v0.8.0: dep prune, memtest introspection fix, concurrent uploads, x-api-key

Dependency cleanup (ponytail audit):
- Drop 14 unused dependency declarations across 7 crates; quick-xml and
  x509-parser leave the tree entirely (SAML cert/XML work is handled by
  bergshamra + roxmltree).

Fixes:
- introspect: drop the over-broad "microsoft" UTF-16 bulk-scan marker that
  mislabeled Secure-Boot-signed non-Windows bootables (memtest86, signed
  BSDs, firmware tools) as Windows — the string lives in their MS-signed
  EFI loader's FAT long-filename entries. INTROSPECT_REV 3 -> 4 re-probes
  existing local ISOs on startup so the bogus label clears on upgrade.
- upload: begin_upload now reclaims an abandoned <id>.partial instead of
  rejecting the re-upload with "already uploading". Robust against browser
  refresh, tab close, and dropped connections (the chunked protocol can't
  resume a dead session anyway).

Features:
- Storage upload: multi-file + concurrent. Each dropped/selected .iso gets
  its own progress row and uploads independently; a single page-leave guard
  plus a pagehide keepalive-abort replace the old shared singletons.
- Operator API key (x-api-key): a persisted key authenticates /api/* exactly
  like an operator session, for Postman/scripts. New core ApiKeyStore
  (generated on first run, regenerable), accepted in require_auth alongside
  the session cookie, surfaced in Settings -> Advanced with copy + regenerate
  and a usage reference. GET /api/api-key + POST /api/api-key/regenerate.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>

Cargo.lock

@@ -175,45 +175,6 @@ dependencies = [
  "password-hash",
 ]
 
-[[package]]
-name = "asn1-rs"
-version = "0.7.2"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "b7f43a50ac4fdca5df8e885c21b835997f0a1cdee65494a6847694a98652d9d8"
-dependencies = [
- "asn1-rs-derive",
- "asn1-rs-impl",
- "displaydoc",
- "nom 7.1.3",
- "num-traits",
- "rusticata-macros",
- "thiserror",
- "time",
-]
-
-[[package]]
-name = "asn1-rs-derive"
-version = "0.6.0"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "3109e49b1e4909e9db6515a30c633684d68cdeaa252f215214cb4fa1a5bfee2c"
-dependencies = [
- "proc-macro2",
- "quote",
- "syn",
- "synstructure",
-]
-
-[[package]]
-name = "asn1-rs-impl"
-version = "0.2.0"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "7b18050c2cd6fe86c3a76584ef5e0baf286d038cda203eb6223df2cc413565f7"
-dependencies = [
- "proc-macro2",
- "quote",
- "syn",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "assert-json-diff"
 version = "2.0.2"
@@ -1144,20 +1105,6 @@ dependencies = [
  "zeroize",
 ]
 
-[[package]]
-name = "der-parser"
-version = "10.0.0"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "07da5016415d5a3c4dd39b11ed26f915f52fc4e0dc197d87908bc916e51bc1a6"
-dependencies = [
- "asn1-rs",
- "displaydoc",
- "nom 7.1.3",
- "num-bigint",
- "num-traits",
- "rusticata-macros",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "der_derive"
 version = "0.7.3"
@@ -2445,7 +2392,7 @@ dependencies = [
  "httpdate",
  "idna",
  "mime",
- "nom 8.0.0",
+ "nom",
  "percent-encoding",
  "quoted_printable",
  "rustls",
@@ -2564,12 +2511,6 @@ dependencies = [
  "unicase",
 ]
 
-[[package]]
-name = "minimal-lexical"
-version = "0.2.1"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "68354c5c6bd36d73ff3feceb05efa59b6acb7626617f4962be322a825e61f79a"
-
 [[package]]
 name = "miniz_oxide"
 version = "0.8.9"
@@ -2702,16 +2643,6 @@ dependencies = [
  "libc",
 ]
 
-[[package]]
-name = "nom"
-version = "7.1.3"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "d273983c5a657a70a3e8f2a01329822f3b8c8172b73826411a55751e404a0a4a"
-dependencies = [
- "memchr",
- "minimal-lexical",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "nom"
 version = "8.0.0"
@@ -2803,15 +2734,6 @@ dependencies = [
  "libc",
 ]
 
-[[package]]
-name = "oid-registry"
-version = "0.8.1"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "12f40cff3dde1b6087cc5d5f5d4d65712f34016a03ed60e9c08dcc392736b5b7"
-dependencies = [
- "asn1-rs",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "once_cell"
 version = "1.21.4"
@@ -2836,7 +2758,7 @@ checksum = "c08d65885ee38876c4f86fa503fb49d7b507c2b62552df7c70b2fce627e06381"
 
 [[package]]
 name = "openpxe"
-version = "0.7.0"
+version = "0.8.0"
 dependencies = [
  "anyhow",
  "axum",
@@ -2848,17 +2770,15 @@ dependencies = [
  "openpxe-ipxe-assets",
  "openpxe-iso-store",
  "openpxe-tftp",
- "serde",
  "time",
  "tokio",
- "toml",
  "tracing",
  "tracing-subscriber",
 ]
 
 [[package]]
 name = "openpxe-core"
-version = "0.7.0"
+version = "0.8.0"
 dependencies = [
  "anyhow",
  "base64",
@@ -2867,7 +2787,6 @@ dependencies = [
  "figment",
  "flate2",
  "parking_lot",
- "quick-xml",
  "rcgen",
  "roxmltree",
  "serde",
@@ -2880,27 +2799,26 @@ dependencies = [
  "tracing",
  "tracing-subscriber",
  "uuid",
- "x509-parser",
 ]
 
 [[package]]
 name = "openpxe-dhcp-proxy"
-version = "0.7.0"
+version = "0.8.0"
 dependencies = [
  "anyhow",
- "bytes",
  "dhcproto",
  "openpxe-core",
  "parking_lot",
+ "serde_json",
  "socket2",
- "thiserror",
+ "tempfile",
  "tokio",
  "tracing",
 ]
 
 [[package]]
 name = "openpxe-http-api"
-version = "0.7.0"
+version = "0.8.0"
 dependencies = [
  "anyhow",
  "axum",
@@ -2908,7 +2826,6 @@ dependencies = [
  "bergshamra",
  "bytes",
  "futures",
- "hyper",
  "image",
  "insta",
  "lettre",
@@ -2922,7 +2839,6 @@ dependencies = [
  "serde",
  "serde_json",
  "tempfile",
- "thiserror",
  "time",
  "tokio",
  "tokio-stream",
@@ -2936,17 +2852,16 @@ dependencies = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "openpxe-ipxe-assets"
-version = "0.7.0"
+version = "0.8.0"
 dependencies = [
  "openpxe-core",
  "rust-embed",
- "thiserror",
  "tracing",
 ]
 
 [[package]]
 name = "openpxe-iso-store"
-version = "0.7.0"
+version = "0.8.0"
 dependencies = [
  "anyhow",
  "bcrypt",
@@ -2965,31 +2880,26 @@ dependencies = [
  "serde_json",
  "sha2 0.10.9",
  "tempfile",
- "thiserror",
  "time",
  "tokio",
- "tokio-util",
  "tracing",
- "uuid",
 ]
 
 [[package]]
 name = "openpxe-tftp"
-version = "0.7.0"
+version = "0.8.0"
 dependencies = [
  "anyhow",
- "bytes",
  "openpxe-core",
  "openpxe-ipxe-assets",
  "socket2",
- "thiserror",
  "tokio",
  "tracing",
 ]
 
 [[package]]
 name = "openpxe-webui"
-version = "0.7.0"
+version = "0.8.0"
 
 [[package]]
 name = "p256"
@@ -3436,15 +3346,6 @@ version = "2.0.1"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "a993555f31e5a609f617c12db6250dedcac1b0a85076912c436e6fc9b2c8e6a3"
 
-[[package]]
-name = "quick-xml"
-version = "0.40.1"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "2474bd2e5029e7ccb6abb2ba48cf2383a333851dedf495901544281590c7da7f"
-dependencies = [
- "memchr",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "quinn"
 version = "0.11.9"
@@ -3931,15 +3832,6 @@ dependencies = [
  "semver",
 ]
 
-[[package]]
-name = "rusticata-macros"
-version = "4.1.0"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "faf0c4a6ece9950b9abdb62b1cfcf2a68b3b67a10ba445b3bb85be2a293d0632"
-dependencies = [
- "nom 7.1.3",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "rustix"
 version = "1.1.4"
@@ -5642,23 +5534,6 @@ dependencies = [
  "tls_codec",
 ]
 
-[[package]]
-name = "x509-parser"
-version = "0.18.1"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "d43b0f71ce057da06bc0851b23ee24f3f86190b07203dd8f567d0b706a185202"
-dependencies = [
- "asn1-rs",
- "data-encoding",
- "der-parser",
- "lazy_static",
- "nom 7.1.3",
- "oid-registry",
- "rusticata-macros",
- "thiserror",
- "time",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "yansi"
 version = "1.0.1"

Cargo.toml

@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ members = [
 ]
 
 [workspace.package]
-version = "0.7.0"
+version = "0.8.0"
 edition = "2021"
 rust-version = "1.95"
 license = "MIT OR Apache-2.0"
@@ -82,8 +82,6 @@ lettre = { version = "0.11", default-features = false, features = ["smtp-transpo
 # SP layer (AuthnRequest, metadata parse, SAMLResponse semantics) on top.
 bergshamra = "0.5"
 roxmltree = "0.21"
-quick-xml = "0.40"
-x509-parser = "0.18"
 # flate2 default backend is miniz_oxide (pure Rust) — do NOT enable the
 # zlib/zlib-ng C backends, which would break the musl-static build.
 flate2 = "1.1"

crates/core/Cargo.toml

@@ -27,13 +27,11 @@ tokio = { workspace = true, features = ["sync", "rt", "macros", "time"] }
 bcrypt.workspace = true
 
 # v0.5.1: pure-Rust SAML 2.0 SP. bergshamra = XML-DSig verify + exclusive
-# c14n (no OpenSSL/C). roxmltree/quick-xml parse + build SAML XML;
+# c14n (no OpenSSL/C), plus IdP signing-cert extraction from metadata.
-# x509-parser pulls the IdP signing cert out of metadata; flate2+base64
+# roxmltree parses the SAML/metadata XML; flate2+base64 encode the
-# encode the HTTP-Redirect binding's SAMLRequest.
+# HTTP-Redirect binding's SAMLRequest.
 bergshamra.workspace = true
 roxmltree.workspace = true
-quick-xml.workspace = true
-x509-parser.workspace = true
 flate2.workspace = true
 base64.workspace = true
 

crates/core/src/api_key.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,158 @@
+//! Operator API key — a single persisted secret that authenticates
+//! programmatic `/api/*` callers (Postman, scripts, CI) via the
+//! `x-api-key` header, as an alternative to the browser session cookie.
+//!
+//! Generated on first load and persisted to `<work_dir>/api_key.json` so
+//! it survives restarts — an operator pastes it into their client once.
+//! Regenerable from Settings → Advanced; the previous key stops working
+//! the moment a new one is minted. Grants the same access as a logged-in
+//! operator (the middleware treats a valid key exactly like a session).
+
+use parking_lot::RwLock;
+use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
+use std::path::PathBuf;
+use std::sync::Arc;
+use uuid::Uuid;
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+struct ApiKeyFile {
+    key: String,
+}
+
+/// Persisted operator API key. Cheap to clone (Arc-shared); contention is
+/// nil (read on every authenticated request, written only on regenerate).
+#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
+pub struct ApiKeyStore {
+    path: Arc<PathBuf>,
+    inner: Arc<RwLock<String>>,
+}
+
+impl ApiKeyStore {
+    /// Load the stored key, minting + persisting a fresh one on first run
+    /// (or when the file is missing / corrupt / empty).
+    #[must_use]
+    pub fn load_or_init(work_dir: &std::path::Path) -> Self {
+        let path = work_dir.join("api_key.json");
+        let key = match std::fs::read_to_string(&path) {
+            Ok(text) => serde_json::from_str::<ApiKeyFile>(&text)
+                .map(|f| f.key)
+                .ok()
+                .filter(|k| !k.is_empty())
+                .unwrap_or_else(generate_key),
+            Err(_) => generate_key(),
+        };
+        let store = Self {
+            path: Arc::new(path),
+            inner: Arc::new(RwLock::new(key)),
+        };
+        // Land a first-run (or repaired) key on disk immediately so it's
+        // stable across the very next restart.
+        store.persist();
+        store
+    }
+
+    #[must_use]
+    pub fn current(&self) -> String {
+        self.inner.read().clone()
+    }
+
+    /// Constant-time comparison against the stored key. An empty candidate
+    /// never matches, so a blank/absent header can't authenticate.
+    #[must_use]
+    pub fn verify(&self, candidate: &str) -> bool {
+        if candidate.is_empty() {
+            return false;
+        }
+        ct_eq(self.inner.read().as_bytes(), candidate.as_bytes())
+    }
+
+    /// Mint a fresh key, persist it, and return it. The previous key is
+    /// invalid the instant this returns.
+    #[must_use]
+    pub fn regenerate(&self) -> String {
+        let key = generate_key();
+        self.inner.write().clone_from(&key);
+        self.persist();
+        tracing::info!(target: "openpxe::auth", "operator API key regenerated");
+        key
+    }
+
+    fn persist(&self) {
+        let body = match serde_json::to_vec_pretty(&ApiKeyFile {
+            key: self.current(),
+        }) {
+            Ok(b) => b,
+            Err(e) => {
+                tracing::warn!(target: "openpxe::auth", "serialize api_key.json: {e}");
+                return;
+            }
+        };
+        if let Some(parent) = self.path.parent() {
+            let _ = std::fs::create_dir_all(parent);
+        }
+        let tmp = self.path.with_extension("json.tmp");
+        if let Err(e) = std::fs::write(&tmp, body) {
+            tracing::warn!(target: "openpxe::auth", "write api_key.json tmp: {e}");
+            return;
+        }
+        if let Err(e) = std::fs::rename(&tmp, self.path.as_path()) {
+            tracing::warn!(target: "openpxe::auth", "rename api_key.json: {e}");
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// 128 random bits as 32 lowercase hex chars — unambiguous to copy-paste
+/// into an `x-api-key` header. UUID v4 is already our CSPRNG-backed source
+/// for session ids, so no new dependency.
+fn generate_key() -> String {
+    Uuid::new_v4().simple().to_string()
+}
+
+/// Length-checked constant-time byte compare — keeps key verification from
+/// leaking the matched-prefix length via timing. A 128-bit random secret
+/// isn't practically timing-attackable over a network, but the check is
+/// four lines, so we keep it.
+fn ct_eq(a: &[u8], b: &[u8]) -> bool {
+    if a.len() != b.len() {
+        return false;
+    }
+    let mut diff = 0u8;
+    for (x, y) in a.iter().zip(b.iter()) {
+        diff |= x ^ y;
+    }
+    diff == 0
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+    use tempfile::tempdir;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn generates_persists_and_reloads() {
+        let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
+        let s = ApiKeyStore::load_or_init(dir.path());
+        let k = s.current();
+        assert_eq!(k.len(), 32, "32 hex chars = 128 bits");
+        assert!(s.verify(&k));
+        assert!(!s.verify("wrong"));
+        assert!(!s.verify(""), "blank header must not authenticate");
+        // Reload from disk → same key (survives restart).
+        let s2 = ApiKeyStore::load_or_init(dir.path());
+        assert_eq!(s2.current(), k);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn regenerate_invalidates_old() {
+        let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
+        let s = ApiKeyStore::load_or_init(dir.path());
+        let old = s.current();
+        let new = s.regenerate();
+        assert_ne!(old, new);
+        assert!(s.verify(&new));
+        assert!(!s.verify(&old), "old key must stop working");
+        // Persisted: a reload sees the new key.
+        let s2 = ApiKeyStore::load_or_init(dir.path());
+        assert_eq!(s2.current(), new);
+    }
+}

crates/core/src/boot_rules.rs

@@ -41,7 +41,16 @@ pub struct BootRule {
     pub arch: String,
     /// Boot entry id (a `BootEntry::id`) or reserved menu name
     /// (`_local`, `_queue`, …) to chain to when this rule matches.
+    /// May be empty for a rule that only pins a driver mode.
+    #[serde(default)]
     pub target: String,
+    /// v0.7.1: optional first-boot binary pin — `""` (auto: let the
+    /// escalation ladder decide), `"firmware"`, `"builtin"`, or
+    /// `"shim"`. Lets an operator declare "this rack is all Secure
+    /// Boot → serve the signed chain immediately", skipping the
+    /// learn-by-failing walk entirely for known fleets.
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub driver_mode: String,
     /// Rules can be parked without deleting them.
     #[serde(default = "default_true")]
     pub enabled: bool,
@@ -111,6 +120,7 @@ impl BootRulesStore {
             r.mac_prefix = normalize_mac(&r.mac_prefix);
             r.arch = r.arch.trim().to_ascii_lowercase();
             r.target = r.target.trim().to_string();
+            r.driver_mode = r.driver_mode.trim().to_ascii_lowercase();
             r.note = r.note.trim().to_string();
         }
         cfg.webhook_url = cfg.webhook_url.trim().to_string();
@@ -134,10 +144,40 @@ impl BootRulesStore {
     /// passed one along, `None` otherwise (older chains).
     #[must_use]
     pub fn match_target(&self, mac: &str, arch: Option<&str>) -> Option<String> {
+        self.first_match(mac, arch, |r| {
+            (!r.target.is_empty()).then(|| r.target.clone())
+        })
+    }
+
+    /// v0.7.1: first enabled rule that pins a driver mode for `(mac,
+    /// arch)`. Consulted by the DHCP proxy *before* the automatic
+    /// escalation ladder — an operator who knows a rack is all Secure
+    /// Boot pins it to `shim` and those machines never walk the ladder.
+    /// Unknown mode strings are ignored (forward compatibility).
+    #[must_use]
+    pub fn driver_mode_hint(&self, mac: &str, arch: Option<&str>) -> Option<crate::DriverMode> {
+        self.first_match(mac, arch, |r| match r.driver_mode.as_str() {
+            "firmware" => Some(crate::DriverMode::Firmware),
+            "builtin" => Some(crate::DriverMode::Builtin),
+            "shim" => Some(crate::DriverMode::Shim),
+            _ => None,
+        })
+    }
+
+    /// Shared rule-matching walk: returns the first `extract` result from
+    /// an enabled rule whose selectors match. Rules that match but yield
+    /// `None` from `extract` (e.g. no target set, or no driver mode set)
+    /// don't stop the walk — target rules and mode-pin rules coexist.
+    fn first_match<T>(
+        &self,
+        mac: &str,
+        arch: Option<&str>,
+        extract: impl Fn(&BootRule) -> Option<T>,
+    ) -> Option<T> {
         let mac = normalize_mac(mac);
         let g = self.inner.read();
         for r in &g.rules {
-            if !r.enabled || r.target.is_empty() {
+            if !r.enabled {
                 continue;
             }
             if !r.mac_prefix.is_empty() && !mac.starts_with(r.mac_prefix.as_str()) {
@@ -151,7 +191,9 @@ impl BootRulesStore {
                     _ => continue,
                 }
             }
-            return Some(r.target.clone());
+            if let Some(v) = extract(r) {
+                return Some(v);
+            }
         }
         None
     }
@@ -189,11 +231,54 @@ mod tests {
             mac_prefix: mac_prefix.into(),
             arch: arch.into(),
             target: target.into(),
+            driver_mode: String::new(),
             enabled: true,
             note: String::new(),
         }
     }
 
+    #[test]
+    fn driver_mode_hint_pins_known_modes_and_ignores_unknown() {
+        let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
+        let s = BootRulesStore::load_or_default(dir.path());
+        let mut sb_rack = rule("aa:bb:cc", "", "");
+        sb_rack.driver_mode = "SHIM".into(); // normalized on replace
+        let mut weird = rule("11:22:33", "", "");
+        weird.driver_mode = "quantum".into(); // unknown → ignored
+        s.replace(BootRulesConfig {
+            rules: vec![sb_rack, weird],
+            webhook_url: String::new(),
+        });
+        assert_eq!(
+            s.driver_mode_hint("aa:bb:cc:00:00:01", None),
+            Some(crate::DriverMode::Shim)
+        );
+        assert_eq!(s.driver_mode_hint("11:22:33:00:00:01", None), None);
+        assert_eq!(s.driver_mode_hint("99:99:99:00:00:01", None), None);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn mode_pin_rule_does_not_shadow_later_target_rule() {
+        // A mode-only rule and a target rule can both apply to the same
+        // client: the mode pin must not consume the target walk.
+        let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
+        let s = BootRulesStore::load_or_default(dir.path());
+        let mut pin = rule("aa:bb", "", "");
+        pin.driver_mode = "builtin".into();
+        s.replace(BootRulesConfig {
+            rules: vec![pin, rule("aa:bb", "", "rack-image")],
+            webhook_url: String::new(),
+        });
+        assert_eq!(
+            s.driver_mode_hint("aa:bb:00:00:00:01", None),
+            Some(crate::DriverMode::Builtin)
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            s.match_target("aa:bb:00:00:00:01", None).as_deref(),
+            Some("rack-image")
+        );
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn empty_config_matches_nothing() {
         let dir = tempdir().unwrap();

crates/core/src/lib.rs

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
 //! runtime settings, and the Queued Deployment queue.
 #![forbid(unsafe_code)]
 
+pub mod api_key;
 pub mod arch;
 pub mod auth;
 pub mod boot_log;
@@ -23,6 +24,7 @@ pub mod settings;
 pub mod sso;
 pub mod wol;
 
+pub use api_key::ApiKeyStore;
 pub use arch::{ClientArch, DriverMode, FirmwareClass};
 pub use auth::{AdminAccount, AdminPublic, AdminStore};
 pub use boot_log::{BootEvent, BootLog};

crates/dhcp-proxy/Cargo.toml

@@ -15,7 +15,10 @@ tokio.workspace = true
 socket2.workspace = true
 dhcproto.workspace = true
 tracing.workspace = true
-thiserror.workspace = true
 anyhow.workspace = true
-bytes.workspace = true
 parking_lot.workspace = true
+# v0.7.1: learned driver modes persist to <work_dir>/driver_modes.json.
+serde_json.workspace = true
+
+[dev-dependencies]
+tempfile = "3.12"

crates/dhcp-proxy/src/escalation.rs

@@ -1,24 +1,43 @@
-//! Automatic per-MAC NIC driver-mode escalation (v0.6.1).
+//! Automatic per-MAC boot-binary escalation (v0.6.1, extended v0.7.x).
 //!
 //! OpenPXE serves the firmware-net iPXE build (`snponly`/`undionly`) by
 //! default — it's the most reliable choice for chainloading because the
-//! firmware just proved its network works by downloading the NBP. A minority
+//! firmware just proved its network works by downloading the NBP. Two
-//! of NICs have a missing or buggy firmware UNDI/SNP stack; those clients
+//! classes of machine can't run it:
-//! TFTP the binary fine, but then iPXE can't bring the link up, so the
-//! tell-tale second DHCP DISCOVER carrying the `iPXE` user-class never arrives
-//! and the machine eventually re-PXE-boots.
 //!
-//! We detect exactly that: a *fresh* firmware DISCOVER from a MAC whose
+//! * a minority of NICs have a missing or buggy firmware UNDI/SNP stack —
-//! previous firmware attempt was never confirmed by an iPXE handoff means the
+//!   they TFTP the binary fine but iPXE can't bring the link up;
-//! firmware-net build failed → escalate that MAC to [`DriverMode::Builtin`]
+//! * Secure-Boot firmware downloads it fine but refuses to *execute* an
-//! (iPXE's own NIC drivers). The decision is sticky — once a MAC settles on a
+//!   unsigned image.
-//! mode that completes the handoff, later boots go straight to it. There is no
+//!
-//! operator toggle; it just works, and the default (firmware) path is
+//! Both look identical from here: the tell-tale second DHCP DISCOVER
-//! unchanged so hardware that already boots never regresses.
+//! carrying the `iPXE` user-class never arrives and the machine
+//! re-PXE-boots. So a fresh firmware DISCOVER from a MAC whose previous
+//! attempt was never confirmed climbs one rung:
+//! `Firmware → Builtin → Shim` (the signed shim+GRUB chain). The decision
+//! is sticky; there is no operator toggle; the default path is unchanged
+//! so hardware that already boots never regresses.
+//!
+//! v0.7.1 — **learned modes persist**. Walking the ladder costs one or
+//! two failed boot cycles, so a machine should pay it once *ever*, not
+//! once per idle window or server restart. Two events pin a MAC's mode
+//! to disk (`<work_dir>/driver_modes.json`):
+//!
+//! * a confirmed iPXE handoff at a non-default mode (Builtin proved to
+//!   work — also Shim, via the GRUB→iPXE same-boot chainload);
+//! * reaching the terminal Shim rung (Secure-Boot machines never produce
+//!   an iPXE handoff from the signed menu, so escalation itself is the
+//!   best knowledge we'll ever have).
+//!
+//! Pinned entries are immune to the TTL and reload at startup. The
+//! operator escape hatch is a rules-level driver-mode pin (which
+//! overrides this table entirely) or deleting `driver_modes.json`.
 
 use openpxe_core::DriverMode;
 use parking_lot::Mutex;
 use std::collections::HashMap;
+use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
+use std::sync::Arc;
 use std::time::{Duration, Instant};
 
 /// Multiple DISCOVERs within this window belong to the *same* boot (DHCP
@@ -26,13 +45,14 @@ use std::time::{Duration, Instant};
 /// DISCOVER). They must not be mistaken for a failed-and-retried boot.
 const SAME_BOOT_DEBOUNCE: Duration = Duration::from_secs(8);
 
-/// Forget a MAC's state after this long with no activity, so a transient
+/// Forget an *unpinned* MAC's state after this long with no activity, so
-/// escalation doesn't pin a client to Builtin forever and the map stays
+/// a transient mid-walk state doesn't linger and the map stays bounded.
-/// bounded over a long-running deployment.
+/// Pinned (learned) entries are exempt — that's their whole point.
 const ENTRY_TTL: Duration = Duration::from_mins(30);
 
 /// Hard cap on tracked MACs. Past this we evict the least-recently-seen
-/// entry — escalation is best-effort, never a memory-growth vector.
+/// entry (unpinned first) — escalation is best-effort, never a
+/// memory-growth vector.
 const MAX_ENTRIES: usize = 4096;
 
 /// How often (at most) the whole map is swept for expired entries.
@@ -49,6 +69,8 @@ struct Entry {
     /// confirm it worked. A *new* boot arriving while this is still true means
     /// the previous attempt failed and we should escalate.
     awaiting_confirm: bool,
+    /// Learned mode (v0.7.1): persisted to disk, exempt from the TTL.
+    pinned: bool,
     last_seen: Instant,
 }
 
@@ -72,14 +94,68 @@ impl Default for Inner {
 #[derive(Debug, Default)]
 pub struct DriverEscalation {
     inner: Mutex<Inner>,
+    /// Persistence target for learned modes; `None` = ephemeral (tests).
+    path: Option<Arc<PathBuf>>,
 }
 
 impl DriverEscalation {
+    /// Ephemeral instance (no persistence) — used by tests.
     #[must_use]
     pub fn new() -> Self {
         Self::default()
     }
 
+    /// Instance backed by `<work_dir>/driver_modes.json`. Learned modes
+    /// from previous runs are reloaded as pinned entries; a missing or
+    /// corrupt file starts empty (same crash-cache policy as every other
+    /// store — a bad file must never block PXE).
+    #[must_use]
+    pub fn load_or_default(work_dir: &Path) -> Self {
+        let path = work_dir.join("driver_modes.json");
+        let mut map = HashMap::new();
+        if let Ok(text) = std::fs::read_to_string(&path) {
+            match serde_json::from_str::<HashMap<String, DriverMode>>(&text) {
+                Ok(loaded) => {
+                    let now = Instant::now();
+                    for (mac, mode) in loaded {
+                        // Firmware is the default — persisting it would be
+                        // noise; tolerate it in the file but don't track it.
+                        if mode == DriverMode::Firmware {
+                            continue;
+                        }
+                        map.insert(
+                            mac,
+                            Entry {
+                                mode,
+                                awaiting_confirm: false,
+                                pinned: true,
+                                last_seen: now,
+                            },
+                        );
+                    }
+                    tracing::info!(
+                        target: "openpxe::dhcp",
+                        learned = map.len(),
+                        "loaded learned driver modes"
+                    );
+                }
+                Err(e) => {
+                    tracing::warn!(
+                        target: "openpxe::dhcp",
+                        "driver_modes.json present but unreadable ({e}); starting empty"
+                    );
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        Self {
+            inner: Mutex::new(Inner {
+                map,
+                last_prune: Instant::now(),
+            }),
+            path: Some(Arc::new(path)),
+        }
+    }
+
     /// Decide the driver mode for a firmware (PXEClient/HTTPClient) boot from
     /// `mac`. `primary` is true for the main DHCP DISCOVER (:67) and false for
     /// the PXE Boot Server query (:4011); only the primary path drives
@@ -91,82 +167,150 @@ impl DriverEscalation {
 
