).
-    let mut pvd = [0u8; 2048];
-    if f.seek(SeekFrom::Start(0x8000)).is_ok() && f.read_exact(&mut pvd).is_ok() {
-        // Byte 0 must be 0x01 (primary descriptor), bytes 1..6 = "CD001".
-        if pvd[0] == 0x01 && &pvd[1..6] == b"CD001" {
-            let label_raw = &pvd[40..72];
-            let label = String::from_utf8_lossy(label_raw).trim().to_string();
-            if !label.is_empty() {
-                report.volume_label = Some(label.clone());
-                report.family = family_from_label(&label);
-            }
-        }
-    }
-
-    // Does the ISO have an El Torito boot catalog? This is what decides
-    // whether an ISO we *can't* otherwise classify is bootable at all —
-    // a bootable ISO sanboots; a data/appliance ISO (no catalog) can't.
-    report.el_torito = detect_el_torito(&mut f);
-
-    // Cheap content scan: read the first ~64 MiB, look for signature filenames.
-    // This is enough to identify `sources/boot.wim` (Windows) and common
-    // kernel/initrd paths for the major Linux distros.
-    let _ = f.seek(SeekFrom::Start(0));
-    let scan_bytes = 64 * 1024 * 1024;
-    let mut buf = vec![0u8; 1024 * 1024];
-    let mut read_total = 0usize;
-    // Size the haystack to what will actually be read — the scan cap or
-    // the file itself, whichever is smaller — so the fill never reallocs
-    // and a small ISO doesn't reserve the full 64 MiB.
-    let file_len = f.metadata().map_or(usize::MAX, |m| {
-        usize::try_from(m.len()).unwrap_or(usize::MAX)
-    });
-    let mut haystack = Vec::with_capacity(scan_bytes.min(file_len));
-    while read_total < scan_bytes {
-        let n = f.read(&mut buf).unwrap_or(0);
-        if n == 0 {
-            break;
-        }
-        haystack.extend_from_slice(&buf[..n]);
-        read_total += n;
-    }
-
-    // `sources/boot.wim` is the definitive Windows-install-media marker
-    // when the ISO exposes ASCII (ISO9660/Joliet) names. `contains_ascii`
-    // is case-insensitive, so one form covers BOOT.WIM / boot.wim and the
-    // backslash variant.
-    if contains_ascii(&haystack, b"sources/boot.wim")
-        || contains_ascii(&haystack, b"sources\\boot.wim")
+    // Everything sector-shaped goes through one caching wrapper: the
+    // descriptor-set sectors are read once and shared between the label
+    // scan, the El Torito walk, and the namespace-root lookups; the
+    // probe table's repeated root/subdirectory reads collapse the same
+    // way — over NFS/SFTP that's the difference between ~6 and ~60+
+    // round-trips per ISO.
    {
+        let mut cr = CachingReadAt::new(r);
+
+        // ISO9660 Primary Volume Descriptor: bytes 40..72 are the volume
+        // identifier (space-padded). v0.7.5: located by scanning the
+        // descriptor set (tolerating filler sectors) instead of assuming
+        // a pristine sector 16.
+        if let Some(pvd) = iso_fs::find_descriptor(&mut cr, false).await {
+            let label = String::from_utf8_lossy(&pvd[40..72]).trim().to_string();
+            if !label.is_empty() {
+                report.family = family_from_label(&label);
+                report.volume_label = Some(label);
+            }
+        }
+
+        report.el_torito = detect_el_torito(&mut cr).await;
+
+        if iso_fs::exists(&mut cr, "/sources/boot.wim").await {
            report.has_boot_wim = true;
            report.family = DistroFamily::WindowsPe;
+        } else {
+            for probe in LINUX_PROBES {
+                if !iso_fs::exists(&mut cr, probe.kernel).await {
+                    continue;
+                }
+                let mut initrd = None;
+                for cand in probe.initrd_candidates {
+                    if iso_fs::exists(&mut cr, cand).await {
+                        initrd = Some((*cand).to_string());
+                        break;
+                    }
+                }
+                let Some(initrd) = initrd else { continue };
+                // Content beats label: a rebadged derivative (volume
+                // label "ISE-3.2") with the anaconda layout is
+                // RHEL-family no matter what the label says.
+                report.family = probe.family;
+                let coreos = probe.family == DistroFamily::RhelFedora
+                    && iso_fs::exists(&mut cr, COREOS_ROOTFS).await;
+                if probe.emit_kernel && !coreos {
+                    report.kernel_path = Some(probe.kernel.to_string());
+                    report.initrd_paths = vec![initrd];
+                }
+                break;
+            }
+        }
    }

-    // v0.5.8: broaden Windows detection. Modern Windows 10/11 ISOs are
-    // UDF — filenames are stored as UTF-16 (so the ASCII scan above misses
-    // them) and the volume label is a cryptic Microsoft string (so
-    // `family_from_label` misses it too). Booting is via HTTP sanboot of
-    // the raw ISO (no boot.wim extraction), so we only need the *family*.
-    // Catch the common cases: well-known Windows markers in either ASCII
-    // or UTF-16LE within the first 16 MiB, plus a filename hint.
-    if report.family == DistroFamily::Unknown {
-        let head = &haystack[..haystack.len().min(16 * 1024 * 1024)];
-        let ascii_markers: [&[u8]; 4] = [
-            b"bootmgr",
-            b"sources/install.wim",
-            b"sources/install.esd",
-            b"efi/microsoft",
-        ];
-        let utf16_markers = ["bootmgr", "boot.wim", "install.wim", "microsoft"];
-        let looks_windows = ascii_markers.iter().any(|m| contains_ascii(head, m))
-            || utf16_markers.iter().any(|m| contains_utf16le_ci(head, m))
-            || filename_looks_windows(path);
-        if looks_windows {
+    // Modern Windows 10/11 ISOs are UDF — their tree is invisible to the
+    // ISO9660 walk and the volume label is a cryptic Microsoft string.
+    // Scan the first 16 MiB for well-known markers, ASCII and UTF-16LE.
+    // Runs after the Linux probes so a Linux ISO that *contains* the
+    // string "bootmgr" (GRUB/syslinux chainload modules do) has already
+    // classified and never reaches this — that ordering is the v0.7.4
+    // gparted-misdetection fix.
+    if report.family == DistroFamily::Unknown && allow_bulk_scan {
+        if let Some(win) = bulk_windows_scan(r, total_len).await {
            report.family = DistroFamily::WindowsPe;
+            report.has_boot_wim = win;
        }
    }

-    // Best-effort kernel/initrd path guess from family. These paths are what
-    // distro ISOs conventionally ship at — we don't verify extraction here;
-    // that happens in the store after introspection.
-    let (k, i) = guess_kernel_initrd(report.family);
-    report.kernel_path = k.map(str::to_string);
-    report.initrd_paths = i.iter().map(std::string::ToString::to_string).collect();
+    // Last resort: filename tokens. The only signal for SMB-sourced ISOs
+    // and renamed/UDF images that defeated everything above.
+    if report.family == DistroFamily::Unknown {
+        report.family = family_from_filename(filename);
+    }

    report
 }

+/// Provisional report for a remote ISO that hasn't been (or can't be)
+/// content-probed yet: family from the filename, `introspect_rev` left
+/// at 0 so the entry generator keeps the optimistic sanboot entry and
+/// the UI shows it as awaiting introspection. Used by all three share
+/// managers at registration; NFS/SFTP upgrade it in the background.
+#[must_use]
+pub fn provisional_report(filename: &str) -> IntrospectionReport {
+    IntrospectionReport {
+        family: family_from_filename(filename),
+        ..Default::default()
+    }
+}
+
 fn family_from_label(label: &str) -> DistroFamily {
    let l = label.to_ascii_lowercase();
-    if l.contains("ubuntu") || l.contains("debian") || l.contains("mint") {
+    if l.contains("ubuntu")
+        || l.contains("debian")
+        || l.contains("mint")
+        || l.contains("kali")
+        || l.contains("gparted")
+        || l.contains("clonezilla")
+    {
        DistroFamily::DebianUbuntu
    } else if l.contains("rhel")
        || l.contains("centos")
        || l.contains("fedora")
        || l.contains("rocky")
        || l.contains("alma")
+        || l.contains("rhcos")
+        || l.contains("coreos")
+        || l.contains("openshift")
+        || l.contains("okd")
    {
        DistroFamily::RhelFedora
    } else if l.contains("suse") || l.contains("opensuse") {
@@ -188,23 +343,97 @@ fn family_from_label(label: &str) -> DistroFamily {
    }
 }

-fn guess_kernel_initrd(family: DistroFamily) -> (Option<&'static str>, Vec<&'static str>) {
-    match family {
-        DistroFamily::DebianUbuntu => (Some("/casper/vmlinuz"), vec!["/casper/initrd"]),
-        DistroFamily::RhelFedora => (
-            Some("/images/pxeboot/vmlinuz"),
-            vec!["/images/pxeboot/initrd.img"],
-        ),
-        DistroFamily::OpenSuse => (
-            Some("/boot/x86_64/loader/linux"),
-            vec!["/boot/x86_64/loader/initrd"],
-        ),
-        DistroFamily::Arch => (
-            Some("/arch/boot/x86_64/vmlinuz-linux"),
-            vec!["/arch/boot/x86_64/initramfs-linux.img"],
-        ),
-        DistroFamily::Alpine => (Some("/boot/vmlinuz-lts"), vec!["/boot/initramfs-lts"]),
-        DistroFamily::WindowsPe | DistroFamily::Unknown => (None, Vec::new()),
+/// Filename token heuristic — `AlmaLinux-9.5-x86_64-dvd.iso` says what
+/// it is even when we can't read a byte of it. Tokens are the filename
+/// split on every non-alphanumeric character, so "almalinux", "rhel",
+/// "win11" match without "search" tripping the "arch" token.
+pub fn family_from_filename(filename: &str) -> DistroFamily {
+    if filename_looks_windows(filename) {
+        return DistroFamily::WindowsPe;
+    }
+    let lower = filename.to_ascii_lowercase();
+    let tokens: Vec<&str> = lower
+        .split(|c: char| !c.is_ascii_alphanumeric())
+        .filter(|t| !t.is_empty())
+        .collect();
+    let has = |t: &str| tokens.contains(&t);
+    if has("ubuntu")
+        || has("debian")
+        || has("mint")
+        || has("kali")
+        || has("gparted")
+        || has("clonezilla")
+        || has("tails")
+    {
+        DistroFamily::DebianUbuntu
+    } else if has("rhel")
+        || has("centos")
+        || has("almalinux")
+        || has("alma")
+        || has("rocky")
+        || has("rockylinux")
+        || has("fedora")
+        || has("rhcos")
+        || has("coreos")
+        || has("openshift")
+        || has("okd")
+    {
+        DistroFamily::RhelFedora
+    } else if has("opensuse") || has("suse") || has("sles") {
+        DistroFamily::OpenSuse
+    } else if has("arch") || has("archlinux") || has("manjaro") {
+        DistroFamily::Arch
+    } else if has("alpine") {
+        DistroFamily::Alpine
+    } else {
+        DistroFamily::Unknown
+    }
+}
+
+/// Scan the first 16 MiB (or the whole image when smaller) for Windows
+/// markers. Returns `Some(has_boot_wim)` on a hit, `None` when nothing
+/// Windows-shaped is found.
+async fn bulk_windows_scan<R: IsoReadAt + Send>(r: &mut R, total_len: u64) -> Option<bool> {
+    const SCAN_BYTES: u64 = 16 * 1024 * 1024;
+    const CHUNK: u64 = 1024 * 1024;
+    let budget = SCAN_BYTES.min(total_len);
+    let mut haystack = Vec::with_capacity(usize::try_from(budget).unwrap_or(0));
+    let mut offset = 0u64;
+    while offset < budget {
+        // Reads are exact-or-error, so clamp the final chunk to what the
+        // image actually has — netboot.xyz is 2.3 MB, not 16.
+        let want = u32::try_from(CHUNK.min(budget - offset)).unwrap_or(u32::MAX);
+        let Ok(chunk) = r.read_at(offset, want).await else {
+            break; // read error: scan what we have
+        };
+        offset += chunk.len() as u64;
+        haystack.extend_from_slice(&chunk);
+    }
+    if haystack.is_empty() {
+        return None;
+    }
+    let boot_wim = contains_ascii(&haystack, b"sources/boot.wim")
+        || contains_ascii(&haystack, b"sources\\boot.wim")
+        || contains_utf16le_ci(&haystack, "boot.wim");
+    if boot_wim {
+        return Some(true);
+    }
+    let ascii_markers: [&[u8]; 3] = [b"bootmgr", b"sources/install.wim", b"sources/install.esd"];
+    // v0.8.0: dropped the bare "microsoft" marker. It matched the
+    // Microsoft-signed Secure-Boot EFI loader that memtest86 (and signed
+    // BSDs / firmware tools) ship — the string lives in the loader's FAT
+    // long-filename entries — so any signed non-Windows bootable
+    // false-classified as Windows. The remaining markers are all
+    // Windows-exclusive filenames.
+    let utf16_markers = ["bootmgr", "install.wim"];
+    let hit = ascii_markers.iter().any(|m| contains_ascii(&haystack, m))
+        || utf16_markers
+            .iter()
+            .any(|m| contains_utf16le_ci(&haystack, m));
+    if hit {
+        Some(false)
+    } else {
+        None
    }
 }

@@ -237,14 +466,10 @@ fn contains_utf16le_ci(haystack: &[u8], ascii: &str) -> bool {

 /// Filename heuristic: a stock Windows ISO almost always carries an obvious
 /// token in its name (e.g. `..._windows_11_...`, `Win10`, `winserver`).
-/// Used only as a last-resort family hint when the content scan and volume
-/// label are inconclusive. v0.5.8.
-fn filename_looks_windows(path: &Path) -> bool {
-    let name = path
-        .file_name()
-        .and_then(|s| s.to_str())
-        .unwrap_or("")
-        .to_ascii_lowercase();
+/// v0.7.4: takes the bare filename instead of a `Path` so the same check
+/// runs against remote share listings.
+fn filename_looks_windows(filename: &str) -> bool {
+    let name = filename.to_ascii_lowercase();
    const TOKENS: [&str; 6] = [
        "windows",
        "winpe",
@@ -263,32 +488,32 @@ const EL_TORITO_ID: &[u8] = b"EL TORITO SPECIFICATION";
 /// Detect an El Torito boot catalog — the marker that an ISO is bootable
 /// by BIOS/UEFI firmware (and thus by iPXE `sanboot`).
 ///
-/// The ISO9660 Volume Descriptor Set starts at LBA 16 (offset 0x8000) and
-/// runs one 2048-byte descriptor per sector until a Set Terminator
-/// (type 0xFF). A Boot Record descriptor (type 0x00) whose 32-byte boot
-/// system identifier reads "EL TORITO SPECIFICATION" means the image
-/// declares an El Torito boot catalog. We only confirm its presence — we
-/// don't parse the catalog (sanboot/the firmware does that). The walk is
-/// capped so a malformed/huge image can't spin us. v0.5.9.
-fn detect_el_torito(f: &mut std::fs::File) -> bool {
-    let mut vd = [0u8; 2048];
+/// The ISO9660 Volume Descriptor Set starts at LBA 16 and runs one
+/// 2048-byte descriptor per sector; a Boot Record descriptor (type 0x00)
+/// whose 32-byte boot system identifier reads "EL TORITO SPECIFICATION"
+/// means the image declares a boot catalog. We only confirm its presence
+/// — we don't parse the catalog (sanboot/the firmware does that).
+///
+/// v0.7.5: the walk no longer aborts at the first non-`CD001` sector or
+/// stops at a Set Terminator. Sloppy mastering tools (appliance ISOs
+/// especially) leave zeroed filler sectors inside the descriptor area or
+/// odd descriptor ordering, which used to hide a real boot record and
+/// flag a bootable image as a data ISO. All 16 sectors are examined —
+/// the signature is 25 exact bytes, so scanning past the terminator
+/// (into e.g. a UDF volume recognition sequence) cannot false-positive.
+/// The cap keeps a malformed image from spinning us. v0.5.9 originally;
+/// reader-generic since v0.7.4.
+async fn detect_el_torito<R: IsoReadAt + Send>(r: &mut R) -> bool {
    for lba in 16u64..32 {
-        if f.seek(SeekFrom::Start(lba * 2048)).is_err() || f.read_exact(&mut vd).is_err() {
+        let Ok(vd) = r.read_at(lba * SECTOR, 2048).await else {
+            // Past end of a tiny image — nothing more to examine.
            return false;
-        }
-        // Every descriptor in the set carries the "CD001" magic; once it's
-        // missing we've walked off the end of a valid set.
+        };
        if &vd[1..6] != b"CD001" {
-            return false;
+            continue; // filler/garbage sector — keep walking
        }
-        match vd[0] {
-            // Boot Record descriptor carrying the El Torito signature.
-            0x00 if vd[7..7 + EL_TORITO_ID.len()] == *EL_TORITO_ID => return true,
-            // Volume Descriptor Set Terminator — nothing bootable found.
-            0xFF => return false,
-            // Any other descriptor (incl. a non-El-Torito boot record) —
-            // keep walking the set.
-            _ => {}
+        if vd[0] == 0x00 && vd[7..7 + EL_TORITO_ID.len()] == *EL_TORITO_ID {
+            return true;
        }
    }
    false
@@ -297,6 +522,12 @@ fn detect_el_torito(f: &mut std::fs::File) -> bool {
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests {
    use super::*;
+    use crate::iso_fs::testiso::{MemReadAt, TestIsoBuilder};
+
+    fn introspect_mem(img: Vec<u8>, filename: &str, bulk: bool) -> IntrospectionReport {
+        let len = img.len() as u64;
+        futures::executor::block_on(introspect_reader(&mut MemReadAt(img), len, filename, bulk))
+    }

    #[test]
    fn label_matching() {
@@ -313,13 +544,158 @@ mod tests {
            DistroFamily::OpenSuse
        );
        assert_eq!(family_from_label("ARCH_202604"), DistroFamily::Arch);
+        assert_eq!(
+            family_from_label("GParted-live"),
+            DistroFamily::DebianUbuntu
+        );
+        assert_eq!(family_from_label("rhcos-417"), DistroFamily::RhelFedora);
        assert_eq!(family_from_label("weird-custom"), DistroFamily::Unknown);
    }

+    #[test]
+    fn gparted_shape_is_not_windows() {
+        // The v0.7.4 regression test: a Debian-live image whose payload
+        // contains the literal string "bootmgr" (as GRUB/syslinux
+        // chainload modules do). The old byte-grep classified this as
+        // WindowsPe; the probe order must classify Debian first.
+        let img = TestIsoBuilder::new("GParted-live")
+            .el_torito(true)
+            .file("/live/vmlinuz", b"KERNEL")
+            .file("/live/initrd.img", b"INITRD")
+            .file("/boot/grub/chain.mod", b"xxx bootmgr xxx")
+            .build();
+        let r = introspect_mem(img, "gparted-live-1.8.1-3-amd64.iso", true);
+        assert_eq!(r.family, DistroFamily::DebianUbuntu);
+        // Classification only — live-boot args aren't rendered yet, so no
+        // kernel entry; sanboot (via el_torito) keeps working.
+        assert!(r.kernel_path.is_none());
+        assert!(r.el_torito);
+        assert_eq!(r.introspect_rev, INTROSPECT_REV);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn casper_shape_verifies_kernel_and_initrd() {
+        let img = TestIsoBuilder::new("Ubuntu-Server 24.04.1 LTS amd64")
+            .el_torito(true)
+            .file("/casper/vmlinuz", b"K")
+            .file("/casper/initrd", b"I")
+            .build();
+        let r = introspect_mem(img, "ubuntu-24.04.1-live-server-amd64.iso", true);
+        assert_eq!(r.family, DistroFamily::DebianUbuntu);
+        assert_eq!(r.kernel_path.as_deref(), Some("/casper/vmlinuz"));
+        assert_eq!(r.initrd_paths, vec!["/casper/initrd".to_string()]);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn anaconda_shape_emits_verified_paths() {
+        let img = TestIsoBuilder::new("AlmaLinux-9-5-x86_64-dvd")
+            .el_torito(true)
+            .file("/images/pxeboot/vmlinuz", b"K")
+            .file("/images/pxeboot/initrd.img", b"I")
+            .build();
+        let r = introspect_mem(img, "AlmaLinux-9.5-x86_64-dvd.iso", true);
+        assert_eq!(r.family, DistroFamily::RhelFedora);
+        assert_eq!(r.kernel_path.as_deref(), Some("/images/pxeboot/vmlinuz"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn coreos_shape_classifies_but_keeps_sanboot() {
+        // RHCOS / OpenShift agent ISOs: anaconda layout + rootfs.img.
+        // Direct kernel boot needs coreos.live.rootfs_url (and agent
+        // ISOs their embedded ignition), so kernel_path must stay None.
+        let img = TestIsoBuilder::new("rhcos-417.94.202501")
+            .el_torito(true)
+            .file("/images/pxeboot/vmlinuz", b"K")
+            .file("/images/pxeboot/initrd.img", b"I")
+            .file("/images/pxeboot/rootfs.img", b"R")
+            .build();
+        let r = introspect_mem(img, "rhcos-live.x86_64.iso", true);
+        assert_eq!(r.family, DistroFamily::RhelFedora);
+        assert!(
+            r.kernel_path.is_none(),
+            "CoreOS must not get a kernel entry"
+        );
+        assert!(r.el_torito);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn boot_wim_probe_classifies_windows() {
+        let img = TestIsoBuilder::new("CCCOMA_X64FRE_EN-US_DV9")
+            .el_torito(true)
+            .file("/sources/boot.wim", b"MSWIMMSWIM")
+            .build();
+        let r = introspect_mem(img, "whatever.iso", false);
+        assert_eq!(r.family, DistroFamily::WindowsPe);
+        assert!(r.has_boot_wim);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn label_only_linux_without_verified_kernel_gets_no_kernel_path() {
+        // Label says RHEL but the tree has no pxeboot files — the old
+        // code guessed `/images/pxeboot/vmlinuz` and emitted an entry
+        // that 404'd at boot. Now: family yes, kernel paths no.
+        let img = TestIsoBuilder::new("RHEL-9-5-CUSTOM")
+            .el_torito(true)
+            .file("/readme.txt", b"hi")
+            .build();
+        let r = introspect_mem(img, "rhel-custom.iso", true);
+        assert_eq!(r.family, DistroFamily::RhelFedora);
+        assert!(r.kernel_path.is_none());
+        assert!(r.initrd_paths.is_empty());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn remote_skips_bulk_scan_but_filename_still_hints() {
+        // No ISO9660 signatures at all (e.g. pure-UDF image read over a
+        // share), bulk scan off: filename is the only signal.
+        let img = vec![0u8; 64 * 1024];
+        let r = introspect_mem(img.clone(), "Win11_24H2_English_x64.iso", false);
+        assert_eq!(r.family, DistroFamily::WindowsPe);
+        let r2 = introspect_mem(img, "mystery.iso", false);
+        assert_eq!(r2.family, DistroFamily::Unknown);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn filename_family_table() {
+        use DistroFamily::*;
+        let cases = [
+            ("AlmaLinux-9.5-x86_64-dvd.iso", RhelFedora),
+            ("CentOS-Stream-10-latest-x86_64-dvd1.iso", RhelFedora),
+            ("rhel-9.0-x86_64-boot.iso", RhelFedora),
+            ("rhcos-live.x86_64.iso", RhelFedora),
+            ("openshift-4-21-9.agent.x86_64.iso", RhelFedora),
+            ("ubuntu-24.04-desktop.iso", DebianUbuntu),
+            ("gparted-live-1.8.1-3-amd64.iso", DebianUbuntu),
+            ("archlinux-2026.05.01-x86_64.iso", Arch),
+            ("arch-2026.05.01.iso", Arch),
+            ("alpine-standard-3.21.0-x86_64.iso", Alpine),
+            ("openSUSE-Leap-15.6-DVD-x86_64.iso", OpenSuse),
+            ("en-us_windows_11_iot_enterprise.iso", WindowsPe),
+            ("Win10_22H2_English_x64.iso", WindowsPe),
+            ("netboot.xyz.iso", Unknown),
+            ("ise-3.2.0.542a.SPA.x86_64.iso", Unknown),
+            ("Macrium_5860_v2.iso", Unknown),
+            // "search" must not trip the "arch" token.
+            ("research-data.iso", Unknown),
+        ];
+        for (name, want) in cases {
+            assert_eq!(family_from_filename(name), want, "{name}");
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn provisional_report_keeps_rev_zero() {
+        let r = provisional_report("rhel-9.0-x86_64-dvd.iso");
+        assert_eq!(r.family, DistroFamily::RhelFedora);
+        assert_eq!(
+            r.introspect_rev, 0,
+            "provisional must keep optimistic sanboot"
+        );
+        assert!(!r.el_torito);
+    }
+
    #[test]
    fn utf16le_marker_matches_case_insensitively() {
-        // "boot.wim" encoded UTF-16LE, mixed case — UDF stores Windows
-        // filenames this way, which the ASCII scan can't see.
        let s = "BOOT.WIM";
        let utf16: Vec<u8> = s.bytes().flat_map(|b| [b, 0]).collect();
        let mut hay = vec![0u8; 8];
@@ -328,59 +704,108 @@ mod tests {
        assert!(contains_utf16le_ci(&hay, "boot.wim"));
        assert!(contains_utf16le_ci(&hay, "Boot.Wim"));
        assert!(!contains_utf16le_ci(&hay, "install.wim"));
-        // An ASCII (not UTF-16) occurrence must NOT match the UTF-16 scan.
        assert!(!contains_utf16le_ci(b"boot.wim plain ascii", "boot.wim"));
    }

    #[test]
-    fn el_torito_boot_catalog_detected() {
-        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
-        // Helper: stamp a 2048-byte descriptor at `lba` with type + magic.
-        let stamp = |img: &mut [u8], lba: usize, ty: u8| {
-            let off = lba * 2048;
-            img[off] = ty;
-            img[off + 1..off + 6].copy_from_slice(b"CD001");
-        };
+    fn el_torito_detected_through_reader() {
+        let with = TestIsoBuilder::new("BOOTABLE").el_torito(true).build();
+        let without = TestIsoBuilder::new("DATA").build();
+        assert!(futures::executor::block_on(detect_el_torito(
+            &mut MemReadAt(with)
+        )));
+        assert!(!futures::executor::block_on(detect_el_torito(
+            &mut MemReadAt(without)
+        )));
+    }

-        // Bootable image: PVD @16, El Torito Boot Record @17, terminator @18.
-        let mut boot = vec![0u8; 2048 * 19];
-        stamp(&mut boot, 16, 0x01);
-        stamp(&mut boot, 17, 0x00);
-        boot[17 * 2048 + 7..17 * 2048 + 7 + EL_TORITO_ID.len()].copy_from_slice(EL_TORITO_ID);
-        stamp(&mut boot, 18, 0xFF);
-        let bp = dir.path().join("boot.iso");
-        std::fs::write(&bp, &boot).unwrap();
-        let mut f = std::fs::File::open(&bp).unwrap();
+    #[test]
+    fn el_torito_survives_filler_sector_in_descriptor_area() {
+        // v0.7.5 tolerance test: sloppy appliance mastering leaves a
+        // zeroed sector inside the Volume Descriptor Set. The old walk
+        // aborted at the first non-CD001 sector and flagged a genuinely
+        // bootable image as a data ISO.
+        let sector = SECTOR as usize;
+        let mut img = TestIsoBuilder::new("GAPPY").el_torito(true).build();
+        // Builder layout: PVD @16, Boot Record @17, terminator @18.
+        // Move the BR to 18 (over the terminator) and zero out 17.
+        img.copy_within(17 * sector..18 * sector, 18 * sector);
+        img[17 * sector..18 * sector].fill(0);
        assert!(
-            detect_el_torito(&mut f),
-            "El Torito boot record should match"
+            futures::executor::block_on(detect_el_torito(&mut MemReadAt(img))),
+            "boot record behind a zeroed filler sector must still be found"
        );
+    }