     /// Record that `mac` completed the iPXE handoff (a DISCOVER carrying the
     /// `iPXE` user-class). The mode we last served worked, so stop awaiting
-    /// confirmation and keep it sticky for next time.
+    /// confirmation, keep it sticky, and — for non-default modes — pin it to
+    /// disk so the machine never re-walks the ladder (v0.7.1).
     pub fn mark_ipxe_success(&self, mac: &str) {
         self.confirm_at(mac, Instant::now());
     }
 
     fn decide_at(&self, mac: &str, primary: bool, now: Instant) -> DriverMode {
-        let mut g = self.inner.lock();
+        let (mode, snapshot) = {
-        if now.duration_since(g.last_prune) >= PRUNE_INTERVAL {
+            let mut g = self.inner.lock();
-            g.map
+            if now.duration_since(g.last_prune) >= PRUNE_INTERVAL {
-                .retain(|_, e| now.duration_since(e.last_seen) < ENTRY_TTL);
+                g.map
-            g.last_prune = now;
+                    .retain(|_, e| e.pinned || now.duration_since(e.last_seen) < ENTRY_TTL);
-        }
+                g.last_prune = now;
-        // Inline staleness check: a MAC whose entry outlived the TTL starts
+            }
-        // fresh even when the amortized sweep above hasn't caught it yet.
+            // Inline staleness check: an unpinned MAC whose entry outlived
-        if g.map
+            // the TTL starts fresh even when the amortized sweep above
-            .get(mac)
+            // hasn't caught it yet. Pinned entries never go stale.
-            .is_some_and(|e| now.duration_since(e.last_seen) >= ENTRY_TTL)
+            if g.map
-        {
+                .get(mac)
-            g.map.remove(mac);
+                .is_some_and(|e| !e.pinned && now.duration_since(e.last_seen) >= ENTRY_TTL)
-        }
+            {
+                g.map.remove(mac);
+            }
 
-        match g.map.get_mut(mac) {
+            let mut newly_pinned = false;
-            None => {
+            let mode = match g.map.get_mut(mac) {
-                g.map.insert(
+                None => {
-                    mac.to_owned(),
+                    g.map.insert(
-                    Entry {
+                        mac.to_owned(),
-                        mode: DriverMode::Firmware,
+                        Entry {
-                        // Only the primary DISCOVER opens a confirmation window.
+                            mode: DriverMode::Firmware,
-                        awaiting_confirm: primary,
+                            // Only the primary DISCOVER opens a confirmation window.
-                        last_seen: now,
+                            awaiting_confirm: primary,
-                    },
+                            pinned: false,
-                );
+                            last_seen: now,
-                if g.map.len() > MAX_ENTRIES {
+                        },
-                    evict_oldest(&mut g.map);
+                    );
-                }
+                    if g.map.len() > MAX_ENTRIES {
-                DriverMode::Firmware
+                        evict_oldest(&mut g.map);
-            }
-            Some(entry) => {
-                let recent = now.duration_since(entry.last_seen) < SAME_BOOT_DEBOUNCE;
-                if primary && !recent {
-                    // A genuinely new boot. If the previous attempt was never
-                    // confirmed, the build we served failed → climb one rung:
-                    // Firmware (firmware NIC stack) → Builtin (iPXE's own
-                    // drivers) → Shim (signed shim+GRUB, v0.7.0 — covers
-                    // Secure Boot firmware that downloads our unsigned iPXE
-                    // but refuses to execute it). Shim is terminal: a MAC
-                    // there stays until its entry TTLs out and resets.
-                    if entry.awaiting_confirm {
-                        entry.mode = match entry.mode {
-                            DriverMode::Firmware => DriverMode::Builtin,
-                            DriverMode::Builtin | DriverMode::Shim => DriverMode::Shim,
-                        };
                     }
-                    entry.awaiting_confirm = true;
+                    DriverMode::Firmware
                 }
-                entry.last_seen = now;
+                Some(entry) => {
-                entry.mode
+                    let recent = now.duration_since(entry.last_seen) < SAME_BOOT_DEBOUNCE;
-            }
+                    if primary && !recent {
+                        // A genuinely new boot. If the previous attempt was
+                        // never confirmed, the build we served failed → climb
+                        // one rung: Firmware (firmware NIC stack) → Builtin
+                        // (iPXE's own drivers) → Shim (signed shim+GRUB —
+                        // covers Secure Boot firmware that downloads our
+                        // unsigned iPXE but refuses to execute it). Shim is
+                        // terminal and pins to disk: SB machines never emit
+                        // an iPXE handoff from the signed menu, so reaching
+                        // the rung *is* the durable knowledge.
+                        if entry.awaiting_confirm {
+                            entry.mode = match entry.mode {
+                                DriverMode::Firmware => DriverMode::Builtin,
+                                DriverMode::Builtin | DriverMode::Shim => DriverMode::Shim,
+                            };
+                            if entry.mode == DriverMode::Shim && !entry.pinned {
+                                entry.pinned = true;
+                                newly_pinned = true;
+                            }
+                        }
+                        entry.awaiting_confirm = true;
+                    }
+                    entry.last_seen = now;
+                    entry.mode
+                }
+            };
+            (mode, newly_pinned.then(|| pinned_snapshot(&g.map)))
+        };
+        if let Some(s) = snapshot {
+            self.persist(&s);
         }
+        mode
     }
 
     fn confirm_at(&self, mac: &str, now: Instant) {
-        let mut g = self.inner.lock();
+        let snapshot = {
-        if let Some(e) = g.map.get_mut(mac) {
+            let mut g = self.inner.lock();
+            let Some(e) = g.map.get_mut(mac) else {
+                return;
+            };
             e.awaiting_confirm = false;
             e.last_seen = now;
+            // A proven non-default mode is worth remembering forever —
+            // the machine demonstrably can't use the default path.
+            if e.mode != DriverMode::Firmware && !e.pinned {
+                e.pinned = true;
+                Some(pinned_snapshot(&g.map))
+            } else {
+                None
+            }
+        };
+        if let Some(s) = snapshot {
+            self.persist(&s);
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Best-effort atomic write of the learned-mode table. No-op for
+    /// ephemeral instances. Failure logs and moves on — persistence is an
+    /// optimization, never a correctness requirement.
+    fn persist(&self, snapshot: &HashMap<String, DriverMode>) {
+        let Some(path) = &self.path else { return };
+        let body = match serde_json::to_vec_pretty(snapshot) {
+            Ok(b) => b,
+            Err(e) => {
+                tracing::warn!(target: "openpxe::dhcp", "serialize driver_modes.json: {e}");
+                return;
+            }
+        };
+        if let Some(parent) = path.parent() {
+            let _ = std::fs::create_dir_all(parent);
+        }
+        let tmp = path.with_extension("json.tmp");
+        if let Err(e) = std::fs::write(&tmp, body) {
+            tracing::warn!(target: "openpxe::dhcp", "write driver_modes.json tmp: {e}");
+            return;
+        }
+        if let Err(e) = std::fs::rename(&tmp, path.as_path()) {
+            tracing::warn!(target: "openpxe::dhcp", "rename driver_modes.json: {e}");
         }
     }
 }
 
+fn pinned_snapshot(map: &HashMap<String, Entry>) -> HashMap<String, DriverMode> {
+    map.iter()
+        .filter(|(_, e)| e.pinned)
+        .map(|(k, e)| (k.clone(), e.mode))
+        .collect()
+}
+
 fn evict_oldest(map: &mut HashMap<String, Entry>) {
-    if let Some(oldest) = map
+    // Prefer evicting an unpinned entry; only touch learned modes when
-        .iter()
+    // the whole table is pinned (4096 learned machines — at that point
-        .min_by_key(|(_, e)| e.last_seen)
+    // the operator has bigger questions than our memory bound).
-        .map(|(k, _)| k.clone())
+    let pick = |pinned: bool| {
-    {
+        map.iter()
+            .filter(|(_, e)| e.pinned == pinned)
+            .min_by_key(|(_, e)| e.last_seen)
+            .map(|(k, _)| k.clone())
+    };
+    if let Some(oldest) = pick(false).or_else(|| pick(true)) {
         map.remove(&oldest);
     }
 }
@@ -174,6 +318,7 @@ fn evict_oldest(map: &mut HashMap<String, Entry>) {
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests {
     use super::*;
+    use tempfile::tempdir;
 
     #[test]
     fn firmware_first_then_escalates_on_unconfirmed_retry() {
@@ -250,7 +395,7 @@ mod tests {
     }
 
     #[test]
-    fn stale_entry_is_forgotten_and_resets_to_firmware() {
+    fn stale_unpinned_entry_is_forgotten_and_resets_to_firmware() {
         let e = DriverEscalation::new();
         let t0 = Instant::now();
         assert_eq!(e.decide_at("dd", true, t0), DriverMode::Firmware);
@@ -258,8 +403,92 @@ mod tests {
             e.decide_at("dd", true, t0 + Duration::from_mins(1)),
             DriverMode::Builtin
         );
-        // After the TTL with no activity the entry is pruned → fresh firmware.
+        // After the TTL with no activity the (unpinned) Builtin walk is
+        // pruned → fresh firmware. (A *confirmed* Builtin would be pinned
+        // and survive — see learned_builtin_survives_ttl.)
         let later = t0 + Duration::from_mins(1) + ENTRY_TTL + Duration::from_secs(1);
         assert_eq!(e.decide_at("dd", true, later), DriverMode::Firmware);
     }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn shim_pin_survives_ttl() {
+        // v0.7.1: reaching the Shim rung is durable knowledge — the
+        // machine must NOT re-walk the ladder after an idle period.
+        let e = DriverEscalation::new();
+        let t0 = Instant::now();
+        let _ = e.decide_at("ff", true, t0);
+        let _ = e.decide_at("ff", true, t0 + Duration::from_mins(1));
+        assert_eq!(
+            e.decide_at("ff", true, t0 + Duration::from_mins(2)),
+            DriverMode::Shim
+        );
+        let much_later = t0 + Duration::from_mins(2) + ENTRY_TTL + Duration::from_mins(5);
+        assert_eq!(e.decide_at("ff", true, much_later), DriverMode::Shim);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn learned_builtin_survives_ttl() {
+        let e = DriverEscalation::new();
+        let t0 = Instant::now();
+        let _ = e.decide_at("gg", true, t0);
+        assert_eq!(
+            e.decide_at("gg", true, t0 + Duration::from_mins(1)),
+            DriverMode::Builtin
+        );
+        // The handoff confirms Builtin → pinned.
+        e.confirm_at("gg", t0 + Duration::from_secs(61));
+        let much_later = t0 + ENTRY_TTL + Duration::from_mins(10);
+        assert_eq!(e.decide_at("gg", true, much_later), DriverMode::Builtin);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn learned_modes_persist_across_restart() {
+        let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
+        let t0 = Instant::now();
+        {
+            let e = DriverEscalation::load_or_default(dir.path());
+            // Walk one MAC to Shim (pins on escalation)...
+            let _ = e.decide_at("aa:01", true, t0);
+            let _ = e.decide_at("aa:01", true, t0 + Duration::from_mins(1));
+            assert_eq!(
+                e.decide_at("aa:01", true, t0 + Duration::from_mins(2)),
+                DriverMode::Shim
+            );
+            // ...and another to a confirmed Builtin (pins on handoff).
+            let _ = e.decide_at("aa:02", true, t0);
+            let _ = e.decide_at("aa:02", true, t0 + Duration::from_mins(1));
+            e.confirm_at("aa:02", t0 + Duration::from_secs(61));
+        }
+        // "Restart": a fresh instance from the same work_dir knows both.
+        let e2 = DriverEscalation::load_or_default(dir.path());
+        assert_eq!(e2.decide_at("aa:01", true, t0), DriverMode::Shim);
+        assert_eq!(e2.decide_at("aa:02", true, t0), DriverMode::Builtin);
+        // Unlearned MACs still start at the default.
+        assert_eq!(e2.decide_at("aa:03", true, t0), DriverMode::Firmware);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn corrupt_persistence_file_starts_empty() {
+        let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
+        std::fs::write(dir.path().join("driver_modes.json"), b"{broken").unwrap();
+        let e = DriverEscalation::load_or_default(dir.path());
+        assert_eq!(
+            e.decide_at("aa:bb", true, Instant::now()),
+            DriverMode::Firmware
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn confirmed_firmware_is_not_persisted() {
+        // The default mode is never written — the file only carries
+        // exceptions, so a healthy fleet leaves it absent/empty.
+        let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
+        let t0 = Instant::now();
+        {
+            let e = DriverEscalation::load_or_default(dir.path());
+            let _ = e.decide_at("aa:09", true, t0);
+            e.confirm_at("aa:09", t0 + Duration::from_secs(2));
+        }
+        assert!(!dir.path().join("driver_modes.json").exists());
+    }
 }

crates/dhcp-proxy/src/server.rs

@@ -5,7 +5,9 @@ use crate::escalation::DriverEscalation;
 use crate::reply::{build_reply, decide, BootDirective, ReplyContext};
 use dhcproto::v4::{DhcpOption, Message, OptionCode};
 use dhcproto::{Decodable, Decoder, Encodable, Encoder};
-use openpxe_core::{ClientArch, ClientEvent, ClientRegistry, DriverMode, FirmwareClass};
+use openpxe_core::{
+    BootRulesStore, ClientArch, ClientEvent, ClientRegistry, DriverMode, FirmwareClass,
+};
 use socket2::{Domain, Protocol, Socket, Type};
 use std::net::{IpAddr, Ipv4Addr, SocketAddr, SocketAddrV4};
 use std::sync::Arc;
@@ -19,12 +21,19 @@ pub struct DhcpProxyServer {
     public_base_url: String,
     clients: Arc<ClientRegistry>,
     metrics: openpxe_core::Metrics,
-    /// Automatic per-MAC NIC driver-mode escalation (v0.6.1). Shared across
+    /// Automatic per-MAC NIC driver-mode escalation (v0.6.1; persistent
-    /// the :67 and :4011 listener tasks via the server `Arc`.
+    /// learned modes since v0.7.1). Shared across the :67 and :4011
+    /// listener tasks via the server `Arc`. Built by the caller so the
+    /// persistence path comes from the configured work dir.
     escalation: DriverEscalation,
+    /// v0.7.1: boot rules — consulted for an operator driver-mode pin
+    /// (e.g. "this OUI is all Secure Boot → serve shim immediately")
+    /// before the automatic escalation ladder.
+    rules: BootRulesStore,
 }
 
 impl DhcpProxyServer {
+    #[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
     pub fn new(
         bind: IpAddr,
         dhcp_port: u16,
@@ -33,6 +42,8 @@ impl DhcpProxyServer {
         public_base_url: String,
         clients: Arc<ClientRegistry>,
         metrics: openpxe_core::Metrics,
+        escalation: DriverEscalation,
+        rules: BootRulesStore,
     ) -> Self {
         Self {
             bind,
@@ -42,7 +53,8 @@ impl DhcpProxyServer {
             public_base_url,
             clients,
             metrics,
-            escalation: DriverEscalation::new(),
+            escalation,
+            rules,
         }
     }
 
@@ -142,9 +154,17 @@ impl DhcpProxyServer {
                 self.escalation.mark_ipxe_success(&mac);
                 DriverMode::Firmware // unused: this path serves the HTTP script
             }
-            FirmwareClass::PxeClient | FirmwareClass::HttpClient => self
+            FirmwareClass::PxeClient | FirmwareClass::HttpClient => {
-                .escalation
+                // v0.7.1: an operator rule pin wins over (and bypasses)
-                .mode_for_firmware_attempt(&mac, label == "67"),
+                // the automatic escalation ladder — known Secure-Boot
+                // fleets boot the signed chain on the very first cycle.
+                if let Some(pinned) = self.rules.driver_mode_hint(&mac, Some(arch.as_str())) {
+                    pinned
+                } else {
+                    self.escalation
+                        .mode_for_firmware_attempt(&mac, label == "67")
+                }
+            }
             // Unreachable: FirmwareClass::Other returned above.
             FirmwareClass::Other => DriverMode::Firmware,
         };

crates/http-api/Cargo.toml

@@ -25,11 +25,9 @@ time.workspace = true
 axum.workspace = true
 tower.workspace = true
 tower-http.workspace = true
-hyper.workspace = true
 serde.workspace = true
 serde_json.workspace = true
 tracing.workspace = true
-thiserror.workspace = true
 anyhow.workspace = true
 bytes.workspace = true
 futures.workspace = true
@@ -49,6 +47,10 @@ base64.workspace = true
 tokio = { workspace = true, features = ["macros", "rt", "rt-multi-thread", "time"] }
 tower = { workspace = true }
 tempfile = "3.12"
+# v0.7.4: probe-based introspection verifies kernel paths against the
+# real ISO9660 tree, so the full-flow tests synthesize images with the
+# shared test builder instead of label-only blobs.
+openpxe-iso-store = { workspace = true, features = ["test-image"] }
 serde_json = { workspace = true }
 time = { workspace = true }
 # v0.4.61: integration tests need to generate real PNG bytes for the

crates/http-api/src/app.rs

@@ -19,7 +19,6 @@ use crate::ipxe_script::{
     render_entry, render_family_menu, render_local_hdd, render_menu, render_nic_info,
     render_queue_entry, render_shell, render_tools_menu, render_util,
 };
-use crate::iso_fs;
 use crate::log_stream;
 use crate::state::AppState;
 use crate::terminal;
@@ -36,6 +35,7 @@ use openpxe_core::{
     LogoSlot, NotifyConfig, Settings, SsoConfig, ALLOWED_LOGO_MIMES, MAX_LOGO_BYTES,
 };
 use openpxe_ipxe_assets::asset_slice;
+use openpxe_iso_store::iso_fs;
 use openpxe_iso_store::{
     render_template, IsoCategory, IsoMeta, IsoSource, NfsAddRequest, SftpAddRequest, SmbAddRequest,
     SmbState, UnattendedKind, UnattendedMeta,
@@ -147,6 +147,14 @@ pub fn build_router(state: AppState) -> Router {
         .route("/api/logout", post(auth_api::api_logout))
         .route("/api/me", get(auth_api::api_me))
         .route("/api/me/credentials", put(auth_api::api_update_credentials))
+        // v0.8.0: operator API key surface (read current + regenerate).
+        // Gated by require_auth like the rest of /api/*; a logged-in
+        // operator or an x-api-key holder can read/rotate it.
+        .route("/api/api-key", get(auth_api::api_api_key_get))
+        .route(
+            "/api/api-key/regenerate",
+            post(auth_api::api_api_key_regenerate),
+        )
         // SAML SSO configuration (FleetDM-shaped). Gated behind auth — the
         // operator pastes their IdP metadata, Entity ID, and toggles here.
         .route("/api/sso", get(api_sso_get).put(api_sso_put))
@@ -1087,28 +1095,105 @@ async fn iso_file(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
     AxumPath((id, path)): AxumPath<(String, String)>,
 ) -> Response {
-    // In-ISO file extraction is only supported for local ISOs — it
+    let Some(meta) = state.iso_store.get(&id) else {
-    // needs random-access reads into the ISO9660 directory tree, which
-    // smbclient's whole-file streaming can't do efficiently. SMB-
-    // sourced ISOs use the raw streaming endpoint above instead.
-    let Some(iso_path) = state.iso_store.iso_path_for(&id) else {
         return (StatusCode::NOT_FOUND, "no such iso").into_response();
     };
-    let p = iso_path.clone();
     let in_path = format!("/{path}");
-    let loc = tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || iso_fs::lookup(&p, &in_path))
+    match &meta.source {
-        .await
+        IsoSource::Local => {
-        .ok()
+            let Some(iso_path) = state.iso_store.local_path(&meta) else {
-        .flatten();
+                return (StatusCode::NOT_FOUND, "no such iso").into_response();
-    let Some(loc) = loc else {
+            };
-        return (StatusCode::NOT_FOUND, "not found inside iso").into_response();
+            let p = iso_path.clone();
-    };
+            let loc = tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || iso_fs::lookup_local(&p, &in_path))
-    match stream_byte_range(&iso_path, loc.offset, loc.length).await {
+                .await
-        Ok(r) => r,
+                .ok()
-        Err(e) => (StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR, format!("{e}")).into_response(),
+                .flatten();
+            let Some(loc) = loc else {
+                return (StatusCode::NOT_FOUND, "not found inside iso").into_response();
+            };
+            match stream_byte_range(&iso_path, loc.offset, loc.length).await {
+                Ok(r) => r,
+                Err(e) => (StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR, format!("{e}")).into_response(),
+            }
+        }
+        // v0.7.4: remote ISOs serve in-ISO files too — the same ISO9660
+        // walk runs over NFS READ3 / SFTP seek-reads, then the located
+        // byte range streams through the share manager. This is what
+        // makes the verified kernel/initrd boot entries on share-hosted
+        // Linux ISOs actually bootable.
+        IsoSource::Nfs {
+            share_id,
+            relative_path,
+        } => {
+            match state
+                .nfs_shares
+                .locate_in_iso(share_id, relative_path, &in_path)
+                .await
+            {
+                Ok(Some(loc)) => {
+                    match state
+                        .nfs_shares
+                        .stream_iso(share_id, relative_path, loc.offset, Some(loc.length))
+                        .await
+                    {
+                        Ok(stream) => in_iso_stream_response(Body::from_stream(stream), loc.length),
+                        Err(e) => {
+                            (StatusCode::BAD_GATEWAY, format!("nfs stream: {e}")).into_response()
+                        }
+                    }
+                }
+                Ok(None) => (StatusCode::NOT_FOUND, "not found inside iso").into_response(),
+                Err(e) => (StatusCode::BAD_GATEWAY, format!("nfs lookup: {e}")).into_response(),
+            }
+        }
+        IsoSource::Sftp {
+            share_id,
+            relative_path,
+        } => {
+            match state
+                .sftp_shares
+                .locate_in_iso(share_id, relative_path, &in_path)
+                .await
+            {
+                Ok(Some(loc)) => {
+                    match state
+                        .sftp_shares
+                        .stream_iso(share_id, relative_path, loc.offset, Some(loc.length))
+                        .await
+                    {
+                        Ok(stream) => in_iso_stream_response(Body::from_stream(stream), loc.length),
+                        Err(e) => {
+                            (StatusCode::BAD_GATEWAY, format!("sftp stream: {e}")).into_response()
+                        }
+                    }
+                }
+                Ok(None) => (StatusCode::NOT_FOUND, "not found inside iso").into_response(),
+                Err(e) => (StatusCode::BAD_GATEWAY, format!("sftp lookup: {e}")).into_response(),
+            }
+        }
+        // smbclient streams sequentially — no seeks, no ISO9660 walk.
+        // SMB ISOs never emit kernel entries, so nothing requests this.
+        IsoSource::Smb { .. } => (
+            StatusCode::NOT_FOUND,
+            "in-ISO files are not available for SMB-sourced ISOs",
+        )
+            .into_response(),
     }
 }
 
+/// 200 response wrapping an in-ISO byte-range stream from a share
+/// manager. Content-Length is the located file's length — the stream is
+/// already bounded to exactly that range.
+fn in_iso_stream_response(body: Body, length: u64) -> Response {
+    Response::builder()
+        .status(StatusCode::OK)
+        .header(header::CONTENT_TYPE, "application/octet-stream")
+        .header(header::CONTENT_LENGTH, length)
+        .body(body)
+        .unwrap()
+}
+
 async fn stream_file_range(
     path: &std::path::Path,
     range: Option<&HeaderValue>,
@@ -1867,6 +1952,10 @@ async fn api_docs() -> Json<serde_json::Value> {
                      "summary": "Auth status — { setup_required, authenticated, user }. Always 200."},
                     {"method": "PUT", "path": "/api/me/credentials",
                      "summary": "Rotate the admin's credentials. Body: { current_password, new_username?, new_password? }. Revokes all other sessions on success."},
+                    {"method": "GET", "path": "/api/api-key",
+                     "summary": "Return the operator API key + the header to send it in (x-api-key). That header authenticates API calls without a browser session — full operator access."},
+                    {"method": "POST", "path": "/api/api-key/regenerate",
+                     "summary": "Mint a fresh API key, invalidating the previous one immediately."},
                 ],
             },
             {
@@ -2744,6 +2833,7 @@ async fn api_network(State(state): State<AppState>) -> Json<serde_json::Value> {
             .strip_prefix("http://")
             .unwrap_or(&state.public_base_url),
         "nic_name":   state.nic_name,
+        "nic_link":   state.nic_link,
         "subnet_mask": state.subnet_mask,
         "gateway":     state.gateway,
         "dns_server":  state.settings.snapshot().dns_server,

crates/http-api/src/auth.rs

@@ -52,6 +52,12 @@ const SESSION_TTL: Duration = Duration::from_hours(24);
 /// to avoid collisions with anything else sharing the host.
 pub const SESSION_COOKIE: &str = "openpxe_session";
 
+/// Header an API client sends to authenticate without a browser session.
+/// Matches the de-facto `x-api-key` convention operators already use with
+/// other appliances. A valid key grants the same access as a logged-in
+/// operator. See [`crate::state::AppState::api_key`].
+pub const API_KEY_HEADER: &str = "x-api-key";
+
 #[derive(Debug, Clone)]
 struct Session {
     username: String,
@@ -223,13 +229,18 @@ pub async fn require_auth(
     if is_public_path(path) {
         return next.run(req).await;
     }
-    // Authenticated path. The cookie must be present, map to a live
+    // Authenticated path: either a live operator session cookie (the
-    // session, and the TTL refresh happens as a side-effect.
+    // browser) or the x-api-key header (scripts / Postman). Touching the
-    let token = parse_cookie(req.headers());
+    // cookie refreshes its idle TTL as a side-effect.
-    if let Some(t) = token {
+    let session_ok =
-        if state.sessions.touch(&t).is_some() {
+        parse_cookie(req.headers()).is_some_and(|t| state.sessions.touch(&t).is_some());
-            return next.run(req).await;
+    let key_ok = req
-        }
+        .headers()
+        .get(API_KEY_HEADER)
+        .and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
+        .is_some_and(|k| state.api_key.verify(k));
+    if session_ok || key_ok {
+        return next.run(req).await;
     }
     (
         StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED,
@@ -447,6 +458,28 @@ pub async fn api_update_credentials(
     }
 }
 
+/// Return the current operator API key plus the header to send it in.
+/// Gated by the auth middleware, so only a logged-in operator (or a
+/// caller already holding the key) can read it.
+pub async fn api_api_key_get(State(state): State<AppState>) -> Response {
+    (
+        StatusCode::OK,
+        Json(json!({ "key": state.api_key.current(), "header": API_KEY_HEADER })),
+    )
+        .into_response()
+}
+
+/// Mint a fresh operator API key, invalidating the previous one, and
+/// return it. Same gating as the GET.
+pub async fn api_api_key_regenerate(State(state): State<AppState>) -> Response {
+    let key = state.api_key.regenerate();
+    (
+        StatusCode::OK,
+        Json(json!({ "key": key, "header": API_KEY_HEADER })),
+    )
+        .into_response()
+}
+
 #[derive(Debug, Serialize)]
 struct LoginPayload<'a> {
     user: &'a AdminPublic,

crates/http-api/src/grub_script.rs

@@ -35,6 +35,24 @@ pub fn render_grub_menu(isos: &[IsoMeta], base_url: &str) -> String {
     let dev = grub_http_device(base);
     let mut s = String::new();
     let _ = writeln!(s, "# OpenPXE — Secure Boot menu (signed shim+GRUB chain)");
+    // v0.7.1: before showing the limited signed menu, try to hand the
+    // boot back to full iPXE *in this same boot cycle*. With Secure Boot
+    // OFF the chainload succeeds and the client gets the complete iPXE
+    // feature set (sanboot, wimboot, the full menu) despite having been
+    // escalated here. With Secure Boot ON, shim's verifier refuses the
+    // unsigned image INLINE — no reboot, no failed cycle — and execution
+    // falls through to the signed menu below. The all-drivers build is
+    // used because a MAC only lands here after the firmware-net build
+    // already failed once.
+    let _ = writeln!(s, "if [ \"$grub_cpu\" = \"arm64\" ]; then");
+    let _ = writeln!(s, "    set openpxe_ipxe=ipxe-arm64.efi");
+    let _ = writeln!(s, "else");
+    let _ = writeln!(s, "    set openpxe_ipxe=ipxe.efi");
+    let _ = writeln!(s, "fi");
+    let _ = writeln!(s, "if chainloader {dev}/ipxe/$openpxe_ipxe ; then");
+    let _ = writeln!(s, "    boot");
+    let _ = writeln!(s, "fi");
+    let _ = writeln!(s);
     let _ = writeln!(s, "set timeout=30");
     let _ = writeln!(s, "set default=0");
     let _ = writeln!(s);
@@ -139,6 +157,24 @@ mod tests {
         assert!(cfg.contains("Boot from local disk"), "{cfg}");
     }
 