-        // Data/appliance image: PVD @16, terminator @17, no boot record.
-        let mut data = vec![0u8; 2048 * 18];
-        stamp(&mut data, 16, 0x01);
-        stamp(&mut data, 17, 0xFF);
-        let dp = dir.path().join("data.iso");
-        std::fs::write(&dp, &data).unwrap();
-        let mut f2 = std::fs::File::open(&dp).unwrap();
-        assert!(!detect_el_torito(&mut f2), "data ISO has no boot catalog");
+    #[test]
+    fn joliet_only_image_classifies_via_fallback() {
+        // Primary namespace bare, real tree only in Joliet — the v0.7.5
+        // fallback must classify it (boot.wim probe) where v0.7.4 saw
+        // "no installer files".
+        let img = TestIsoBuilder::new("WIN_APPLIANCE")
+            .el_torito(true)
+            .joliet_only(true)
+            .file("/sources/boot.wim", b"WIMWIM")
+            .build();
+        let r = introspect_mem(img, "appliance.iso", false);
+        assert_eq!(r.family, DistroFamily::WindowsPe);
+        assert!(r.has_boot_wim);
+        assert!(r.el_torito);
+
+        // Same for a Linux shape: verified kernel paths via Joliet.
+        let img2 = TestIsoBuilder::new("CUSTOM-EL9")
+            .el_torito(true)
+            .joliet_only(true)
+            .file("/images/pxeboot/vmlinuz", b"K")
+            .file("/images/pxeboot/initrd.img", b"I")
+            .build();
+        let r2 = introspect_mem(img2, "custom-el9.iso", false);
+        assert_eq!(r2.family, DistroFamily::RhelFedora);
+        assert_eq!(r2.kernel_path.as_deref(), Some("/images/pxeboot/vmlinuz"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn filename_hint_catches_windows_isos() {
-        use std::path::Path;
-        assert!(filename_looks_windows(Path::new(
+        assert!(filename_looks_windows(
            "en-us_windows_11_iot_enterprise_ltsc_2024_x64_dvd.iso"
-        )));
-        assert!(filename_looks_windows(Path::new(
-            "Win10_22H2_English_x64.iso"
-        )));
-        assert!(filename_looks_windows(Path::new("winserver2022.iso")));
-        assert!(!filename_looks_windows(Path::new(
-            "ubuntu-24.04-desktop.iso"
-        )));
-        assert!(!filename_looks_windows(Path::new(
-            "Rocky-9.4-x86_64-dvd.iso"
-        )));
+        ));
+        assert!(filename_looks_windows("Win10_22H2_English_x64.iso"));
+        assert!(filename_looks_windows("winserver2022.iso"));
+        assert!(!filename_looks_windows("ubuntu-24.04-desktop.iso"));
+        assert!(!filename_looks_windows("Rocky-9.4-x86_64-dvd.iso"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn bulk_scan_catches_udf_windows_markers() {
+        // A blob with no ISO9660 tree but a UTF-16 "install.wim" — the
+        // UDF Windows shape after every probe missed.
+        let mut img = vec![0u8; 256 * 1024];
+        let marker: Vec<u8> = "install.wim".bytes().flat_map(|b| [b, 0]).collect();
+        img[100_000..100_000 + marker.len()].copy_from_slice(&marker);
+        let r = introspect_mem(img, "renamed.iso", true);
+        assert_eq!(r.family, DistroFamily::WindowsPe);
+        assert!(!r.has_boot_wim);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn memtest_signed_efi_is_not_windows() {
+        // v0.8.0 regression: PassMark MemTest86 ships a Microsoft-signed
+        // Secure-Boot EFI loader, and "Microsoft" appears in its FAT
+        // long-filename entries as UTF-16LE. The old bulk-scan "microsoft"
+        // marker classified it (and any signed BSD / firmware tool) as
+        // Windows. It must now classify as a generic bootable (sanboot).
+        let mut img = TestIsoBuilder::new("MEMTEST86")
+            .el_torito(true)
+            .file("/EFI/BOOT/BOOTX64.EFI", b"signed-efi-app")
+            .build();
+        let marker: Vec<u8> = "Microsoft".bytes().flat_map(|b| [b, 0]).collect();
+        img.extend_from_slice(&marker);
+        let r = introspect_mem(img, "memtest86-iso.iso", true);
+        assert_ne!(
+            r.family,
+            DistroFamily::WindowsPe,
+            "a Microsoft-signed EFI loader is not Windows media"
+        );
+        assert!(r.el_torito, "still a bootable image");
    }
 }
@@ -0,0 +1,761 @@
+//! Read-only ISO9660 lookup over any random-access byte source.
+//!
+//! v0.7.4: generalized from the http-api crate's local-file-only walker so
+//! the same directory walk drives three consumers:
+//!
+//!   1. `iso_file` HTTP serving — locate `/casper/vmlinuz` inside a local
+//!      *or remote* (NFS/SFTP) ISO and stream just that byte range.
+//!   2. Introspection — probe for well-known kernel/initrd/boot.wim paths
+//!      instead of grepping raw sectors for filename strings (which
+//!      false-positived: any Linux ISO shipping GRUB/syslinux chainload
+//!      modules contains the literal "bootmgr" and used to classify as
+//!      Windows).
+//!   3. Remote introspection — the same probes over an NFSv3 READ3 /
+//!      SFTP seek-read connection, which is what finally classifies
+//!      share-sourced ISOs instead of registering them all as `Unknown`.
+//!
+//! Namespaces: the primary ISO9660 tree is tried first; on a miss the
+//! walk falls back to the **Joliet** supplementary namespace (v0.7.5) —
+//! Windows-oriented mastering tools often write a minimal/mangled
+//! primary tree with the real names only in Joliet. Rock Ridge stays
+//! ignored. Matching is case-insensitive with the `;1` version suffix
+//! and the trailing dot of extension-less strict-mastered names
+//! stripped.
+
+use std::collections::HashMap;
+use std::future::Future;
+use std::io::{Read, Seek, SeekFrom};
+use std::path::Path;
+
+pub const SECTOR: u64 = 2048;
+
+/// Upper bound on a single directory extent we'll buffer. Real distro ISO
+/// directories are a handful of KiB; the cap keeps a malformed or hostile
+/// image from asking us to allocate gigabytes.
+const MAX_DIR_BYTES: u64 = 4 * 1024 * 1024;
+
+/// Byte range of one file inside the ISO image.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
+pub struct FileLocation {
+    pub offset: u64,
+    pub length: u64,
+}
+
+/// Random-access reads into an ISO image. Implemented by a local
+/// `std::fs::File`, the NFS and SFTP share readers, and the in-memory
+/// test image.
+///
+/// The contract is `read_exact`-like: the returned buffer is exactly
+/// `len` bytes or the call errors. The future must be `Send` because
+/// remote introspection runs inside spawned tokio tasks.
+pub trait IsoReadAt {
+    fn read_at(
+        &mut self,
+        offset: u64,
+        len: u32,
+    ) -> impl Future<Output = std::io::Result<Vec<u8>>> + Send;
+}
+
+/// Local-file reader. The reads are synchronous inside an async fn —
+/// callers run it either on the blocking pool (introspection at upload)
+/// or through [`lookup_local`]'s `block_on`, never on a hot runtime
+/// worker with real awaits pending.
+pub struct FileReadAt(std::fs::File);
+
+impl FileReadAt {
+    #[must_use]
+    pub fn new(f: std::fs::File) -> Self {
+        Self(f)
+    }
+}
+
+impl IsoReadAt for FileReadAt {
+    async fn read_at(&mut self, offset: u64, len: u32) -> std::io::Result<Vec<u8>> {
+        self.0.seek(SeekFrom::Start(offset))?;
+        let mut buf = vec![0u8; len as usize];
+        self.0.read_exact(&mut buf)?;
+        Ok(buf)
+    }
+}
+
+/// Exact-key read cache for the probe phase of introspection. The probe
+/// table looks up ~20 paths and every one of them re-reads the root
+/// directory (and usually one shared subdirectory); over NFS/SFTP that
+/// would be 20 identical round-trips. Directory reads repeat with the
+/// exact same `(offset, len)`, so a plain map keyed on the pair hits
+/// every time. Large data reads bypass the cache.
+pub struct CachingReadAt<'a, R: IsoReadAt + Send> {
+    inner: &'a mut R,
+    cache: HashMap<(u64, u32), Vec<u8>>,
+}
+
+/// Don't cache reads bigger than this (file payloads, bulk scans).
+const CACHE_MAX_READ: u32 = 256 * 1024;
+/// Bound the cache so a pathological image can't grow it unbounded.
+const CACHE_MAX_ENTRIES: usize = 256;
+
+impl<'a, R: IsoReadAt + Send> CachingReadAt<'a, R> {
+    pub fn new(inner: &'a mut R) -> Self {
+        Self {
+            inner,
+            cache: HashMap::new(),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+impl<R: IsoReadAt + Send> IsoReadAt for CachingReadAt<'_, R> {
+    async fn read_at(&mut self, offset: u64, len: u32) -> std::io::Result<Vec<u8>> {
+        let key = (offset, len);
+        if let Some(hit) = self.cache.get(&key) {
+            return Ok(hit.clone());
+        }
+        let buf = self.inner.read_at(offset, len).await?;
+        if len <= CACHE_MAX_READ && self.cache.len() < CACHE_MAX_ENTRIES {
+            self.cache.insert(key, buf.clone());
+        }
+        Ok(buf)
+    }
+}
+
+/// Look up `in_iso_path` (leading slash optional, case-insensitive) in
+/// the image behind `r`. Returns `None` on any parsing or IO failure —
+/// "not found" and "couldn't read" are the same answer to a prober.
+///
+/// v0.7.5: tries the primary ISO9660 namespace first, then falls back
+/// to the **Joliet** supplementary namespace. Windows-oriented mastering
+/// tools (common for appliance ISOs) often write a minimal or mangled
+/// primary tree and keep the real filenames only in Joliet — without the
+/// fallback those images probed as "no installer files" and their in-ISO
+/// kernel fetches 404'd.
+pub async fn lookup<R: IsoReadAt + Send>(r: &mut R, in_iso_path: &str) -> Option<FileLocation> {
+    let components: Vec<&str> = in_iso_path
+        .trim_start_matches('/')
+        .split('/')
+        .filter(|c| !c.is_empty())
+        .collect();
+    if components.is_empty() {
+        return None;
+    }
+    if let Some(root) = find_root(r, false).await {
+        if let Some(loc) = walk_namespace(r, root, &components, false).await {
+            return Some(loc);
+        }
+    }
+    if let Some(root) = find_root(r, true).await {
+        if let Some(loc) = walk_namespace(r, root, &components, true).await {
+            return Some(loc);
+        }
+    }
+    None
+}
+
+/// Find the namespace root: the Primary Volume Descriptor (`joliet =
+/// false`) or the Joliet Supplementary Volume Descriptor (`joliet =
+/// true`, identified by its UCS-2 escape sequence). Scans the whole
+/// descriptor area rather than assuming fixed sectors, skipping any
+/// non-`CD001` sector — sloppy mastering tools leave gaps. Returns the
+/// root directory's `(lba, len)`.
+async fn find_root<R: IsoReadAt + Send>(r: &mut R, joliet: bool) -> Option<(u64, u64)> {
+    let vd = find_descriptor(r, joliet).await?;
+    // Root directory record at descriptor offset 156, 34 bytes.
+    parse_dir_record_ext(&vd[156..156 + 34])
+}
+
+/// Scan the Volume Descriptor Set (LBA 16..32) for the wanted
+/// descriptor: PVD (type 0x01) or Joliet SVD (type 0x02 carrying a
+/// UCS-2 level 1/2/3 escape sequence at offset 88). Tolerant of
+/// non-`CD001` filler sectors; stops at the Set Terminator.
+pub(crate) async fn find_descriptor<R: IsoReadAt + Send>(
+    r: &mut R,
+    joliet: bool,
+) -> Option<Vec<u8>> {
+    for lba in 16u64..32 {
+        let Ok(vd) = r.read_at(lba * SECTOR, 2048).await else {
+            return None;
+        };
+        if &vd[1..6] != b"CD001" {
+            continue;
+        }
+        match vd[0] {
+            0x01 if !joliet => return Some(vd),
+            0x02 if joliet && has_joliet_escape(&vd) => return Some(vd),
+            0xFF => return None,
+            _ => {}
+        }
+    }
+    None
+}
+
+/// Joliet SVDs declare a UCS-2 escape sequence at offset 88: `%/@`,
+/// `%/C`, or `%/E` (levels 1–3).
+fn has_joliet_escape(vd: &[u8]) -> bool {
+    matches!(vd.get(88..91), Some([0x25, 0x2F, 0x40 | 0x43 | 0x45]))
+}
+
+/// Walk path components down one namespace's directory tree. The
+/// original walk was tail-recursive; iterate instead so the future
+/// stays a plain (non-boxed) state machine.
+async fn walk_namespace<R: IsoReadAt + Send>(
+    r: &mut R,
+    root: (u64, u64),
+    components: &[&str],
+    joliet: bool,
+) -> Option<FileLocation> {
+    let (mut lba, mut len) = root;
+    for (idx, comp) in components.iter().enumerate() {
+        if len == 0 || len > MAX_DIR_BYTES {
+            return None;
+        }
+        let dir = r.read_at(lba * SECTOR, len as u32).await.ok()?;
+        let hit = scan_dir(&dir, comp, joliet)?;
+        let last = idx + 1 == components.len();
+        match (last, hit.is_dir) {
+            (true, false) => {
+                return Some(FileLocation {
+                    offset: hit.lba * SECTOR,
+                    length: hit.len,
+                })
+            }
+            (false, true) => {
+                lba = hit.lba;
+                len = hit.len;
+            }
+            _ => return None,
+        }
+    }
+    None
+}
+
+/// Convenience probe: does `in_iso_path` exist as a file?
+pub async fn exists<R: IsoReadAt + Send>(r: &mut R, in_iso_path: &str) -> bool {
+    lookup(r, in_iso_path).await.is_some()
+}
+
+/// Synchronous wrapper for local files — the shape the HTTP handler's
+/// `spawn_blocking` call site wants. `block_on` is safe here because
+/// `FileReadAt`'s reads never actually await (they complete inline), so
+/// the executor never parks.
+#[must_use]
+pub fn lookup_local(iso_path: &Path, in_iso_path: &str) -> Option<FileLocation> {
+    let f = std::fs::File::open(iso_path).ok()?;
+    futures::executor::block_on(lookup(&mut FileReadAt::new(f), in_iso_path))
+}
+
+struct DirHit {
+    lba: u64,
+    len: u64,
+    is_dir: bool,
+}
+
+/// Scan one directory extent for an identifier. Pure function over the
+/// buffered extent — all protocol/IO concerns live in the caller.
+/// `joliet` switches the identifier decoding (UCS-2 big-endian vs
+/// d-characters); the record layout is otherwise identical.
+fn scan_dir(dir: &[u8], target: &str, joliet: bool) -> Option<DirHit> {
+    let mut i = 0;
+    while i < dir.len() {
+        let len = dir[i] as usize;
+        if len == 0 {
+            // Records never span sectors; a zero length byte means the
+            // rest of this sector is padding. Hop to the next one.
+            let next = (i / SECTOR as usize + 1) * SECTOR as usize;
+            if next <= i {
+                break;
+            }
+            i = next;
+            continue;
+        }
+        if i + len > dir.len() {
+            break;
+        }
+        let rec = &dir[i..i + len];
+        let name = dir_record_name(rec, joliet);
+        let is_dir = (rec.get(25).copied().unwrap_or(0) & 0x02) != 0;
+        // Skip "." (0x00) and ".." (0x01) pseudo-entries.
+        let is_pseudo =
+            rec.get(32).copied() == Some(1) && matches!(rec.get(33).copied(), Some(0x00 | 0x01));
+        if !is_pseudo && name.eq_ignore_ascii_case(target) {
+            let (lba, dlen) = parse_dir_record_ext(rec)?;
+            return Some(DirHit {
+                lba,
+                len: dlen,
+                is_dir,
+            });
+        }
+        i += len;
+    }
+    None
+}
+
+/// Extract (extent LBA, data length in bytes) from a directory record.
+/// Layout per ISO9660: bytes 2..10 extent LBA (LE+BE duplicate), 10..18
+/// data length (LE+BE duplicate). We trust the little-endian copy.
+fn parse_dir_record_ext(rec: &[u8]) -> Option<(u64, u64)> {
+    if rec.len() < 34 {
+        return None;
+    }
+    let lba = u64::from(u32::from_le_bytes(rec[2..6].try_into().ok()?));
+    let len = u64::from(u32::from_le_bytes(rec[10..14].try_into().ok()?));
+    Some((lba, len))
+}
+
+/// Extract the identifier from a directory record, normalizing ISO9660
+/// quirks: the `;N` version suffix and the trailing dot that strict
+/// mastering appends to extension-less names (`VMLINUZ.;1`). Without the
+/// dot strip, level-1 images' kernels never matched `/casper/vmlinuz`.
+/// Joliet identifiers are UCS-2 big-endian; decode then normalize the
+/// same way (the `;1` suffix is two UCS-2 characters there).
+fn dir_record_name(rec: &[u8], joliet: bool) -> String {
+    if joliet {
+        let name_len = *rec.get(32).unwrap_or(&0) as usize;
+        if name_len < 2 || rec.len() < 33 + name_len {
+            return String::new();
+        }
+        let raw = &rec[33..33 + name_len];
+        let units: Vec<u16> = raw
+            .chunks_exact(2)
+            .map(|p| u16::from_be_bytes([p[0], p[1]]))
+            .collect();
+        let s = String::from_utf16_lossy(&units);
+        let s = s.rfind(';').map_or_else(|| s.as_str(), |i| &s[..i]);
+        return s.strip_suffix('.').unwrap_or(s).to_string();
+    }
+    primary_record_name(rec)
+}
+
+fn primary_record_name(rec: &[u8]) -> String {
+    let name_len = *rec.get(32).unwrap_or(&0) as usize;
+    if name_len == 0 || rec.len() < 33 + name_len {
+        return String::new();
+    }
+    let raw = &rec[33..33 + name_len];
+    let s = String::from_utf8_lossy(raw);
+    let s = s.rfind(';').map_or_else(|| s.as_ref(), |i| &s[..i]);
+    s.strip_suffix('.').unwrap_or(s).to_string()
+}
+
+// ── test support ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+//
+// A tiny ISO9660 image builder used by this module's tests, the
+// introspection tests, and (behind the `test-image` feature) other
+// crates' integration tests. Lays out: PVD @ LBA 16, optional El Torito
+// boot record @ 17, set terminator @ 18, directories from LBA 20, file
+// data after. Only what `lookup`/introspection read is populated.
+
+#[cfg(any(test, feature = "test-image"))]
+#[doc(hidden)]
+pub mod testiso {
+    use super::SECTOR;
+    use std::collections::BTreeMap;
+
+    #[derive(Default)]
+    struct Node {
+        children: BTreeMap<String, Node>,
+        content: Option<Vec<u8>>,
+    }
+
+    pub struct TestIsoBuilder {
+        root: Node,
+        volume_label: String,
+        el_torito: bool,
+        joliet_only: bool,
+    }
+
+    impl TestIsoBuilder {
+        pub fn new(volume_label: &str) -> Self {
+            Self {
+                root: Node::default(),
+                volume_label: volume_label.to_string(),
+                el_torito: false,
+                joliet_only: false,
+            }
+        }
+
+        #[must_use]
+        pub fn el_torito(mut self, on: bool) -> Self {
+            self.el_torito = on;
+            self
+        }
+
+        /// Model the Windows-mastering worst case: the primary ISO9660
+        /// tree is empty (just `.`/`..` in the root) and every real name
+        /// lives only in the Joliet supplementary namespace. Exercises
+        /// the v0.7.5 Joliet fallback end to end.
+        #[must_use]
+        pub fn joliet_only(mut self, on: bool) -> Self {
+            self.joliet_only = on;
+            self
+        }
+
+        /// Add a file at `path` (e.g. "/casper/vmlinuz") with `content`.
+        #[must_use]
+        pub fn file(mut self, path: &str, content: &[u8]) -> Self {
+            let mut node = &mut self.root;
+            let comps: Vec<&str> = path
+                .trim_start_matches('/')
+                .split('/')
+                .filter(|c| !c.is_empty())
+                .collect();
+            for (i, c) in comps.iter().enumerate() {
+                node = node.children.entry((*c).to_string()).or_default();
+                if i + 1 == comps.len() {
+                    node.content = Some(content.to_vec());
+                }
+            }
+            self
+        }
+
+        pub fn build(self) -> Vec<u8> {
+            // Pass 1: allocate extents. Primary directories first (1
+            // sector each), then an optional parallel set of Joliet
+            // directory extents, then file contents (shared by both
+            // namespaces — only the directory trees differ).
+            let mut next_lba: u64 = 20;
+            let mut dirs: Vec<(*const Node, u64)> = Vec::new();
+            fn alloc_dirs(n: &Node, next: &mut u64, out: &mut Vec<(*const Node, u64)>) {
+                out.push((std::ptr::from_ref(n), *next));
+                *next += 1;
+                for child in n.children.values() {
+                    if child.content.is_none() {
+                        alloc_dirs(child, next, out);
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+            alloc_dirs(&self.root, &mut next_lba, &mut dirs);
+            let lba_of = |n: &Node| -> u64 {
+                dirs.iter()
+                    .find(|(p, _)| std::ptr::eq(*p, n))
+                    .map(|(_, l)| *l)
+                    .expect("dir allocated")
+            };
+            let mut jdirs: Vec<(*const Node, u64)> = Vec::new();
+            if self.joliet_only {
+                alloc_dirs(&self.root, &mut next_lba, &mut jdirs);
+            }
+            let jlba_of = |n: &Node| -> u64 {
+                jdirs
+                    .iter()
+                    .find(|(p, _)| std::ptr::eq(*p, n))
+                    .map(|(_, l)| *l)
+                    .expect("joliet dir allocated")
+            };
+            let mut file_lbas: Vec<(*const Node, u64, usize)> = Vec::new();
+            fn alloc_files(n: &Node, next: &mut u64, out: &mut Vec<(*const Node, u64, usize)>) {
+                for child in n.children.values() {
+                    if let Some(c) = &child.content {
+                        out.push((std::ptr::from_ref(child), *next, c.len()));
+                        *next += c.len().div_ceil(SECTOR as usize).max(1) as u64;
+                    } else {
+                        alloc_files(child, next, out);
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+            alloc_files(&self.root, &mut next_lba, &mut file_lbas);
+            let file_lba_of = |n: &Node| -> u64 {
+                file_lbas
+                    .iter()
+                    .find(|(p, _, _)| std::ptr::eq(*p, n))
+                    .map(|(_, l, _)| *l)
+                    .expect("file allocated")
+            };
+
+            let total = next_lba as usize * SECTOR as usize;
+            let mut img = vec![0u8; total];
+
+            // Directory record encoder.
+            fn record(name_bytes: &[u8], lba: u64, len: u64, is_dir: bool) -> Vec<u8> {
+                let mut rec_len = 33 + name_bytes.len();
+                if rec_len % 2 == 1 {
+                    rec_len += 1; // pad to even
+                }
+                let rec_len = rec_len.max(34);
+                let mut r = vec![0u8; rec_len];
+                r[0] = rec_len as u8;
+                r[2..6].copy_from_slice(&(lba as u32).to_le_bytes());
+                r[6..10].copy_from_slice(&(lba as u32).to_be_bytes());
+                r[10..14].copy_from_slice(&(len as u32).to_le_bytes());
+                r[14..18].copy_from_slice(&(len as u32).to_be_bytes());
+                if is_dir {
+                    r[25] = 0x02;
+                }
+                r[32] = name_bytes.len() as u8;
+                r[33..33 + name_bytes.len()].copy_from_slice(name_bytes);
+                r
+            }
+
+            // Pass 2: write each directory extent. `joliet` switches the
+            // identifier encoding; `skip_children` writes a bare ./..
+            // directory (the mangled-primary worst case).
+            #[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
+            fn write_dir(
+                img: &mut [u8],
+                n: &Node,
+                self_lba: u64,
+                parent_lba: u64,
+                dir_lba_of: &dyn Fn(&Node) -> u64,
+                file_lba_of: &dyn Fn(&Node) -> u64,
+                joliet: bool,
+                skip_children: bool,
+            ) {
+                let base = self_lba as usize * SECTOR as usize;
+                let mut off = 0usize;
+                let mut put = |rec: Vec<u8>, off: &mut usize| {
+                    img[base + *off..base + *off + rec.len()].copy_from_slice(&rec);
+                    *off += rec.len();
+                };
+                put(record(&[0x00], self_lba, SECTOR, true), &mut off);
+                put(record(&[0x01], parent_lba, SECTOR, true), &mut off);
+                if skip_children {
+                    return;
+                }
+                let encode = |name: &str, file: bool| -> Vec<u8> {
+                    if joliet {
+                        // Joliet preserves case; files still carry `;1`.
+                        let s = if file {
+                            format!("{name};1")
+                        } else {
+                            name.to_string()
+                        };
+                        s.encode_utf16().flat_map(u16::to_be_bytes).collect()
+                    } else if file {
+                        // Primary gets the ISO9660 uppercase `;1` treatment
+                        // so case-insensitive + version-strip matching is
+                        // what the tests actually exercise.
+                        format!("{};1", name.to_ascii_uppercase()).into_bytes()
+                    } else {
+                        name.to_ascii_uppercase().into_bytes()
+                    }
+                };
+                for (name, child) in &n.children {
+                    if let Some(c) = &child.content {
+                        put(
+                            record(
+                                &encode(name, true),
+                                file_lba_of(child),
+                                c.len() as u64,
+                                false,
+                            ),
+                            &mut off,
+                        );
+                    } else {
+                        put(
+                            record(&encode(name, false), dir_lba_of(child), SECTOR, true),
+                            &mut off,
+                        );
+                    }
+                }
+                for child in n.children.values() {
+                    if child.content.is_none() {
+                        write_dir(
+                            img,
+                            child,
+                            dir_lba_of(child),
+                            self_lba,
+                            dir_lba_of,
+                            file_lba_of,
+                            joliet,
+                            false,
+                        );
+                    } else if let Some(c) = &child.content {
+                        let b = file_lba_of(child) as usize * SECTOR as usize;
+                        img[b..b + c.len()].copy_from_slice(c);
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+            let root_lba = lba_of(&self.root);
+            write_dir(
+                &mut img,
+                &self.root,
+                root_lba,
+                root_lba,
+                &lba_of,
+                &file_lba_of,
+                false,
+                self.joliet_only,
+            );
+            let jroot_lba = if self.joliet_only {
+                let jroot = jlba_of(&self.root);
+                write_dir(
+                    &mut img,
+                    &self.root,
+                    jroot,
+                    jroot,
+                    &jlba_of,
+                    &file_lba_of,
+                    true,
+                    false,
+                );
+                Some(jroot)
+            } else {
+                None
+            };
+            // PVD @ 16.
+            let pvd = 16 * SECTOR as usize;
+            img[pvd] = 0x01;
+            img[pvd + 1..pvd + 6].copy_from_slice(b"CD001");
+            let label = self.volume_label.as_bytes();
+            let label_field = &mut img[pvd + 40..pvd + 72];
+            label_field.fill(b' ');
+            label_field[..label.len().min(32)].copy_from_slice(&label[..label.len().min(32)]);
+            let root_rec = record(&[0x00], root_lba, SECTOR, true);
+            img[pvd + 156..pvd + 156 + 34].copy_from_slice(&root_rec[..34]);
+
+            // Optional El Torito boot record @ 17, then the optional
+            // Joliet SVD, then the set terminator.
+            let mut vd = 17 * SECTOR as usize;
+            if self.el_torito {
+                img[vd] = 0x00;
+                img[vd + 1..vd + 6].copy_from_slice(b"CD001");
+                let id = b"EL TORITO SPECIFICATION";
+                img[vd + 7..vd + 7 + id.len()].copy_from_slice(id);
+                vd += SECTOR as usize;
+            }
+            if let Some(jroot) = jroot_lba {
+                img[vd] = 0x02;
+                img[vd + 1..vd + 6].copy_from_slice(b"CD001");
+                // Joliet level-3 UCS-2 escape sequence.
+                img[vd + 88..vd + 91].copy_from_slice(&[0x25, 0x2F, 0x45]);
+                let jroot_rec = record(&[0x00], jroot, SECTOR, true);
+                img[vd + 156..vd + 156 + 34].copy_from_slice(&jroot_rec[..34]);
+                vd += SECTOR as usize;
+            }
+            img[vd] = 0xFF;
+            img[vd + 1..vd + 6].copy_from_slice(b"CD001");
+
+            img
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// In-memory `IsoReadAt` over a built test image.
+    pub struct MemReadAt(pub Vec<u8>);
+
+    impl super::IsoReadAt for MemReadAt {
+        async fn read_at(&mut self, offset: u64, len: u32) -> std::io::Result<Vec<u8>> {
+            let start = usize::try_from(offset).unwrap_or(usize::MAX);
+            let end = start.saturating_add(len as usize);
+            if end > self.0.len() {
+                return Err(std::io::Error::new(
+                    std::io::ErrorKind::UnexpectedEof,
+                    "read past end of test image",
+                ));
+            }
+            Ok(self.0[start..end].to_vec())
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::testiso::{MemReadAt, TestIsoBuilder};
+    use super::*;
+
+    fn block_on<T>(f: impl Future<Output = T>) -> T {
+        futures::executor::block_on(f)
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn lookup_finds_nested_file_case_insensitively() {
+        let img = TestIsoBuilder::new("UBUNTU 24.04")
+            .file("/casper/vmlinuz", b"KERNELDATA")
+            .file("/casper/initrd", b"INITRDDATA")
+            .build();
+        let mut r = MemReadAt(img);
+        let loc = block_on(lookup(&mut r, "/CASPER/VMLINUZ")).expect("found");
+        assert_eq!(loc.length, 10);
+        let bytes = block_on(r.read_at(loc.offset, 10)).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(&bytes, b"KERNELDATA");
+        // Missing file and missing dir both miss cleanly.
+        assert!(block_on(lookup(&mut r, "/casper/missing")).is_none());
+        assert!(block_on(lookup(&mut r, "/nodir/vmlinuz")).is_none());
+        // A directory path that resolves to a directory is not a file hit.
+        assert!(block_on(lookup(&mut r, "/casper")).is_none());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn strict_mastered_extensionless_names_match() {
+        // Strict level-1 mastering stores "VMLINUZ" as "VMLINUZ.;1" — the
+        // trailing dot must be normalized away or kernels never match.
+        let img = TestIsoBuilder::new("STRICT")
+            .file("/boot/vmlinuz.", b"K") // builder stores "VMLINUZ.;1"
+            .build();
+        let mut r = MemReadAt(img);
+        assert!(
+            block_on(lookup(&mut r, "/boot/vmlinuz")).is_some(),
+            "trailing-dot ISO9660 name must match the dotless path"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn lookup_three_levels_deep() {
+        let img = TestIsoBuilder::new("DEEP")
+            .file("/images/pxeboot/vmlinuz", b"ANACONDA")
+            .build();
+        let mut r = MemReadAt(img);
+        let loc = block_on(lookup(&mut r, "images/pxeboot/vmlinuz")).expect("no leading slash ok");
+        assert_eq!(loc.length, 8);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn caching_reader_dedupes_repeated_directory_reads() {
+        struct Counting<'a> {
+            inner: &'a mut MemReadAt,
+            calls: usize,
+        }
+        impl IsoReadAt for Counting<'_> {
+            async fn read_at(&mut self, offset: u64, len: u32) -> std::io::Result<Vec<u8>> {
+                self.calls += 1;
+                self.inner.read_at(offset, len).await
+            }
+        }
+        let img = TestIsoBuilder::new("CACHE")
+            .file("/a/one", b"1")
+            .file("/a/two", b"2")
+            .build();
+        let mut mem = MemReadAt(img);
+        let mut counting = Counting {
+            inner: &mut mem,
+            calls: 0,
+        };
+        let mut cr = CachingReadAt::new(&mut counting);
+        assert!(block_on(exists(&mut cr, "/a/one")));
+        assert!(block_on(exists(&mut cr, "/a/two")));
+        assert!(!block_on(exists(&mut cr, "/a/three")));
+        drop(cr);
+        // 3 probes × (PVD + root dir + subdir) collapse to the 3 distinct
+        // extents, plus one: the "/a/three" miss falls back to the Joliet
+        // namespace search (v0.7.5), which reads the terminator sector
+        // once before concluding there is no SVD.
+        assert_eq!(counting.calls, 4, "all repeat reads must hit the cache");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn joliet_fallback_finds_names_missing_from_primary() {
+        // Windows-mastering worst case: primary tree is bare (./.. only),
+        // real names live only in the Joliet SVD. The lookup must fall
+        // back and still resolve nested paths case-insensitively.
+        let img = TestIsoBuilder::new("APPLIANCE")
+            .joliet_only(true)
+            .file("/images/pxeboot/vmlinuz", b"JKERNEL")
+            .file("/sources/boot.wim", b"JWIM")
+            .build();
+        let mut r = MemReadAt(img);
+        let loc = block_on(lookup(&mut r, "/images/pxeboot/vmlinuz")).expect("joliet fallback");
+        let bytes = block_on(r.read_at(loc.offset, loc.length as u32)).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(&bytes, b"JKERNEL");
+        assert!(block_on(lookup(&mut r, "/SOURCES/BOOT.WIM")).is_some());
+        assert!(block_on(lookup(&mut r, "/images/pxeboot/missing")).is_none());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn lookup_local_reads_a_real_file() {
+        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+        let p = dir.path().join("t.iso");
+        let img = TestIsoBuilder::new("LOCAL")
+            .file("/sources/boot.wim", b"WIMWIM")
+            .build();
+        std::fs::write(&p, &img).unwrap();
+        let loc = lookup_local(&p, "/sources/boot.wim").expect("found");
+        assert_eq!(loc.length, 6);
+        assert!(lookup_local(&p, "/sources/none").is_none());
+    }
+}
@@ -18,8 +18,15 @@

 pub mod entry;
 pub mod introspect;
+// v0.7.4: read-only ISO9660 walker generic over any random-access byte
+// source (local file, NFS READ3, SFTP seek-read). Powers both in-ISO
+// HTTP serving and the probe-based introspection.
+pub mod iso_fs;
 pub mod nfs_share;
 pub mod pxe_logo;
+// v0.7.4: persisted cache of remote-share introspection results so a
+// container restart doesn't re-probe an unchanged 40-ISO library.
+pub mod remote_cache;
 pub mod sftp_share;
 pub mod smb;
 pub mod smb_share;
@@ -29,6 +36,7 @@ pub mod windows;

 pub use entry::{BootEntry, BootKind, KernelArgs};
 pub use introspect::{DistroFamily, IntrospectionReport};
+pub use iso_fs::FileLocation;
 // v0.4.65: kernel-mount NFS is gone. SMB shares via Samba's userspace
 // `smbclient` CLI replaced it — works in any container (no
 // CAP_SYS_ADMIN, no host kernel modules), matching how Bootimus and
@@ -57,7 +57,9 @@
 //! UI to ask for. (If a future server needs Kerberos or non-default
 //! uid mapping we can add those, but for ISO read access nobody does.)

-use crate::introspect::IntrospectionReport;
+use crate::introspect::{introspect_reader, provisional_report};
+use crate::iso_fs::{self, FileLocation, IsoReadAt};
+use crate::remote_cache::RemoteIntrospectCache;
 use crate::store::{generate_boot_entries_for, slugify_str, IsoSource, IsoStore};
 use bytes::Bytes;
 use nfs3_client::tokio::TokioConnector;
@@ -100,6 +102,18 @@ const READ_CHUNK_BYTES: u32 = 64 * 1024;
 /// client park gigabytes of decoded ISO in RAM.
 const STREAM_BUFFER_DEPTH: usize = 16;

+/// v0.7.4: per-ISO budget for a background introspection probe. A probe
+/// is one connection plus a few dozen KiB-sized reads — sub-second on a
+/// LAN — so anything past this is a wedged server, not a slow one.
+const INTROSPECT_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(30);
+
+/// One queued background-introspection unit (v0.7.4).
+struct ProbeJob {
+    iso_id: String,
+    filename: String,
+    size: u64,
+}
+
 /// One configured NFS share. The id is derived from server+export so
 /// re-adding the same coordinates is idempotent.
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
@@ -177,6 +191,9 @@ pub struct NfsShareManager {
    /// opens its own NFS connection so concurrency isn't a hard
    /// requirement, but serializing keeps log output predictable.
    op_lock: Arc<tokio::sync::Mutex<()>>,
+    /// v0.7.4: persisted introspection results keyed `share/path@size`,
+    /// so a restart re-probes only new or replaced ISOs.
+    introspect_cache: RemoteIntrospectCache,
 }

 impl NfsShareManager {
@@ -190,6 +207,7 @@ impl NfsShareManager {
            inner: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Inner::default())),
            iso_store,
            op_lock: Arc::new(tokio::sync::Mutex::new(())),
+            introspect_cache: RemoteIntrospectCache::open(work_dir, "nfs_introspect_cache.json"),
        }
    }

@@ -387,12 +405,26 @@ impl NfsShareManager {
        };

        let mut count = 0u32;
+        let mut to_probe: Vec<ProbeJob> = Vec::new();
        for entry in listing {
            let iso_id = format!("nfs-{}-{}", share.id, slugify_str(&entry.filename));
-            // Same approach as SMB: no real introspection over the
-            // network in v0.4.67. The boot-entry generator falls back
-            // to filename-based sanboot detection.
-            let report = IntrospectionReport::default();
+            // v0.7.4: real introspection over the share — NFSv3 READ3
+            // takes an offset, so the ISO9660 probes work remotely. A
+            // cache hit registers the full report immediately; a miss
+            // registers a provisional filename-based report (so the scan
+            // returns fast) and queues a background probe that upgrades
+            // the entry in place.
+            let cached = self
+                .introspect_cache
+                .get(&share.id, &entry.filename, entry.size);
+            let report = cached.unwrap_or_else(|| {
+                to_probe.push(ProbeJob {
+                    iso_id: iso_id.clone(),
+                    filename: entry.filename.clone(),
+                    size: entry.size,
+                });
+                provisional_report(&entry.filename)
+            });
            let boot_entries = generate_boot_entries_for(&iso_id, &entry.filename, &report);
            let source = IsoSource::Nfs {
                share_id: share.id.clone(),
@@ -413,11 +445,88 @@ impl NfsShareManager {
            target: "openpxe::nfs",
            id = %id, server = %share.server, export = %share.export,
            iso_count = count,
+            pending_introspection = to_probe.len(),
            "NFS share scanned"
        );
+        if !to_probe.is_empty() {
+            self.spawn_introspection_pass(&share, to_probe);
+        }
        Ok(count)
    }

+    /// v0.7.4: probe each queued ISO over its own NFS connection and swap
+    /// the full introspection into the store as results land. Runs
+    /// detached so neither startup nor the share-add API call waits on a
+    /// 40-ISO library; per-ISO failures (or a share removed mid-pass)
+    /// leave the provisional entry in place, which still sanboots.
+    fn spawn_introspection_pass(&self, share: &NfsShare, work: Vec<ProbeJob>) {
+        let store = self.iso_store.clone();
+        let cache = self.introspect_cache.clone();
+        let share_id = share.id.clone();
+        let server = share.server.clone();
+        let export = share.export.clone();
+        let port = share.port;
+        let queued = work.len();
+        tokio::spawn(async move {
+            let mut upgraded = 0usize;
+            for job in work {
+                let probe = async {
+                    let mut reader = NfsReadAt::open(&server, &export, port, &job.filename).await?;
+                    let report =
+                        introspect_reader(&mut reader, job.size, &job.filename, false).await;
+                    reader.finish().await;
+                    Ok::<_, NfsClientError>(report)
+                };
+                match tokio::time::timeout(INTROSPECT_TIMEOUT, probe).await {
+                    Ok(Ok(report)) => {
+                        cache.put(&share_id, &job.filename, job.size, report.clone());
+                        if store.update_external_introspection(&job.iso_id, report) {
+                            upgraded += 1;
+                        }
+                    }
+                    Ok(Err(e)) => tracing::warn!(
+                        target: "openpxe::nfs",
+                        share = %share_id, iso = %job.filename,
+                        "introspection failed: {e}"
+                    ),
+                    Err(_) => tracing::warn!(
+                        target: "openpxe::nfs",
+                        share = %share_id, iso = %job.filename,
+                        "introspection timed out after {}s", INTROSPECT_TIMEOUT.as_secs()
+                    ),
+                }
+            }
+            tracing::info!(
+                target: "openpxe::nfs",
+                share = %share_id, queued, upgraded,
+                "remote introspection pass complete"
+            );
+        });
+    }
+
+    /// v0.7.4: locate `in_iso_path` inside a share-hosted ISO. Returns the
+    /// byte range so the HTTP layer can serve kernel/initrd files out of
+    /// remote ISOs with a follow-up ranged [`Self::stream_iso`].
+    pub async fn locate_in_iso(
+        &self,
+        share_id: &str,
+        filename: &str,
+        in_iso_path: &str,
+    ) -> Result<Option<FileLocation>> {
+        let share = self
+            .get(share_id)
+            .ok_or_else(|| Error::Invalid(format!("no such NFS share '{share_id}'")))?;
+        if filename.contains('/') || filename.contains('\\') || filename.contains("..") {
+            return Err(Error::Invalid(format!("invalid filename '{filename}'")));
+        }
+        let mut reader = NfsReadAt::open(&share.server, &share.export, share.port, filename)
+            .await
+            .map_err(|e| Error::Invalid(format!("nfs open '{filename}': {e}")))?;
+        let loc = iso_fs::lookup(&mut reader, in_iso_path).await;
+        reader.finish().await;
+        Ok(loc)
+    }
+
    fn update_status(
        &self,
        id: &str,
@@ -490,6 +599,96 @@ struct NfsListEntry {
    size: u64,
 }