+    #[test]
+    fn config_tries_ipxe_chainload_before_menu() {
+        // v0.7.1: SB-off machines recover full iPXE in the same boot;
+        // SB-on machines fail the chainload inline and reach the menu.
+        let cfg = render_grub_menu(&[linux_iso()], "http://10.0.0.5:8080");
+        let chain_pos = cfg
+            .find("if chainloader (http,10.0.0.5:8080)/ipxe/$openpxe_ipxe ; then")
+            .expect("chainload attempt missing");
+        let menu_pos = cfg.find("menuentry").expect("menu missing");
+        assert!(
+            chain_pos < menu_pos,
+            "chainload must precede the menu:\n{cfg}"
+        );
+        // Arch-conditional binary selection via GRUB's $grub_cpu.
+        assert!(cfg.contains("set openpxe_ipxe=ipxe-arm64.efi"), "{cfg}");
+        assert!(cfg.contains("set openpxe_ipxe=ipxe.efi"), "{cfg}");
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn sanboot_and_wimboot_entries_are_omitted() {
         let mut iso = linux_iso();

crates/http-api/src/iso_fs.rs

@@ -1,135 +0,0 @@
-//! Minimal read-only ISO9660 lookup. Given an uploaded ISO file and an
-//! in-ISO path (e.g. `/casper/vmlinuz`), locate the file and return a
-//! `(start_byte, length_bytes)` pair so the HTTP handler can stream just
-//! that range from the on-disk ISO without full extraction.
-//!
-//! We only implement what we need: the Primary Volume Descriptor and Rock
-//! Ridge / Joliet extensions are ignored. Paths are matched case-insensitive
-//! against plain ISO9660 filenames (uppercase, `;1` version suffix stripped).
-//! This is sufficient for the kernel/initrd and wimboot files we serve;
-//! if a requested path isn't found, the handler returns 404 and the user
-//! can still download the whole ISO via `/iso/<id>.iso`.
-
-use std::io::{Read, Seek, SeekFrom};
-use std::path::Path;
-
-const SECTOR: u64 = 2048;
-
-#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
-pub struct FileLocation {
-    pub offset: u64,
-    pub length: u64,
-}
-
-/// Look up `in_iso_path` (leading slash optional, case-insensitive) in the
-/// ISO at `iso_path`. Returns None on any parsing or IO failure.
-pub fn lookup(iso_path: &Path, in_iso_path: &str) -> Option<FileLocation> {
-    let mut f = std::fs::File::open(iso_path).ok()?;
-    let root = read_root_directory(&mut f)?;
-    let components: Vec<&str> = in_iso_path
-        .trim_start_matches('/')
-        .split('/')
-        .filter(|c| !c.is_empty())
-        .collect();
-    if components.is_empty() {
-        return None;
-    }
-    walk(&mut f, root.offset, root.length, &components)
-}
-
-fn read_root_directory(f: &mut std::fs::File) -> Option<FileLocation> {
-    // Primary Volume Descriptor at LBA 16.
-    let mut pvd = [0u8; 2048];
-    f.seek(SeekFrom::Start(16 * SECTOR)).ok()?;
-    f.read_exact(&mut pvd).ok()?;
-    if pvd[0] != 0x01 || &pvd[1..6] != b"CD001" {
-        return None;
-    }
-    // Root directory record is at offset 156, length 34.
-    let rec = &pvd[156..156 + 34];
-    let (offset, length) = parse_dir_record_ext(rec)?;
-    Some(FileLocation {
-        offset: offset * SECTOR,
-        length,
-    })
-}
-
-/// Walk components down the directory tree starting at `dir_offset`.
-fn walk(
-    f: &mut std::fs::File,
-    dir_offset: u64,
-    dir_len: u64,
-    components: &[&str],
-) -> Option<FileLocation> {
-    let mut dir = vec![0u8; dir_len as usize];
-    f.seek(SeekFrom::Start(dir_offset)).ok()?;
-    f.read_exact(&mut dir).ok()?;
-
-    let target = components[0];
-    let rest = &components[1..];
-    let mut i = 0;
-    while i < dir.len() {
-        let len = dir[i] as usize;
-        if len == 0 {
-            // Padding to sector boundary.
-            let next = (i / SECTOR as usize + 1) * SECTOR as usize;
-            if next <= i {
-                break;
-            }
-            i = next;
-            continue;
-        }
-        if i + len > dir.len() {
-            break;
-        }
-        let rec = &dir[i..i + len];
-        let name = dir_record_name(rec);
-        let is_dir = (rec.get(25).copied().unwrap_or(0) & 0x02) != 0;
-        // Skip "." (0x00) and ".." (0x01) pseudo-entries.
-        let is_pseudo = matches!(rec.get(32).copied(), Some(1))
-            && rec.get(33).copied() == Some(0x00)
-            || matches!(rec.get(32).copied(), Some(1)) && rec.get(33).copied() == Some(0x01);
-        if !is_pseudo && name.eq_ignore_ascii_case(target) {
-            let (child_off, child_len) = parse_dir_record_ext(rec)?;
-            if rest.is_empty() && !is_dir {
-                return Some(FileLocation {
-                    offset: child_off * SECTOR,
-                    length: child_len,
-                });
-            } else if !rest.is_empty() && is_dir {
-                return walk(f, child_off * SECTOR, child_len, rest);
-            }
-        }
-        i += len;
-    }
-    None
-}
-
-/// Extract (extent LBA, data length in bytes) from a directory record.
-/// Layout per ISO9660: bytes 2..10 extent LBA (LE+BE duplicate), 10..18
-/// data length (LE+BE duplicate). We trust the little-endian copy.
-fn parse_dir_record_ext(rec: &[u8]) -> Option<(u64, u64)> {
-    if rec.len() < 34 {
-        return None;
-    }
-    let lba = u32::from_le_bytes(rec[2..6].try_into().ok()?) as u64;
-    let len = u32::from_le_bytes(rec[10..14].try_into().ok()?) as u64;
-    Some((lba, len))
-}
-
-/// Extract the identifier from a directory record, stripping ISO9660's
-/// `;1` version suffix.
-fn dir_record_name(rec: &[u8]) -> String {
-    let name_len = *rec.get(32).unwrap_or(&0) as usize;
-    if name_len == 0 || rec.len() < 33 + name_len {
-        return String::new();
-    }
-    let raw = &rec[33..33 + name_len];
-    let s = String::from_utf8_lossy(raw).to_string();
-    // Strip `;N` version suffix.
-    if let Some(i) = s.rfind(';') {
-        s[..i].to_string()
-    } else {
-        s
-    }
-}

crates/http-api/src/lib.rs

@@ -9,8 +9,9 @@
 //!     and Linux kernel/initrd, without having to
 //!     re-extract on every request)
 //!
-//! The `<id>/<path>` handler uses a read-only ISO9660 shim (see `iso_fs`)
+//! The `<id>/<path>` handler uses the read-only ISO9660 walker from
-//! that lseeks into the ISO on disk — so we never keep extracted copies.
+//! `openpxe_iso_store::iso_fs` — seeking into the image wherever it
+//! lives (local disk, NFS, SFTP), so we never keep extracted copies.
 #![forbid(unsafe_code)]
 
 pub mod app;
@@ -18,7 +19,6 @@ pub mod auth;
 pub mod error;
 pub mod grub_script;
 pub mod ipxe_script;
-pub mod iso_fs;
 pub mod log_stream;
 pub mod notify;
 pub mod saml_routes;

crates/http-api/src/state.rs

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ use crate::auth::SessionStore;
 use crate::saml_routes::SamlRuntime;
 use crate::uploads::UploadSessions;
 use openpxe_core::{
-    AdminStore, BootLog, BootRulesStore, BootTokens, BrandingStore, ClientRegistry,
+    AdminStore, ApiKeyStore, BootLog, BootRulesStore, BootTokens, BrandingStore, ClientRegistry,
     DeploymentQueue, HostBindings, LogBus, Metrics, NotifyStore, SettingsStore, SsoStore,
 };
 use openpxe_iso_store::{
@@ -55,6 +55,11 @@ pub struct AppState {
     /// process restart (sessions are tied to UI state, not persisted —
     /// matches Sonarr/Radarr behaviour).
     pub sessions: SessionStore,
+    /// v0.8.0: persisted operator API key. A request carrying a matching
+    /// `x-api-key` header authenticates exactly like an operator session,
+    /// so scripts / Postman can drive `/api/*` without a browser login.
+    /// Generated on first run; regenerable from Settings → Advanced.
+    pub api_key: ApiKeyStore,
     /// SAML SSO configuration (persisted IdP metadata, Entity ID, toggles).
     pub sso: SsoStore,
     /// v0.5.1: in-memory SAML runtime state — outstanding AuthnRequest IDs
@@ -116,6 +121,10 @@ pub struct AppState {
     /// `enp1s0`). Surfaced read-only on the Network tab. Empty if the
     /// interface couldn't be identified.
     pub nic_name: String,
+    /// v0.7.2: physical link summary for that NIC (operstate, speed,
+    /// duplex, port MAC) — read from sysfs at startup; empty where
+    /// unavailable. Helps confirm which port answers PXE.
+    pub nic_link: String,
     /// Subnet mask of the public interface in dotted-quad form.
     pub subnet_mask: String,
     /// Default gateway IPv4 address.

crates/http-api/tests/full_flow.rs

@@ -18,23 +18,16 @@ use openpxe_iso_store::{IsoStore, NfsShareManager, SftpShareManager, SmbShareMan
 use tempfile::tempdir;
 use tower::ServiceExt;
 
-/// Build a tiny valid ISO9660 blob with volume label "ALPINE-TEST" so
+/// Build a tiny Alpine-shaped ISO9660 image: volume label "ALPINE-TEST"
-/// introspection identifies it as Alpine.
+/// plus the real `/boot/vmlinuz-lts` + `/boot/initramfs-lts` tree.
+/// v0.7.4's probe-based introspection verifies those paths exist before
+/// emitting a kernel boot entry — a label-only blob no longer counts.
 fn fake_alpine_iso() -> Vec<u8> {
-    let mut buf = vec![0u8; 32 * 2048];
+    openpxe_iso_store::iso_fs::testiso::TestIsoBuilder::new("ALPINE-TEST")
-    let off = 16 * 2048;
+        .el_torito(true)
-    buf[off] = 0x01;
+        .file("/boot/vmlinuz-lts", b"fake-kernel-bytes")
-    buf[off + 1..off + 6].copy_from_slice(b"CD001");
+        .file("/boot/initramfs-lts", b"fake-initramfs-bytes")
-    buf[off + 6] = 0x01;
+        .build()
-    let label = b"ALPINE-TEST".to_vec();
-    let mut padded = label.clone();
-    padded.resize(32, b' ');
-    buf[off + 40..off + 40 + 32].copy_from_slice(&padded);
-    let term = 17 * 2048;
-    buf[term] = 0xFF;
-    buf[term + 1..term + 6].copy_from_slice(b"CD001");
-    buf[term + 6] = 0x01;
-    buf
 }
 
 fn multipart_iso_body(filename: &str, bytes: &[u8]) -> (String, Vec<u8>) {
@@ -106,6 +99,7 @@ async fn build_state() -> (AppState, tempfile::TempDir) {
     let admin = openpxe_core::AdminStore::load_or_default(dir.path());
     let sso = openpxe_core::SsoStore::load_or_default(dir.path());
     let notify = openpxe_core::NotifyStore::load_or_default(dir.path());
+    let api_key = openpxe_core::ApiKeyStore::load_or_init(dir.path());
     let sessions = openpxe_http_api::auth::SessionStore::default();
     let metrics = Metrics::new();
     let state = AppState {
@@ -121,6 +115,7 @@ async fn build_state() -> (AppState, tempfile::TempDir) {
         pxe_bg_cache: openpxe_http_api::state::PxeBgCache::default(),
         admin,
         sessions,
+        api_key,
         sso,
         saml: openpxe_http_api::saml_routes::SamlRuntime::default(),
         notify,
@@ -135,12 +130,67 @@ async fn build_state() -> (AppState, tempfile::TempDir) {
         started_at: time::OffsetDateTime::now_utc(),
         public_base_url: "http://127.0.0.1".into(),
         nic_name: "lo".into(),
+        nic_link: String::new(),
         subnet_mask: "255.0.0.0".into(),
         gateway: "127.0.0.1".into(),
     };
     (state, dir)
 }
 
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn api_key_authenticates_gated_endpoints() {
+    // v0.8.0: the x-api-key header authenticates /api/* like an operator
+    // session. The middleware only enforces once an admin is configured
+    // (before that everything is open), so bootstrap one first.
+    let (state, _dir) = build_state().await;
+    state
+        .admin
+        .bootstrap("admin", "correct-horse-battery-staple")
+        .unwrap();
+    let key = state.api_key.current();
+    let app = build_router(state);
+
+    // No credentials → 401.
+    let res = app
+        .clone()
+        .oneshot(
+            Request::builder()
+                .uri("/api/isos")
+                .body(Body::empty())
+                .unwrap(),
+        )
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED, "no auth must 401");
+
+    // Wrong key → 401.
+    let res = app
+        .clone()
+        .oneshot(
+            Request::builder()
+                .uri("/api/isos")
+                .header("x-api-key", "not-the-key")
+                .body(Body::empty())
+                .unwrap(),
+        )
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED, "wrong key must 401");
+
+    // Correct key → 200 (operator-equivalent access).
+    let res = app
+        .oneshot(
+            Request::builder()
+                .uri("/api/isos")
+                .header("x-api-key", key)
+                .body(Body::empty())
+                .unwrap(),
+        )
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::OK, "valid key must authenticate");
+}
+
 #[tokio::test]
 async fn health_and_ready_endpoints() {
     let (state, _dir) = build_state().await;
@@ -1247,9 +1297,10 @@ async fn chunked_upload_writes_progressively_and_finishes_iso() {
                 .method("POST")
                 .uri("/api/uploads")
                 .header("content-type", "application/json")
-                .body(Body::from(
+                .body(Body::from(format!(
-                    r#"{"filename":"chunked-alpine.iso","size_bytes":65536}"#,
+                    r#"{{"filename":"chunked-alpine.iso","size_bytes":{}}}"#,
-                ))
+                    iso.len()
+                )))
                 .unwrap(),
         )
         .await
@@ -2751,3 +2802,23 @@ async fn arch_selective_rule_ignores_other_arches() {
     assert_eq!(s, StatusCode::OK);
     assert!(String::from_utf8_lossy(&b).contains("boot rule -> fake-alpine-linux"));
 }
+
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn boot_rule_driver_mode_pin_round_trips_via_api() {
+    // v0.7.1: a rule may pin only a boot binary (no target) — the API
+    // must persist and return it for the DHCP proxy to consult.
+    let (state, _dir) = build_state().await;
+    let app = build_router(state.clone());
+    let cfg = r#"{"rules":[{"mac_prefix":"aa:bb:cc","arch":"","target":"","driver_mode":"shim","enabled":true,"note":"SB rack"}],"webhook_url":""}"#;
+    let (s, _) = put_json(&app, "/api/boot-rules", cfg).await;
+    assert_eq!(s, StatusCode::NO_CONTENT);
+    let (s, b) = get(&app, "/api/boot-rules").await;
+    assert_eq!(s, StatusCode::OK);
+    let v: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_slice(&b).unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(v["rules"][0]["driver_mode"], "shim");
+    // And the store the DHCP proxy shares resolves the pin.
+    assert_eq!(
+        state.boot_rules.driver_mode_hint("aa:bb:cc:00:00:07", None),
+        Some(openpxe_core::DriverMode::Shim)
+    );
+}

crates/ipxe-assets/Cargo.toml

@@ -13,4 +13,3 @@ workspace = true
 openpxe-core.workspace = true
 rust-embed.workspace = true
 tracing.workspace = true
-thiserror.workspace = true

crates/iso-store/Cargo.toml

@@ -12,16 +12,13 @@ workspace = true
 [dependencies]
 openpxe-core.workspace = true
 tokio = { workspace = true }
-tokio-util = { workspace = true }
 serde.workspace = true
 serde_json.workspace = true
 tracing.workspace = true
-thiserror.workspace = true
 anyhow.workspace = true
 sha2.workspace = true
 hex.workspace = true
 bcrypt.workspace = true
-uuid.workspace = true
 time.workspace = true
 parking_lot.workspace = true
 bytes.workspace = true
@@ -49,3 +46,11 @@ futures = { workspace = true }
 
 [dev-dependencies]
 tempfile = "3.12"
+
+[features]
+# v0.7.4: exposes the in-memory ISO9660 test-image builder
+# (`iso_fs::testiso`) to other crates' integration tests, so http-api's
+# full-flow tests can synthesize ISOs with real directory trees — the
+# probe-based introspection no longer classifies label-only blobs.
+# Never enabled in production builds.
+test-image = []

crates/iso-store/src/introspect.rs

@@ -1,16 +1,33 @@
 //! ISO introspection — identify the distro family and locate kernel/initrd.
 //!
-//! We avoid a full ISO9660/Joliet/Rock-Ridge parser by reading a small number
+//! v0.7.4 rewrite: detection is **probe-based**. Instead of grepping raw
-//! of well-known files via `isoinfo` (from cdrtools/genisoimage) when it's on
+//! sectors for filename strings (which false-positived — any Linux ISO
-//! the path. As a pure-Rust fallback we do a crude scan: read the volume
+//! shipping GRUB/syslinux chainload modules contains the literal
-//! descriptor at offset 0x8000 to grab the volume label, and grep for known
+//! "bootmgr", so gparted-live classified as Windows), we walk the
-//! filenames by scanning raw sectors — good enough to tell Debian from RHEL
+//! ISO9660 directory tree via [`crate::iso_fs`] and check whether the
-//! most of the time, without shelling out.
+//! well-known boot files actually exist. The same probes run over local
+//! files and remote NFS/SFTP shares — remote ISOs finally classify
+//! instead of registering as `Unknown`.
 //!
-//! The returned `IntrospectionReport` is what `BootEntry`s get generated from.
+//! Layered, first-decisive-answer-wins:
+//!   1. PVD volume label → family hint.
+//!   2. El Torito boot-catalog presence (the "bootable at all" signal).
+//!   3. `/sources/boot.wim` directory probe → Windows install media.
+//!   4. Linux probe table → verified kernel+initrd paths. A probe match
+//!      both classifies the family and (for the families whose boot
+//!      arguments we render) yields kernel paths that are *known to
+//!      exist* — no more guessed paths that 404 at boot.
+//!   5. Bulk byte scan for UDF Windows markers — local images only
+//!      (modern Windows ISOs hide their tree from ISO9660; remote scans
+//!      skip this so a share rescan doesn't stream 16 MiB per ISO).
+//!   6. Filename tokens — the last-resort hint, and the only signal
+//!      available for SMB shares (smbclient cannot seek).
+//!
+//! The returned `IntrospectionReport` is what `BootEntry`s get generated
+//! from.
 
+use crate::iso_fs::{self, CachingReadAt, FileReadAt, IsoReadAt, SECTOR};
 use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
-use std::io::{Read, Seek, SeekFrom};
 use std::path::Path;
 
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize, Default)]
@@ -30,18 +47,35 @@ pub enum DistroFamily {
 /// re-classify already-uploaded ISOs. On startup the store re-runs
 /// `introspect` on any *local* ISO whose persisted report predates this
 /// revision (see `IsoStore::load_from_disk`), so an upgrade fixes stale
-/// metadata — e.g. a Windows 11 ISO tagged `Unknown` by an older binary —
+/// metadata without the operator having to delete and re-upload.
-/// without the operator having to delete and re-upload it.
 ///
 /// rev 1 (v0.5.9): added El Torito boot-catalog detection + broadened
-/// Windows (UDF/UTF-16) detection becomes retroactive.
+/// Windows (UDF/UTF-16) detection.
-pub const INTROSPECT_REV: u32 = 1;
+/// rev 2 (v0.7.4): probe-based detection. Fixes Linux live ISOs that
+/// classified as Windows via the raw "bootmgr" byte grep, verifies
+/// kernel/initrd paths exist before emitting them, and adds the Debian
+/// live / netinst / CoreOS shapes. Remote (NFS/SFTP) introspection
+/// caches key off this rev too, so the cache self-invalidates.
+/// rev 3 (v0.7.5): Joliet namespace fallback + gap-tolerant El Torito /
+/// descriptor scans. Without this bump, images the rev-2 logic flagged
+/// as data ISOs (mangled-primary appliance images, filler-sector boot
+/// records) would never re-probe and stay mislabeled.
+/// rev 4 (v0.8.0): dropped the over-broad "microsoft" UTF-16 bulk-scan
+/// marker that classified any Secure-Boot-signed non-Windows bootable
+/// (memtest86, signed BSDs, firmware tools) as Windows — the string
+/// lives in the FAT long-filename entries of their MS-signed EFI loader.
+/// The bump re-probes those so they drop the bogus Windows label.
+pub const INTROSPECT_REV: u32 = 4;
 
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, Serialize, Deserialize)]
 pub struct IntrospectionReport {
     pub family: DistroFamily,
     pub volume_label: Option<String>,
-    /// Kernel path inside the ISO (e.g. `/casper/vmlinuz`, `/isolinux/vmlinuz`).
+    /// Kernel path inside the ISO (e.g. `/casper/vmlinuz`). v0.7.4: only
+    /// set when the path was verified to exist *and* the family's boot
+    /// arguments are known-good for direct kernel boot; families we can
+    /// only classify (Debian live, CoreOS live) leave it `None` so the
+    /// entry generator falls back to sanboot instead of a broken boot.
     pub kernel_path: Option<String>,
     /// Initrd path(s) inside the ISO. May be multiple for multi-initrd setups.
     pub initrd_paths: Vec<String>,
@@ -55,124 +89,245 @@ pub struct IntrospectionReport {
     /// appliance bundle) has no boot catalog and reports `false`. v0.5.9.
     #[serde(default)]
     pub el_torito: bool,
-    /// Revision of the introspection logic that produced this report. Old
+    /// Revision of the introspection logic that produced this report.
-    /// `meta.json` files without the field deserialize as 0, which is
+    /// `0` means "never introspected" (pre-v0.5.9 metadata, or a remote
-    /// below [`INTROSPECT_REV`], triggering a one-time re-introspect on
+    /// ISO whose probe hasn't run / can't run) — the entry generator
-    /// the next startup. v0.5.9.
+    /// treats those optimistically (sanboot) and the UI labels them.
     #[serde(default)]
     pub introspect_rev: u32,
 }
 
-/// Probe an ISO file on disk. Never fails — on unrecoverable IO error we log
+/// One row of the Linux detection table.
-/// and return an `Unknown` family so the uploader still sees a record.
+///
+/// `emit_kernel` distinguishes "we can boot this directly" from "we can
+/// only classify it". Families marked `false` have boot protocols our
+/// cmdline renderer doesn't speak yet (Debian-live `boot=live fetch=`,
+/// d-i netinst, CoreOS `coreos.live.rootfs_url=`) — for those the probe
+/// sets the family for the UI/menu but leaves `kernel_path` unset so the
+/// ISO keeps its (working) sanboot entry instead of gaining a broken
+/// kernel one. Strictly fewer broken boots than guessing.
+struct LinuxProbe {
+    family: DistroFamily,
+    kernel: &'static str,
+    initrd_candidates: &'static [&'static str],
+    emit_kernel: bool,
+}
+
+const LINUX_PROBES: &[LinuxProbe] = &[
+    // Ubuntu and friends (casper) — the classic direct-boot shape.
+    LinuxProbe {
+        family: DistroFamily::DebianUbuntu,
+        kernel: "/casper/vmlinuz",
+        initrd_candidates: &["/casper/initrd", "/casper/initrd.lz", "/casper/initrd.gz"],
+        emit_kernel: true,
+    },
+    // Debian-live derivatives: gparted-live, Clonezilla, Kali live, tails.
+    // Classification only — live-boot needs `boot=live fetch=<squashfs>`
+    // which we don't render yet; sanboot of these images works today.
+    LinuxProbe {
+        family: DistroFamily::DebianUbuntu,
+        kernel: "/live/vmlinuz",
+        initrd_candidates: &["/live/initrd.img", "/live/initrd"],
+        emit_kernel: false,
+    },
+    // Debian installer (netinst/DVD). Classification only for the same
+    // reason — d-i sanboots fine.
+    LinuxProbe {
+        family: DistroFamily::DebianUbuntu,
+        kernel: "/install.amd/vmlinuz",
+        initrd_candidates: &["/install.amd/initrd.gz"],
+        emit_kernel: false,
+    },
+    // Anaconda family: RHEL, CentOS, Alma, Rocky, Fedora — and their
+    // many derivatives (Cisco ISE, Nagios appliances, …). The CoreOS
+    // variant of this shape is special-cased after the table.
+    LinuxProbe {
+        family: DistroFamily::RhelFedora,
+        kernel: "/images/pxeboot/vmlinuz",
+        initrd_candidates: &["/images/pxeboot/initrd.img"],
+        emit_kernel: true,
+    },
+    LinuxProbe {
+        family: DistroFamily::OpenSuse,
+        kernel: "/boot/x86_64/loader/linux",
+        initrd_candidates: &["/boot/x86_64/loader/initrd"],
+        emit_kernel: true,
+    },
+    LinuxProbe {
+        family: DistroFamily::Arch,
+        kernel: "/arch/boot/x86_64/vmlinuz-linux",
+        initrd_candidates: &["/arch/boot/x86_64/initramfs-linux.img"],
+        emit_kernel: true,
+    },
+    LinuxProbe {
+        family: DistroFamily::Alpine,
+        kernel: "/boot/vmlinuz-lts",
+        initrd_candidates: &["/boot/initramfs-lts"],
+        emit_kernel: true,
+    },
+];
+
+/// CoreOS-style live images (RHCOS, FCOS, OpenShift agent ISOs) carry
+/// the anaconda pxeboot layout *plus* a rootfs image. Direct kernel boot
+/// of those requires `coreos.live.rootfs_url=` (and for agent ISOs, the
+/// ignition config embedded in the ISO device) — neither of which a
+/// plain `inst.repo=` cmdline provides. Their sanboot path works, so
+/// they classify as RHEL-family but keep the sanboot entry.
+const COREOS_ROOTFS: &str = "/images/pxeboot/rootfs.img";
+
+/// Probe an ISO file on disk. Never fails — on unrecoverable IO error we
+/// log and return an `Unknown` family so the uploader still sees a record.
 pub fn introspect(path: &Path) -> IntrospectionReport {
+    let filename = path
+        .file_name()
+        .map(|s| s.to_string_lossy().into_owned())
+        .unwrap_or_default();
+    let Ok(f) = std::fs::File::open(path) else {
+        tracing::warn!(target: "openpxe::iso", "cannot open ISO for introspection: {}", path.display());
+        return IntrospectionReport {
+            introspect_rev: INTROSPECT_REV,
+            ..Default::default()
+        };
+    };
+    let len = f.metadata().map_or(0, |m| m.len());
+    // `FileReadAt` completes every read inline (no real awaits), so this
+    // light-weight block_on never parks; callers already run us on the
+    // blocking pool.
+    futures::executor::block_on(introspect_reader(
+        &mut FileReadAt::new(f),
+        len,
+        &filename,
+        true,
+    ))
+}
+
+/// The detection core, generic over any random-access source. `total_len`
+/// is the image size (every caller knows it — file metadata locally, the
+/// share listing remotely) and bounds the bulk scan, since `IsoReadAt`
+/// reads are exact-or-error. `filename` feeds the last-resort token
+/// heuristics; `allow_bulk_scan` gates the 16 MiB UDF-Windows byte scan
+/// (local files only — remote shares would stream that much per ISO per
+/// rescan).
+pub async fn introspect_reader<R: IsoReadAt + Send>(
+    r: &mut R,
+    total_len: u64,
+    filename: &str,
+    allow_bulk_scan: bool,
+) -> IntrospectionReport {
     let mut report = IntrospectionReport {
         introspect_rev: INTROSPECT_REV,
         ..Default::default()
     };
 