+/// The connection type [`build_connection`] yields.
+type NfsConn = nfs3_client::Nfs3Connection<nfs3_client::tokio::TokioIo<tokio::net::TcpStream>>;
+
+/// v0.7.4: random-access reader over one NFS connection + file handle —
+/// the [`IsoReadAt`] impl that lets the ISO9660 walker and introspection
+/// probes run against share-hosted images.
+struct NfsReadAt {
+    conn: NfsConn,
+    fh: nfs_fh3,
+}
+
+impl NfsReadAt {
+    /// Connect, mount, and LOOKUP `filename` at the export root.
+    async fn open(
+        server: &str,
+        export: &str,
+        port: u16,
+        filename: &str,
+    ) -> std::result::Result<Self, NfsClientError> {
+        let mut conn = build_connection(server, export, port).await?;
+        let root = conn.root_nfs_fh3();
+        let lookup = conn
+            .lookup(&LOOKUP3args {
+                what: diropargs3 {
+                    dir: root,
+                    name: filename3(Opaque::borrowed(filename.as_bytes())),
+                },
+            })
+            .await
+            .map_err(NfsClientError::Rpc)?;
+        let fh = match lookup {
+            Nfs3Result::Ok(o) => o.object,
+            Nfs3Result::Err((status, _)) => {
+                return Err(NfsClientError::Nfsstat(status_label(status)));
+            }
+        };
+        Ok(Self { conn, fh })
+    }
+
+    /// Best-effort unmount. Consumes the reader — it's done.
+    async fn finish(self) {
+        let _ = self.conn.unmount().await;
+    }
+}
+
+impl IsoReadAt for NfsReadAt {
+    async fn read_at(&mut self, offset: u64, len: u32) -> std::io::Result<Vec<u8>> {
+        let mut out: Vec<u8> = Vec::with_capacity(len as usize);
+        let mut off = offset;
+        // READ3 may legally return fewer bytes than asked (server cap);
+        // loop until the exact-read contract is satisfied or the file
+        // genuinely ends short.
+        while (out.len() as u32) < len {
+            let want = (len - out.len() as u32).min(READ_CHUNK_BYTES);
+            let res = self
+                .conn
+                .read(&READ3args {
+                    file: self.fh.clone(),
+                    offset: off,
+                    count: want,
+                })
+                .await
+                .map_err(|e| std::io::Error::other(e.to_string()))?;
+            let ok = match res {
+                Nfs3Result::Ok(o) => o,
+                Nfs3Result::Err((status, _)) => {
+                    return Err(std::io::Error::other(status_label(status)));
+                }
+            };
+            let data = ok.data.as_ref();
+            if data.is_empty() {
+                return Err(std::io::Error::new(
+                    std::io::ErrorKind::UnexpectedEof,
+                    "NFS read past end of file",
+                ));
+            }
+            out.extend_from_slice(data);
+            off += data.len() as u64;
+            if ok.eof && (out.len() as u32) < len {
+                return Err(std::io::Error::new(
+                    std::io::ErrorKind::UnexpectedEof,
+                    "NFS read past end of file",
+                ));
+            }
+        }
+        out.truncate(len as usize);
+        Ok(out)
+    }
+}
+
 /// Connect, READDIR the export root, look up each `*.iso` to get its
 /// size + file handle. Returns a flat list. Errors are returned with
 /// a human-readable message; the caller decides how to surface them.
@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
+//! Persisted cache of remote-share introspection results.
+//!
+//! NFS/SFTP introspection costs a connection plus a few dozen small
+//! reads per ISO. Shares are rescanned on every startup and share-add,
+//! so without a cache a 40-ISO library would re-probe 40 ISOs on every
+//! container restart. The cache keys on `share/path@size` — a replaced
+//! file (new size) re-probes, an untouched one is free — and entries
+//! only count as hits when their `introspect_rev` matches the current
+//! logic, so an upgrade that changes detection re-probes everything
+//! exactly once.
+//!
+//! One file per protocol (`nfs_introspect_cache.json`,
+//! `sftp_introspect_cache.json`) so the two managers never contend over
+//! one writer.
+
+use crate::introspect::{IntrospectionReport, INTROSPECT_REV};
+use parking_lot::Mutex;
+use std::collections::HashMap;
+use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
+use std::sync::Arc;
+
+/// Hard cap on cached entries; beyond it the cache resets rather than
+/// growing unbounded (a cache wipe only costs one re-probe pass).
+const MAX_ENTRIES: usize = 4096;
+
+#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
+pub struct RemoteIntrospectCache {
+    path: Arc<PathBuf>,
+    map: Arc<Mutex<HashMap<String, IntrospectionReport>>>,
+}
+
+impl RemoteIntrospectCache {
+    /// Open (or start empty) the cache at `<work_dir>/<file_name>`.
+    /// A corrupt or missing file is an empty cache, never an error.
+    #[must_use]
+    pub fn open(work_dir: &Path, file_name: &str) -> Self {
+        let path = work_dir.join(file_name);
+        let map = std::fs::read_to_string(&path)
+            .ok()
+            .and_then(|text| {
+                serde_json::from_str::<HashMap<String, IntrospectionReport>>(&text).ok()
+            })
+            .unwrap_or_default();
+        Self {
+            path: Arc::new(path),
+            map: Arc::new(Mutex::new(map)),
+        }
+    }
+
+    fn key(share_id: &str, relative_path: &str, size: u64) -> String {
+        format!("{share_id}/{relative_path}@{size}")
+    }
+
+    /// A hit requires the entry to have been produced by the *current*
+    /// introspection logic — stale-rev entries are misses, which is how
+    /// the cache self-invalidates across upgrades.
+    #[must_use]
+    pub fn get(
+        &self,
+        share_id: &str,
+        relative_path: &str,
+        size: u64,
+    ) -> Option<IntrospectionReport> {
+        self.map
+            .lock()
+            .get(&Self::key(share_id, relative_path, size))
+            .filter(|r| r.introspect_rev == INTROSPECT_REV)
+            .cloned()
+    }
+
+    pub fn put(&self, share_id: &str, relative_path: &str, size: u64, report: IntrospectionReport) {
+        let snapshot = {
+            let mut g = self.map.lock();
+            if g.len() >= MAX_ENTRIES {
+                g.clear();
+            }
+            g.insert(Self::key(share_id, relative_path, size), report);
+            g.clone()
+        };
+        // Persist outside the lock; tmp+rename so a crash mid-write
+        // leaves the previous cache intact.
+        let path = self.path.as_path();
+        let tmp = path.with_extension("json.tmp");
+        let Ok(body) = serde_json::to_vec_pretty(&snapshot) else {
+            return;
+        };
+        if let Some(parent) = path.parent() {
+            let _ = std::fs::create_dir_all(parent);
+        }
+        if std::fs::write(&tmp, body).is_ok() {
+            let _ = std::fs::rename(&tmp, path);
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+    use crate::introspect::DistroFamily;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn round_trips_across_reopen_and_rev_gates() {
+        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+        let cache = RemoteIntrospectCache::open(dir.path(), "t.json");
+        assert!(cache.get("s1", "a.iso", 100).is_none());
+
+        let fresh = IntrospectionReport {
+            family: DistroFamily::RhelFedora,
+            introspect_rev: INTROSPECT_REV,
+            el_torito: true,
+            ..Default::default()
+        };
+        cache.put("s1", "a.iso", 100, fresh.clone());
+        assert_eq!(
+            cache.get("s1", "a.iso", 100).unwrap().family,
+            DistroFamily::RhelFedora
+        );
+        // Different size = different file = miss.
+        assert!(cache.get("s1", "a.iso", 101).is_none());
+
+        // Survives a reopen.
+        let cache2 = RemoteIntrospectCache::open(dir.path(), "t.json");
+        assert!(cache2.get("s1", "a.iso", 100).is_some());
+
+        // Stale-rev entries never hit.
+        let stale = IntrospectionReport {
+            family: DistroFamily::Arch,
+            introspect_rev: INTROSPECT_REV - 1,
+            ..Default::default()
+        };
+        cache2.put("s1", "b.iso", 7, stale);
+        assert!(cache2.get("s1", "b.iso", 7).is_none());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn corrupt_cache_file_starts_empty() {
+        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+        std::fs::write(dir.path().join("t.json"), b"{nope").unwrap();
+        let cache = RemoteIntrospectCache::open(dir.path(), "t.json");
+        assert!(cache.get("s", "x.iso", 1).is_none());
+    }
+}
@@ -56,7 +56,9 @@
 //! hint}` error shape is shared so the storage tab renders all three
 //! protocols through one code path.

-use crate::introspect::IntrospectionReport;
+use crate::introspect::{introspect_reader, provisional_report};
+use crate::iso_fs::{self, FileLocation, IsoReadAt};
+use crate::remote_cache::RemoteIntrospectCache;
 use crate::store::{generate_boot_entries_for, slugify_str, IsoSource, IsoStore};
 use bytes::Bytes;
 use openpxe_core::{Error, Result};
@@ -96,6 +98,18 @@ const READ_CHUNK_BYTES: usize = 64 * 1024;
 /// body stream. 16 * 64 KiB ≈ 1 MiB max buffer per stream.
 const STREAM_BUFFER_DEPTH: usize = 16;

+/// v0.7.4: per-ISO budget for a background introspection probe — one SSH
+/// connection plus a few dozen KiB-sized reads. SSH handshakes cost more
+/// than NFS mounts, but 30s still only trips on a wedged server.
+const INTROSPECT_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(30);
+
+/// One queued background-introspection unit (v0.7.4).
+struct ProbeJob {
+    iso_id: String,
+    filename: String,
+    size: u64,
+}
+
 /// Which credential the share authenticates with. The secret itself
 /// lives in the 0600 creds file, never here.
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
@@ -209,6 +223,9 @@ pub struct SftpShareManager {
    /// Serializes scan operations on the same manager for predictable
    /// log output; each scan opens its own SSH connection.
    op_lock: Arc<tokio::sync::Mutex<()>>,
+    /// v0.7.4: persisted introspection results keyed `share/path@size`,
+    /// so a restart re-probes only new or replaced ISOs.
+    introspect_cache: RemoteIntrospectCache,
 }

 impl SftpShareManager {
@@ -222,6 +239,7 @@ impl SftpShareManager {
            inner: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Inner::default())),
            iso_store,
            op_lock: Arc::new(tokio::sync::Mutex::new(())),
+            introspect_cache: RemoteIntrospectCache::open(work_dir, "sftp_introspect_cache.json"),
        }
    }

@@ -474,13 +492,25 @@ impl SftpShareManager {
        };

        let mut count = 0u32;
+        let mut to_probe: Vec<ProbeJob> = Vec::new();
        for entry in listing {
            let iso_id = format!("sftp-{}-{}", share.id, slugify_str(&entry.filename));
-            // Same as NFS/SMB: no over-the-network introspection yet, so
-            // register `Unknown` and let the boot-entry generator fall
-            // back to filename-based detection. SFTP *could* do bounded
-            // PVD reads (it has random access) — a follow-up can add it.
-            let report = IntrospectionReport::default();
+            // v0.7.4: real introspection over the share — SFTP file
+            // handles are seekable, so the ISO9660 probes work remotely.
+            // Cache hit → full report now; miss → provisional filename-
+            // based report (scan returns fast) + a queued background
+            // probe that upgrades the entry in place.
+            let cached = self
+                .introspect_cache
+                .get(&share.id, &entry.filename, entry.size);
+            let report = cached.unwrap_or_else(|| {
+                to_probe.push(ProbeJob {
+                    iso_id: iso_id.clone(),
+                    filename: entry.filename.clone(),
+                    size: entry.size,
+                });
+                provisional_report(&entry.filename)
+            });
            let boot_entries = generate_boot_entries_for(&iso_id, &entry.filename, &report);
            let source = IsoSource::Sftp {
                share_id: share.id.clone(),
@@ -506,11 +536,88 @@ impl SftpShareManager {
            target: "openpxe::sftp",
            id = %id, server = %share.server, export = %share.export,
            iso_count = count,
+            pending_introspection = to_probe.len(),
            "SFTP share scanned"
        );
+        if !to_probe.is_empty() {
+            self.spawn_introspection_pass(&share, &creds, to_probe);
+        }
        Ok(count)
    }

+    /// v0.7.4: probe each queued ISO over its own SSH connection and swap
+    /// the full introspection into the store as results land. Detached so
+    /// neither startup nor the share-add API call waits on a big library;
+    /// per-ISO failures leave the provisional entry, which still sanboots.
+    fn spawn_introspection_pass(&self, share: &SftpShare, creds: &SftpCreds, work: Vec<ProbeJob>) {
+        let store = self.iso_store.clone();
+        let cache = self.introspect_cache.clone();
+        let share_id = share.id.clone();
+        let params = ConnParams::from_share(share);
+        let creds = creds.clone();
+        let queued = work.len();
+        tokio::spawn(async move {
+            let mut upgraded = 0usize;
+            for job in work {
+                let probe = async {
+                    let mut reader = SftpReadAt::open(&params, &creds, &job.filename).await?;
+                    let report =
+                        introspect_reader(&mut reader, job.size, &job.filename, false).await;
+                    Ok::<_, SftpClientError>(report)
+                };
+                match tokio::time::timeout(INTROSPECT_TIMEOUT, probe).await {
+                    Ok(Ok(report)) => {
+                        cache.put(&share_id, &job.filename, job.size, report.clone());
+                        if store.update_external_introspection(&job.iso_id, report) {
+                            upgraded += 1;
+                        }
+                    }
+                    Ok(Err(e)) => tracing::warn!(
+                        target: "openpxe::sftp",
+                        share = %share_id, iso = %job.filename,
+                        "introspection failed: {e}"
+                    ),
+                    Err(_) => tracing::warn!(
+                        target: "openpxe::sftp",
+                        share = %share_id, iso = %job.filename,
+                        "introspection timed out after {}s", INTROSPECT_TIMEOUT.as_secs()
+                    ),
+                }
+            }
+            tracing::info!(
+                target: "openpxe::sftp",
+                share = %share_id, queued, upgraded,
+                "remote introspection pass complete"
+            );
+        });
+    }
+
+    /// v0.7.4: locate `in_iso_path` inside a share-hosted ISO. Returns the
+    /// byte range so the HTTP layer can serve kernel/initrd files out of
+    /// remote ISOs with a follow-up ranged [`Self::stream_iso`].
+    pub async fn locate_in_iso(
+        &self,
+        share_id: &str,
+        filename: &str,
+        in_iso_path: &str,
+    ) -> Result<Option<FileLocation>> {
+        let share = self
+            .get(share_id)
+            .ok_or_else(|| Error::Invalid(format!("no such SFTP share '{share_id}'")))?;
+        if filename.contains('/') || filename.contains('\\') || filename.contains("..") {
+            return Err(Error::Invalid(format!("invalid filename '{filename}'")));
+        }
+        let creds = self
+            .read_creds(share_id)
+            .await
+            .map_err(|e| Error::Invalid(format!("could not read credentials: {e}")))?;
+        let params = ConnParams::from_share(&share);
+        let mut reader = SftpReadAt::open(&params, &creds, filename)
+            .await
+            .map_err(|e| Error::Invalid(format!("sftp open '{filename}': {e}")))?;
+        Ok(iso_fs::lookup(&mut reader, in_iso_path).await)
+    }
+
    fn pin_fingerprint(&self, id: &str, fingerprint: String) {
        if fingerprint.is_empty() {
            return;
@@ -652,6 +759,43 @@ struct SftpConn {
    sftp: SftpSession,
 }

+/// v0.7.4: random-access reader over one SSH connection + open file
+/// handle — the [`IsoReadAt`] impl that lets the ISO9660 walker and
+/// introspection probes run against share-hosted images. Holds the
+/// `SftpConn` so the SSH session outlives every read.
+struct SftpReadAt {
+    _conn: SftpConn,
+    file: russh_sftp::client::fs::File,
+}
+
+impl SftpReadAt {
+    async fn open(
+        p: &ConnParams,
+        creds: &SftpCreds,
+        filename: &str,
+    ) -> std::result::Result<Self, SftpClientError> {
+        let (conn, _fp) = connect(p, creds).await?;
+        let full = format!("{}/{}", p.export.trim_end_matches('/'), filename);
+        let file = conn
+            .sftp
+            .open(full)
+            .await
+            .map_err(|e| SftpClientError::Sftp(e.to_string()))?;
+        Ok(Self { _conn: conn, file })
+    }
+}
+
+impl IsoReadAt for SftpReadAt {
+    async fn read_at(&mut self, offset: u64, len: u32) -> std::io::Result<Vec<u8>> {
+        self.file.seek(SeekFrom::Start(offset)).await?;
+        let mut buf = vec![0u8; len as usize];
+        // read_exact loops over the transport's short reads and fails
+        // with UnexpectedEof past end-of-file — exactly the contract.
+        self.file.read_exact(&mut buf).await?;
+        Ok(buf)
+    }
+}
+
 /// russh client handler implementing trust-on-first-use host-key
 /// verification. We never construct an `Err` from `check_server_key`;
 /// returning `Ok(false)` makes russh abort the handshake, and the
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@
 //! streaming. A follow-up release can add libsmbclient-based seek if
 //! a real workload needs it.

-use crate::introspect::IntrospectionReport;
+use crate::introspect::provisional_report;
 use crate::store::{generate_boot_entries_for, slugify_str, IsoSource, IsoStore};
 use openpxe_core::{Error, Result};
 use parking_lot::Mutex;
@@ -455,15 +455,14 @@ impl SmbShareManager {
        let mut count = 0u32;
        for entry in listing {
            let iso_id = format!("smb-{}-{}", share.id, slugify_str(&entry.filename));
-            // SMB sources don't get a real introspection pass — that
-            // would require seeking into the ISO9660 PVD over the
-            // network, and smbclient CLI doesn't seek. We register an
-            // `Unknown` family so the boot-entry generator falls back
-            // to generic sanboot/wimboot detection from the filename
-            // and the operator gets *something* bootable. A follow-up
-            // release can do a bounded `smbclient get` of the first
-            // 64 KiB for real detection.
-            let report = IntrospectionReport::default();
+            // SMB sources can't get the content-probe pass NFS/SFTP got
+            // in v0.7.4 — the ISO9660 probes need seeks, and smbclient's
+            // CLI streaming doesn't seek. The provisional filename-token
+            // report is as far as SMB detection goes: family for the UI
+            // when the name says it ("rhel-9.0…", "Win11_…"), and
+            // `introspect_rev = 0` so the entry generator keeps the
+            // optimistic sanboot entry.
+            let report = provisional_report(&entry.filename);
            let boot_entries = generate_boot_entries_for(&iso_id, &entry.filename, &report);
            let source = IsoSource::Smb {
                share_id: share.id.clone(),
@@ -300,7 +300,19 @@ impl IsoStore {
        }
        let partial_path = self.iso_dir.join(format!("{id}.partial"));
        if partial_path.exists() {
-            return Err(Error::Invalid(format!("iso '{id}' is already uploading")));
+            // A leftover .partial is an upload abandoned mid-flight (browser
+            // refresh, tab close, dropped connection) — nothing reaps it
+            // otherwise, and the operator hits a bogus "already uploading"
+            // on retry. The chunked protocol can't resume it anyway (a
+            // fresh session restarts at offset 0), so reclaim it.
+            // ponytail: two tabs uploading the *same filename* at once would
+            // race here — last writer wins, and the truncating create below
+            // keeps that from corrupting a half-written file.
+            tracing::info!(
+                target: "openpxe::iso", %id,
+                "reclaiming abandoned .partial from a prior upload attempt"
+            );
+            tokio::fs::remove_file(&partial_path).await.ok();
        }
        let file = tokio::fs::File::create(&partial_path).await?;
        Ok(UploadHandle {
@@ -415,6 +427,28 @@ impl IsoStore {
        self.inner.write().isos.insert(id, meta);
    }

+    /// v0.7.4: swap in a completed introspection for an external ISO and
+    /// regenerate its boot entries. Used by the NFS/SFTP managers'
+    /// background probe pass — the scan registers a provisional
+    /// (filename-only) report immediately so startup and share-add stay
+    /// fast, then this upgrades each entry as its probe finishes.
+    /// Operator-set fields (category, password) are preserved; returns
+    /// `false` when the id is gone (share removed or re-scanned away
+    /// mid-probe), which callers treat as a benign no-op.
+    pub fn update_external_introspection(
+        &self,
+        id: &str,
+        introspection: IntrospectionReport,
+    ) -> bool {
+        let mut g = self.inner.write();
+        let Some(m) = g.isos.get_mut(id) else {
+            return false;
+        };
+        m.boot_entries = generate_boot_entries(&m.id, &m.filename, &introspection);
+        m.introspection = introspection;
+        true
+    }
+
    /// Drop every entry that belongs to `share_id`. Used by the SMB
    /// and NFS share managers when an operator removes a share, or
    /// before re-scanning to clean out stale entries. The same id
@@ -850,15 +884,39 @@ mod tests {
    }

    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn begin_upload_rejects_existing_partial_file() {
+    async fn begin_upload_reclaims_stale_partial_file() {
+        // v0.8.0: an abandoned .partial (browser refresh / crash / dropped
+        // connection) must not block a re-upload with a bogus "already
+        // uploading" — begin_upload reclaims it and starts fresh, since the
+        // chunked protocol can't resume a dead session anyway.
        let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
        let store = IsoStore::new(dir.path().to_path_buf());
        store.ensure_dirs().await.unwrap();
-        tokio::fs::write(dir.path().join("ubuntu.partial"), b"in-flight")
+        let partial = dir.path().join("ubuntu.partial");
+        tokio::fs::write(&partial, b"in-flight").await.unwrap();
+
+        let handle = store
+            .begin_upload("ubuntu.iso")
+            .await
+            .expect("stale .partial is reclaimed, not rejected");
+        assert_eq!(handle.id, "ubuntu");
+        // Reclaimed: the leftover bytes are gone (fresh, empty file).
+        let meta = tokio::fs::metadata(&partial).await.unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(meta.len(), 0, "stale .partial must be truncated on reclaim");
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn begin_upload_still_rejects_completed_iso() {
+        // A finished upload (final .iso on disk) is a genuine duplicate, not
+        // an abandoned attempt — that case must still be refused.
+        let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
+        let store = IsoStore::new(dir.path().to_path_buf());
+        store.ensure_dirs().await.unwrap();
+        tokio::fs::write(dir.path().join("rocky.iso"), b"done")
            .await
            .unwrap();

-        let r = store.begin_upload("ubuntu.iso").await;
+        let r = store.begin_upload("rocky.iso").await;
        assert!(matches!(r, Err(Error::Invalid(_))));
    }

@@ -26,7 +26,5 @@ tracing.workspace = true
 tracing-subscriber.workspace = true
 anyhow.workspace = true
 clap.workspace = true
-serde.workspace = true
-toml.workspace = true
 bytes.workspace = true
 time.workspace = true
@@ -120,8 +120,41 @@ async fn main() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
    let boot_log = openpxe_core::BootLog::load_or_default(&config.paths.work_dir);
    let branding = openpxe_core::BrandingStore::load_or_default(&config.paths.work_dir);
    let admin = openpxe_core::AdminStore::load_or_default(&config.paths.work_dir);
+    // v0.8.1: zero-touch first-run bootstrap. If no admin exists yet and the
+    // operator supplied OPENPXE_ADMIN_USERNAME + OPENPXE_ADMIN_PASSWORD (or
+    // …_PASSWORD_FILE, for Docker/K8s secrets), create the admin now so a
+    // fresh container is usable without the web setup wizard. Seeds the
+    // first run only — once an admin exists (including one made in the UI)
+    // this is a no-op, so a lingering env var can't reset a rotated password.
+    if !admin.is_configured() {
+        if let Ok(username) = std::env::var("OPENPXE_ADMIN_USERNAME") {
+            let password = std::env::var("OPENPXE_ADMIN_PASSWORD_FILE")
+                .ok()
+                .and_then(|p| std::fs::read_to_string(p).ok())
+                .map(|s| s.trim_end_matches(['\n', '\r']).to_string())
+                .or_else(|| std::env::var("OPENPXE_ADMIN_PASSWORD").ok());
+            if let Some(password) = password {
+                match admin.bootstrap(&username, &password) {
+                    Ok(p) => tracing::info!(
+                        target: "openpxe::auth", username = %p.username,
+                        "admin bootstrapped from environment"
+                    ),
+                    Err(e) => tracing::warn!(
+                        target: "openpxe::auth",
+                        "env admin bootstrap failed ({e}); use the web setup wizard"
+                    ),
+                }
+            } else {
+                tracing::warn!(
+                    target: "openpxe::auth",
+                    "OPENPXE_ADMIN_USERNAME set without OPENPXE_ADMIN_PASSWORD[_FILE]; skipping bootstrap"
+                );
+            }
+        }
+    }
    let sso = openpxe_core::SsoStore::load_or_default(&config.paths.work_dir);
    let notify = openpxe_core::NotifyStore::load_or_default(&config.paths.work_dir);
+    let api_key = openpxe_core::ApiKeyStore::load_or_init(&config.paths.work_dir);
    let sessions = openpxe_http_api::auth::SessionStore::default();
    let metrics = Metrics::new();

@@ -201,6 +234,7 @@ async fn main() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
        pxe_bg_cache: openpxe_http_api::state::PxeBgCache::default(),
        admin: admin.clone(),
        sessions: sessions.clone(),
+        api_key,
        sso: sso.clone(),
        saml: openpxe_http_api::saml_routes::SamlRuntime::default(),
        notify: notify.clone(),
@@ -211,6 +245,7 @@ async fn main() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
        sftp_shares: sftp_shares.clone(),
        unattended: unattended.clone(),
        uploads: openpxe_http_api::uploads::UploadSessions::default(),
+        fetch_jobs: openpxe_http_api::fetch::FetchJobs::default(),
        log_bus: log_bus.clone(),
        started_at: time::OffsetDateTime::now_utc(),
        public_base_url: public_base_url.clone(),
@@ -15,6 +15,4 @@ openpxe-ipxe-assets.workspace = true
 tokio.workspace = true
 socket2.workspace = true
 tracing.workspace = true
-thiserror.workspace = true
 anyhow.workspace = true
-bytes.workspace = true
@@ -920,6 +920,20 @@ tr.unbootable td:first-child { border-left: 3px solid var(--warn); }
   the same 16px below its form. */
 .card .body > label.field:has(+ button) { margin-bottom: 0; }

-/* v0.7.2: inline list filter (Available images / Unattended files). */
-.list-search { padding: 14px 16px 0; }
-.list-search input { width: 100%; }
+/* v0.7.2: inline list filter above a table (Available images). The input
+   is wrapped in a label.field so it borrows the standard text-field chrome
+   and matches every other input in the app; this wrapper just insets it
+   from the card edges so it lines up with the header text above. */
+.list-search { padding: 14px 16px; }
+
+/* v0.7.4: pager footer under the Available-images table — quiet status
+   text on the left, ghost Prev/Next on the right. */
+.list-pager {
+  display: flex; align-items: center; gap: 8px;
+  padding: 12px 16px;
+  color: var(--fg-dim); font-size: 12px;
+  font-variant-numeric: tabular-nums;
+}
+.list-pager .spacer { flex: 1; }
+.list-pager button { padding: 4px 12px; font-size: 12px; }
+.list-pager button:disabled { opacity: 0.45; cursor: default; }
@@ -178,12 +178,14 @@
    if (iso.introspection.el_torito) {
      return { ok: true, warn: 'generic bootable ISO — boots via sanboot (emulated CD)' };
    }
-    // Remote-share ISOs aren't introspected (no random access over the
-    // network), so el_torito is unknown — assume bootable and let sanboot
-    // try rather than cry wolf.
+    // v0.7.4: NFS/SFTP ISOs now introspect over the share, so a probed
+    // remote ISO flows through the kernel/el_torito branches above like
+    // a local one. introspect_rev 0 means the probe hasn't landed yet
+    // (it runs in the background right after a scan) or never can (SMB —
+    // smbclient can't seek): stay optimistic and let sanboot try.
    const remote = iso.source && iso.source.kind && iso.source.kind !== 'local';
-    if (remote) {
-      return { ok: true, warn: 'remote ISO — not introspected; sanboot is attempted at boot' };
+    if (remote && (iso.introspection.introspect_rev || 0) === 0) {
+      return { ok: true, warn: 'remote ISO — awaiting introspection; sanboot is attempted at boot' };
    }
    // Local ISO with no Windows/Linux boot files and no El Torito catalog:
    // a data/appliance image (e.g. a VMware vCenter bundle), not a bootable
@@ -267,7 +269,7 @@
      el('label', {class:'field'}, [
        el('span', {class:'name'}, 'Auto IP address (optional)'), ipInput]),
      el('label', {class:'field'}, [
-        el('span', {class:'name'}, 'Unattended file'), sel]),
+        el('span', {class:'name'}, 'Unattended file (in Storage → Advanced)'), sel]),
    ]);
    return {
      wrap,
@@ -439,17 +441,18 @@
            el('div', {class:'v'}, net.server_ip || '?'),
            el('div', {class:'k'}, 'NIC name'),
            el('div', {class:'v'}, net.nic_name || '(auto-detect failed)'),
-            // v0.7.2: physical link details (operstate · speed · duplex ·
-            // port MAC) so the operator can confirm WHICH port answers
-            // PXE in multi-NIC / trunked environments.
-            el('div', {class:'k'}, 'Link'),
-            el('div', {class:'v'}, net.nic_link || '—'),
            el('div', {class:'k'}, 'Subnet mask'),
            el('div', {class:'v'}, net.subnet_mask || '?'),
            el('div', {class:'k'}, 'Gateway'),
            el('div', {class:'v'}, net.gateway || '?'),
            el('div', {class:'k'}, 'Public base URL'),
            el('div', {class:'v'}, net.public_base_url),
+            // v0.7.2: physical link details (operstate · speed · duplex ·
+            // port MAC) so the operator can confirm WHICH port answers PXE
+            // in multi-NIC / trunked environments. Kept last — the joined
+            // value runs long, so it wraps cleanly at the bottom of the list.
+            el('div', {class:'k'}, 'Link'),
+            el('div', {class:'v'}, net.nic_link || '—'),
          ]),
          el('p', {class:'msg'},
            'Server IP, NIC, mask, and gateway are auto-detected at startup. ' +
@@ -600,48 +603,40 @@

      // ── Upload card ──
      const drop = el('div', {class:'drop', id:'drop'}, [
-        el('div', {}, ['Drop an ', el('strong', {}, '.iso'), ' here, or click to choose.']),
+        el('div', {}, ['Drop one or more ', el('strong', {}, '.iso'), ' files here, or click to choose.']),
        el('div', {style:'font-size:12px;margin-top:6px'},
-           'Linux + Windows installers auto-detected on upload. Streaming, no 502s on big files.'),
+           'Linux + Windows installers auto-detected on upload. Multiple files upload at once. Streaming, no 502s on big files.'),
      ]);
      const file = el('input', {type:'file', accept:'.iso,application/octet-stream',
-                                style:'display:none', id:'file'});
-      const prog = el('div', {class:'progress', id:'prog'}, el('div', {class:'bar', id:'bar'}));
-      const upMsg = el('div', {class:'msg', id:'upmsg'});
-      // v0.5.8: cancel button — shown only while an upload is in flight.
-      const cancelUpload = el('button', {class:'danger', type:'button',
-        style:'display:none;margin-top:12px', id:'cancel-upload'}, 'Cancel upload');
+                                multiple:true, style:'display:none', id:'file'});
+      // v0.8.0: one progress row per file, appended here. Replaces the
+      // single shared bar/msg/cancel that a second concurrent upload used
+      // to clobber.
+      const uploadsList = el('div', {id:'uploads', style:'display:grid;gap:12px'});

-      drop.onclick = () => file.click();
-      drop.addEventListener('dragover', e => { e.preventDefault(); drop.classList.add('hover'); });
-      drop.addEventListener('dragleave', () => drop.classList.remove('hover'));
-      drop.addEventListener('drop', e => {
-        e.preventDefault(); drop.classList.remove('hover');
-        if (e.dataTransfer.files[0]) upload(e.dataTransfer.files[0]);
-      });
-      file.onchange = () => { if (file.files[0]) upload(file.files[0]); };
-
-      // Chunked upload telemetry. The old browser path posted one huge
-      // multipart body, which left operators staring at 0% when a reverse
-      // proxy buffered or rejected the request before OpenPXE saw it. This
-      // path writes small raw chunks; each acknowledged chunk advances the
-      // bar and leaves a visible .partial file in the ISO directory.
-      async function upload(f) {
-        const started = Date.now();
-        const bar = $('#bar');
-        const setStatus = (text, cls) => { upMsg.textContent = text; upMsg.className = 'msg ' + (cls || ''); };
-        const update = (loaded, total, phase) => {
-          const pct = total > 0 ? Math.min(100, (loaded / total) * 100) : 100;
-          bar.style.width = pct.toFixed(1) + '%';
-          const elapsed = Math.max(0.001, (Date.now() - started) / 1000);
-          const rate = loaded > 0 ? loaded / elapsed : 0;
-          const remain = rate > 0 ? (total - loaded) / rate : 0;
-          setStatus(
-            phase + ' ' + f.name + ' - ' +
-            fmtBytes(loaded) + ' of ' + fmtBytes(total) +
-            ' (' + pct.toFixed(1) + '%, ' + fmtBytes(rate) + '/s' +
-            (remain > 0 ? ', ' + Math.ceil(remain) + 's left' : '') + ')');
+      // One page-leave guard + one tab-hide cleanup for the whole card,
+      // registered only while ≥1 upload is in flight (added on 0→1, removed
+      // on 1→0) so listeners never pile up across re-renders.
+      let activeUploads = 0;
+      const activeIds = new Set();
+      const warnLeave = (e) => { if (activeUploads > 0) { e.preventDefault(); e.returnValue = ''; return ''; } };
+      const abortOnHide = () => {
+        // keepalive lets these DELETEs outlive the unload; the server also
+        // reclaims an orphaned .partial on the next upload, so best-effort
+        // is fine here.
+        for (const id of activeIds) {
+          try { fetch('/api/uploads/' + encodeURIComponent(id), {method:'DELETE', keepalive:true}); } catch (_) {}
+        }
      };
+      const addGuards = () => {
+        window.addEventListener('beforeunload', warnLeave);
+        window.addEventListener('pagehide', abortOnHide);
+      };
+      const removeGuards = () => {
+        window.removeEventListener('beforeunload', warnLeave);
+        window.removeEventListener('pagehide', abortOnHide);
+      };
+
      const failText = async (r) => {
        const text = (await r.text()).slice(0, 240);
        let hint = '';
@@ -652,19 +647,66 @@
        return 'HTTP ' + r.status + ' ' + text + hint;
      };

+      // Launch an upload per dropped/selected .iso. The browser's ~6
+      // connections-per-origin cap naturally bounds how many stream at
+      // once, so there's no hand-rolled queue. Non-.iso files are ignored.
+      const startMany = (fileList) => {
+        [...fileList].filter(f => /\.iso$/i.test(f.name)).forEach(uploadOne);
+      };
+
+      drop.onclick = () => file.click();
+      drop.addEventListener('dragover', e => { e.preventDefault(); drop.classList.add('hover'); });
+      drop.addEventListener('dragleave', () => drop.classList.remove('hover'));
+      drop.addEventListener('drop', e => {
+        e.preventDefault(); drop.classList.remove('hover');
+        startMany(e.dataTransfer.files);
+      });
+      // Reset value so re-selecting the same filename still fires onchange.
+      file.onchange = () => { startMany(file.files); file.value = ''; };
+
+      // One independent chunked upload with its own progress row. The old
+      // browser path posted one huge multipart body, which left operators
+      // staring at 0% when a reverse proxy buffered or rejected the request
+      // before OpenPXE saw it. This path writes small raw chunks; each
+      // acknowledged chunk advances the bar and leaves a visible .partial.
+      async function uploadOne(f) {
+        const started = Date.now();
+        const bar = el('div', {class:'bar'});
+        const prog = el('div', {class:'progress active'}, bar);
+        const rowMsg = el('div', {class:'msg'});
+        const cancelBtn = el('button', {class:'danger', type:'button', style:'margin-top:8px'}, 'Cancel');
+        const row = el('div', {}, [
+          el('div', {style:'font-weight:600;font-size:13px;margin-bottom:6px;word-break:break-all'}, f.name),
+          prog, rowMsg, cancelBtn,
+        ]);
+        uploadsList.appendChild(row);
+
+        const setStatus = (text, cls) => { rowMsg.textContent = text; rowMsg.className = 'msg ' + (cls || ''); };
+        const update = (loaded, total, phase) => {
+          const pct = total > 0 ? Math.min(100, (loaded / total) * 100) : 100;
+          bar.style.width = pct.toFixed(1) + '%';
+          const elapsed = Math.max(0.001, (Date.now() - started) / 1000);
+          const rate = loaded > 0 ? loaded / elapsed : 0;
+          const remain = rate > 0 ? (total - loaded) / rate : 0;
+          setStatus(
+            phase + ' - ' +
+            fmtBytes(loaded) + ' of ' + fmtBytes(total) +
+            ' (' + pct.toFixed(1) + '%, ' + fmtBytes(rate) + '/s' +
+            (remain > 0 ? ', ' + Math.ceil(remain) + 's left' : '') + ')');
+        };
+
        let uploadId = null;
-        // v0.5.8: cancel + leave-page guard. The AbortController stops the
-        // in-flight chunk; the beforeunload listener warns the operator
-        // that navigating away aborts the upload (the server-side partial
-        // is then cleaned up by the DELETE in the catch below).
+        // The AbortController stops this upload's in-flight chunk on Cancel.
+        // The card-level beforeunload guard (added while activeUploads > 0)
+        // warns on navigation; the server reclaims an abandoned .partial on
+        // the next upload either way.
        const ac = new AbortController();
        let canceled = false;
-        const warnLeave = (e) => { e.preventDefault(); e.returnValue = ''; return ''; };
-        window.addEventListener('beforeunload', warnLeave);
-        cancelUpload.style.display = '';
-        cancelUpload.onclick = () => { canceled = true; ac.abort(); };
-        setStatus('Preparing upload for ' + f.name + ' (' + fmtBytes(f.size) + ')');
-        prog.classList.add('active');
+        cancelBtn.onclick = () => { canceled = true; ac.abort(); };
+
+        activeUploads += 1;
+        if (activeUploads === 1) addGuards();
+        setStatus('Preparing ' + f.name + ' (' + fmtBytes(f.size) + ')');
        bar.style.width = '1%';

        try {
@@ -675,6 +717,7 @@
          if (!begin.ok) throw new Error(await failText(begin));
          const session = await begin.json();
          uploadId = session.upload_id;
+          activeIds.add(uploadId);
          const chunkSize = Math.max(1024 * 1024, Number(session.chunk_size || 8 * 1024 * 1024));

          let offset = Number(session.offset || 0);
@@ -699,25 +742,100 @@
          } while (!finished);