-    let Ok(mut f) = std::fs::File::open(path) else {
+    // Everything sector-shaped goes through one caching wrapper: the
-        tracing::warn!(target: "openpxe::iso", "cannot open ISO for introspection: {}", path.display());
+    // descriptor-set sectors are read once and shared between the label
-        return report;
+    // scan, the El Torito walk, and the namespace-root lookups; the
-    };
+    // probe table's repeated root/subdirectory reads collapse the same
+    // way — over NFS/SFTP that's the difference between ~6 and ~60+
+    // round-trips per ISO.
+    {
+        let mut cr = CachingReadAt::new(r);
 
-    // ISO9660 Primary Volume Descriptor at LBA 16 (offset 0x8000), 2048 bytes.
+        // ISO9660 Primary Volume Descriptor: bytes 40..72 are the volume
-    // Bytes 40..72 are the Volume Identifier (space-padded, d-characters).
+        // identifier (space-padded). v0.7.5: located by scanning the
-    let mut pvd = [0u8; 2048];
+        // descriptor set (tolerating filler sectors) instead of assuming
-    if f.seek(SeekFrom::Start(0x8000)).is_ok() && f.read_exact(&mut pvd).is_ok() {
+        // a pristine sector 16.
-        // Byte 0 must be 0x01 (primary descriptor), bytes 1..6 = "CD001".
+        if let Some(pvd) = iso_fs::find_descriptor(&mut cr, false).await {
-        if pvd[0] == 0x01 && &pvd[1..6] == b"CD001" {
+            let label = String::from_utf8_lossy(&pvd[40..72]).trim().to_string();
-            let label_raw = &pvd[40..72];
-            let label = String::from_utf8_lossy(label_raw).trim().to_string();
             if !label.is_empty() {
-                report.volume_label = Some(label.clone());
                 report.family = family_from_label(&label);
+                report.volume_label = Some(label);
+            }
+        }
+
+        report.el_torito = detect_el_torito(&mut cr).await;
+
+        if iso_fs::exists(&mut cr, "/sources/boot.wim").await {
+            report.has_boot_wim = true;
+            report.family = DistroFamily::WindowsPe;
+        } else {
+            for probe in LINUX_PROBES {
+                if !iso_fs::exists(&mut cr, probe.kernel).await {
+                    continue;
+                }
+                let mut initrd = None;
+                for cand in probe.initrd_candidates {
+                    if iso_fs::exists(&mut cr, cand).await {
+                        initrd = Some((*cand).to_string());
+                        break;
+                    }
+                }
+                let Some(initrd) = initrd else { continue };
+                // Content beats label: a rebadged derivative (volume
+                // label "ISE-3.2") with the anaconda layout is
+                // RHEL-family no matter what the label says.
+                report.family = probe.family;
+                let coreos = probe.family == DistroFamily::RhelFedora
+                    && iso_fs::exists(&mut cr, COREOS_ROOTFS).await;
+                if probe.emit_kernel && !coreos {
+                    report.kernel_path = Some(probe.kernel.to_string());
+                    report.initrd_paths = vec![initrd];
+                }
+                break;
             }
         }
     }
 
-    // Does the ISO have an El Torito boot catalog? This is what decides
+    // Modern Windows 10/11 ISOs are UDF — their tree is invisible to the
-    // whether an ISO we *can't* otherwise classify is bootable at all —
+    // ISO9660 walk and the volume label is a cryptic Microsoft string.
-    // a bootable ISO sanboots; a data/appliance ISO (no catalog) can't.
+    // Scan the first 16 MiB for well-known markers, ASCII and UTF-16LE.
-    report.el_torito = detect_el_torito(&mut f);
+    // Runs after the Linux probes so a Linux ISO that *contains* the
-
+    // string "bootmgr" (GRUB/syslinux chainload modules do) has already
-    // Cheap content scan: read the first ~64 MiB, look for signature filenames.
+    // classified and never reaches this — that ordering is the v0.7.4
-    // This is enough to identify `sources/boot.wim` (Windows) and common
+    // gparted-misdetection fix.
-    // kernel/initrd paths for the major Linux distros.
+    if report.family == DistroFamily::Unknown && allow_bulk_scan {
-    let _ = f.seek(SeekFrom::Start(0));
+        if let Some(win) = bulk_windows_scan(r, total_len).await {
-    let scan_bytes = 64 * 1024 * 1024;
-    let mut buf = vec![0u8; 1024 * 1024];
-    let mut read_total = 0usize;
-    // Size the haystack to what will actually be read — the scan cap or
-    // the file itself, whichever is smaller — so the fill never reallocs
-    // and a small ISO doesn't reserve the full 64 MiB.
-    let file_len = f.metadata().map_or(usize::MAX, |m| {
-        usize::try_from(m.len()).unwrap_or(usize::MAX)
-    });
-    let mut haystack = Vec::with_capacity(scan_bytes.min(file_len));
-    while read_total < scan_bytes {
-        let n = f.read(&mut buf).unwrap_or(0);
-        if n == 0 {
-            break;
-        }
-        haystack.extend_from_slice(&buf[..n]);
-        read_total += n;
-    }
-
-    // `sources/boot.wim` is the definitive Windows-install-media marker
-    // when the ISO exposes ASCII (ISO9660/Joliet) names. `contains_ascii`
-    // is case-insensitive, so one form covers BOOT.WIM / boot.wim and the
-    // backslash variant.
-    if contains_ascii(&haystack, b"sources/boot.wim")
-        || contains_ascii(&haystack, b"sources\\boot.wim")
-    {
-        report.has_boot_wim = true;
-        report.family = DistroFamily::WindowsPe;
-    }
-
-    // v0.5.8: broaden Windows detection. Modern Windows 10/11 ISOs are
-    // UDF — filenames are stored as UTF-16 (so the ASCII scan above misses
-    // them) and the volume label is a cryptic Microsoft string (so
-    // `family_from_label` misses it too). Booting is via HTTP sanboot of
-    // the raw ISO (no boot.wim extraction), so we only need the *family*.
-    // Catch the common cases: well-known Windows markers in either ASCII
-    // or UTF-16LE within the first 16 MiB, plus a filename hint.
-    if report.family == DistroFamily::Unknown {
-        let head = &haystack[..haystack.len().min(16 * 1024 * 1024)];
-        let ascii_markers: [&[u8]; 4] = [
-            b"bootmgr",
-            b"sources/install.wim",
-            b"sources/install.esd",
-            b"efi/microsoft",
-        ];
-        let utf16_markers = ["bootmgr", "boot.wim", "install.wim", "microsoft"];
-        let looks_windows = ascii_markers.iter().any(|m| contains_ascii(head, m))
-            || utf16_markers.iter().any(|m| contains_utf16le_ci(head, m))
-            || filename_looks_windows(path);
-        if looks_windows {
             report.family = DistroFamily::WindowsPe;
+            report.has_boot_wim = win;
         }
     }
 
-    // Best-effort kernel/initrd path guess from family. These paths are what
+    // Last resort: filename tokens. The only signal for SMB-sourced ISOs
-    // distro ISOs conventionally ship at — we don't verify extraction here;
+    // and renamed/UDF images that defeated everything above.
-    // that happens in the store after introspection.
+    if report.family == DistroFamily::Unknown {
-    let (k, i) = guess_kernel_initrd(report.family);
+        report.family = family_from_filename(filename);
-    report.kernel_path = k.map(str::to_string);
+    }
-    report.initrd_paths = i.iter().map(std::string::ToString::to_string).collect();
 
     report
 }
 
+/// Provisional report for a remote ISO that hasn't been (or can't be)
+/// content-probed yet: family from the filename, `introspect_rev` left
+/// at 0 so the entry generator keeps the optimistic sanboot entry and
+/// the UI shows it as awaiting introspection. Used by all three share
+/// managers at registration; NFS/SFTP upgrade it in the background.
+#[must_use]
+pub fn provisional_report(filename: &str) -> IntrospectionReport {
+    IntrospectionReport {
+        family: family_from_filename(filename),
+        ..Default::default()
+    }
+}
+
 fn family_from_label(label: &str) -> DistroFamily {
     let l = label.to_ascii_lowercase();
-    if l.contains("ubuntu") || l.contains("debian") || l.contains("mint") {
+    if l.contains("ubuntu")
+        || l.contains("debian")
+        || l.contains("mint")
+        || l.contains("kali")
+        || l.contains("gparted")
+        || l.contains("clonezilla")
+    {
         DistroFamily::DebianUbuntu
     } else if l.contains("rhel")
         || l.contains("centos")
         || l.contains("fedora")
         || l.contains("rocky")
         || l.contains("alma")
+        || l.contains("rhcos")
+        || l.contains("coreos")
+        || l.contains("openshift")
+        || l.contains("okd")
     {
         DistroFamily::RhelFedora
     } else if l.contains("suse") || l.contains("opensuse") {
@@ -188,23 +343,97 @@ fn family_from_label(label: &str) -> DistroFamily {
     }
 }
 
-fn guess_kernel_initrd(family: DistroFamily) -> (Option<&'static str>, Vec<&'static str>) {
+/// Filename token heuristic — `AlmaLinux-9.5-x86_64-dvd.iso` says what
-    match family {
+/// it is even when we can't read a byte of it. Tokens are the filename
-        DistroFamily::DebianUbuntu => (Some("/casper/vmlinuz"), vec!["/casper/initrd"]),
+/// split on every non-alphanumeric character, so "almalinux", "rhel",
-        DistroFamily::RhelFedora => (
+/// "win11" match without "search" tripping the "arch" token.
-            Some("/images/pxeboot/vmlinuz"),
+pub fn family_from_filename(filename: &str) -> DistroFamily {
-            vec!["/images/pxeboot/initrd.img"],
+    if filename_looks_windows(filename) {
-        ),
+        return DistroFamily::WindowsPe;
-        DistroFamily::OpenSuse => (
+    }
-            Some("/boot/x86_64/loader/linux"),
+    let lower = filename.to_ascii_lowercase();
-            vec!["/boot/x86_64/loader/initrd"],
+    let tokens: Vec<&str> = lower
-        ),
+        .split(|c: char| !c.is_ascii_alphanumeric())
-        DistroFamily::Arch => (
+        .filter(|t| !t.is_empty())
-            Some("/arch/boot/x86_64/vmlinuz-linux"),
+        .collect();
-            vec!["/arch/boot/x86_64/initramfs-linux.img"],
+    let has = |t: &str| tokens.contains(&t);
-        ),
+    if has("ubuntu")
-        DistroFamily::Alpine => (Some("/boot/vmlinuz-lts"), vec!["/boot/initramfs-lts"]),
+        || has("debian")
-        DistroFamily::WindowsPe | DistroFamily::Unknown => (None, Vec::new()),
+        || has("mint")
+        || has("kali")
+        || has("gparted")
+        || has("clonezilla")
+        || has("tails")
+    {
+        DistroFamily::DebianUbuntu
+    } else if has("rhel")
+        || has("centos")
+        || has("almalinux")
+        || has("alma")
+        || has("rocky")
+        || has("rockylinux")
+        || has("fedora")
+        || has("rhcos")
+        || has("coreos")
+        || has("openshift")
+        || has("okd")
+    {
+        DistroFamily::RhelFedora
+    } else if has("opensuse") || has("suse") || has("sles") {
+        DistroFamily::OpenSuse
+    } else if has("arch") || has("archlinux") || has("manjaro") {
+        DistroFamily::Arch
+    } else if has("alpine") {
+        DistroFamily::Alpine
+    } else {
+        DistroFamily::Unknown
+    }
+}
+
+/// Scan the first 16 MiB (or the whole image when smaller) for Windows
+/// markers. Returns `Some(has_boot_wim)` on a hit, `None` when nothing
+/// Windows-shaped is found.
+async fn bulk_windows_scan<R: IsoReadAt + Send>(r: &mut R, total_len: u64) -> Option<bool> {
+    const SCAN_BYTES: u64 = 16 * 1024 * 1024;
+    const CHUNK: u64 = 1024 * 1024;
+    let budget = SCAN_BYTES.min(total_len);
+    let mut haystack = Vec::with_capacity(usize::try_from(budget).unwrap_or(0));
+    let mut offset = 0u64;
+    while offset < budget {
+        // Reads are exact-or-error, so clamp the final chunk to what the
+        // image actually has — netboot.xyz is 2.3 MB, not 16.
+        let want = u32::try_from(CHUNK.min(budget - offset)).unwrap_or(u32::MAX);
+        let Ok(chunk) = r.read_at(offset, want).await else {
+            break; // read error: scan what we have
+        };
+        offset += chunk.len() as u64;
+        haystack.extend_from_slice(&chunk);
+    }
+    if haystack.is_empty() {
+        return None;
+    }
+    let boot_wim = contains_ascii(&haystack, b"sources/boot.wim")
+        || contains_ascii(&haystack, b"sources\\boot.wim")
+        || contains_utf16le_ci(&haystack, "boot.wim");
+    if boot_wim {
+        return Some(true);
+    }
+    let ascii_markers: [&[u8]; 3] = [b"bootmgr", b"sources/install.wim", b"sources/install.esd"];
+    // v0.8.0: dropped the bare "microsoft" marker. It matched the
+    // Microsoft-signed Secure-Boot EFI loader that memtest86 (and signed
+    // BSDs / firmware tools) ship — the string lives in the loader's FAT
+    // long-filename entries — so any signed non-Windows bootable
+    // false-classified as Windows. The remaining markers are all
+    // Windows-exclusive filenames.
+    let utf16_markers = ["bootmgr", "install.wim"];
+    let hit = ascii_markers.iter().any(|m| contains_ascii(&haystack, m))
+        || utf16_markers
+            .iter()
+            .any(|m| contains_utf16le_ci(&haystack, m));
+    if hit {
+        Some(false)
+    } else {
+        None
     }
 }
 
@@ -237,14 +466,10 @@ fn contains_utf16le_ci(haystack: &[u8], ascii: &str) -> bool {
 
 /// Filename heuristic: a stock Windows ISO almost always carries an obvious
 /// token in its name (e.g. `..._windows_11_...`, `Win10`, `winserver`).
-/// Used only as a last-resort family hint when the content scan and volume
+/// v0.7.4: takes the bare filename instead of a `Path` so the same check
-/// label are inconclusive. v0.5.8.
+/// runs against remote share listings.
-fn filename_looks_windows(path: &Path) -> bool {
+fn filename_looks_windows(filename: &str) -> bool {
-    let name = path
+    let name = filename.to_ascii_lowercase();
-        .file_name()
-        .and_then(|s| s.to_str())
-        .unwrap_or("")
-        .to_ascii_lowercase();
     const TOKENS: [&str; 6] = [
         "windows",
         "winpe",
@@ -263,32 +488,32 @@ const EL_TORITO_ID: &[u8] = b"EL TORITO SPECIFICATION";
 /// Detect an El Torito boot catalog — the marker that an ISO is bootable
 /// by BIOS/UEFI firmware (and thus by iPXE `sanboot`).
 ///
-/// The ISO9660 Volume Descriptor Set starts at LBA 16 (offset 0x8000) and
+/// The ISO9660 Volume Descriptor Set starts at LBA 16 and runs one
-/// runs one 2048-byte descriptor per sector until a Set Terminator
+/// 2048-byte descriptor per sector; a Boot Record descriptor (type 0x00)
-/// (type 0xFF). A Boot Record descriptor (type 0x00) whose 32-byte boot
+/// whose 32-byte boot system identifier reads "EL TORITO SPECIFICATION"
-/// system identifier reads "EL TORITO SPECIFICATION" means the image
+/// means the image declares a boot catalog. We only confirm its presence
-/// declares an El Torito boot catalog. We only confirm its presence — we
+/// — we don't parse the catalog (sanboot/the firmware does that).
-/// don't parse the catalog (sanboot/the firmware does that). The walk is
+///
-/// capped so a malformed/huge image can't spin us. v0.5.9.
+/// v0.7.5: the walk no longer aborts at the first non-`CD001` sector or
-fn detect_el_torito(f: &mut std::fs::File) -> bool {
+/// stops at a Set Terminator. Sloppy mastering tools (appliance ISOs
-    let mut vd = [0u8; 2048];
+/// especially) leave zeroed filler sectors inside the descriptor area or
+/// odd descriptor ordering, which used to hide a real boot record and
+/// flag a bootable image as a data ISO. All 16 sectors are examined —
+/// the signature is 25 exact bytes, so scanning past the terminator
+/// (into e.g. a UDF volume recognition sequence) cannot false-positive.
+/// The cap keeps a malformed image from spinning us. v0.5.9 originally;
+/// reader-generic since v0.7.4.
+async fn detect_el_torito<R: IsoReadAt + Send>(r: &mut R) -> bool {
     for lba in 16u64..32 {
-        if f.seek(SeekFrom::Start(lba * 2048)).is_err() || f.read_exact(&mut vd).is_err() {
+        let Ok(vd) = r.read_at(lba * SECTOR, 2048).await else {
+            // Past end of a tiny image — nothing more to examine.
             return false;
-        }
+        };
-        // Every descriptor in the set carries the "CD001" magic; once it's
-        // missing we've walked off the end of a valid set.
         if &vd[1..6] != b"CD001" {
-            return false;
+            continue; // filler/garbage sector — keep walking
         }
-        match vd[0] {
+        if vd[0] == 0x00 && vd[7..7 + EL_TORITO_ID.len()] == *EL_TORITO_ID {
-            // Boot Record descriptor carrying the El Torito signature.
+            return true;
-            0x00 if vd[7..7 + EL_TORITO_ID.len()] == *EL_TORITO_ID => return true,
-            // Volume Descriptor Set Terminator — nothing bootable found.
-            0xFF => return false,
-            // Any other descriptor (incl. a non-El-Torito boot record) —
-            // keep walking the set.
-            _ => {}
         }
     }
     false
@@ -297,6 +522,12 @@ fn detect_el_torito(f: &mut std::fs::File) -> bool {
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests {
     use super::*;
+    use crate::iso_fs::testiso::{MemReadAt, TestIsoBuilder};
+
+    fn introspect_mem(img: Vec<u8>, filename: &str, bulk: bool) -> IntrospectionReport {
+        let len = img.len() as u64;
+        futures::executor::block_on(introspect_reader(&mut MemReadAt(img), len, filename, bulk))
+    }
 
     #[test]
     fn label_matching() {
@@ -313,13 +544,158 @@ mod tests {
             DistroFamily::OpenSuse
         );
         assert_eq!(family_from_label("ARCH_202604"), DistroFamily::Arch);
+        assert_eq!(
+            family_from_label("GParted-live"),
+            DistroFamily::DebianUbuntu
+        );
+        assert_eq!(family_from_label("rhcos-417"), DistroFamily::RhelFedora);
         assert_eq!(family_from_label("weird-custom"), DistroFamily::Unknown);
     }
 
+    #[test]
+    fn gparted_shape_is_not_windows() {
+        // The v0.7.4 regression test: a Debian-live image whose payload
+        // contains the literal string "bootmgr" (as GRUB/syslinux
+        // chainload modules do). The old byte-grep classified this as
+        // WindowsPe; the probe order must classify Debian first.
+        let img = TestIsoBuilder::new("GParted-live")
+            .el_torito(true)
+            .file("/live/vmlinuz", b"KERNEL")
+            .file("/live/initrd.img", b"INITRD")
+            .file("/boot/grub/chain.mod", b"xxx bootmgr xxx")
+            .build();
+        let r = introspect_mem(img, "gparted-live-1.8.1-3-amd64.iso", true);
+        assert_eq!(r.family, DistroFamily::DebianUbuntu);
+        // Classification only — live-boot args aren't rendered yet, so no
+        // kernel entry; sanboot (via el_torito) keeps working.
+        assert!(r.kernel_path.is_none());
+        assert!(r.el_torito);
+        assert_eq!(r.introspect_rev, INTROSPECT_REV);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn casper_shape_verifies_kernel_and_initrd() {
+        let img = TestIsoBuilder::new("Ubuntu-Server 24.04.1 LTS amd64")
+            .el_torito(true)
+            .file("/casper/vmlinuz", b"K")
+            .file("/casper/initrd", b"I")
+            .build();
+        let r = introspect_mem(img, "ubuntu-24.04.1-live-server-amd64.iso", true);
+        assert_eq!(r.family, DistroFamily::DebianUbuntu);
+        assert_eq!(r.kernel_path.as_deref(), Some("/casper/vmlinuz"));
+        assert_eq!(r.initrd_paths, vec!["/casper/initrd".to_string()]);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn anaconda_shape_emits_verified_paths() {
+        let img = TestIsoBuilder::new("AlmaLinux-9-5-x86_64-dvd")
+            .el_torito(true)
+            .file("/images/pxeboot/vmlinuz", b"K")
+            .file("/images/pxeboot/initrd.img", b"I")
+            .build();
+        let r = introspect_mem(img, "AlmaLinux-9.5-x86_64-dvd.iso", true);
+        assert_eq!(r.family, DistroFamily::RhelFedora);
+        assert_eq!(r.kernel_path.as_deref(), Some("/images/pxeboot/vmlinuz"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn coreos_shape_classifies_but_keeps_sanboot() {
+        // RHCOS / OpenShift agent ISOs: anaconda layout + rootfs.img.
+        // Direct kernel boot needs coreos.live.rootfs_url (and agent
+        // ISOs their embedded ignition), so kernel_path must stay None.
+        let img = TestIsoBuilder::new("rhcos-417.94.202501")
+            .el_torito(true)
+            .file("/images/pxeboot/vmlinuz", b"K")
+            .file("/images/pxeboot/initrd.img", b"I")
+            .file("/images/pxeboot/rootfs.img", b"R")
+            .build();
+        let r = introspect_mem(img, "rhcos-live.x86_64.iso", true);
+        assert_eq!(r.family, DistroFamily::RhelFedora);
+        assert!(
+            r.kernel_path.is_none(),
+            "CoreOS must not get a kernel entry"
+        );
+        assert!(r.el_torito);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn boot_wim_probe_classifies_windows() {
+        let img = TestIsoBuilder::new("CCCOMA_X64FRE_EN-US_DV9")
+            .el_torito(true)
+            .file("/sources/boot.wim", b"MSWIMMSWIM")
+            .build();
+        let r = introspect_mem(img, "whatever.iso", false);
+        assert_eq!(r.family, DistroFamily::WindowsPe);
+        assert!(r.has_boot_wim);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn label_only_linux_without_verified_kernel_gets_no_kernel_path() {
+        // Label says RHEL but the tree has no pxeboot files — the old
+        // code guessed `/images/pxeboot/vmlinuz` and emitted an entry
+        // that 404'd at boot. Now: family yes, kernel paths no.
+        let img = TestIsoBuilder::new("RHEL-9-5-CUSTOM")
+            .el_torito(true)
+            .file("/readme.txt", b"hi")
+            .build();
+        let r = introspect_mem(img, "rhel-custom.iso", true);
+        assert_eq!(r.family, DistroFamily::RhelFedora);
+        assert!(r.kernel_path.is_none());
+        assert!(r.initrd_paths.is_empty());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn remote_skips_bulk_scan_but_filename_still_hints() {
+        // No ISO9660 signatures at all (e.g. pure-UDF image read over a
+        // share), bulk scan off: filename is the only signal.
+        let img = vec![0u8; 64 * 1024];
+        let r = introspect_mem(img.clone(), "Win11_24H2_English_x64.iso", false);
+        assert_eq!(r.family, DistroFamily::WindowsPe);
+        let r2 = introspect_mem(img, "mystery.iso", false);
+        assert_eq!(r2.family, DistroFamily::Unknown);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn filename_family_table() {
+        use DistroFamily::*;
+        let cases = [
+            ("AlmaLinux-9.5-x86_64-dvd.iso", RhelFedora),
+            ("CentOS-Stream-10-latest-x86_64-dvd1.iso", RhelFedora),
+            ("rhel-9.0-x86_64-boot.iso", RhelFedora),
+            ("rhcos-live.x86_64.iso", RhelFedora),
+            ("openshift-4-21-9.agent.x86_64.iso", RhelFedora),
+            ("ubuntu-24.04-desktop.iso", DebianUbuntu),
+            ("gparted-live-1.8.1-3-amd64.iso", DebianUbuntu),
+            ("archlinux-2026.05.01-x86_64.iso", Arch),
+            ("arch-2026.05.01.iso", Arch),
+            ("alpine-standard-3.21.0-x86_64.iso", Alpine),
+            ("openSUSE-Leap-15.6-DVD-x86_64.iso", OpenSuse),
+            ("en-us_windows_11_iot_enterprise.iso", WindowsPe),
+            ("Win10_22H2_English_x64.iso", WindowsPe),
+            ("netboot.xyz.iso", Unknown),
+            ("ise-3.2.0.542a.SPA.x86_64.iso", Unknown),
+            ("Macrium_5860_v2.iso", Unknown),
+            // "search" must not trip the "arch" token.
+            ("research-data.iso", Unknown),
+        ];
+        for (name, want) in cases {
+            assert_eq!(family_from_filename(name), want, "{name}");
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn provisional_report_keeps_rev_zero() {
+        let r = provisional_report("rhel-9.0-x86_64-dvd.iso");
+        assert_eq!(r.family, DistroFamily::RhelFedora);
+        assert_eq!(
+            r.introspect_rev, 0,
+            "provisional must keep optimistic sanboot"
+        );
+        assert!(!r.el_torito);
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn utf16le_marker_matches_case_insensitively() {
-        // "boot.wim" encoded UTF-16LE, mixed case — UDF stores Windows
-        // filenames this way, which the ASCII scan can't see.
         let s = "BOOT.WIM";
         let utf16: Vec<u8> = s.bytes().flat_map(|b| [b, 0]).collect();
         let mut hay = vec![0u8; 8];
@@ -328,59 +704,108 @@ mod tests {
         assert!(contains_utf16le_ci(&hay, "boot.wim"));
         assert!(contains_utf16le_ci(&hay, "Boot.Wim"));
         assert!(!contains_utf16le_ci(&hay, "install.wim"));
-        // An ASCII (not UTF-16) occurrence must NOT match the UTF-16 scan.
         assert!(!contains_utf16le_ci(b"boot.wim plain ascii", "boot.wim"));
     }
 
     #[test]
-    fn el_torito_boot_catalog_detected() {
+    fn el_torito_detected_through_reader() {
-        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+        let with = TestIsoBuilder::new("BOOTABLE").el_torito(true).build();
-        // Helper: stamp a 2048-byte descriptor at `lba` with type + magic.
+        let without = TestIsoBuilder::new("DATA").build();
-        let stamp = |img: &mut [u8], lba: usize, ty: u8| {
+        assert!(futures::executor::block_on(detect_el_torito(
-            let off = lba * 2048;
+            &mut MemReadAt(with)
-            img[off] = ty;
+        )));
-            img[off + 1..off + 6].copy_from_slice(b"CD001");
+        assert!(!futures::executor::block_on(detect_el_torito(
-        };
+            &mut MemReadAt(without)
+        )));
+    }
 
-        // Bootable image: PVD @16, El Torito Boot Record @17, terminator @18.
+    #[test]
-        let mut boot = vec![0u8; 2048 * 19];
+    fn el_torito_survives_filler_sector_in_descriptor_area() {
-        stamp(&mut boot, 16, 0x01);
+        // v0.7.5 tolerance test: sloppy appliance mastering leaves a
-        stamp(&mut boot, 17, 0x00);
+        // zeroed sector inside the Volume Descriptor Set. The old walk
-        boot[17 * 2048 + 7..17 * 2048 + 7 + EL_TORITO_ID.len()].copy_from_slice(EL_TORITO_ID);
+        // aborted at the first non-CD001 sector and flagged a genuinely
-        stamp(&mut boot, 18, 0xFF);
+        // bootable image as a data ISO.
-        let bp = dir.path().join("boot.iso");
+        let sector = SECTOR as usize;
-        std::fs::write(&bp, &boot).unwrap();
+        let mut img = TestIsoBuilder::new("GAPPY").el_torito(true).build();
-        let mut f = std::fs::File::open(&bp).unwrap();
+        // Builder layout: PVD @16, Boot Record @17, terminator @18.
+        // Move the BR to 18 (over the terminator) and zero out 17.
+        img.copy_within(17 * sector..18 * sector, 18 * sector);
+        img[17 * sector..18 * sector].fill(0);
         assert!(
-            detect_el_torito(&mut f),
+            futures::executor::block_on(detect_el_torito(&mut MemReadAt(img))),
-            "El Torito boot record should match"
+            "boot record behind a zeroed filler sector must still be found"
         );
+    }
 