          setStatus('Uploaded and analyzed: ' + f.name + ' (' + fmtBytes(f.size) + ')', 'ok');
-          render('storage');
        } catch (err) {
          if (uploadId) {
            try { await fetch('/api/uploads/' + encodeURIComponent(uploadId), {method: 'DELETE'}); }
-            catch {}
+            catch (_) {}
          }
          if (canceled || (err && err.name === 'AbortError')) {
-            setStatus('Upload canceled — partial file discarded.', '');
+            setStatus('Canceled — partial file discarded.', '');
          } else {
            setStatus('Upload failed: ' + (err && err.message ? err.message : String(err)), 'err');
          }
        } finally {
-          window.removeEventListener('beforeunload', warnLeave);
-          cancelUpload.style.display = 'none';
-          cancelUpload.onclick = null;
+          if (uploadId) activeIds.delete(uploadId);
+          cancelBtn.style.display = 'none';
          prog.classList.remove('active');
-          if (!upMsg.className.includes('ok')) bar.style.width = '0';
+          activeUploads -= 1;
+          if (activeUploads === 0) {
+            removeGuards();
+            // Refresh the table to show the new image(s) — but only if the
+            // operator is still on Storage. isConnected goes false once
+            // render() swapped the view, so a mid-upload tab change won't
+            // yank them back here.
+            if (uploadsList.isConnected) render('storage');
          }
        }
+      }
+
+      // v0.8.1: add ISO by URL. Paste a link and the server streams it
+      // straight into the store and auto-detects it — no download-then-
+      // reupload. Progress polls /api/isos/fetch and shows rows below,
+      // mirroring uploads. On an air-gapped network, use the drop zone.
+      const urlInput = el('input', {type:'url', id:'iso-url', style:'flex:1',
+        placeholder:'https://example.com/systemrescue.iso'});
+      const fetchBtn = el('button', {class:'ghost', type:'button', style:'margin-left:8px'}, 'Fetch');
+      const fetchMsg = el('div', {class:'msg', style:'margin-top:6px'});
+      const fetchList = el('div', {id:'fetches', style:'display:grid;gap:12px;margin-top:12px'});
+      const urlRow = el('div', {style:'margin-top:14px'}, [
+        el('label', {class:'field', style:'margin-bottom:0'}, [
+          el('span', {class:'name'}, 'Or add by URL'),
+          el('div', {style:'display:flex;align-items:center'}, [urlInput, fetchBtn]),
+          el('span', {class:'hint'},
+            'The server downloads the .iso into storage and auto-detects it — same result as a drag-drop. Any http(s) .iso link works.'),
+        ]),
+        fetchMsg,
+      ]);
+
+      let fetchTimer = null;
+      const renderFetchRows = (jobs) => {
+        fetchList.replaceChildren(...jobs.map(j => {
+          const pct = j.total > 0 ? Math.min(100, (j.downloaded / j.total) * 100)
+                                  : (j.state === 'done' ? 100 : 0);
+          let text, cls = '';
+          if (j.state === 'downloading')
+            text = 'Downloading ' + fmtBytes(j.downloaded) +
+              (j.total ? ' of ' + fmtBytes(j.total) + ' (' + pct.toFixed(0) + '%)' : '');
+          else if (j.state === 'done') { text = 'Downloaded and analyzed.'; cls = 'ok'; }
+          else if (j.state === 'failed') { text = 'Failed: ' + (j.error || 'unknown error'); cls = 'err'; }
+          else text = 'Canceled — partial discarded.';
+          const btn = el('button', {class:'danger', type:'button', style:'margin-top:8px'},
+            j.state === 'downloading' ? 'Cancel' : 'Dismiss');
+          btn.onclick = async () => {
+            try { await fetch('/api/isos/fetch/' + encodeURIComponent(j.id), {method:'DELETE'}); } catch (_) {}
+            pollFetches();
+          };
+          return el('div', {}, [
+            el('div', {style:'font-weight:600;font-size:13px;margin-bottom:6px;word-break:break-all'},
+              j.filename + '  ·  ' + j.url),
+            el('div', {class:'progress' + (j.state === 'downloading' ? ' active' : '')},
+              el('div', {class:'bar', style:'width:' + pct.toFixed(1) + '%'})),
+            el('div', {class:'msg ' + cls}, text),
+            btn,
+          ]);
+        }));
+      };
+      async function pollFetches() {
+        if (fetchTimer) { clearTimeout(fetchTimer); fetchTimer = null; }
+        let jobs = [];
+        try { jobs = (await getJSON('/api/isos/fetch')).jobs || []; } catch (_) {}
+        renderFetchRows(jobs);
+        // A successful fetch is read-once on the server, so refreshing here
+        // shows the new image and won't re-trigger on the next poll. Keep
+        // polling only while a download is still in flight.
+        if (jobs.some(j => j.state === 'done')) { render('storage'); return; }
+        if (jobs.some(j => j.state === 'downloading')) fetchTimer = setTimeout(pollFetches, 1500);
+      }
+      async function startFetch() {
+        const url = urlInput.value.trim();
+        if (!url) return;
+        fetchMsg.textContent = 'Starting…'; fetchMsg.className = 'msg';
+        const r = await postJSON('/api/isos/fetch', { url });
+        if (r.ok) { urlInput.value = ''; fetchMsg.textContent = ''; pollFetches(); }
+        else { fetchMsg.textContent = 'Could not start: ' + (await r.text()).slice(0, 160); fetchMsg.className = 'msg err'; }
+      }
+      fetchBtn.onclick = startFetch;
+      urlInput.addEventListener('keydown', e => { if (e.key === 'Enter') { e.preventDefault(); startFetch(); } });

      // ── ISO table (mixed local + SMB) ──
      // Each row gets a "Password" cell that toggles a small inline
@@ -893,20 +1011,38 @@
        rowsAndEditors.push(tr, editorRow);
      });

-      // v0.7.2: client-side filter over the image table. Rows travel in
-      // (row, password-editor) pairs; filtering hides both, and an open
-      // editor stays closed for filtered-out rows.
-      const isoSearch = el('input', {type:'search', placeholder:'Filter images… (name, family, category, source)',
-        spellcheck:'false', oninput: () => {
+      // v0.7.2: client-side filter over the image table; v0.7.4: paged
+      // 5 at a time so a 50-image library doesn't become a scroll wall.
+      // Rows travel in (row, password-editor) pairs. One view function
+      // applies filter-then-page; editors close on any view change.
+      const ISO_PAGE_SIZE = 5;
+      let isoPage = 0;
+      const pagerInfo = el('span', {});
+      const prevBtn = el('button', {class:'ghost', onclick: () => { isoPage -= 1; applyIsoListView(); }}, '‹ Prev');
+      const nextBtn = el('button', {class:'ghost', onclick: () => { isoPage += 1; applyIsoListView(); }}, 'Next ›');
+      function applyIsoListView() {
        const q = isoSearch.value.trim().toLowerCase();
+        const visible = [];
        for (let k = 0; k + 1 < rowsAndEditors.length; k += 2) {
          const row = rowsAndEditors[k];
-            const editor = rowsAndEditors[k + 1];
-            const show = !q || (row.dataset.search || '').includes(q);
-            row.style.display = show ? '' : 'none';
-            if (!show) editor.style.display = 'none';
+          rowsAndEditors[k + 1].style.display = 'none';
+          row.style.display = 'none';
+          if (!q || (row.dataset.search || '').includes(q)) visible.push(row);
        }
-        }});
+        const pages = Math.max(1, Math.ceil(visible.length / ISO_PAGE_SIZE));
+        if (isoPage >= pages) isoPage = pages - 1;
+        if (isoPage < 0) isoPage = 0;
+        visible.slice(isoPage * ISO_PAGE_SIZE, (isoPage + 1) * ISO_PAGE_SIZE)
+          .forEach(r => { r.style.display = ''; });
+        pagerInfo.textContent = visible.length
+          ? 'Showing ' + (isoPage * ISO_PAGE_SIZE + 1) + '–' +
+            Math.min(visible.length, (isoPage + 1) * ISO_PAGE_SIZE) + ' of ' + visible.length
+          : 'No images match';
+        prevBtn.disabled = isoPage === 0;
+        nextBtn.disabled = isoPage >= pages - 1;
+      }
+      const isoSearch = el('input', {type:'search', placeholder:'Filter images by name, type, or source',
+        spellcheck:'false', oninput: () => { isoPage = 0; applyIsoListView(); }});
      const isoTable = isos.length
        ? el('table', {}, [
            el('thead', {}, el('tr', {}, [
@@ -918,6 +1054,13 @@
            el('tbody', {}, rowsAndEditors),
          ])
        : el('div', {class:'empty'}, 'No images yet. Upload an ISO or add an SMB share.');
+      // v0.7.4: pager footer, shown once the library outgrows one page.
+      const isoPager = isos.length > ISO_PAGE_SIZE
+        ? el('div', {class:'list-pager'}, [
+            pagerInfo, el('span', {class:'spacer'}), prevBtn, nextBtn,
+          ])
+        : null;
+      if (isos.length) applyIsoListView();

      // ── Remote shares section (v0.5.1) ──
      // SMB + NFS unified into one "Remote shares" card with a protocol
@@ -1266,6 +1409,36 @@
          ]))
        : [el('div', {class:'empty'}, 'No unattended files yet.')];

+      // v0.7.2: filter for big answer-file libraries; v0.7.5: paged 5 at
+      // a time, the same filter-then-page view the image table uses.
+      const UNATT_PAGE_SIZE = 5;
+      let unattPage = 0;
+      const unattPagerInfo = el('span', {});
+      const unattPrev = el('button', {class:'ghost', onclick: () => { unattPage -= 1; applyUnattListView(); }}, '‹ Prev');
+      const unattNext = el('button', {class:'ghost', onclick: () => { unattPage += 1; applyUnattListView(); }}, 'Next ›');
+      const unattSearch = el('input', {type:'search', placeholder:'Filter files by name or kind',
+        spellcheck:'false', oninput: () => { unattPage = 0; applyUnattListView(); }});
+      function applyUnattListView() {
+        if (!unattendedFiles.length) return; // empty-state div carries no dataset
+        const q = unattSearch.value.trim().toLowerCase();
+        const visible = unattRows.filter(r => {
+          r.style.display = 'none';
+          return !q || (r.dataset.search || '').includes(q);
+        });
+        const pages = Math.max(1, Math.ceil(visible.length / UNATT_PAGE_SIZE));
+        if (unattPage >= pages) unattPage = pages - 1;
+        if (unattPage < 0) unattPage = 0;
+        visible.slice(unattPage * UNATT_PAGE_SIZE, (unattPage + 1) * UNATT_PAGE_SIZE)
+          .forEach(r => { r.style.display = ''; });
+        unattPagerInfo.textContent = visible.length
+          ? 'Showing ' + (unattPage * UNATT_PAGE_SIZE + 1) + '–' +
+            Math.min(visible.length, (unattPage + 1) * UNATT_PAGE_SIZE) + ' of ' + visible.length
+          : 'No files match';
+        unattPrev.disabled = unattPage === 0;
+        unattNext.disabled = unattPage >= pages - 1;
+      }
+      applyUnattListView();
+
      const unattendedAdvanced = el('details', {class:'advanced-disclosure', style:'margin-top:18px'}, [
        el('summary', {class:'advanced-summary'}, 'Advanced'),
        el('div', {class:'card', style:'margin-top:14px'}, [
@@ -1275,18 +1448,15 @@
          ]),
          el('div', {class:'body'}, [
            unattDrop, unattFile, unattMsg,
-            // v0.7.2: filter for big answer-file libraries.
-            unattendedFiles.length > 1 ? (() => {
-              const search = el('input', {type:'search', placeholder:'Filter files… (name, kind)',
-                spellcheck:'false', style:'margin-top:14px', oninput: () => {
-                  const q = search.value.trim().toLowerCase();
-                  unattRows.forEach(r => {
-                    r.style.display = (!q || (r.dataset.search || '').includes(q)) ? '' : 'none';
-                  });
-                }});
-              return search;
-            })() : null,
+            unattendedFiles.length > 1
+              ? el('label', {class:'field', style:'margin-top:14px;margin-bottom:0'}, unattSearch)
+              : null,
            el('div', {style:'margin-top:16px;display:grid;gap:8px'}, unattRows),
+            unattendedFiles.length > UNATT_PAGE_SIZE
+              ? el('div', {class:'list-pager', style:'padding:12px 0 0'}, [
+                  unattPagerInfo, el('span', {class:'spacer'}), unattPrev, unattNext,
+                ])
+              : null,
            el('p', {class:'msg', style:'margin-top:14px'},
              'These answer files drive unattended installs. Attach one to a ' +
              'host pin (Hosts tab) or a queued device (Queue → Profile); on ' +
@@ -1296,11 +1466,11 @@
        ]),
      ]);

-      return el('div', {}, [el('div', {class:'grid'}, [
+      const root = el('div', {}, [el('div', {class:'grid'}, [
        diskCard,
        el('div', {class:'card'}, [
          el('header', {}, el('h2', {}, 'Upload ISO')),
-          el('div', {class:'body'}, [drop, file, prog, upMsg, cancelUpload]),
+          el('div', {class:'body'}, [drop, file, urlRow, uploadsList, fetchList]),
        ]),
        // v0.5.1: SMB + NFS unified into one "Remote shares" card with a
        // protocol dropdown. Backend endpoints are unchanged; this is a
@@ -1332,10 +1502,17 @@
            el('h2', {}, 'Available images'),
            el('span', {class:'sub'}, isos.length + ' image' + (isos.length === 1 ? '' : 's')),
          ]),
-          isos.length > 1 ? el('div', {class:'list-search'}, isoSearch) : null,
+          isos.length > 1
+            ? el('div', {class:'list-search'}, el('label', {class:'field', style:'margin-bottom:0'}, isoSearch))
+            : null,
          isoTable,
+          isoPager,
        ]),
      ]), unattendedAdvanced]);
+      // v0.8.1: resume/kick URL-fetch progress polling; stop it on view swap.
+      root._cleanup = () => { if (fetchTimer) clearTimeout(fetchTimer); };
+      pollFetches();
+      return root;
    },

    hosts: async () => {
@@ -1358,7 +1535,7 @@
        {id: '_tools_menu',   title: '↳ Tools menu (built-in)'},
      ];

-      const macInput   = el('input', {type:'text', placeholder:'aa:bb:cc:dd:ee:ff or prefix aa:bb:cc', spellcheck:'false'});
+      const macInput   = el('input', {type:'text', placeholder:'aa:bb:cc:dd:ee:ff or aa:bb:cc', spellcheck:'false'});
      const labelInput = el('input', {type:'text', placeholder:'optional, e.g. "rack-3 spine"'});
      // v0.7.2: the former separate "Boot rules" card folded into this
      // form. A full MAC with no architecture saves a per-host pin
@@ -1476,38 +1653,32 @@
        el('div', {class:'card'}, [
          el('header', {}, el('h2', {}, 'Pin MAC to boot target')),
          el('div', {class:'body'}, [
-            el('div', {class:'form-row cols-3'}, [
-              el('label', {class:'field'}, [
-                el('span', {class:'name'}, 'MAC address or prefix'),
-                macInput,
-                el('span', {class:'hint'}, 'Full MAC pins one machine; a prefix (OUI) makes a group rule.'),
-              ]),
+            // v0.7.3: MAC · Label · Architecture · Boot binary share one
+            // 4-up row so the controls line up across the page; the
+            // per-field guidance that used to sit under them moved into the
+            // note below to keep the inputs flush. Target spans full width
+            // on its own line beneath them.
+            el('div', {class:'form-row'}, [
+              el('label', {class:'field'}, [el('span', {class:'name'}, 'MAC address or prefix'), macInput]),
              el('label', {class:'field'}, [el('span', {class:'name'}, 'Label (optional)'), labelInput]),
-              el('label', {class:'field'}, [
-                el('span', {class:'name'}, 'Architecture (optional)'),
-                archSel,
-                el('span', {class:'hint'}, 'Selecting one makes a group rule for that firmware.'),
+              el('label', {class:'field'}, [el('span', {class:'name'}, 'Architecture (optional)'), archSel]),
+              el('label', {class:'field'}, [el('span', {class:'name'}, 'Boot binary (optional)'), binSel]),
            ]),
-              el('label', {class:'field', style:'grid-column:1 / -1'}, [
+            el('label', {class:'field', style:'margin-top:14px'}, [
              el('span', {class:'name'}, 'Target'),
              targetSel,
-                el('span', {class:'hint'},
-                  'Built-in shortcuts skip the menu entirely. Per-ISO entries chain straight to the boot script.'),
-              ]),
-              el('label', {class:'field'}, [
-                el('span', {class:'name'}, 'Boot binary (optional)'),
-                binSel,
-                el('span', {class:'hint'}, 'Pin Secure Boot racks to "shim" — zero failed boot cycles.'),
-              ]),
            ]),
            el('div', {style:'margin-top:16px'}, profileFields.wrap),
            upsertBtn, msg,
            el('p', {class:'msg', style:'margin-top:14px'},
-              'When a matching client requests boot.ipxe, OpenPXE short-circuits ' +
-              'past the interactive menu and chains directly. Decision order: ' +
-              'exact MAC pin → first matching group rule → menu. ' +
-              'If an unattended file is selected on a pin, the matching kernel ' +
-              'argument is injected and the hostname/IP are templated into the answer file.'),
+              'A full MAC pins one machine; a MAC prefix (OUI) or an architecture ' +
+              'saves a first-match group rule. Pin the boot binary to “shim” for ' +
+              'Secure Boot racks — zero failed boot cycles. When a matching client ' +
+              'requests boot.ipxe, OpenPXE short-circuits past the interactive menu ' +
+              'and chains directly; decision order is exact MAC pin → first matching ' +
+              'group rule → menu. If an unattended file is selected on a pin, the ' +
+              'matching kernel argument is injected and the hostname/IP are templated ' +
+              'into the answer file.'),
          ]),
        ]),
        el('div', {class:'card'}, [
@@ -1680,7 +1851,7 @@
    },

    settings: async () => {
-      const [status, me, sso, notify, docs] = await Promise.all([
+      const [status, me, sso, notify, docs, apiKey] = await Promise.all([
        getJSON('/api/status'),
        getJSON('/api/me').catch(() => ({})),
        getJSON('/api/sso').catch(() => ({
@@ -1690,6 +1861,7 @@
        // fetches the notify config + API docs it needs too.
        getJSON('/api/notify').catch(() => ({ enabled:false, kind:'slack' })),
        getJSON('/api/docs').catch(() => ({ groups: [] })),
+        getJSON('/api/api-key').catch(() => ({ key:'', header:'x-api-key' })),
      ]);

      // ── Account card (Forms admin credentials, v0.4.5).
@@ -2003,7 +2175,7 @@
      // into a collapsible disclosure beneath the core settings cards —
      // webhook/email notifications + the API reference. Keeps Settings
      // clean by default while leaving the knobs one click away.
-      const [notifyCard, apiCard] = views._advancedCards(notify, docs);
+      const [notifyCard, apiCard] = views._advancedCards(notify, docs, apiKey);
      const advanced = el('details', {class:'advanced-disclosure', style:'margin-top:18px'}, [
        el('summary', {class:'advanced-summary'}, 'Advanced'),
        el('div', {class:'grid', style:'margin-top:14px'}, [notifyCard, apiCard]),
@@ -2018,7 +2190,7 @@
    // and the API reference. There is no longer an Advanced sidebar tab;
    // the Settings view folds these into a collapsible disclosure and
    // passes in the pre-fetched `notify` + `docs` payloads.
-    _advancedCards: (notify, docs) => {
+    _advancedCards: (notify, docs, apiKey) => {

      // ── Notification config ──
      const nMsg = el('div', {class:'msg', style:'margin-top:12px'});
@@ -2133,14 +2305,47 @@
        ]),
      ]);

-      // ── API reference (relocated from Settings) ──
+      // ── API key + reference (relocated from Settings) ──
      const groups = docs.groups || [];
+
+      // v0.8.0: operator API key. Paste into the `x-api-key` request
+      // header to drive /api/* from Postman / scripts without a browser
+      // session (full operator access). Read + rotate via /api/api-key.
+      const keyHeader = (apiKey && apiKey.header) || 'x-api-key';
+      const keyField = el('input', {type:'text', readonly:true,
+        value: (apiKey && apiKey.key) || '(unavailable)',
+        style:'width:100%;font-family:var(--mono)'});
+      const keyMsg = el('span', {class:'hint', style:'margin-left:10px'});
+      const copyKey = el('button', {class:'ghost', type:'button', onclick: async () => {
+        try { await navigator.clipboard.writeText(keyField.value); keyMsg.textContent = 'Copied to clipboard.'; }
+        catch { keyField.select(); keyMsg.textContent = 'Select the field and copy.'; }
+      }}, 'Copy');
+      const regenKey = el('button', {class:'danger', type:'button', style:'margin-left:8px',
+        onclick: async () => {
+          if (!confirm('Regenerate the API key? The current key stops working immediately and any client using it must be updated.')) return;
+          const r = await postJSON('/api/api-key/regenerate', {});
+          if (r.ok) { const j = await r.json(); keyField.value = j.key || ''; keyMsg.textContent = 'New key generated.'; }
+          else { keyMsg.textContent = 'Regenerate failed: ' + (await r.text()).slice(0, 120); }
+        }}, 'Regenerate');
+      const apiKeyBlock = el('div', {style:'padding:16px;border-bottom:1px solid var(--border)'}, [
+        el('label', {class:'field', style:'margin-bottom:10px'}, [
+          el('span', {class:'name'}, 'API key'),
+          keyField,
+          el('span', {class:'hint'}, [
+            'Send as the ', el('code', {}, keyHeader),
+            ' request header to call the API from Postman or scripts — full operator access, so keep it secret.',
+          ]),
+        ]),
+        el('div', {}, [copyKey, regenKey, keyMsg]),
+      ]);
+
      const apiCard = el('div', {class:'card'}, [
        el('header', {}, [
-          el('h2', {}, 'API reference'),
+          el('h2', {}, 'API'),
          el('span', {class:'sub'},
            groups.reduce((n, g) => n + (g.endpoints || []).length, 0) + ' endpoints'),
        ]),
+        apiKeyBlock,
        el('div', {class:'api-ref'},
          groups.length
            ? groups.map(g => el('div', {class:'group'}, [
@@ -1,66 +1,42 @@
-# docker-compose for local / homelab deployment.
+# OpenPXE — single-host / homelab deployment.
 #
-# Two usage patterns:
+# One container: DHCP proxy + TFTP + iPXE chainload + HTTP (web UI, boot
+# scripts, and ISO range streaming).
 #
-#   1. Local MVP test — host network, proxy-DHCP off (don't fight your
-#      existing DHCP server on the LAN), TFTP + HTTP exposed on the host:
+#   OPENPXE_PUBLIC_IP=192.168.1.49 docker compose up -d
 #
-#         docker compose up openpxe-dev
+# (or put OPENPXE_PUBLIC_IP in a .env file beside this one). That's this
+# host's LAN IP, advertised to PXE clients so the iPXE URLs resolve —
+# OpenPXE refuses to start rather than advertise an address clients can't
+# reach, so compose errors out below if it's unset.
 #
-#   2. Real PXE deployment — host network, proxy-DHCP on, runs on a box
-#      plugged into the PXE network:
+# Host networking is REQUIRED: DHCPDISCOVER is a broadcast, and Docker
+# bridges / CNI overlays don't forward it into containers. In host mode
+# the container binds these ports directly on the host:
 #
-#         # First set OPENPXE_PUBLIC_IP to this host's LAN address in .env
-#         docker compose up openpxe
+#   udp/67    DHCP proxy          udp/4011  PXE Boot Server
+#   udp/69    TFTP                tcp/4200  web UI + HTTP boot assets
 #
-# On Linux hosts, `network_mode: host` gives the container direct access to
-# the physical NIC — required for DHCP proxy because CNI overlays and Docker
-# bridges do not forward DHCPDISCOVER broadcasts into containers.
-#
-# On macOS / Windows hosts, `network_mode: host` is limited — the daemon
-# runs in a Linux VM (Colima/Docker Desktop) so the "host" network is the
-# VM, not your Mac. Proxy-DHCP is not feasible on macOS; use `openpxe-dev`
-# with published ports and set DHCP-MODE=disabled.
+# Web UI:  http://<this-host>:4200/

 services:
-  # Real PXE deployment (Linux hosts).
  openpxe:
-    image: openpxe:0.1.0
-    build:
-      context: .
-      dockerfile: deploy/docker/Dockerfile
+    image: gitea.milesward.dev/mward4/openpxe:latest
+    container_name: openpxe
    restart: unless-stopped
    network_mode: host
+    # The binary carries cap_net_bind_service as a file capability, so it
+    # binds the low DHCP/TFTP ports as a non-root user — no privileged mode.
+    cap_add:
+      - NET_BIND_SERVICE
    environment:
-      # REQUIRED on multi-homed hosts. Set to this machine's LAN IP so the
-      # advertised iPXE URLs actually resolve from the PXE clients. Without
-      # this, OpenPXE will refuse to start rather than advertise a
-      # loopback address that can't be reached.
-      OPENPXE_PUBLIC_IP: ${OPENPXE_PUBLIC_IP:?set this to the host LAN IP}
+      OPENPXE_PUBLIC_IP: ${OPENPXE_PUBLIC_IP:?set this to the host LAN IP, e.g. 192.168.1.49}
+      # Web UI + HTTP boot assets. 4200 keeps clear of anything on :80
+      # (an Unraid webGUI, a reverse proxy, …).
+      OPENPXE_HTTP_PORT: "4200"
+      # proxy = coexist with the LAN's existing DHCP server (recommended).
      OPENPXE_DHCP_MODE: proxy
      OPENPXE_LOG: info
    volumes:
-      - ./data/isos:/var/lib/openpxe/isos
-      - ./data/work:/var/lib/openpxe/work
-
-  # Dev / MVP container: published ports, DHCP disabled, HTTP on 8080.
-  # Use this on laptops where you want to curl the API or UI without
-  # running an actual PXE chain.
-  openpxe-dev:
-    image: openpxe:0.1.0
-    build:
-      context: .
-      dockerfile: deploy/docker/Dockerfile
-    environment:
-      OPENPXE_PUBLIC_IP: ${OPENPXE_PUBLIC_IP:-127.0.0.1}
-      OPENPXE_DHCP_MODE: disabled
-      OPENPXE_HTTP_PORT: "8080"
-      OPENPXE_TFTP_PORT: "6969"
-      OPENPXE_DHCP_PORT: "6767"
-      OPENPXE_LOG: info,openpxe=debug
-    ports:
-      - "8080:8080/tcp"
-      - "6969:6969/udp"
-    volumes:
-      - ./data/isos:/var/lib/openpxe/isos
-      - ./data/work:/var/lib/openpxe/work
+      - ./data/isos:/var/lib/openpxe/isos   # uploaded / seeded .iso files
+      - ./data/work:/var/lib/openpxe/work   # settings, share state, scratch
Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Miles WardandClaude Opus 4.8	5f98e6e03f	v0.8.1: add ISO by URL, zero-touch admin bootstrap Ease-of-use pass inspired by Bootimus (Dnsmasq-PXE is a manual dnsmasq setup guide — nothing to adopt; OpenPXE already replaces that stack). Add ISO by URL: - New http-api `fetch` module: a small FetchJobs registry + a background streaming download (reqwest) that pipes a remote .iso through the same UploadHandle + introspection path as an upload, so a URL-fetched image classifies and gains boot entries identically. Progress is polled by the Storage view and rendered as rows, mirroring uploads. - Routes POST/GET/DELETE /api/isos/fetch. http/https only; .iso-only filename derived from Content-Disposition / URL basename with path traversal stripped; 16 GiB cap; cancel; credential-stripped URL display. Operator-gated, no boot-time outbound — offline boot is untouched. - Storage upload card gains an "Or add by URL" field with progress + cancel. Zero-touch admin bootstrap: - OPENPXE_ADMIN_USERNAME + OPENPXE_ADMIN_PASSWORD (or _PASSWORD_FILE for Docker/K8s secrets) auto-create the admin on first run, so a fresh container is usable with no setup wizard. Seeds the first run only — a lingering env var can't reset a rotated password. Tests: URL parse / filename / Content-Disposition unit tests + a wiremock end-to-end fetch-into-store integration test. clippy/fmt/node clean. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>	2026-07-16 15:56:27 -04:00
Miles WardandClaude Opus 4.8	1c262a6d61	v0.8.0: dep prune, memtest introspection fix, concurrent uploads, x-api-key Dependency cleanup (ponytail audit): - Drop 14 unused dependency declarations across 7 crates; quick-xml and x509-parser leave the tree entirely (SAML cert/XML work is handled by bergshamra + roxmltree). Fixes: - introspect: drop the over-broad "microsoft" UTF-16 bulk-scan marker that mislabeled Secure-Boot-signed non-Windows bootables (memtest86, signed BSDs, firmware tools) as Windows — the string lives in their MS-signed EFI loader's FAT long-filename entries. INTROSPECT_REV 3 -> 4 re-probes existing local ISOs on startup so the bogus label clears on upgrade. - upload: begin_upload now reclaims an abandoned <id>.partial instead of rejecting the re-upload with "already uploading". Robust against browser refresh, tab close, and dropped connections (the chunked protocol can't resume a dead session anyway). Features: - Storage upload: multi-file + concurrent. Each dropped/selected .iso gets its own progress row and uploads independently; a single page-leave guard plus a pagehide keepalive-abort replace the old shared singletons. - Operator API key (x-api-key): a persisted key authenticates /api/* exactly like an operator session, for Postman/scripts. New core ApiKeyStore (generated on first run, regenerable), accepted in require_auth alongside the session cookie, surfaced in Settings -> Advanced with copy + regenerate and a usage reference. GET /api/api-key + POST /api/api-key/regenerate. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>	2026-06-21 23:35:42 -04:00
Miles WardandClaude Opus 4.8	27703c437a	docs(compose): simplify root docker-compose to one pull-based service The root compose was scratch-built and carried both a prod and a dev service plus a local build stanza. Replace it with a single deployment-focused service that pulls gitea.milesward.dev/mward4/openpxe:latest (matching the Unraid template and the homelab flow): - drop the openpxe-dev service and the build: context (deploy, not build) - HTTP on 4200 so it clears an Unraid webGUI / reverse proxy on :80 - host networking (DHCPDISCOVER is broadcast — bridges don't forward it) - cap_add NET_BIND_SERVICE instead of privileged; the binary already carries cap_net_bind_service as a file capability - OPENPXE_PUBLIC_IP stays a required, fail-fast variable - isos + work bind mounts (SMB dir omitted — Windows boots via HTTP sanboot since v0.5.8, no SMB server needed) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>	2026-06-14 08:15:43 -04:00
Miles WardandClaude Opus 4.8	1ded291c7b	v0.7.5: Joliet namespace fallback, gap-tolerant El Torito walk, Unattended pagination Follow-up to the v0.7.4 dashboard triage: VCSA/ultravnc data ISOs are correctly flagged non-bootable (no boot catalog exists to find), but two real false-negative holes could mislabel genuinely bootable appliance ISOs — both closed here. iso_fs: - Joliet fallback (the big one): lookup() now tries the primary ISO9660 namespace first and falls back to the Joliet SVD (UCS-2 big-endian identifiers, escape-sequence detected). Windows-oriented mastering tools — common for vendor/appliance ISOs — write a minimal or mangled primary tree and keep the real filenames only in Joliet; those images probed as "no installer files" and their in-ISO fetches 404'd. Applies everywhere the walker is used: introspection probes (local + NFS/SFTP) and /iso/{id}/{*path} serving. - find_descriptor(): the PVD/SVD search scans the whole descriptor area (LBA 16..32), skipping non-CD001 filler sectors instead of requiring a pristine sector 16. - TestIsoBuilder grows a joliet_only mode (bare primary tree, real names only in the SVD) modeling the mastering worst case. introspect: - detect_el_torito() no longer aborts at the first non-CD001 sector or stops at a Set Terminator — sloppy mastering leaves zeroed filler sectors that used to hide a real boot record and flag a bootable image as a data ISO. All 16 descriptor sectors are examined; the 25-byte exact signature can't false-positive on what follows the set. - Volume-label read now uses the same tolerant descriptor scan, and label + El Torito + namespace probes all share one CachingReadAt, so remote probes spend fewer round-trips than before despite scanning more sectors. - INTROSPECT_REV bumped to 3 so everything probed by the rev-2 logic re-probes with the Joliet fallback: local ISOs on first startup, and remote ISOs via the rev-gated cache self-invalidating. webui: - Unattended files: the same 5-per-page pager as Available images (Showing X–Y of N · Prev/Next), composed with the existing filter, page resets on input. Validation: clippy pedantic clean, fmt clean, 319 workspace tests green (+3: joliet fallback lookup, joliet-only classification, filler- sector boot record), webui syntax-checked. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>	2026-06-12 17:04:01 -04:00
Miles WardandClaude Opus 4.8	6524aa4118	v0.7.4: probe-based introspection — remote shares classify, gparted bug fixed, Storage pagination Introspection (the headline): detection is now probe-based. Instead of grepping raw sectors for filename strings, we walk the ISO9660 directory tree and check whether the well-known boot files actually exist — and the same probes run over NFS READ3 / SFTP seek-reads, so share-hosted ISOs finally classify instead of registering as Unknown. iso-store: - New iso_fs module: the read-only ISO9660 walker (generalized from http-api) over an IsoReadAt trait — local files, NFS, SFTP, and the in-memory test images all share it. Iterative walk, 4 MiB directory cap, strict-mastering trailing-dot normalization (VMLINUZ.;1 now matches /vmlinuz), CachingReadAt collapses repeated directory reads during the probe pass (~60 → ~6 round-trips per remote ISO). - introspect.rs rewritten (INTROSPECT_REV 2): PVD label → El Torito → /sources/boot.wim probe → verified Linux kernel+initrd probe table → local-only 16 MiB UDF-Windows scan → filename-token fallback. * Fixes the false-Windows bug: any Linux ISO shipping GRUB/syslinux chainload modules contains the literal "bootmgr", so gparted-live classified as WindowsPe. Linux probes now run first; the byte scan only sees ISOs nothing else claimed. Local ISOs re-probe once on startup via the rev bump — no re-upload. * Kernel entries are emitted only when kernel+initrd verifiably exist (no more guessed paths that 404 at boot). Debian-live / d-i netinst / CoreOS shapes classify for the UI but keep their working sanboot entries (their boot protocols need args we don't render yet; CoreOS additionally needs its embedded ignition). * Label + filename vocab extended: rhcos/coreos/openshift/okd, gparted/clonezilla/kali/tails, almalinux/rocky, sles, manjaro. - NFS + SFTP managers: per-ISO IsoReadAt readers (READ3-at-offset with short-read looping / seek+read_exact), background introspection pass after each scan — entries register instantly with a provisional filename-based report (rev 0, optimistic sanboot preserved) and upgrade in place as probes land (30s/ISO timeout, failures keep the provisional). locate_in_iso() exposes the walker to the HTTP layer. - remote_cache: introspection results persisted per protocol keyed share/path@size and gated on INTROSPECT_REV — container restarts re-probe only new/replaced ISOs; upgrades re-probe exactly once. - SMB: smbclient can't seek, so SMB ISOs get the filename-token family (rev stays 0 → sanboot entry + "awaiting introspection" label). - IsoStore::update_external_introspection swaps in completed reports and regenerates boot entries, preserving category/password. http-api: - /iso/{id}/{*path} now serves files from inside NFS/SFTP-hosted ISOs (remote ISO9660 lookup + ranged share stream) — verified kernel entries on remote Linux ISOs are actually bootable, end to end. - iso_fs.rs deleted in favor of the shared iso-store module. - full_flow fixtures build real directory trees via the shared test-image builder (new iso-store feature) — a label-only blob no longer earns a kernel entry, by design. webui: - Available images: paged 5 per page with a quiet footer pager (Showing X–Y of N · Prev/Next), filter-then-paginate, page resets on search input. Fifty images is five clean pages, not a scroll wall. - Hosts/Queue profile: "Unattended file (in Storage → Advanced)" so the picker says where the files live. - Row badge keys on introspect_rev: probed remote ISOs read like local ones; un-probed say "awaiting introspection". Validation: clippy pedantic clean, fmt clean, 316 workspace tests green (+17: walker, probe shapes incl. gparted regression + CoreOS, filename table, cache round-trips), webui syntax-checked. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>	2026-06-12 15:21:14 -04:00
Miles WardandClaude Opus 4.8	934cfbab46	v0.7.3: UI cleanup — aligned Hosts pin form, native-chrome list filters, Link row reorder Design-language cleanup of the v0.7.2 additions (no behaviour change). Hosts: - The Pin MAC form collapses to a single aligned 4-up row: MAC · Label · Architecture · Boot binary. Target drops full-width onto its own line beneath them. The per-field hints that broke the row's alignment moved into the explanatory note below, so every control shares one baseline. Storage: - The image and unattended filter inputs are now wrapped in a label.field, so they inherit the standard text-field chrome (border, radius, height, focus ring) instead of the raw browser <input type=search> look. They span the full card width for continuity with the rest of the page. Network: - The 'Link' row moved below 'Public base URL'. Its joined operstate · speed · duplex · MAC string runs long, so placing it last lets it wrap at the bottom without shoving the other rows around. Validation: clippy clean, fmt clean, 299 workspace tests green, webui syntax-checked. No protocol or boot-path changes in this release. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>	2026-06-09 22:44:19 -04:00