-        // Data/appliance image: PVD @16, terminator @17, no boot record.
+    #[test]
-        let mut data = vec![0u8; 2048 * 18];
+    fn joliet_only_image_classifies_via_fallback() {
-        stamp(&mut data, 16, 0x01);
+        // Primary namespace bare, real tree only in Joliet — the v0.7.5
-        stamp(&mut data, 17, 0xFF);
+        // fallback must classify it (boot.wim probe) where v0.7.4 saw
-        let dp = dir.path().join("data.iso");
+        // "no installer files".
-        std::fs::write(&dp, &data).unwrap();
+        let img = TestIsoBuilder::new("WIN_APPLIANCE")
-        let mut f2 = std::fs::File::open(&dp).unwrap();
+            .el_torito(true)
-        assert!(!detect_el_torito(&mut f2), "data ISO has no boot catalog");
+            .joliet_only(true)
+            .file("/sources/boot.wim", b"WIMWIM")
+            .build();
+        let r = introspect_mem(img, "appliance.iso", false);
+        assert_eq!(r.family, DistroFamily::WindowsPe);
+        assert!(r.has_boot_wim);
+        assert!(r.el_torito);
+
+        // Same for a Linux shape: verified kernel paths via Joliet.
+        let img2 = TestIsoBuilder::new("CUSTOM-EL9")
+            .el_torito(true)
+            .joliet_only(true)
+            .file("/images/pxeboot/vmlinuz", b"K")
+            .file("/images/pxeboot/initrd.img", b"I")
+            .build();
+        let r2 = introspect_mem(img2, "custom-el9.iso", false);
+        assert_eq!(r2.family, DistroFamily::RhelFedora);
+        assert_eq!(r2.kernel_path.as_deref(), Some("/images/pxeboot/vmlinuz"));
     }
 
     #[test]
     fn filename_hint_catches_windows_isos() {
-        use std::path::Path;
+        assert!(filename_looks_windows(
-        assert!(filename_looks_windows(Path::new(
             "en-us_windows_11_iot_enterprise_ltsc_2024_x64_dvd.iso"
-        )));
+        ));
-        assert!(filename_looks_windows(Path::new(
+        assert!(filename_looks_windows("Win10_22H2_English_x64.iso"));
-            "Win10_22H2_English_x64.iso"
+        assert!(filename_looks_windows("winserver2022.iso"));
-        )));
+        assert!(!filename_looks_windows("ubuntu-24.04-desktop.iso"));
-        assert!(filename_looks_windows(Path::new("winserver2022.iso")));
+        assert!(!filename_looks_windows("Rocky-9.4-x86_64-dvd.iso"));
-        assert!(!filename_looks_windows(Path::new(
+    }
-            "ubuntu-24.04-desktop.iso"
+
-        )));
+    #[test]
-        assert!(!filename_looks_windows(Path::new(
+    fn bulk_scan_catches_udf_windows_markers() {
-            "Rocky-9.4-x86_64-dvd.iso"
+        // A blob with no ISO9660 tree but a UTF-16 "install.wim" — the
-        )));
+        // UDF Windows shape after every probe missed.
+        let mut img = vec![0u8; 256 * 1024];
+        let marker: Vec<u8> = "install.wim".bytes().flat_map(|b| [b, 0]).collect();
+        img[100_000..100_000 + marker.len()].copy_from_slice(&marker);
+        let r = introspect_mem(img, "renamed.iso", true);
+        assert_eq!(r.family, DistroFamily::WindowsPe);
+        assert!(!r.has_boot_wim);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn memtest_signed_efi_is_not_windows() {
+        // v0.8.0 regression: PassMark MemTest86 ships a Microsoft-signed
+        // Secure-Boot EFI loader, and "Microsoft" appears in its FAT
+        // long-filename entries as UTF-16LE. The old bulk-scan "microsoft"
+        // marker classified it (and any signed BSD / firmware tool) as
+        // Windows. It must now classify as a generic bootable (sanboot).
+        let mut img = TestIsoBuilder::new("MEMTEST86")
+            .el_torito(true)
+            .file("/EFI/BOOT/BOOTX64.EFI", b"signed-efi-app")
+            .build();
+        let marker: Vec<u8> = "Microsoft".bytes().flat_map(|b| [b, 0]).collect();
+        img.extend_from_slice(&marker);
+        let r = introspect_mem(img, "memtest86-iso.iso", true);
+        assert_ne!(
+            r.family,
+            DistroFamily::WindowsPe,
+            "a Microsoft-signed EFI loader is not Windows media"
+        );
+        assert!(r.el_torito, "still a bootable image");
     }
 }

crates/iso-store/src/iso_fs.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,761 @@
+//! Read-only ISO9660 lookup over any random-access byte source.
+//!
+//! v0.7.4: generalized from the http-api crate's local-file-only walker so
+//! the same directory walk drives three consumers:
+//!
+//!   1. `iso_file` HTTP serving — locate `/casper/vmlinuz` inside a local
+//!      *or remote* (NFS/SFTP) ISO and stream just that byte range.
+//!   2. Introspection — probe for well-known kernel/initrd/boot.wim paths
+//!      instead of grepping raw sectors for filename strings (which
+//!      false-positived: any Linux ISO shipping GRUB/syslinux chainload
+//!      modules contains the literal "bootmgr" and used to classify as
+//!      Windows).
+//!   3. Remote introspection — the same probes over an NFSv3 READ3 /
+//!      SFTP seek-read connection, which is what finally classifies
+//!      share-sourced ISOs instead of registering them all as `Unknown`.
+//!
+//! Namespaces: the primary ISO9660 tree is tried first; on a miss the
+//! walk falls back to the **Joliet** supplementary namespace (v0.7.5) —
+//! Windows-oriented mastering tools often write a minimal/mangled
+//! primary tree with the real names only in Joliet. Rock Ridge stays
+//! ignored. Matching is case-insensitive with the `;1` version suffix
+//! and the trailing dot of extension-less strict-mastered names
+//! stripped.
+
+use std::collections::HashMap;
+use std::future::Future;
+use std::io::{Read, Seek, SeekFrom};
+use std::path::Path;
+
+pub const SECTOR: u64 = 2048;
+
+/// Upper bound on a single directory extent we'll buffer. Real distro ISO
+/// directories are a handful of KiB; the cap keeps a malformed or hostile
+/// image from asking us to allocate gigabytes.
+const MAX_DIR_BYTES: u64 = 4 * 1024 * 1024;
+
+/// Byte range of one file inside the ISO image.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
+pub struct FileLocation {
+    pub offset: u64,
+    pub length: u64,
+}
+
+/// Random-access reads into an ISO image. Implemented by a local
+/// `std::fs::File`, the NFS and SFTP share readers, and the in-memory
+/// test image.
+///
+/// The contract is `read_exact`-like: the returned buffer is exactly
+/// `len` bytes or the call errors. The future must be `Send` because
+/// remote introspection runs inside spawned tokio tasks.
+pub trait IsoReadAt {
+    fn read_at(
+        &mut self,
+        offset: u64,
+        len: u32,
+    ) -> impl Future<Output = std::io::Result<Vec<u8>>> + Send;
+}
+
+/// Local-file reader. The reads are synchronous inside an async fn —
+/// callers run it either on the blocking pool (introspection at upload)
+/// or through [`lookup_local`]'s `block_on`, never on a hot runtime
+/// worker with real awaits pending.
+pub struct FileReadAt(std::fs::File);
+
+impl FileReadAt {
+    #[must_use]
+    pub fn new(f: std::fs::File) -> Self {
+        Self(f)
+    }
+}
+
+impl IsoReadAt for FileReadAt {
+    async fn read_at(&mut self, offset: u64, len: u32) -> std::io::Result<Vec<u8>> {
+        self.0.seek(SeekFrom::Start(offset))?;
+        let mut buf = vec![0u8; len as usize];
+        self.0.read_exact(&mut buf)?;
+        Ok(buf)
+    }
+}
+
+/// Exact-key read cache for the probe phase of introspection. The probe
+/// table looks up ~20 paths and every one of them re-reads the root
+/// directory (and usually one shared subdirectory); over NFS/SFTP that
+/// would be 20 identical round-trips. Directory reads repeat with the
+/// exact same `(offset, len)`, so a plain map keyed on the pair hits
+/// every time. Large data reads bypass the cache.
+pub struct CachingReadAt<'a, R: IsoReadAt + Send> {
+    inner: &'a mut R,
+    cache: HashMap<(u64, u32), Vec<u8>>,
+}
+
+/// Don't cache reads bigger than this (file payloads, bulk scans).
+const CACHE_MAX_READ: u32 = 256 * 1024;
+/// Bound the cache so a pathological image can't grow it unbounded.
+const CACHE_MAX_ENTRIES: usize = 256;
+
+impl<'a, R: IsoReadAt + Send> CachingReadAt<'a, R> {
+    pub fn new(inner: &'a mut R) -> Self {
+        Self {
+            inner,
+            cache: HashMap::new(),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+impl<R: IsoReadAt + Send> IsoReadAt for CachingReadAt<'_, R> {
+    async fn read_at(&mut self, offset: u64, len: u32) -> std::io::Result<Vec<u8>> {
+        let key = (offset, len);
+        if let Some(hit) = self.cache.get(&key) {
+            return Ok(hit.clone());
+        }
+        let buf = self.inner.read_at(offset, len).await?;
+        if len <= CACHE_MAX_READ && self.cache.len() < CACHE_MAX_ENTRIES {
+            self.cache.insert(key, buf.clone());
+        }
+        Ok(buf)
+    }
+}
+
+/// Look up `in_iso_path` (leading slash optional, case-insensitive) in
+/// the image behind `r`. Returns `None` on any parsing or IO failure —
+/// "not found" and "couldn't read" are the same answer to a prober.
+///
+/// v0.7.5: tries the primary ISO9660 namespace first, then falls back
+/// to the **Joliet** supplementary namespace. Windows-oriented mastering
+/// tools (common for appliance ISOs) often write a minimal or mangled
+/// primary tree and keep the real filenames only in Joliet — without the
+/// fallback those images probed as "no installer files" and their in-ISO
+/// kernel fetches 404'd.
+pub async fn lookup<R: IsoReadAt + Send>(r: &mut R, in_iso_path: &str) -> Option<FileLocation> {
+    let components: Vec<&str> = in_iso_path
+        .trim_start_matches('/')
+        .split('/')
+        .filter(|c| !c.is_empty())
+        .collect();
+    if components.is_empty() {
+        return None;
+    }
+    if let Some(root) = find_root(r, false).await {
+        if let Some(loc) = walk_namespace(r, root, &components, false).await {
+            return Some(loc);
+        }
+    }
+    if let Some(root) = find_root(r, true).await {
+        if let Some(loc) = walk_namespace(r, root, &components, true).await {
+            return Some(loc);
+        }
+    }
+    None
+}
+
+/// Find the namespace root: the Primary Volume Descriptor (`joliet =
+/// false`) or the Joliet Supplementary Volume Descriptor (`joliet =
+/// true`, identified by its UCS-2 escape sequence). Scans the whole
+/// descriptor area rather than assuming fixed sectors, skipping any
+/// non-`CD001` sector — sloppy mastering tools leave gaps. Returns the
+/// root directory's `(lba, len)`.
+async fn find_root<R: IsoReadAt + Send>(r: &mut R, joliet: bool) -> Option<(u64, u64)> {
+    let vd = find_descriptor(r, joliet).await?;
+    // Root directory record at descriptor offset 156, 34 bytes.
+    parse_dir_record_ext(&vd[156..156 + 34])
+}
+
+/// Scan the Volume Descriptor Set (LBA 16..32) for the wanted
+/// descriptor: PVD (type 0x01) or Joliet SVD (type 0x02 carrying a
+/// UCS-2 level 1/2/3 escape sequence at offset 88). Tolerant of
+/// non-`CD001` filler sectors; stops at the Set Terminator.
+pub(crate) async fn find_descriptor<R: IsoReadAt + Send>(
+    r: &mut R,
+    joliet: bool,
+) -> Option<Vec<u8>> {
+    for lba in 16u64..32 {
+        let Ok(vd) = r.read_at(lba * SECTOR, 2048).await else {
+            return None;
+        };
+        if &vd[1..6] != b"CD001" {
+            continue;
+        }
+        match vd[0] {
+            0x01 if !joliet => return Some(vd),
+            0x02 if joliet && has_joliet_escape(&vd) => return Some(vd),
+            0xFF => return None,
+            _ => {}
+        }
+    }
+    None
+}
+
+/// Joliet SVDs declare a UCS-2 escape sequence at offset 88: `%/@`,
+/// `%/C`, or `%/E` (levels 1–3).
+fn has_joliet_escape(vd: &[u8]) -> bool {
+    matches!(vd.get(88..91), Some([0x25, 0x2F, 0x40 | 0x43 | 0x45]))
+}
+
+/// Walk path components down one namespace's directory tree. The
+/// original walk was tail-recursive; iterate instead so the future
+/// stays a plain (non-boxed) state machine.
+async fn walk_namespace<R: IsoReadAt + Send>(
+    r: &mut R,
+    root: (u64, u64),
+    components: &[&str],
+    joliet: bool,
+) -> Option<FileLocation> {
+    let (mut lba, mut len) = root;
+    for (idx, comp) in components.iter().enumerate() {
+        if len == 0 || len > MAX_DIR_BYTES {
+            return None;
+        }
+        let dir = r.read_at(lba * SECTOR, len as u32).await.ok()?;
+        let hit = scan_dir(&dir, comp, joliet)?;
+        let last = idx + 1 == components.len();
+        match (last, hit.is_dir) {
+            (true, false) => {
+                return Some(FileLocation {
+                    offset: hit.lba * SECTOR,
+                    length: hit.len,
+                })
+            }
+            (false, true) => {
+                lba = hit.lba;
+                len = hit.len;
+            }
+            _ => return None,
+        }
+    }
+    None
+}
+
+/// Convenience probe: does `in_iso_path` exist as a file?
+pub async fn exists<R: IsoReadAt + Send>(r: &mut R, in_iso_path: &str) -> bool {
+    lookup(r, in_iso_path).await.is_some()
+}
+
+/// Synchronous wrapper for local files — the shape the HTTP handler's
+/// `spawn_blocking` call site wants. `block_on` is safe here because
+/// `FileReadAt`'s reads never actually await (they complete inline), so
+/// the executor never parks.
+#[must_use]
+pub fn lookup_local(iso_path: &Path, in_iso_path: &str) -> Option<FileLocation> {
+    let f = std::fs::File::open(iso_path).ok()?;
+    futures::executor::block_on(lookup(&mut FileReadAt::new(f), in_iso_path))
+}
+
+struct DirHit {
+    lba: u64,
+    len: u64,
+    is_dir: bool,
+}
+
+/// Scan one directory extent for an identifier. Pure function over the
+/// buffered extent — all protocol/IO concerns live in the caller.
+/// `joliet` switches the identifier decoding (UCS-2 big-endian vs
+/// d-characters); the record layout is otherwise identical.
+fn scan_dir(dir: &[u8], target: &str, joliet: bool) -> Option<DirHit> {
+    let mut i = 0;
+    while i < dir.len() {
+        let len = dir[i] as usize;
+        if len == 0 {
+            // Records never span sectors; a zero length byte means the
+            // rest of this sector is padding. Hop to the next one.
+            let next = (i / SECTOR as usize + 1) * SECTOR as usize;
+            if next <= i {
+                break;
+            }
+            i = next;
+            continue;
+        }
+        if i + len > dir.len() {
+            break;
+        }
+        let rec = &dir[i..i + len];
+        let name = dir_record_name(rec, joliet);
+        let is_dir = (rec.get(25).copied().unwrap_or(0) & 0x02) != 0;
+        // Skip "." (0x00) and ".." (0x01) pseudo-entries.
+        let is_pseudo =
+            rec.get(32).copied() == Some(1) && matches!(rec.get(33).copied(), Some(0x00 | 0x01));
+        if !is_pseudo && name.eq_ignore_ascii_case(target) {
+            let (lba, dlen) = parse_dir_record_ext(rec)?;
+            return Some(DirHit {
+                lba,
+                len: dlen,
+                is_dir,
+            });
+        }
+        i += len;
+    }
+    None
+}
+
+/// Extract (extent LBA, data length in bytes) from a directory record.
+/// Layout per ISO9660: bytes 2..10 extent LBA (LE+BE duplicate), 10..18
+/// data length (LE+BE duplicate). We trust the little-endian copy.
+fn parse_dir_record_ext(rec: &[u8]) -> Option<(u64, u64)> {
+    if rec.len() < 34 {
+        return None;
+    }
+    let lba = u64::from(u32::from_le_bytes(rec[2..6].try_into().ok()?));
+    let len = u64::from(u32::from_le_bytes(rec[10..14].try_into().ok()?));
+    Some((lba, len))
+}
+
+/// Extract the identifier from a directory record, normalizing ISO9660
+/// quirks: the `;N` version suffix and the trailing dot that strict
+/// mastering appends to extension-less names (`VMLINUZ.;1`). Without the
+/// dot strip, level-1 images' kernels never matched `/casper/vmlinuz`.
+/// Joliet identifiers are UCS-2 big-endian; decode then normalize the
+/// same way (the `;1` suffix is two UCS-2 characters there).
+fn dir_record_name(rec: &[u8], joliet: bool) -> String {
+    if joliet {
+        let name_len = *rec.get(32).unwrap_or(&0) as usize;
+        if name_len < 2 || rec.len() < 33 + name_len {
+            return String::new();
+        }
+        let raw = &rec[33..33 + name_len];
+        let units: Vec<u16> = raw
+            .chunks_exact(2)
+            .map(|p| u16::from_be_bytes([p[0], p[1]]))
+            .collect();
+        let s = String::from_utf16_lossy(&units);
+        let s = s.rfind(';').map_or_else(|| s.as_str(), |i| &s[..i]);
+        return s.strip_suffix('.').unwrap_or(s).to_string();
+    }
+    primary_record_name(rec)
+}
+
+fn primary_record_name(rec: &[u8]) -> String {
+    let name_len = *rec.get(32).unwrap_or(&0) as usize;
+    if name_len == 0 || rec.len() < 33 + name_len {
+        return String::new();
+    }
+    let raw = &rec[33..33 + name_len];
+    let s = String::from_utf8_lossy(raw);
+    let s = s.rfind(';').map_or_else(|| s.as_ref(), |i| &s[..i]);
+    s.strip_suffix('.').unwrap_or(s).to_string()
+}
+
+// ── test support ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+//
+// A tiny ISO9660 image builder used by this module's tests, the
+// introspection tests, and (behind the `test-image` feature) other
+// crates' integration tests. Lays out: PVD @ LBA 16, optional El Torito
+// boot record @ 17, set terminator @ 18, directories from LBA 20, file
+// data after. Only what `lookup`/introspection read is populated.
+
+#[cfg(any(test, feature = "test-image"))]
+#[doc(hidden)]
+pub mod testiso {
+    use super::SECTOR;
+    use std::collections::BTreeMap;
+
+    #[derive(Default)]
+    struct Node {
+        children: BTreeMap<String, Node>,
+        content: Option<Vec<u8>>,
+    }
+
+    pub struct TestIsoBuilder {
+        root: Node,
+        volume_label: String,
+        el_torito: bool,
+        joliet_only: bool,
+    }
+
+    impl TestIsoBuilder {
+        pub fn new(volume_label: &str) -> Self {
+            Self {
+                root: Node::default(),
+                volume_label: volume_label.to_string(),
+                el_torito: false,
+                joliet_only: false,
+            }
+        }
+
+        #[must_use]
+        pub fn el_torito(mut self, on: bool) -> Self {
+            self.el_torito = on;
+            self
+        }
+
+        /// Model the Windows-mastering worst case: the primary ISO9660
+        /// tree is empty (just `.`/`..` in the root) and every real name
+        /// lives only in the Joliet supplementary namespace. Exercises
+        /// the v0.7.5 Joliet fallback end to end.
+        #[must_use]
+        pub fn joliet_only(mut self, on: bool) -> Self {
+            self.joliet_only = on;
+            self
+        }
+
+        /// Add a file at `path` (e.g. "/casper/vmlinuz") with `content`.
+        #[must_use]
+        pub fn file(mut self, path: &str, content: &[u8]) -> Self {
+            let mut node = &mut self.root;
+            let comps: Vec<&str> = path
+                .trim_start_matches('/')
+                .split('/')
+                .filter(|c| !c.is_empty())
+                .collect();
+            for (i, c) in comps.iter().enumerate() {
+                node = node.children.entry((*c).to_string()).or_default();
+                if i + 1 == comps.len() {
+                    node.content = Some(content.to_vec());
+                }
+            }
+            self
+        }
+
+        pub fn build(self) -> Vec<u8> {
+            // Pass 1: allocate extents. Primary directories first (1
+            // sector each), then an optional parallel set of Joliet
+            // directory extents, then file contents (shared by both
+            // namespaces — only the directory trees differ).
+            let mut next_lba: u64 = 20;
+            let mut dirs: Vec<(*const Node, u64)> = Vec::new();
+            fn alloc_dirs(n: &Node, next: &mut u64, out: &mut Vec<(*const Node, u64)>) {
+                out.push((std::ptr::from_ref(n), *next));
+                *next += 1;
+                for child in n.children.values() {
+                    if child.content.is_none() {
+                        alloc_dirs(child, next, out);
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+            alloc_dirs(&self.root, &mut next_lba, &mut dirs);
+            let lba_of = |n: &Node| -> u64 {
+                dirs.iter()
+                    .find(|(p, _)| std::ptr::eq(*p, n))
+                    .map(|(_, l)| *l)
+                    .expect("dir allocated")
+            };
+            let mut jdirs: Vec<(*const Node, u64)> = Vec::new();
+            if self.joliet_only {
+                alloc_dirs(&self.root, &mut next_lba, &mut jdirs);
+            }
+            let jlba_of = |n: &Node| -> u64 {
+                jdirs
+                    .iter()
+                    .find(|(p, _)| std::ptr::eq(*p, n))
+                    .map(|(_, l)| *l)
+                    .expect("joliet dir allocated")
+            };
+            let mut file_lbas: Vec<(*const Node, u64, usize)> = Vec::new();
+            fn alloc_files(n: &Node, next: &mut u64, out: &mut Vec<(*const Node, u64, usize)>) {
+                for child in n.children.values() {
+                    if let Some(c) = &child.content {
+                        out.push((std::ptr::from_ref(child), *next, c.len()));
+                        *next += c.len().div_ceil(SECTOR as usize).max(1) as u64;
+                    } else {
+                        alloc_files(child, next, out);
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+            alloc_files(&self.root, &mut next_lba, &mut file_lbas);
+            let file_lba_of = |n: &Node| -> u64 {
+                file_lbas
+                    .iter()
+                    .find(|(p, _, _)| std::ptr::eq(*p, n))
+                    .map(|(_, l, _)| *l)
+                    .expect("file allocated")
+            };
+
+            let total = next_lba as usize * SECTOR as usize;
+            let mut img = vec![0u8; total];
+
+            // Directory record encoder.
+            fn record(name_bytes: &[u8], lba: u64, len: u64, is_dir: bool) -> Vec<u8> {
+                let mut rec_len = 33 + name_bytes.len();
+                if rec_len % 2 == 1 {
+                    rec_len += 1; // pad to even
+                }
+                let rec_len = rec_len.max(34);
+                let mut r = vec![0u8; rec_len];
+                r[0] = rec_len as u8;
+                r[2..6].copy_from_slice(&(lba as u32).to_le_bytes());
+                r[6..10].copy_from_slice(&(lba as u32).to_be_bytes());
+                r[10..14].copy_from_slice(&(len as u32).to_le_bytes());
+                r[14..18].copy_from_slice(&(len as u32).to_be_bytes());
+                if is_dir {
+                    r[25] = 0x02;
+                }
+                r[32] = name_bytes.len() as u8;
+                r[33..33 + name_bytes.len()].copy_from_slice(name_bytes);
+                r
+            }
+
+            // Pass 2: write each directory extent. `joliet` switches the
+            // identifier encoding; `skip_children` writes a bare ./..
+            // directory (the mangled-primary worst case).
+            #[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
+            fn write_dir(
+                img: &mut [u8],
+                n: &Node,
+                self_lba: u64,
+                parent_lba: u64,
+                dir_lba_of: &dyn Fn(&Node) -> u64,
+                file_lba_of: &dyn Fn(&Node) -> u64,
+                joliet: bool,
+                skip_children: bool,
+            ) {
+                let base = self_lba as usize * SECTOR as usize;
+                let mut off = 0usize;
+                let mut put = |rec: Vec<u8>, off: &mut usize| {
+                    img[base + *off..base + *off + rec.len()].copy_from_slice(&rec);
+                    *off += rec.len();
+                };
+                put(record(&[0x00], self_lba, SECTOR, true), &mut off);
+                put(record(&[0x01], parent_lba, SECTOR, true), &mut off);
+                if skip_children {
+                    return;
+                }
+                let encode = |name: &str, file: bool| -> Vec<u8> {
+                    if joliet {
+                        // Joliet preserves case; files still carry `;1`.
+                        let s = if file {
+                            format!("{name};1")
+                        } else {
+                            name.to_string()
+                        };
+                        s.encode_utf16().flat_map(u16::to_be_bytes).collect()
+                    } else if file {
+                        // Primary gets the ISO9660 uppercase `;1` treatment
+                        // so case-insensitive + version-strip matching is
+                        // what the tests actually exercise.
+                        format!("{};1", name.to_ascii_uppercase()).into_bytes()
+                    } else {
+                        name.to_ascii_uppercase().into_bytes()
+                    }
+                };
+                for (name, child) in &n.children {
+                    if let Some(c) = &child.content {
+                        put(
+                            record(
+                                &encode(name, true),
+                                file_lba_of(child),
+                                c.len() as u64,
+                                false,
+                            ),
+                            &mut off,
+                        );
+                    } else {
+                        put(
+                            record(&encode(name, false), dir_lba_of(child), SECTOR, true),
+                            &mut off,
+                        );
+                    }
+                }
+                for child in n.children.values() {
+                    if child.content.is_none() {
+                        write_dir(
+                            img,
+                            child,
+                            dir_lba_of(child),
+                            self_lba,
+                            dir_lba_of,
+                            file_lba_of,
+                            joliet,
+                            false,
+                        );
+                    } else if let Some(c) = &child.content {
+                        let b = file_lba_of(child) as usize * SECTOR as usize;
+                        img[b..b + c.len()].copy_from_slice(c);
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+            let root_lba = lba_of(&self.root);
+            write_dir(
+                &mut img,
+                &self.root,
+                root_lba,
+                root_lba,
+                &lba_of,
+                &file_lba_of,
+                false,
+                self.joliet_only,
+            );
+            let jroot_lba = if self.joliet_only {
+                let jroot = jlba_of(&self.root);
+                write_dir(
+                    &mut img,
+                    &self.root,
+                    jroot,
+                    jroot,
+                    &jlba_of,
+                    &file_lba_of,
+                    true,
+                    false,
+                );
+                Some(jroot)
+            } else {
+                None
+            };
+            // PVD @ 16.
+            let pvd = 16 * SECTOR as usize;
+            img[pvd] = 0x01;
+            img[pvd + 1..pvd + 6].copy_from_slice(b"CD001");
+            let label = self.volume_label.as_bytes();
+            let label_field = &mut img[pvd + 40..pvd + 72];
+            label_field.fill(b' ');
+            label_field[..label.len().min(32)].copy_from_slice(&label[..label.len().min(32)]);
+            let root_rec = record(&[0x00], root_lba, SECTOR, true);
+            img[pvd + 156..pvd + 156 + 34].copy_from_slice(&root_rec[..34]);
+
+            // Optional El Torito boot record @ 17, then the optional
+            // Joliet SVD, then the set terminator.
+            let mut vd = 17 * SECTOR as usize;
+            if self.el_torito {
+                img[vd] = 0x00;
+                img[vd + 1..vd + 6].copy_from_slice(b"CD001");
+                let id = b"EL TORITO SPECIFICATION";
+                img[vd + 7..vd + 7 + id.len()].copy_from_slice(id);
+                vd += SECTOR as usize;
+            }
+            if let Some(jroot) = jroot_lba {
+                img[vd] = 0x02;
+                img[vd + 1..vd + 6].copy_from_slice(b"CD001");
+                // Joliet level-3 UCS-2 escape sequence.
+                img[vd + 88..vd + 91].copy_from_slice(&[0x25, 0x2F, 0x45]);
+                let jroot_rec = record(&[0x00], jroot, SECTOR, true);
+                img[vd + 156..vd + 156 + 34].copy_from_slice(&jroot_rec[..34]);
+                vd += SECTOR as usize;
+            }
+            img[vd] = 0xFF;
+            img[vd + 1..vd + 6].copy_from_slice(b"CD001");
+
+            img
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// In-memory `IsoReadAt` over a built test image.
+    pub struct MemReadAt(pub Vec<u8>);
+
+    impl super::IsoReadAt for MemReadAt {
+        async fn read_at(&mut self, offset: u64, len: u32) -> std::io::Result<Vec<u8>> {
+            let start = usize::try_from(offset).unwrap_or(usize::MAX);
+            let end = start.saturating_add(len as usize);
+            if end > self.0.len() {
+                return Err(std::io::Error::new(
+                    std::io::ErrorKind::UnexpectedEof,
+                    "read past end of test image",
+                ));
+            }
+            Ok(self.0[start..end].to_vec())
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::testiso::{MemReadAt, TestIsoBuilder};
+    use super::*;
+
+    fn block_on<T>(f: impl Future<Output = T>) -> T {
+        futures::executor::block_on(f)
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn lookup_finds_nested_file_case_insensitively() {
+        let img = TestIsoBuilder::new("UBUNTU 24.04")
+            .file("/casper/vmlinuz", b"KERNELDATA")
+            .file("/casper/initrd", b"INITRDDATA")
+            .build();
+        let mut r = MemReadAt(img);
+        let loc = block_on(lookup(&mut r, "/CASPER/VMLINUZ")).expect("found");
+        assert_eq!(loc.length, 10);
+        let bytes = block_on(r.read_at(loc.offset, 10)).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(&bytes, b"KERNELDATA");
+        // Missing file and missing dir both miss cleanly.
+        assert!(block_on(lookup(&mut r, "/casper/missing")).is_none());
+        assert!(block_on(lookup(&mut r, "/nodir/vmlinuz")).is_none());
+        // A directory path that resolves to a directory is not a file hit.
+        assert!(block_on(lookup(&mut r, "/casper")).is_none());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn strict_mastered_extensionless_names_match() {
+        // Strict level-1 mastering stores "VMLINUZ" as "VMLINUZ.;1" — the
+        // trailing dot must be normalized away or kernels never match.
+        let img = TestIsoBuilder::new("STRICT")
+            .file("/boot/vmlinuz.", b"K") // builder stores "VMLINUZ.;1"
+            .build();
+        let mut r = MemReadAt(img);
+        assert!(
+            block_on(lookup(&mut r, "/boot/vmlinuz")).is_some(),
+            "trailing-dot ISO9660 name must match the dotless path"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn lookup_three_levels_deep() {
+        let img = TestIsoBuilder::new("DEEP")
+            .file("/images/pxeboot/vmlinuz", b"ANACONDA")
+            .build();
+        let mut r = MemReadAt(img);
+        let loc = block_on(lookup(&mut r, "images/pxeboot/vmlinuz")).expect("no leading slash ok");
+        assert_eq!(loc.length, 8);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn caching_reader_dedupes_repeated_directory_reads() {
+        struct Counting<'a> {
+            inner: &'a mut MemReadAt,
+            calls: usize,
+        }
+        impl IsoReadAt for Counting<'_> {
+            async fn read_at(&mut self, offset: u64, len: u32) -> std::io::Result<Vec<u8>> {
+                self.calls += 1;
+                self.inner.read_at(offset, len).await
+            }
+        }
+        let img = TestIsoBuilder::new("CACHE")
+            .file("/a/one", b"1")
+            .file("/a/two", b"2")
+            .build();
+        let mut mem = MemReadAt(img);
+        let mut counting = Counting {
+            inner: &mut mem,
+            calls: 0,
+        };
+        let mut cr = CachingReadAt::new(&mut counting);
+        assert!(block_on(exists(&mut cr, "/a/one")));
+        assert!(block_on(exists(&mut cr, "/a/two")));
+        assert!(!block_on(exists(&mut cr, "/a/three")));
+        drop(cr);
+        // 3 probes × (PVD + root dir + subdir) collapse to the 3 distinct
+        // extents, plus one: the "/a/three" miss falls back to the Joliet
+        // namespace search (v0.7.5), which reads the terminator sector
+        // once before concluding there is no SVD.
+        assert_eq!(counting.calls, 4, "all repeat reads must hit the cache");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn joliet_fallback_finds_names_missing_from_primary() {
+        // Windows-mastering worst case: primary tree is bare (./.. only),
+        // real names live only in the Joliet SVD. The lookup must fall
+        // back and still resolve nested paths case-insensitively.
+        let img = TestIsoBuilder::new("APPLIANCE")
+            .joliet_only(true)
+            .file("/images/pxeboot/vmlinuz", b"JKERNEL")
+            .file("/sources/boot.wim", b"JWIM")
+            .build();
+        let mut r = MemReadAt(img);
+        let loc = block_on(lookup(&mut r, "/images/pxeboot/vmlinuz")).expect("joliet fallback");
+        let bytes = block_on(r.read_at(loc.offset, loc.length as u32)).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(&bytes, b"JKERNEL");
+        assert!(block_on(lookup(&mut r, "/SOURCES/BOOT.WIM")).is_some());
+        assert!(block_on(lookup(&mut r, "/images/pxeboot/missing")).is_none());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn lookup_local_reads_a_real_file() {
+        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+        let p = dir.path().join("t.iso");
+        let img = TestIsoBuilder::new("LOCAL")
+            .file("/sources/boot.wim", b"WIMWIM")
+            .build();
+        std::fs::write(&p, &img).unwrap();
+        let loc = lookup_local(&p, "/sources/boot.wim").expect("found");
+        assert_eq!(loc.length, 6);
+        assert!(lookup_local(&p, "/sources/none").is_none());
+    }
+}

crates/iso-store/src/lib.rs

@@ -18,8 +18,15 @@
 
 pub mod entry;
 pub mod introspect;
+// v0.7.4: read-only ISO9660 walker generic over any random-access byte
+// source (local file, NFS READ3, SFTP seek-read). Powers both in-ISO
+// HTTP serving and the probe-based introspection.
+pub mod iso_fs;
 pub mod nfs_share;
 pub mod pxe_logo;
+// v0.7.4: persisted cache of remote-share introspection results so a
+// container restart doesn't re-probe an unchanged 40-ISO library.
+pub mod remote_cache;
 pub mod sftp_share;
 pub mod smb;
 pub mod smb_share;
@@ -29,6 +36,7 @@ pub mod windows;
 
 pub use entry::{BootEntry, BootKind, KernelArgs};
 pub use introspect::{DistroFamily, IntrospectionReport};
+pub use iso_fs::FileLocation;
 // v0.4.65: kernel-mount NFS is gone. SMB shares via Samba's userspace
 // `smbclient` CLI replaced it — works in any container (no
 // CAP_SYS_ADMIN, no host kernel modules), matching how Bootimus and

crates/iso-store/src/nfs_share.rs

@@ -57,7 +57,9 @@
 //! UI to ask for. (If a future server needs Kerberos or non-default
 //! uid mapping we can add those, but for ISO read access nobody does.)
 
-use crate::introspect::IntrospectionReport;
+use crate::introspect::{introspect_reader, provisional_report};
+use crate::iso_fs::{self, FileLocation, IsoReadAt};
+use crate::remote_cache::RemoteIntrospectCache;
 use crate::store::{generate_boot_entries_for, slugify_str, IsoSource, IsoStore};
 use bytes::Bytes;
 use nfs3_client::tokio::TokioConnector;
@@ -100,6 +102,18 @@ const READ_CHUNK_BYTES: u32 = 64 * 1024;
 /// client park gigabytes of decoded ISO in RAM.
 const STREAM_BUFFER_DEPTH: usize = 16;
 
+/// v0.7.4: per-ISO budget for a background introspection probe. A probe
+/// is one connection plus a few dozen KiB-sized reads — sub-second on a
+/// LAN — so anything past this is a wedged server, not a slow one.
+const INTROSPECT_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(30);
+
+/// One queued background-introspection unit (v0.7.4).
+struct ProbeJob {
+    iso_id: String,
+    filename: String,
+    size: u64,
+}
+
 /// One configured NFS share. The id is derived from server+export so
 /// re-adding the same coordinates is idempotent.
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
@@ -177,6 +191,9 @@ pub struct NfsShareManager {
     /// opens its own NFS connection so concurrency isn't a hard
     /// requirement, but serializing keeps log output predictable.
     op_lock: Arc<tokio::sync::Mutex<()>>,
+    /// v0.7.4: persisted introspection results keyed `share/path@size`,
+    /// so a restart re-probes only new or replaced ISOs.
+    introspect_cache: RemoteIntrospectCache,
 }
 
 impl NfsShareManager {
@@ -190,6 +207,7 @@ impl NfsShareManager {
             inner: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Inner::default())),
             iso_store,
             op_lock: Arc::new(tokio::sync::Mutex::new(())),
+            introspect_cache: RemoteIntrospectCache::open(work_dir, "nfs_introspect_cache.json"),
         }
     }
 
@@ -387,12 +405,26 @@ impl NfsShareManager {
         };
 
         let mut count = 0u32;
+        let mut to_probe: Vec<ProbeJob> = Vec::new();
         for entry in listing {
             let iso_id = format!("nfs-{}-{}", share.id, slugify_str(&entry.filename));
-            // Same approach as SMB: no real introspection over the
+            // v0.7.4: real introspection over the share — NFSv3 READ3
-            // network in v0.4.67. The boot-entry generator falls back
+            // takes an offset, so the ISO9660 probes work remotely. A
-            // to filename-based sanboot detection.
+            // cache hit registers the full report immediately; a miss
-            let report = IntrospectionReport::default();
+            // registers a provisional filename-based report (so the scan
+            // returns fast) and queues a background probe that upgrades
+            // the entry in place.
+            let cached = self
+                .introspect_cache
+                .get(&share.id, &entry.filename, entry.size);
+            let report = cached.unwrap_or_else(|| {
+                to_probe.push(ProbeJob {
+                    iso_id: iso_id.clone(),
+                    filename: entry.filename.clone(),
+                    size: entry.size,
+                });
+                provisional_report(&entry.filename)
+            });
             let boot_entries = generate_boot_entries_for(&iso_id, &entry.filename, &report);
             let source = IsoSource::Nfs {
                 share_id: share.id.clone(),
@@ -413,11 +445,88 @@ impl NfsShareManager {
             target: "openpxe::nfs",
             id = %id, server = %share.server, export = %share.export,
             iso_count = count,
+            pending_introspection = to_probe.len(),
             "NFS share scanned"
         );
+        if !to_probe.is_empty() {
+            self.spawn_introspection_pass(&share, to_probe);
+        }
         Ok(count)
     }
 
+    /// v0.7.4: probe each queued ISO over its own NFS connection and swap
+    /// the full introspection into the store as results land. Runs
+    /// detached so neither startup nor the share-add API call waits on a
+    /// 40-ISO library; per-ISO failures (or a share removed mid-pass)
+    /// leave the provisional entry in place, which still sanboots.
+    fn spawn_introspection_pass(&self, share: &NfsShare, work: Vec<ProbeJob>) {
+        let store = self.iso_store.clone();
+        let cache = self.introspect_cache.clone();
+        let share_id = share.id.clone();
+        let server = share.server.clone();
+        let export = share.export.clone();
+        let port = share.port;
+        let queued = work.len();
+        tokio::spawn(async move {
+            let mut upgraded = 0usize;
+            for job in work {
+                let probe = async {
+                    let mut reader = NfsReadAt::open(&server, &export, port, &job.filename).await?;
+                    let report =
+                        introspect_reader(&mut reader, job.size, &job.filename, false).await;
+                    reader.finish().await;
+                    Ok::<_, NfsClientError>(report)
+                };
+                match tokio::time::timeout(INTROSPECT_TIMEOUT, probe).await {
+                    Ok(Ok(report)) => {
+                        cache.put(&share_id, &job.filename, job.size, report.clone());
+                        if store.update_external_introspection(&job.iso_id, report) {
+                            upgraded += 1;
+                        }
+                    }
+                    Ok(Err(e)) => tracing::warn!(
+                        target: "openpxe::nfs",
+                        share = %share_id, iso = %job.filename,
+                        "introspection failed: {e}"
+                    ),
+                    Err(_) => tracing::warn!(
+                        target: "openpxe::nfs",
+                        share = %share_id, iso = %job.filename,
+                        "introspection timed out after {}s", INTROSPECT_TIMEOUT.as_secs()
+                    ),
+                }
+            }
+            tracing::info!(
+                target: "openpxe::nfs",
+                share = %share_id, queued, upgraded,
+                "remote introspection pass complete"
+            );
+        });
+    }
+
+    /// v0.7.4: locate `in_iso_path` inside a share-hosted ISO. Returns the
+    /// byte range so the HTTP layer can serve kernel/initrd files out of
+    /// remote ISOs with a follow-up ranged [`Self::stream_iso`].
+    pub async fn locate_in_iso(
+        &self,
+        share_id: &str,
+        filename: &str,
+        in_iso_path: &str,
+    ) -> Result<Option<FileLocation>> {
+        let share = self
+            .get(share_id)
+            .ok_or_else(|| Error::Invalid(format!("no such NFS share '{share_id}'")))?;
+        if filename.contains('/') || filename.contains('\\') || filename.contains("..") {
+            return Err(Error::Invalid(format!("invalid filename '{filename}'")));
+        }
+        let mut reader = NfsReadAt::open(&share.server, &share.export, share.port, filename)
+            .await
+            .map_err(|e| Error::Invalid(format!("nfs open '{filename}': {e}")))?;
+        let loc = iso_fs::lookup(&mut reader, in_iso_path).await;
+        reader.finish().await;
+        Ok(loc)
+    }
+
     fn update_status(
         &self,
         id: &str,
@@ -490,6 +599,96 @@ struct NfsListEntry {
     size: u64,
 }
 
+/// The connection type [`build_connection`] yields.
+type NfsConn = nfs3_client::Nfs3Connection<nfs3_client::tokio::TokioIo<tokio::net::TcpStream>>;
+
+/// v0.7.4: random-access reader over one NFS connection + file handle —
+/// the [`IsoReadAt`] impl that lets the ISO9660 walker and introspection
+/// probes run against share-hosted images.
+struct NfsReadAt {
+    conn: NfsConn,
+    fh: nfs_fh3,
+}
+
+impl NfsReadAt {
+    /// Connect, mount, and LOOKUP `filename` at the export root.
+    async fn open(
+        server: &str,
+        export: &str,
+        port: u16,
+        filename: &str,
+    ) -> std::result::Result<Self, NfsClientError> {
+        let mut conn = build_connection(server, export, port).await?;
+        let root = conn.root_nfs_fh3();
+        let lookup = conn
+            .lookup(&LOOKUP3args {
+                what: diropargs3 {
+                    dir: root,
+                    name: filename3(Opaque::borrowed(filename.as_bytes())),
+                },
+            })
+            .await
+            .map_err(NfsClientError::Rpc)?;
+        let fh = match lookup {
+            Nfs3Result::Ok(o) => o.object,
+            Nfs3Result::Err((status, _)) => {
+                return Err(NfsClientError::Nfsstat(status_label(status)));
+            }
+        };
+        Ok(Self { conn, fh })
+    }
+
+    /// Best-effort unmount. Consumes the reader — it's done.
+    async fn finish(self) {
+        let _ = self.conn.unmount().await;
+    }
+}
+
+impl IsoReadAt for NfsReadAt {
+    async fn read_at(&mut self, offset: u64, len: u32) -> std::io::Result<Vec<u8>> {
+        let mut out: Vec<u8> = Vec::with_capacity(len as usize);
+        let mut off = offset;
+        // READ3 may legally return fewer bytes than asked (server cap);
+        // loop until the exact-read contract is satisfied or the file
+        // genuinely ends short.
+        while (out.len() as u32) < len {
+            let want = (len - out.len() as u32).min(READ_CHUNK_BYTES);
+            let res = self
+                .conn
+                .read(&READ3args {
+                    file: self.fh.clone(),
+                    offset: off,
+                    count: want,
+                })
+                .await
+                .map_err(|e| std::io::Error::other(e.to_string()))?;
+            let ok = match res {
+                Nfs3Result::Ok(o) => o,
+                Nfs3Result::Err((status, _)) => {
+                    return Err(std::io::Error::other(status_label(status)));
+                }
+            };
+            let data = ok.data.as_ref();
+            if data.is_empty() {
+                return Err(std::io::Error::new(
+                    std::io::ErrorKind::UnexpectedEof,
+                    "NFS read past end of file",
+                ));
+            }
+            out.extend_from_slice(data);
+            off += data.len() as u64;
+            if ok.eof && (out.len() as u32) < len {
+                return Err(std::io::Error::new(
+                    std::io::ErrorKind::UnexpectedEof,
+                    "NFS read past end of file",
+                ));
+            }
+        }
+        out.truncate(len as usize);
+        Ok(out)
+    }
+}
+
 /// Connect, READDIR the export root, look up each `*.iso` to get its
 /// size + file handle. Returns a flat list. Errors are returned with
 /// a human-readable message; the caller decides how to surface them.

crates/iso-store/src/remote_cache.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
+//! Persisted cache of remote-share introspection results.
+//!
+//! NFS/SFTP introspection costs a connection plus a few dozen small
+//! reads per ISO. Shares are rescanned on every startup and share-add,
+//! so without a cache a 40-ISO library would re-probe 40 ISOs on every
+//! container restart. The cache keys on `share/path@size` — a replaced
+//! file (new size) re-probes, an untouched one is free — and entries
+//! only count as hits when their `introspect_rev` matches the current
+//! logic, so an upgrade that changes detection re-probes everything
+//! exactly once.
+//!
+//! One file per protocol (`nfs_introspect_cache.json`,
+//! `sftp_introspect_cache.json`) so the two managers never contend over
+//! one writer.
+
+use crate::introspect::{IntrospectionReport, INTROSPECT_REV};
+use parking_lot::Mutex;
+use std::collections::HashMap;
+use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
+use std::sync::Arc;
+
+/// Hard cap on cached entries; beyond it the cache resets rather than
+/// growing unbounded (a cache wipe only costs one re-probe pass).
+const MAX_ENTRIES: usize = 4096;
+
+#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
+pub struct RemoteIntrospectCache {
+    path: Arc<PathBuf>,
+    map: Arc<Mutex<HashMap<String, IntrospectionReport>>>,
+}
+
+impl RemoteIntrospectCache {
+    /// Open (or start empty) the cache at `<work_dir>/<file_name>`.
+    /// A corrupt or missing file is an empty cache, never an error.
+    #[must_use]
+    pub fn open(work_dir: &Path, file_name: &str) -> Self {
+        let path = work_dir.join(file_name);
+        let map = std::fs::read_to_string(&path)
+            .ok()
+            .and_then(|text| {
+                serde_json::from_str::<HashMap<String, IntrospectionReport>>(&text).ok()
+            })
+            .unwrap_or_default();
+        Self {
+            path: Arc::new(path),
+            map: Arc::new(Mutex::new(map)),
+        }
+    }
+
+    fn key(share_id: &str, relative_path: &str, size: u64) -> String {
+        format!("{share_id}/{relative_path}@{size}")
+    }
+
+    /// A hit requires the entry to have been produced by the *current*
+    /// introspection logic — stale-rev entries are misses, which is how
+    /// the cache self-invalidates across upgrades.
+    #[must_use]
+    pub fn get(
+        &self,
+        share_id: &str,
+        relative_path: &str,
+        size: u64,
+    ) -> Option<IntrospectionReport> {
+        self.map
+            .lock()
+            .get(&Self::key(share_id, relative_path, size))
+            .filter(|r| r.introspect_rev == INTROSPECT_REV)
+            .cloned()
+    }
+
+    pub fn put(&self, share_id: &str, relative_path: &str, size: u64, report: IntrospectionReport) {
+        let snapshot = {
+            let mut g = self.map.lock();
+            if g.len() >= MAX_ENTRIES {
+                g.clear();
+            }
+            g.insert(Self::key(share_id, relative_path, size), report);
+            g.clone()
+        };
+        // Persist outside the lock; tmp+rename so a crash mid-write
+        // leaves the previous cache intact.
+        let path = self.path.as_path();
+        let tmp = path.with_extension("json.tmp");
+        let Ok(body) = serde_json::to_vec_pretty(&snapshot) else {
+            return;
+        };
+        if let Some(parent) = path.parent() {
+            let _ = std::fs::create_dir_all(parent);
+        }
+        if std::fs::write(&tmp, body).is_ok() {
+            let _ = std::fs::rename(&tmp, path);
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+    use crate::introspect::DistroFamily;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn round_trips_across_reopen_and_rev_gates() {
+        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+        let cache = RemoteIntrospectCache::open(dir.path(), "t.json");
+        assert!(cache.get("s1", "a.iso", 100).is_none());
+
+        let fresh = IntrospectionReport {
+            family: DistroFamily::RhelFedora,
+            introspect_rev: INTROSPECT_REV,
+            el_torito: true,
+            ..Default::default()
+        };
+        cache.put("s1", "a.iso", 100, fresh.clone());
+        assert_eq!(
+            cache.get("s1", "a.iso", 100).unwrap().family,
+            DistroFamily::RhelFedora
+        );
+        // Different size = different file = miss.
+        assert!(cache.get("s1", "a.iso", 101).is_none());
+
+        // Survives a reopen.
+        let cache2 = RemoteIntrospectCache::open(dir.path(), "t.json");
+        assert!(cache2.get("s1", "a.iso", 100).is_some());
+
+        // Stale-rev entries never hit.
+        let stale = IntrospectionReport {
+            family: DistroFamily::Arch,
+            introspect_rev: INTROSPECT_REV - 1,
+            ..Default::default()
+        };
+        cache2.put("s1", "b.iso", 7, stale);
+        assert!(cache2.get("s1", "b.iso", 7).is_none());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn corrupt_cache_file_starts_empty() {
+        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+        std::fs::write(dir.path().join("t.json"), b"{nope").unwrap();
+        let cache = RemoteIntrospectCache::open(dir.path(), "t.json");
+        assert!(cache.get("s", "x.iso", 1).is_none());
+    }
+}

crates/iso-store/src/sftp_share.rs

@@ -56,7 +56,9 @@
 //! hint}` error shape is shared so the storage tab renders all three
 //! protocols through one code path.
 
-use crate::introspect::IntrospectionReport;
+use crate::introspect::{introspect_reader, provisional_report};
+use crate::iso_fs::{self, FileLocation, IsoReadAt};
+use crate::remote_cache::RemoteIntrospectCache;
 use crate::store::{generate_boot_entries_for, slugify_str, IsoSource, IsoStore};
 use bytes::Bytes;
 use openpxe_core::{Error, Result};
@@ -96,6 +98,18 @@ const READ_CHUNK_BYTES: usize = 64 * 1024;
 /// body stream. 16 * 64 KiB ≈ 1 MiB max buffer per stream.
 const STREAM_BUFFER_DEPTH: usize = 16;
 
+/// v0.7.4: per-ISO budget for a background introspection probe — one SSH
+/// connection plus a few dozen KiB-sized reads. SSH handshakes cost more
+/// than NFS mounts, but 30s still only trips on a wedged server.
+const INTROSPECT_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(30);
+
+/// One queued background-introspection unit (v0.7.4).
+struct ProbeJob {
+    iso_id: String,
+    filename: String,
+    size: u64,
+}
+
 /// Which credential the share authenticates with. The secret itself
 /// lives in the 0600 creds file, never here.
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
@@ -209,6 +223,9 @@ pub struct SftpShareManager {
     /// Serializes scan operations on the same manager for predictable
     /// log output; each scan opens its own SSH connection.
     op_lock: Arc<tokio::sync::Mutex<()>>,
+    /// v0.7.4: persisted introspection results keyed `share/path@size`,
+    /// so a restart re-probes only new or replaced ISOs.
+    introspect_cache: RemoteIntrospectCache,
 }
 
 impl SftpShareManager {
@@ -222,6 +239,7 @@ impl SftpShareManager {
             inner: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Inner::default())),
             iso_store,
             op_lock: Arc::new(tokio::sync::Mutex::new(())),
+            introspect_cache: RemoteIntrospectCache::open(work_dir, "sftp_introspect_cache.json"),
         }
     }
 
@@ -474,13 +492,25 @@ impl SftpShareManager {
         };
 
         let mut count = 0u32;
+        let mut to_probe: Vec<ProbeJob> = Vec::new();
         for entry in listing {
             let iso_id = format!("sftp-{}-{}", share.id, slugify_str(&entry.filename));
-            // Same as NFS/SMB: no over-the-network introspection yet, so
+            // v0.7.4: real introspection over the share — SFTP file
-            // register `Unknown` and let the boot-entry generator fall
+            // handles are seekable, so the ISO9660 probes work remotely.
-            // back to filename-based detection. SFTP *could* do bounded
+            // Cache hit → full report now; miss → provisional filename-
-            // PVD reads (it has random access) — a follow-up can add it.
+            // based report (scan returns fast) + a queued background
-            let report = IntrospectionReport::default();
+            // probe that upgrades the entry in place.
+            let cached = self
+                .introspect_cache
+                .get(&share.id, &entry.filename, entry.size);
+            let report = cached.unwrap_or_else(|| {
+                to_probe.push(ProbeJob {
+                    iso_id: iso_id.clone(),
+                    filename: entry.filename.clone(),
+                    size: entry.size,
+                });
+                provisional_report(&entry.filename)
+            });
             let boot_entries = generate_boot_entries_for(&iso_id, &entry.filename, &report);
             let source = IsoSource::Sftp {
                 share_id: share.id.clone(),
@@ -506,11 +536,88 @@ impl SftpShareManager {
             target: "openpxe::sftp",
             id = %id, server = %share.server, export = %share.export,
             iso_count = count,
+            pending_introspection = to_probe.len(),
             "SFTP share scanned"
         );
+        if !to_probe.is_empty() {
+            self.spawn_introspection_pass(&share, &creds, to_probe);
+        }
         Ok(count)
     }
 
+    /// v0.7.4: probe each queued ISO over its own SSH connection and swap
+    /// the full introspection into the store as results land. Detached so
+    /// neither startup nor the share-add API call waits on a big library;
+    /// per-ISO failures leave the provisional entry, which still sanboots.
+    fn spawn_introspection_pass(&self, share: &SftpShare, creds: &SftpCreds, work: Vec<ProbeJob>) {
+        let store = self.iso_store.clone();
+        let cache = self.introspect_cache.clone();
+        let share_id = share.id.clone();
+        let params = ConnParams::from_share(share);
+        let creds = creds.clone();
+        let queued = work.len();
+        tokio::spawn(async move {
+            let mut upgraded = 0usize;
+            for job in work {
+                let probe = async {
+                    let mut reader = SftpReadAt::open(&params, &creds, &job.filename).await?;
+                    let report =
+                        introspect_reader(&mut reader, job.size, &job.filename, false).await;
+                    Ok::<_, SftpClientError>(report)
+                };
+                match tokio::time::timeout(INTROSPECT_TIMEOUT, probe).await {
+                    Ok(Ok(report)) => {
+                        cache.put(&share_id, &job.filename, job.size, report.clone());
+                        if store.update_external_introspection(&job.iso_id, report) {
+                            upgraded += 1;
+                        }
+                    }
+                    Ok(Err(e)) => tracing::warn!(
+                        target: "openpxe::sftp",
+                        share = %share_id, iso = %job.filename,
+                        "introspection failed: {e}"
+                    ),
+                    Err(_) => tracing::warn!(
+                        target: "openpxe::sftp",
+                        share = %share_id, iso = %job.filename,
+                        "introspection timed out after {}s", INTROSPECT_TIMEOUT.as_secs()
+                    ),
+                }
+            }
+            tracing::info!(
+                target: "openpxe::sftp",
+                share = %share_id, queued, upgraded,
+                "remote introspection pass complete"
+            );
+        });
+    }
+
+    /// v0.7.4: locate `in_iso_path` inside a share-hosted ISO. Returns the
+    /// byte range so the HTTP layer can serve kernel/initrd files out of
+    /// remote ISOs with a follow-up ranged [`Self::stream_iso`].
+    pub async fn locate_in_iso(
+        &self,
+        share_id: &str,
+        filename: &str,
+        in_iso_path: &str,
+    ) -> Result<Option<FileLocation>> {
+        let share = self
+            .get(share_id)
+            .ok_or_else(|| Error::Invalid(format!("no such SFTP share '{share_id}'")))?;
+        if filename.contains('/') || filename.contains('\\') || filename.contains("..") {
+            return Err(Error::Invalid(format!("invalid filename '{filename}'")));
+        }
+        let creds = self
+            .read_creds(share_id)
+            .await
+            .map_err(|e| Error::Invalid(format!("could not read credentials: {e}")))?;
+        let params = ConnParams::from_share(&share);
+        let mut reader = SftpReadAt::open(&params, &creds, filename)
+            .await
+            .map_err(|e| Error::Invalid(format!("sftp open '{filename}': {e}")))?;
+        Ok(iso_fs::lookup(&mut reader, in_iso_path).await)
+    }
+
     fn pin_fingerprint(&self, id: &str, fingerprint: String) {
         if fingerprint.is_empty() {
             return;
@@ -652,6 +759,43 @@ struct SftpConn {
     sftp: SftpSession,
 }
 
+/// v0.7.4: random-access reader over one SSH connection + open file
+/// handle — the [`IsoReadAt`] impl that lets the ISO9660 walker and
+/// introspection probes run against share-hosted images. Holds the
+/// `SftpConn` so the SSH session outlives every read.
+struct SftpReadAt {
+    _conn: SftpConn,
+    file: russh_sftp::client::fs::File,
+}
+
+impl SftpReadAt {
+    async fn open(
+        p: &ConnParams,
+        creds: &SftpCreds,
+        filename: &str,
+    ) -> std::result::Result<Self, SftpClientError> {
+        let (conn, _fp) = connect(p, creds).await?;
+        let full = format!("{}/{}", p.export.trim_end_matches('/'), filename);
+        let file = conn
+            .sftp
+            .open(full)
+            .await
+            .map_err(|e| SftpClientError::Sftp(e.to_string()))?;
+        Ok(Self { _conn: conn, file })
+    }
+}
+
+impl IsoReadAt for SftpReadAt {
+    async fn read_at(&mut self, offset: u64, len: u32) -> std::io::Result<Vec<u8>> {
+        self.file.seek(SeekFrom::Start(offset)).await?;
+        let mut buf = vec![0u8; len as usize];
+        // read_exact loops over the transport's short reads and fails
+        // with UnexpectedEof past end-of-file — exactly the contract.
+        self.file.read_exact(&mut buf).await?;
+        Ok(buf)
+    }
+}
+
 /// russh client handler implementing trust-on-first-use host-key
 /// verification. We never construct an `Err` from `check_server_key`;
 /// returning `Ok(false)` makes russh abort the handshake, and the

crates/iso-store/src/smb_share.rs

@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@
 //! streaming. A follow-up release can add libsmbclient-based seek if
 //! a real workload needs it.
 
-use crate::introspect::IntrospectionReport;
+use crate::introspect::provisional_report;
 use crate::store::{generate_boot_entries_for, slugify_str, IsoSource, IsoStore};
 use openpxe_core::{Error, Result};
 use parking_lot::Mutex;
@@ -455,15 +455,14 @@ impl SmbShareManager {
         let mut count = 0u32;
         for entry in listing {
             let iso_id = format!("smb-{}-{}", share.id, slugify_str(&entry.filename));
-            // SMB sources don't get a real introspection pass — that
+            // SMB sources can't get the content-probe pass NFS/SFTP got
-            // would require seeking into the ISO9660 PVD over the
+            // in v0.7.4 — the ISO9660 probes need seeks, and smbclient's
-            // network, and smbclient CLI doesn't seek. We register an
+            // CLI streaming doesn't seek. The provisional filename-token
-            // `Unknown` family so the boot-entry generator falls back
+            // report is as far as SMB detection goes: family for the UI
-            // to generic sanboot/wimboot detection from the filename
+            // when the name says it ("rhel-9.0…", "Win11_…"), and
-            // and the operator gets *something* bootable. A follow-up
+            // `introspect_rev = 0` so the entry generator keeps the
-            // release can do a bounded `smbclient get` of the first
+            // optimistic sanboot entry.
-            // 64 KiB for real detection.
+            let report = provisional_report(&entry.filename);
-            let report = IntrospectionReport::default();
             let boot_entries = generate_boot_entries_for(&iso_id, &entry.filename, &report);
             let source = IsoSource::Smb {
                 share_id: share.id.clone(),

crates/iso-store/src/store.rs

@@ -300,7 +300,19 @@ impl IsoStore {
         }
         let partial_path = self.iso_dir.join(format!("{id}.partial"));
         if partial_path.exists() {
-            return Err(Error::Invalid(format!("iso '{id}' is already uploading")));
+            // A leftover .partial is an upload abandoned mid-flight (browser
+            // refresh, tab close, dropped connection) — nothing reaps it
+            // otherwise, and the operator hits a bogus "already uploading"
+            // on retry. The chunked protocol can't resume it anyway (a
+            // fresh session restarts at offset 0), so reclaim it.
+            // ponytail: two tabs uploading the *same filename* at once would
+            // race here — last writer wins, and the truncating create below
+            // keeps that from corrupting a half-written file.
+            tracing::info!(
+                target: "openpxe::iso", %id,
+                "reclaiming abandoned .partial from a prior upload attempt"
+            );
+            tokio::fs::remove_file(&partial_path).await.ok();
         }
         let file = tokio::fs::File::create(&partial_path).await?;
         Ok(UploadHandle {
@@ -415,6 +427,28 @@ impl IsoStore {
         self.inner.write().isos.insert(id, meta);
     }
 
+    /// v0.7.4: swap in a completed introspection for an external ISO and
+    /// regenerate its boot entries. Used by the NFS/SFTP managers'
+    /// background probe pass — the scan registers a provisional
+    /// (filename-only) report immediately so startup and share-add stay
+    /// fast, then this upgrades each entry as its probe finishes.
+    /// Operator-set fields (category, password) are preserved; returns
+    /// `false` when the id is gone (share removed or re-scanned away
+    /// mid-probe), which callers treat as a benign no-op.
+    pub fn update_external_introspection(
+        &self,
+        id: &str,
+        introspection: IntrospectionReport,
+    ) -> bool {
+        let mut g = self.inner.write();
+        let Some(m) = g.isos.get_mut(id) else {
+            return false;
+        };
+        m.boot_entries = generate_boot_entries(&m.id, &m.filename, &introspection);
+        m.introspection = introspection;
+        true
+    }
+
     /// Drop every entry that belongs to `share_id`. Used by the SMB
     /// and NFS share managers when an operator removes a share, or
     /// before re-scanning to clean out stale entries. The same id
@@ -850,15 +884,39 @@ mod tests {
     }
 
     #[tokio::test]
-    async fn begin_upload_rejects_existing_partial_file() {
+    async fn begin_upload_reclaims_stale_partial_file() {
+        // v0.8.0: an abandoned .partial (browser refresh / crash / dropped
+        // connection) must not block a re-upload with a bogus "already
+        // uploading" — begin_upload reclaims it and starts fresh, since the
+        // chunked protocol can't resume a dead session anyway.
         let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
         let store = IsoStore::new(dir.path().to_path_buf());
         store.ensure_dirs().await.unwrap();
-        tokio::fs::write(dir.path().join("ubuntu.partial"), b"in-flight")
+        let partial = dir.path().join("ubuntu.partial");
+        tokio::fs::write(&partial, b"in-flight").await.unwrap();
+
+        let handle = store
+            .begin_upload("ubuntu.iso")
+            .await
+            .expect("stale .partial is reclaimed, not rejected");
+        assert_eq!(handle.id, "ubuntu");
+        // Reclaimed: the leftover bytes are gone (fresh, empty file).
+        let meta = tokio::fs::metadata(&partial).await.unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(meta.len(), 0, "stale .partial must be truncated on reclaim");
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn begin_upload_still_rejects_completed_iso() {
+        // A finished upload (final .iso on disk) is a genuine duplicate, not
+        // an abandoned attempt — that case must still be refused.
+        let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
+        let store = IsoStore::new(dir.path().to_path_buf());
+        store.ensure_dirs().await.unwrap();
+        tokio::fs::write(dir.path().join("rocky.iso"), b"done")
             .await
             .unwrap();
 
-        let r = store.begin_upload("ubuntu.iso").await;
+        let r = store.begin_upload("rocky.iso").await;
         assert!(matches!(r, Err(Error::Invalid(_))));
     }
 

crates/openpxe/Cargo.toml

@@ -26,7 +26,5 @@ tracing.workspace = true
 tracing-subscriber.workspace = true
 anyhow.workspace = true
 clap.workspace = true
-serde.workspace = true
-toml.workspace = true
 bytes.workspace = true
 time.workspace = true

crates/openpxe/src/main.rs

@@ -122,6 +122,7 @@ async fn main() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
     let admin = openpxe_core::AdminStore::load_or_default(&config.paths.work_dir);
     let sso = openpxe_core::SsoStore::load_or_default(&config.paths.work_dir);
     let notify = openpxe_core::NotifyStore::load_or_default(&config.paths.work_dir);
+    let api_key = openpxe_core::ApiKeyStore::load_or_init(&config.paths.work_dir);
     let sessions = openpxe_http_api::auth::SessionStore::default();
     let metrics = Metrics::new();
 
@@ -184,6 +185,10 @@ async fn main() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
         "network info"
     );
 
+    // v0.7.1: boot rules are shared between the HTTP layer (target rules,
+    // webhook, the editor API) and the DHCP proxy (driver-mode pins).
+    let boot_rules = openpxe_core::BootRulesStore::load_or_default(&config.paths.work_dir);
+
     let state = AppState {
         iso_store: iso_store.clone(),
         clients: clients.clone(),
@@ -191,12 +196,13 @@ async fn main() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
         queue: queue.clone(),
         hosts: hosts.clone(),
         boot_log: boot_log.clone(),
-        boot_rules: openpxe_core::BootRulesStore::load_or_default(&config.paths.work_dir),
+        boot_rules: boot_rules.clone(),
         boot_tokens: openpxe_core::BootTokens::new(),
         branding: branding.clone(),
         pxe_bg_cache: openpxe_http_api::state::PxeBgCache::default(),
         admin: admin.clone(),
         sessions: sessions.clone(),
+        api_key,
         sso: sso.clone(),
         saml: openpxe_http_api::saml_routes::SamlRuntime::default(),
         notify: notify.clone(),
@@ -211,6 +217,7 @@ async fn main() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
         started_at: time::OffsetDateTime::now_utc(),
         public_base_url: public_base_url.clone(),
         nic_name: net.nic_name,
+        nic_link: net.nic_link,
         subnet_mask: net.subnet_mask,
         gateway: net.gateway,
     };
@@ -267,6 +274,10 @@ async fn main() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
                 public_base_url.clone(),
                 clients.clone(),
                 metrics.clone(),
+                // v0.7.1: learned driver modes persist next to the other
+                // state files, so a machine walks the ladder once *ever*.
+                openpxe_dhcp_proxy::DriverEscalation::load_or_default(&config.paths.work_dir),
+                boot_rules.clone(),
             );
             tokio::spawn(s.run())
         }
@@ -440,6 +451,12 @@ struct NetworkInfo {
     nic_name: String,
     subnet_mask: String,
     gateway: String,
+    /// v0.7.2: physical link summary for the Network tab — operstate,
+    /// negotiated speed/duplex, and the port's own MAC. Helps operators
+    /// in multi-NIC / trunked environments confirm *which* port the PXE
+    /// server actually answers on. Empty when sysfs isn't available
+    /// (non-Linux dev builds) or the NIC wasn't identified.
+    nic_link: String,
 }
 
 /// Best-effort population of the Network tab's read-only fields. We shell
@@ -500,9 +517,44 @@ fn detect_network_info(our_ip: Ipv4Addr) -> NetworkInfo {
         }
     }
 
+    info.nic_link = detect_link_info(&info.nic_name);
+
     info
 }
 
+/// v0.7.2: read the NIC's physical link details from sysfs. Every field
+/// is optional — virtual NICs report no speed (`-1` or absent), and
+/// non-Linux dev machines have no `/sys/class/net` at all — so the
+/// result is whatever could be read, joined human-readably, or empty.
+fn detect_link_info(nic: &str) -> String {
+    if nic.is_empty() {
+        return String::new();
+    }
+    let read = |file: &str| {
+        std::fs::read_to_string(format!("/sys/class/net/{nic}/{file}"))
+            .map(|s| s.trim().to_string())
+            .unwrap_or_default()
+    };
+    let mut parts: Vec<String> = Vec::new();
+    let state = read("operstate");
+    if !state.is_empty() {
+        parts.push(format!("link {state}"));
+    }
+    let speed = read("speed");
+    if !speed.is_empty() && speed != "-1" {
+        parts.push(format!("{speed} Mb/s"));
+    }
+    let duplex = read("duplex");
+    if !duplex.is_empty() && duplex != "unknown" {
+        parts.push(format!("{duplex} duplex"));
+    }
+    let mac = read("address");
+    if !mac.is_empty() {
+        parts.push(format!("port {mac}"));
+    }
+    parts.join(" · ")
+}
+
 fn prefix_to_dotted(prefix: u8) -> String {
     let prefix = prefix.min(32);
     let mask: u32 = if prefix == 0 {

crates/tftp/Cargo.toml

@@ -15,6 +15,4 @@ openpxe-ipxe-assets.workspace = true
 tokio.workspace = true
 socket2.workspace = true
 tracing.workspace = true
-thiserror.workspace = true
 anyhow.workspace = true
-bytes.workspace = true

crates/webui/src/app.css

@@ -912,3 +912,28 @@ tr.unbootable td:first-child { border-left: 3px solid var(--warn); }
   display: flex; justify-content: flex-end; gap: 10px; margin-top: 18px;
 }
 .modal-actions .submit { width: auto; padding: 8px 18px; }
+
+/* v0.7.2: a label.field directly followed by the card's action button
+   stacked its own 14px bottom margin onto the button's 16px top margin
+   (30px total) — visible on Queue "Launch for all waiting" and the
+   Network "Save". Collapse the doubled gap so every primary action sits
+   the same 16px below its form. */
+.card .body > label.field:has(+ button) { margin-bottom: 0; }
+
+/* v0.7.2: inline list filter above a table (Available images). The input
+   is wrapped in a label.field so it borrows the standard text-field chrome
+   and matches every other input in the app; this wrapper just insets it
+   from the card edges so it lines up with the header text above. */
+.list-search { padding: 14px 16px; }
+
+/* v0.7.4: pager footer under the Available-images table — quiet status
+   text on the left, ghost Prev/Next on the right. */
+.list-pager {
+  display: flex; align-items: center; gap: 8px;
+  padding: 12px 16px;
+  color: var(--fg-dim); font-size: 12px;
+  font-variant-numeric: tabular-nums;
+}
+.list-pager .spacer { flex: 1; }
+.list-pager button { padding: 4px 12px; font-size: 12px; }
+.list-pager button:disabled { opacity: 0.45; cursor: default; }

crates/webui/src/app.js

@@ -178,12 +178,14 @@
     if (iso.introspection.el_torito) {
       return { ok: true, warn: 'generic bootable ISO — boots via sanboot (emulated CD)' };
     }
-    // Remote-share ISOs aren't introspected (no random access over the
+    // v0.7.4: NFS/SFTP ISOs now introspect over the share, so a probed
-    // network), so el_torito is unknown — assume bootable and let sanboot
+    // remote ISO flows through the kernel/el_torito branches above like
-    // try rather than cry wolf.
+    // a local one. introspect_rev 0 means the probe hasn't landed yet
+    // (it runs in the background right after a scan) or never can (SMB —
+    // smbclient can't seek): stay optimistic and let sanboot try.
     const remote = iso.source && iso.source.kind && iso.source.kind !== 'local';
-    if (remote) {
+    if (remote && (iso.introspection.introspect_rev || 0) === 0) {
-      return { ok: true, warn: 'remote ISO — not introspected; sanboot is attempted at boot' };
+      return { ok: true, warn: 'remote ISO — awaiting introspection; sanboot is attempted at boot' };
     }
     // Local ISO with no Windows/Linux boot files and no El Torito catalog:
     // a data/appliance image (e.g. a VMware vCenter bundle), not a bootable
@@ -199,97 +201,47 @@
     })[k] || (k || 'Unknown');
   }
 
-  // v0.7.0: the Boot rules card — ordered first-match-wins rules
+  // v0.7.2: compact read-out of saved group rules — created from the
-  // (MAC prefix / architecture → target) plus the optional
+  // unified "Pin MAC" form on the Hosts tab (a prefix or an architecture
-  // boot-decision webhook. Saved as one config because rule order
+  // there saves a rule instead of a pin). First match wins, top to
-  // matters. With no rules and no webhook, behavior is identical to
+  // bottom. The boot-decision webhook remains available via the API
-  // before the feature existed.
+  // (/api/boot-rules `webhook_url`) but no longer has a UI knob.
-  function bootRulesCard(cfg, targetOptions) {
+  function groupRulesCard(cfg, targetOptions) {
-    const archChoices = [
+    const rules = (cfg && cfg.rules) || [];
-      ['', 'any arch'], ['bios', 'BIOS'], ['uefi-x64', 'UEFI x64'],
+    if (!rules.length) return null;
-      ['uefi-ia32', 'UEFI IA32'], ['uefi-arm64', 'UEFI ARM64'],
+    const titleFor = id => {
-    ];
+      const t = targetOptions.find(x => x.id === id);
-    const rules = (cfg.rules || []).map(r => Object.assign({}, r));
+      return t ? t.title : id;
-    const tbody = el('tbody', {});
-    const msg = el('div', {class:'msg'});
-    const webhookInput = el('input', {type:'text', spellcheck:'false',
-      placeholder:'http://automation.example/boot-decision (optional)',
-      value: cfg.webhook_url || ''});
-
-    const targetSelect = (val) => el('select', {},
-      [el('option', {value:''}, '— target —')]
-      .concat(targetOptions.map(t =>
-        el('option', Object.assign({value: t.id}, t.id === val ? {selected:''} : {}), t.title))));
-
-    const redraw = () => {
-      tbody.innerHTML = '';
-      if (!rules.length) {
-        tbody.appendChild(el('tr', {}, el('td', {colspan:'6', class:'empty', style:'padding:14px'},
-          'No rules. Add one to route whole groups of machines (an OUI, an architecture) to a target.')));
-      }
-      rules.forEach((r, i) => {
-        const macIn = el('input', {type:'text', spellcheck:'false', placeholder:'aa:bb:cc (prefix)',
-          value: r.mac_prefix || '', oninput: e => { r.mac_prefix = e.target.value; }});
-        const archSel = el('select', {onchange: e => { r.arch = e.target.value; }},
-          archChoices.map(([v, label]) =>
-            el('option', Object.assign({value: v}, v === (r.arch || '') ? {selected:''} : {}), label)));
-        const tgtSel = targetSelect(r.target || '');
-        tgtSel.onchange = e => { r.target = e.target.value; };
-        const noteIn = el('input', {type:'text', placeholder:'note',
-          value: r.note || '', oninput: e => { r.note = e.target.value; }});
-        const enabled = el('input', {type:'checkbox', onchange: e => { r.enabled = e.target.checked; }});
-        enabled.checked = r.enabled !== false;
-        tbody.appendChild(el('tr', {}, [
-          el('td', {}, macIn),
-          el('td', {}, archSel),
-          el('td', {}, tgtSel),
-          el('td', {}, noteIn),
-          el('td', {style:'text-align:center'}, enabled),
-          el('td', {style:'text-align:right'},
-            el('button', {class:'danger', onclick: () => { rules.splice(i, 1); redraw(); }}, '✕')),
-        ]));
-      });
     };
-    redraw();
+    const modeLabel = {firmware:'Firmware NIC', builtin:'iPXE drivers', shim:'Secure Boot (shim)'};
-
+    const rows = rules.map((r, i) => el('tr', r.enabled === false ? {style:'opacity:.5'} : {}, [
-    const addBtn = el('button', {class:'ghost', onclick: () => {
+      el('td', {class:'mono'}, r.mac_prefix || el('span', {class:'tag'}, 'any MAC')),
-      rules.push({mac_prefix:'', arch:'', target:'', enabled:true, note:''});
+      el('td', {}, r.arch || el('span', {class:'tag'}, 'any arch')),
-      redraw();
+      el('td', {}, r.target ? titleFor(r.target) : el('span', {class:'tag'}, '—')),
-    }}, '+ Add rule');
+      el('td', {}, r.driver_mode
-    const saveBtn = el('button', {onclick: async () => {
+        ? el('span', {class:'tag accent'}, modeLabel[r.driver_mode] || r.driver_mode)
-      const bad = rules.find(r => r.enabled !== false && !r.target);
+        : el('span', {class:'tag'}, 'auto')),
-      if (bad) { msg.textContent = 'Every enabled rule needs a target.'; msg.className = 'msg err'; return; }
+      el('td', {}, r.note || ''),
-      const r = await putJSON('/api/boot-rules', {rules, webhook_url: webhookInput.value.trim()});
+      el('td', {style:'text-align:right'},
-      if (r.ok) { msg.textContent = 'Saved.'; msg.className = 'msg ok'; }
+        el('button', {class:'danger', onclick: async () => {
-      else { msg.textContent = 'Save failed: ' + await r.text(); msg.className = 'msg err'; }
+          if (!confirm('Remove this group rule?')) return;
-    }}, 'Save rules');
+          const fresh = await getJSON('/api/boot-rules').catch(() => ({rules: [], webhook_url: ''}));
-
+          (fresh.rules = fresh.rules || []).splice(i, 1);
+          await putJSON('/api/boot-rules', fresh);
+          render('hosts');
+        }}, 'Remove')),
+    ]));
     return el('div', {class:'card'}, [
       el('header', {}, [
-        el('h2', {}, 'Boot rules'),
+        el('h2', {}, 'Group rules'),
         el('span', {class:'sub'}, 'first match wins · checked top to bottom'),
       ]),
-      el('div', {class:'body'}, [
+      el('table', {}, [
-        el('table', {}, [
+        el('thead', {}, el('tr', {}, [
-          el('thead', {}, el('tr', {}, [
+          el('th',{},'MAC prefix'), el('th',{},'Arch'), el('th',{},'Target'),
-            el('th',{},'MAC prefix'), el('th',{},'Arch'), el('th',{},'Target'),
+          el('th',{},'Boot binary'), el('th',{},'Note'), el('th',{},''),
-            el('th',{},'Note'), el('th',{},'On'), el('th',{},''),
+        ])),
-          ])),
+        el('tbody', {}, rows),
-          tbody,
-        ]),
-        el('div', {style:'margin-top:12px'}, [addBtn, saveBtn]),
-        el('label', {class:'field', style:'margin-top:16px;display:block'}, [
-          el('span', {class:'name'}, 'Boot-decision webhook (optional)'),
-          webhookInput,
-          el('span', {class:'hint'},
-            'When no pin or rule matches, OpenPXE GETs this URL with ?mac=…&arch=… ' +
-            'A 200 reply of {"target": "<entry-id>"} chains to that target; anything ' +
-            'else (404, timeout, error) falls through to the menu — a dead endpoint ' +
-            'can never block PXE.'),
-        ]),
-        msg,
-        el('p', {class:'msg', style:'margin-top:10px'},
-          'Decision order per boot: exact MAC pin → first matching rule → webhook → interactive menu.'),
       ]),
     ]);
   }
@@ -317,7 +269,7 @@
       el('label', {class:'field'}, [
         el('span', {class:'name'}, 'Auto IP address (optional)'), ipInput]),
       el('label', {class:'field'}, [
-        el('span', {class:'name'}, 'Unattended file'), sel]),
+        el('span', {class:'name'}, 'Unattended file (in Storage → Advanced)'), sel]),
     ]);
     return {
       wrap,
@@ -495,6 +447,12 @@
             el('div', {class:'v'}, net.gateway || '?'),
             el('div', {class:'k'}, 'Public base URL'),
             el('div', {class:'v'}, net.public_base_url),
+            // v0.7.2: physical link details (operstate · speed · duplex ·
+            // port MAC) so the operator can confirm WHICH port answers PXE
+            // in multi-NIC / trunked environments. Kept last — the joined
+            // value runs long, so it wraps cleanly at the bottom of the list.
+            el('div', {class:'k'}, 'Link'),
+            el('div', {class:'v'}, net.nic_link || '—'),
           ]),
           el('p', {class:'msg'},
             'Server IP, NIC, mask, and gateway are auto-detected at startup. ' +
@@ -645,36 +603,85 @@
 
       // ── Upload card ──
       const drop = el('div', {class:'drop', id:'drop'}, [
-        el('div', {}, ['Drop an ', el('strong', {}, '.iso'), ' here, or click to choose.']),
+        el('div', {}, ['Drop one or more ', el('strong', {}, '.iso'), ' files here, or click to choose.']),
         el('div', {style:'font-size:12px;margin-top:6px'},
-           'Linux + Windows installers auto-detected on upload. Streaming, no 502s on big files.'),
+           'Linux + Windows installers auto-detected on upload. Multiple files upload at once. Streaming, no 502s on big files.'),
       ]);
       const file = el('input', {type:'file', accept:'.iso,application/octet-stream',
-                                style:'display:none', id:'file'});
+                                multiple:true, style:'display:none', id:'file'});
-      const prog = el('div', {class:'progress', id:'prog'}, el('div', {class:'bar', id:'bar'}));
+      // v0.8.0: one progress row per file, appended here. Replaces the
-      const upMsg = el('div', {class:'msg', id:'upmsg'});
+      // single shared bar/msg/cancel that a second concurrent upload used
-      // v0.5.8: cancel button — shown only while an upload is in flight.
+      // to clobber.
-      const cancelUpload = el('button', {class:'danger', type:'button',
+      const uploadsList = el('div', {id:'uploads', style:'display:grid;gap:12px'});
-        style:'display:none;margin-top:12px', id:'cancel-upload'}, 'Cancel upload');
+
+      // One page-leave guard + one tab-hide cleanup for the whole card,
+      // registered only while ≥1 upload is in flight (added on 0→1, removed
+      // on 1→0) so listeners never pile up across re-renders.
+      let activeUploads = 0;
+      const activeIds = new Set();
+      const warnLeave = (e) => { if (activeUploads > 0) { e.preventDefault(); e.returnValue = ''; return ''; } };
+      const abortOnHide = () => {
+        // keepalive lets these DELETEs outlive the unload; the server also
+        // reclaims an orphaned .partial on the next upload, so best-effort
+        // is fine here.
+        for (const id of activeIds) {
+          try { fetch('/api/uploads/' + encodeURIComponent(id), {method:'DELETE', keepalive:true}); } catch (_) {}
+        }
+      };
+      const addGuards = () => {
+        window.addEventListener('beforeunload', warnLeave);
+        window.addEventListener('pagehide', abortOnHide);
+      };
+      const removeGuards = () => {
+        window.removeEventListener('beforeunload', warnLeave);
+        window.removeEventListener('pagehide', abortOnHide);
+      };
+
+      const failText = async (r) => {
+        const text = (await r.text()).slice(0, 240);
+        let hint = '';
+        if (r.status === 413)      hint = ' - body too large. A proxy likely rejected this chunk.';
+        else if (r.status === 502) hint = ' - bad gateway. Proxy lost the upstream mid-stream.';
+        else if (r.status === 504) hint = ' - gateway timeout. Try the LAN IP directly.';
+        else if (r.status === 409) hint = ' - name conflict or offset mismatch. Remove the old ISO and retry.';
+        return 'HTTP ' + r.status + ' ' + text + hint;
+      };
+
+      // Launch an upload per dropped/selected .iso. The browser's ~6
+      // connections-per-origin cap naturally bounds how many stream at
+      // once, so there's no hand-rolled queue. Non-.iso files are ignored.
+      const startMany = (fileList) => {
+        [...fileList].filter(f => /\.iso$/i.test(f.name)).forEach(uploadOne);
+      };
 
       drop.onclick = () => file.click();
       drop.addEventListener('dragover', e => { e.preventDefault(); drop.classList.add('hover'); });
       drop.addEventListener('dragleave', () => drop.classList.remove('hover'));
       drop.addEventListener('drop', e => {
         e.preventDefault(); drop.classList.remove('hover');
-        if (e.dataTransfer.files[0]) upload(e.dataTransfer.files[0]);
+        startMany(e.dataTransfer.files);
       });
-      file.onchange = () => { if (file.files[0]) upload(file.files[0]); };
+      // Reset value so re-selecting the same filename still fires onchange.
+      file.onchange = () => { startMany(file.files); file.value = ''; };
 
-      // Chunked upload telemetry. The old browser path posted one huge
+      // One independent chunked upload with its own progress row. The old
-      // multipart body, which left operators staring at 0% when a reverse
+      // browser path posted one huge multipart body, which left operators
-      // proxy buffered or rejected the request before OpenPXE saw it. This
+      // staring at 0% when a reverse proxy buffered or rejected the request
-      // path writes small raw chunks; each acknowledged chunk advances the
+      // before OpenPXE saw it. This path writes small raw chunks; each
-      // bar and leaves a visible .partial file in the ISO directory.
+      // acknowledged chunk advances the bar and leaves a visible .partial.
-      async function upload(f) {
+      async function uploadOne(f) {
         const started = Date.now();
-        const bar = $('#bar');
+        const bar = el('div', {class:'bar'});
-        const setStatus = (text, cls) => { upMsg.textContent = text; upMsg.className = 'msg ' + (cls || ''); };
+        const prog = el('div', {class:'progress active'}, bar);
+        const rowMsg = el('div', {class:'msg'});
+        const cancelBtn = el('button', {class:'danger', type:'button', style:'margin-top:8px'}, 'Cancel');
+        const row = el('div', {}, [
+          el('div', {style:'font-weight:600;font-size:13px;margin-bottom:6px;word-break:break-all'}, f.name),
+          prog, rowMsg, cancelBtn,
+        ]);
+        uploadsList.appendChild(row);
+
+        const setStatus = (text, cls) => { rowMsg.textContent = text; rowMsg.className = 'msg ' + (cls || ''); };
         const update = (loaded, total, phase) => {
           const pct = total > 0 ? Math.min(100, (loaded / total) * 100) : 100;
           bar.style.width = pct.toFixed(1) + '%';
@@ -682,34 +689,24 @@
           const rate = loaded > 0 ? loaded / elapsed : 0;
           const remain = rate > 0 ? (total - loaded) / rate : 0;
           setStatus(
-            phase + ' ' + f.name + ' - ' +
+            phase + ' - ' +
             fmtBytes(loaded) + ' of ' + fmtBytes(total) +
             ' (' + pct.toFixed(1) + '%, ' + fmtBytes(rate) + '/s' +
             (remain > 0 ? ', ' + Math.ceil(remain) + 's left' : '') + ')');
         };
-        const failText = async (r) => {
-          const text = (await r.text()).slice(0, 240);
-          let hint = '';
-          if (r.status === 413)      hint = ' - body too large. A proxy likely rejected this chunk.';
-          else if (r.status === 502) hint = ' - bad gateway. Proxy lost the upstream mid-stream.';
-          else if (r.status === 504) hint = ' - gateway timeout. Try the LAN IP directly.';
-          else if (r.status === 409) hint = ' - name conflict or offset mismatch. Remove the old ISO and retry.';
-          return 'HTTP ' + r.status + ' ' + text + hint;
-        };
 
         let uploadId = null;
-        // v0.5.8: cancel + leave-page guard. The AbortController stops the
+        // The AbortController stops this upload's in-flight chunk on Cancel.
-        // in-flight chunk; the beforeunload listener warns the operator
+        // The card-level beforeunload guard (added while activeUploads > 0)
-        // that navigating away aborts the upload (the server-side partial
+        // warns on navigation; the server reclaims an abandoned .partial on
-        // is then cleaned up by the DELETE in the catch below).
+        // the next upload either way.
         const ac = new AbortController();
         let canceled = false;
-        const warnLeave = (e) => { e.preventDefault(); e.returnValue = ''; return ''; };
+        cancelBtn.onclick = () => { canceled = true; ac.abort(); };
-        window.addEventListener('beforeunload', warnLeave);
+
-        cancelUpload.style.display = '';
+        activeUploads += 1;
-        cancelUpload.onclick = () => { canceled = true; ac.abort(); };
+        if (activeUploads === 1) addGuards();
-        setStatus('Preparing upload for ' + f.name + ' (' + fmtBytes(f.size) + ')');
+        setStatus('Preparing ' + f.name + ' (' + fmtBytes(f.size) + ')');
-        prog.classList.add('active');
         bar.style.width = '1%';
 
         try {
@@ -720,6 +717,7 @@
           if (!begin.ok) throw new Error(await failText(begin));
           const session = await begin.json();
           uploadId = session.upload_id;
+          activeIds.add(uploadId);
           const chunkSize = Math.max(1024 * 1024, Number(session.chunk_size || 8 * 1024 * 1024));
 
           let offset = Number(session.offset || 0);
@@ -744,23 +742,29 @@
           } while (!finished);
 
           setStatus('Uploaded and analyzed: ' + f.name + ' (' + fmtBytes(f.size) + ')', 'ok');
-          render('storage');
         } catch (err) {
           if (uploadId) {
             try { await fetch('/api/uploads/' + encodeURIComponent(uploadId), {method: 'DELETE'}); }
-            catch {}
+            catch (_) {}
           }
           if (canceled || (err && err.name === 'AbortError')) {
-            setStatus('Upload canceled — partial file discarded.', '');
+            setStatus('Canceled — partial file discarded.', '');
           } else {
             setStatus('Upload failed: ' + (err && err.message ? err.message : String(err)), 'err');
           }
         } finally {
-          window.removeEventListener('beforeunload', warnLeave);
+          if (uploadId) activeIds.delete(uploadId);
-          cancelUpload.style.display = 'none';
+          cancelBtn.style.display = 'none';
-          cancelUpload.onclick = null;
           prog.classList.remove('active');
-          if (!upMsg.className.includes('ok')) bar.style.width = '0';
+          activeUploads -= 1;
+          if (activeUploads === 0) {
+            removeGuards();
+            // Refresh the table to show the new image(s) — but only if the
+            // operator is still on Storage. isConnected goes false once
+            // render() swapped the view, so a mid-upload tab change won't
+            // yank them back here.
+            if (uploadsList.isConnected) render('storage');
+          }
         }
       }
 
@@ -884,6 +888,12 @@
           render('storage');
         };
 
+        // v0.7.2: searchable haystack for the list filter — filename,
+        // detected family, category, and source all match.
+        const searchText = [
+          i.filename, familyLabel(i.introspection.family), i.category || '',
+          isSmb ? 'smb' : isNfs ? 'nfs' : 'local', i.id,
+        ].join(' ').toLowerCase();
         const tr = el('tr', b.ok ? {} : {class: 'unbootable'}, [
           el('td', {}, [
             el('div', {style:'display:flex;align-items:center;gap:8px'}, [
@@ -928,8 +938,42 @@
                 }}, 'Remove'),
           ]),
         ]);
+        tr.dataset.search = searchText;
         rowsAndEditors.push(tr, editorRow);
       });
+
+      // v0.7.2: client-side filter over the image table; v0.7.4: paged
+      // 5 at a time so a 50-image library doesn't become a scroll wall.
+      // Rows travel in (row, password-editor) pairs. One view function
+      // applies filter-then-page; editors close on any view change.
+      const ISO_PAGE_SIZE = 5;
+      let isoPage = 0;
+      const pagerInfo = el('span', {});
+      const prevBtn = el('button', {class:'ghost', onclick: () => { isoPage -= 1; applyIsoListView(); }}, '‹ Prev');
+      const nextBtn = el('button', {class:'ghost', onclick: () => { isoPage += 1; applyIsoListView(); }}, 'Next ›');
+      function applyIsoListView() {
+        const q = isoSearch.value.trim().toLowerCase();
+        const visible = [];
+        for (let k = 0; k + 1 < rowsAndEditors.length; k += 2) {
+          const row = rowsAndEditors[k];
+          rowsAndEditors[k + 1].style.display = 'none';
+          row.style.display = 'none';
+          if (!q || (row.dataset.search || '').includes(q)) visible.push(row);
+        }
+        const pages = Math.max(1, Math.ceil(visible.length / ISO_PAGE_SIZE));
+        if (isoPage >= pages) isoPage = pages - 1;
+        if (isoPage < 0) isoPage = 0;
+        visible.slice(isoPage * ISO_PAGE_SIZE, (isoPage + 1) * ISO_PAGE_SIZE)
+          .forEach(r => { r.style.display = ''; });
+        pagerInfo.textContent = visible.length
+          ? 'Showing ' + (isoPage * ISO_PAGE_SIZE + 1) + '–' +
+            Math.min(visible.length, (isoPage + 1) * ISO_PAGE_SIZE) + ' of ' + visible.length
+          : 'No images match';
+        prevBtn.disabled = isoPage === 0;
+        nextBtn.disabled = isoPage >= pages - 1;
+      }
+      const isoSearch = el('input', {type:'search', placeholder:'Filter images by name, type, or source',
+        spellcheck:'false', oninput: () => { isoPage = 0; applyIsoListView(); }});
       const isoTable = isos.length
         ? el('table', {}, [
             el('thead', {}, el('tr', {}, [
@@ -941,6 +985,13 @@
             el('tbody', {}, rowsAndEditors),
           ])
         : el('div', {class:'empty'}, 'No images yet. Upload an ISO or add an SMB share.');
+      // v0.7.4: pager footer, shown once the library outgrows one page.
+      const isoPager = isos.length > ISO_PAGE_SIZE
+        ? el('div', {class:'list-pager'}, [
+            pagerInfo, el('span', {class:'spacer'}), prevBtn, nextBtn,
+          ])
+        : null;
+      if (isos.length) applyIsoListView();
 
       // ── Remote shares section (v0.5.1) ──
       // SMB + NFS unified into one "Remote shares" card with a protocol
@@ -1267,7 +1318,10 @@
       unattFile.onchange = () => { if (unattFile.files[0]) uploadUnattended(unattFile.files[0]); };
 
       const unattRows = unattendedFiles.length
-        ? unattendedFiles.map(f => el('div', {class:'nfs-row'}, [
+        ? unattendedFiles.map(f => el('div', {
+            class:'nfs-row',
+            'data-search': (f.filename + ' ' + unattendedKindLabel(f.kind) + ' ' + f.id).toLowerCase(),
+          }, [
             el('span', {class:'dot ok'}),
             el('div', {}, [
               el('div', {class:'id'}, [
@@ -1286,6 +1340,36 @@
           ]))
         : [el('div', {class:'empty'}, 'No unattended files yet.')];
 
+      // v0.7.2: filter for big answer-file libraries; v0.7.5: paged 5 at
+      // a time, the same filter-then-page view the image table uses.
+      const UNATT_PAGE_SIZE = 5;
+      let unattPage = 0;
+      const unattPagerInfo = el('span', {});
+      const unattPrev = el('button', {class:'ghost', onclick: () => { unattPage -= 1; applyUnattListView(); }}, '‹ Prev');
+      const unattNext = el('button', {class:'ghost', onclick: () => { unattPage += 1; applyUnattListView(); }}, 'Next ›');
+      const unattSearch = el('input', {type:'search', placeholder:'Filter files by name or kind',
+        spellcheck:'false', oninput: () => { unattPage = 0; applyUnattListView(); }});
+      function applyUnattListView() {
+        if (!unattendedFiles.length) return; // empty-state div carries no dataset
+        const q = unattSearch.value.trim().toLowerCase();
+        const visible = unattRows.filter(r => {
+          r.style.display = 'none';
+          return !q || (r.dataset.search || '').includes(q);
+        });
+        const pages = Math.max(1, Math.ceil(visible.length / UNATT_PAGE_SIZE));
+        if (unattPage >= pages) unattPage = pages - 1;
+        if (unattPage < 0) unattPage = 0;
+        visible.slice(unattPage * UNATT_PAGE_SIZE, (unattPage + 1) * UNATT_PAGE_SIZE)
+          .forEach(r => { r.style.display = ''; });
+        unattPagerInfo.textContent = visible.length
+          ? 'Showing ' + (unattPage * UNATT_PAGE_SIZE + 1) + '–' +
+            Math.min(visible.length, (unattPage + 1) * UNATT_PAGE_SIZE) + ' of ' + visible.length
+          : 'No files match';
+        unattPrev.disabled = unattPage === 0;
+        unattNext.disabled = unattPage >= pages - 1;
+      }
+      applyUnattListView();
+
       const unattendedAdvanced = el('details', {class:'advanced-disclosure', style:'margin-top:18px'}, [
         el('summary', {class:'advanced-summary'}, 'Advanced'),
         el('div', {class:'card', style:'margin-top:14px'}, [
@@ -1295,7 +1379,15 @@
           ]),
           el('div', {class:'body'}, [
             unattDrop, unattFile, unattMsg,
+            unattendedFiles.length > 1
+              ? el('label', {class:'field', style:'margin-top:14px;margin-bottom:0'}, unattSearch)
+              : null,
             el('div', {style:'margin-top:16px;display:grid;gap:8px'}, unattRows),
+            unattendedFiles.length > UNATT_PAGE_SIZE
+              ? el('div', {class:'list-pager', style:'padding:12px 0 0'}, [
+                  unattPagerInfo, el('span', {class:'spacer'}), unattPrev, unattNext,
+                ])
+              : null,
             el('p', {class:'msg', style:'margin-top:14px'},
               'These answer files drive unattended installs. Attach one to a ' +
               'host pin (Hosts tab) or a queued device (Queue → Profile); on ' +
@@ -1309,7 +1401,7 @@
         diskCard,
         el('div', {class:'card'}, [
           el('header', {}, el('h2', {}, 'Upload ISO')),
-          el('div', {class:'body'}, [drop, file, prog, upMsg, cancelUpload]),
+          el('div', {class:'body'}, [drop, file, uploadsList]),
         ]),
         // v0.5.1: SMB + NFS unified into one "Remote shares" card with a
         // protocol dropdown. Backend endpoints are unchanged; this is a
@@ -1341,7 +1433,11 @@
             el('h2', {}, 'Available images'),
             el('span', {class:'sub'}, isos.length + ' image' + (isos.length === 1 ? '' : 's')),
           ]),
+          isos.length > 1
+            ? el('div', {class:'list-search'}, el('label', {class:'field', style:'margin-bottom:0'}, isoSearch))
+            : null,
           isoTable,
+          isoPager,
         ]),
       ]), unattendedAdvanced]);
     },
@@ -1366,8 +1462,22 @@
         {id: '_tools_menu',   title: '↳ Tools menu (built-in)'},
       ];
 
-      const macInput   = el('input', {type:'text', placeholder:'aa:bb:cc:dd:ee:ff', spellcheck:'false'});
+      const macInput   = el('input', {type:'text', placeholder:'aa:bb:cc:dd:ee:ff or aa:bb:cc', spellcheck:'false'});
       const labelInput = el('input', {type:'text', placeholder:'optional, e.g. "rack-3 spine"'});
+      // v0.7.2: the former separate "Boot rules" card folded into this
+      // form. A full MAC with no architecture saves a per-host pin
+      // exactly as before; a MAC *prefix* and/or an architecture saves a
+      // first-match-wins group rule instead. Same form, one mental model.
+      const archSel = el('select', {}, [
+        ['', 'any (this exact MAC)'], ['bios', 'BIOS'], ['uefi-x64', 'UEFI x64'],
+        ['uefi-ia32', 'UEFI IA32'], ['uefi-arm64', 'UEFI ARM64'],
+      ].map(([v, t]) => el('option', {value: v}, t)));
+      // v0.7.1's boot-binary pin keeps its home here too (auto = let the
+      // escalation ladder learn; shim = known Secure Boot fleet).
+      const binSel = el('select', {}, [
+        ['', 'auto (learn per machine)'], ['firmware', 'Firmware NIC'],
+        ['builtin', 'iPXE drivers'], ['shim', 'Secure Boot (shim)'],
+      ].map(([v, t]) => el('option', {value: v}, t)));
       const targetSel = el('select', {},
         [el('option', {value:''}, '— choose a target —')]
         .concat(reserved.map(t => el('option', {value: t.id}, t.title)))
@@ -1380,21 +1490,40 @@
       // hostname/IP templated into the served answer file.
       const profileFields = buildProfileFields({}, unattendedFiles, 'form-row cols-3');
 
+      const FULL_MAC = /^([0-9a-f]{2}[:-]){5}[0-9a-f]{2}$/i;
       const upsertBtn = el('button', {onclick: async () => {
-        if (!macInput.value || !targetSel.value) {
+        const mac = macInput.value.trim();
-          msg.textContent = 'MAC and target are required.'; msg.className = 'msg err'; return;
+        const isGroup = !!archSel.value || !!binSel.value || (mac !== '' && !FULL_MAC.test(mac));
+        if (!isGroup) {
+          // Exact-MAC pin — unchanged behavior.
+          if (!mac || !targetSel.value) {
+            msg.textContent = 'MAC and target are required.'; msg.className = 'msg err'; return;
+          }
+          const r = await postJSON('/api/hosts', Object.assign({
+            mac, target: targetSel.value, label: labelInput.value,
+          }, profileFields.read()));
+          if (r.ok) { msg.textContent = 'Saved.'; msg.className = 'msg ok'; render('hosts'); }
+          else { msg.textContent = 'Save failed: ' + await r.text(); msg.className = 'msg err'; }
+          return;
         }
-        const r = await postJSON('/api/hosts', Object.assign({
+        // Group rule (prefix and/or architecture). Per-host profile
-          mac: macInput.value, target: targetSel.value, label: labelInput.value,
+        // fields don't apply to a group — they're per-machine values.
-        }, profileFields.read()));
+        if (!targetSel.value && !binSel.value) {
-        if (r.ok) {
+          msg.textContent = 'A group rule needs a target or a boot binary.'; msg.className = 'msg err'; return;
-          msg.textContent = 'Saved.'; msg.className = 'msg ok';
-          render('hosts');
-        } else {
-          const t = await r.text();
-          msg.textContent = 'Save failed: ' + t; msg.className = 'msg err';
         }
-      }}, 'Bind MAC to target');
+        const p = profileFields.read();
+        if (p.auto_hostname || p.auto_ip || p.unattended_file) {
+          msg.textContent = 'Auto-deploy fields are per-machine — clear them, or use a full MAC.'; msg.className = 'msg err'; return;
+        }
+        const cfg = await getJSON('/api/boot-rules').catch(() => ({rules: [], webhook_url: ''}));
+        (cfg.rules = cfg.rules || []).push({
+          mac_prefix: mac, arch: archSel.value, target: targetSel.value,
+          driver_mode: binSel.value, enabled: true, note: labelInput.value,
+        });
+        const r = await putJSON('/api/boot-rules', cfg);
+        if (r.ok) { msg.textContent = 'Group rule saved.'; msg.className = 'msg ok'; render('hosts'); }
+        else { msg.textContent = 'Save failed: ' + await r.text(); msg.className = 'msg err'; }
+      }}, 'Bind to target');
 
       const rows = hosts.map(h => {
         // v0.5.0: Wake-on-LAN. Only shown for bound hosts (this whole
@@ -1451,23 +1580,32 @@
         el('div', {class:'card'}, [
           el('header', {}, el('h2', {}, 'Pin MAC to boot target')),
           el('div', {class:'body'}, [
+            // v0.7.3: MAC · Label · Architecture · Boot binary share one
+            // 4-up row so the controls line up across the page; the
+            // per-field guidance that used to sit under them moved into the
+            // note below to keep the inputs flush. Target spans full width
+            // on its own line beneath them.
             el('div', {class:'form-row'}, [
-              el('label', {class:'field'}, [el('span', {class:'name'}, 'MAC address'), macInput]),
+              el('label', {class:'field'}, [el('span', {class:'name'}, 'MAC address or prefix'), macInput]),
               el('label', {class:'field'}, [el('span', {class:'name'}, 'Label (optional)'), labelInput]),
-              el('label', {class:'field', style:'grid-column:1 / -1'}, [
+              el('label', {class:'field'}, [el('span', {class:'name'}, 'Architecture (optional)'), archSel]),
-                el('span', {class:'name'}, 'Target'),
+              el('label', {class:'field'}, [el('span', {class:'name'}, 'Boot binary (optional)'), binSel]),
-                targetSel,
+            ]),
-                el('span', {class:'hint'},
+            el('label', {class:'field', style:'margin-top:14px'}, [
-                  'Built-in shortcuts skip the menu entirely. Per-ISO entries chain straight to the boot script.'),
+              el('span', {class:'name'}, 'Target'),
-              ]),
+              targetSel,
             ]),
             el('div', {style:'margin-top:16px'}, profileFields.wrap),
             upsertBtn, msg,
             el('p', {class:'msg', style:'margin-top:14px'},
-              'When a client with a bound MAC requests boot.ipxe, OpenPXE ' +
+              'A full MAC pins one machine; a MAC prefix (OUI) or an architecture ' +
-              'short-circuits past the interactive menu and chains directly. ' +
+              'saves a first-match group rule. Pin the boot binary to “shim” for ' +
-              'If an unattended file is selected, the matching kernel argument ' +
+              'Secure Boot racks — zero failed boot cycles. When a matching client ' +
-              'is injected and the hostname/IP are templated into the answer file.'),
+              'requests boot.ipxe, OpenPXE short-circuits past the interactive menu ' +
+              'and chains directly; decision order is exact MAC pin → first matching ' +
+              'group rule → menu. If an unattended file is selected on a pin, the ' +
+              'matching kernel argument is injected and the hostname/IP are templated ' +
+              'into the answer file.'),
           ]),
         ]),
         el('div', {class:'card'}, [
@@ -1477,7 +1615,7 @@
           ]),
           table,
         ]),
-        bootRulesCard(rulesCfg, reserved.concat(targets)),
+        groupRulesCard(rulesCfg, reserved.concat(targets)),
         el('div', {class:'card'}, [
           el('header', {}, [
             el('h2', {}, 'Host log'),
@@ -1640,7 +1778,7 @@
     },
 
     settings: async () => {
-      const [status, me, sso, notify, docs] = await Promise.all([
+      const [status, me, sso, notify, docs, apiKey] = await Promise.all([
         getJSON('/api/status'),
         getJSON('/api/me').catch(() => ({})),
         getJSON('/api/sso').catch(() => ({
@@ -1650,6 +1788,7 @@
         // fetches the notify config + API docs it needs too.
         getJSON('/api/notify').catch(() => ({ enabled:false, kind:'slack' })),
         getJSON('/api/docs').catch(() => ({ groups: [] })),
+        getJSON('/api/api-key').catch(() => ({ key:'', header:'x-api-key' })),
       ]);
 
       // ── Account card (Forms admin credentials, v0.4.5).
@@ -1963,7 +2102,7 @@
       // into a collapsible disclosure beneath the core settings cards —
       // webhook/email notifications + the API reference. Keeps Settings
       // clean by default while leaving the knobs one click away.
-      const [notifyCard, apiCard] = views._advancedCards(notify, docs);
+      const [notifyCard, apiCard] = views._advancedCards(notify, docs, apiKey);
       const advanced = el('details', {class:'advanced-disclosure', style:'margin-top:18px'}, [
         el('summary', {class:'advanced-summary'}, 'Advanced'),
         el('div', {class:'grid', style:'margin-top:14px'}, [notifyCard, apiCard]),
@@ -1978,7 +2117,7 @@
     // and the API reference. There is no longer an Advanced sidebar tab;
     // the Settings view folds these into a collapsible disclosure and
     // passes in the pre-fetched `notify` + `docs` payloads.
-    _advancedCards: (notify, docs) => {
+    _advancedCards: (notify, docs, apiKey) => {
 
       // ── Notification config ──
       const nMsg = el('div', {class:'msg', style:'margin-top:12px'});
@@ -2093,14 +2232,47 @@
         ]),
       ]);
 
-      // ── API reference (relocated from Settings) ──
+      // ── API key + reference (relocated from Settings) ──
       const groups = docs.groups || [];
+
+      // v0.8.0: operator API key. Paste into the `x-api-key` request
+      // header to drive /api/* from Postman / scripts without a browser
+      // session (full operator access). Read + rotate via /api/api-key.
+      const keyHeader = (apiKey && apiKey.header) || 'x-api-key';
+      const keyField = el('input', {type:'text', readonly:true,
+        value: (apiKey && apiKey.key) || '(unavailable)',
+        style:'width:100%;font-family:var(--mono)'});
+      const keyMsg = el('span', {class:'hint', style:'margin-left:10px'});
+      const copyKey = el('button', {class:'ghost', type:'button', onclick: async () => {
+        try { await navigator.clipboard.writeText(keyField.value); keyMsg.textContent = 'Copied to clipboard.'; }
+        catch { keyField.select(); keyMsg.textContent = 'Select the field and copy.'; }
+      }}, 'Copy');
+      const regenKey = el('button', {class:'danger', type:'button', style:'margin-left:8px',
+        onclick: async () => {
+          if (!confirm('Regenerate the API key? The current key stops working immediately and any client using it must be updated.')) return;
+          const r = await postJSON('/api/api-key/regenerate', {});
+          if (r.ok) { const j = await r.json(); keyField.value = j.key || ''; keyMsg.textContent = 'New key generated.'; }
+          else { keyMsg.textContent = 'Regenerate failed: ' + (await r.text()).slice(0, 120); }
+        }}, 'Regenerate');
+      const apiKeyBlock = el('div', {style:'padding:16px;border-bottom:1px solid var(--border)'}, [
+        el('label', {class:'field', style:'margin-bottom:10px'}, [
+          el('span', {class:'name'}, 'API key'),
+          keyField,
+          el('span', {class:'hint'}, [
+            'Send as the ', el('code', {}, keyHeader),
+            ' request header to call the API from Postman or scripts — full operator access, so keep it secret.',
+          ]),
+        ]),
+        el('div', {}, [copyKey, regenKey, keyMsg]),
+      ]);
+
       const apiCard = el('div', {class:'card'}, [
         el('header', {}, [
-          el('h2', {}, 'API reference'),
+          el('h2', {}, 'API'),
           el('span', {class:'sub'},
             groups.reduce((n, g) => n + (g.endpoints || []).length, 0) + ' endpoints'),
         ]),
+        apiKeyBlock,
         el('div', {class:'api-ref'},
           groups.length
             ? groups.map(g => el('div', {class:'group'}, [
@@ -2154,9 +2326,24 @@
         el('div', {class:'about-hero'}, [
           el('h2', {}, 'OpenPXE'),
           el('p', {class:'lead'},
-            'Air-gapped network PXE boot, container-native, that anyone can run. ' +
+            'The network-boot platform for modern infrastructure. Drop in an ISO ' +
-            'No CDN calls, no telemetry, no surprise external dependencies — ship ' +
+            'and every machine on your network — BIOS, UEFI, Secure Boot — can ' +
-            'the image once, run it forever.'),
+            'boot it, image from it, and install unattended. One container, one ' +
+            'static binary, nothing installed on clients, nothing leaving your network.'),
+          el('div', {style:'display:grid;grid-template-columns:repeat(3,1fr);gap:14px;margin:18px 0'}, [
+            ['Boot anything', 'Linux, Windows, hypervisors, rescue tools — uploaded ' +
+              'ISOs become menu entries automatically, served on demand from local ' +
+              'disk or your existing NFS, SMB, or SFTP libraries.'],
+            ['Adapt to every machine', 'Per-machine boot intelligence: firmware quirks, ' +
+              'NIC driver fallback, and a Microsoft-signed Secure Boot chain are ' +
+              'negotiated automatically and remembered — no toggles, no client prep.'],
+            ['Run it in production', 'SAML single sign-on, token-scoped answer files, ' +
+              'fleet routing rules, Wake-on-LAN, queued mass deployment, Prometheus ' +
+              'metrics. Built in Rust for boot infrastructure that cannot flinch.'],
+          ].map(([h, body]) => el('div', {}, [
+            el('h3', {style:'margin:0 0 6px;font-size:13.5px'}, h),
+            el('p', {class:'msg', style:'font-size:12px;margin:0'}, body),
+          ]))),
           el('div', {class:'who'}, [
             el('span', {}, 'Developer: '), el('strong', {}, 'Miles Ward'), el('br'),
             el('span', {}, 'Version: '), el('strong', {}, status.version || '?'), el('br'),
@@ -2167,15 +2354,16 @@
           ]),
           el('div', {style:'margin-top:18px'}, [updBtn, updMsg]),
           el('p', {class:'msg', style:'margin-top:18px'},
-            'iPXE is an internal implementation detail. Everything the firmware ' +
+            'Private by design: no telemetry, no CDN calls, no runtime ' +
-            'executes is generated from the settings on these tabs — there is no ' +
+            'dependencies on the outside world. Air-gapped labs, customer sites ' +
-            'hand-written .ipxe path anywhere in this product.'),
+            'without internet, and locked-down OpenShift clusters run the same ' +
+            'image, the same way, indefinitely.'),
           el('p', {class:'msg'},
-            'Vision: a deployment-grade tool that works on first try in the most ' +
+            'Principled by default: OpenPXE never asks an operator to install ' +
-            'awkward environments — air-gapped labs, customer sites without ' +
+            'test-signed drivers, modify a client’s trust store, or weaken ' +
-            'internet, OpenShift clusters with strict SCCs — without ever asking ' +
+            'Secure Boot. Everything the firmware executes is generated from the ' +
-            'an operator to install drivers signed with test certificates or to ' +
+            'settings on these tabs — there are no hand-written boot scripts to ' +
-            'flip "testsigning" on a target machine.'),
+            'maintain and no internals to learn.'),
         ]),
       ]);
 

docker-compose.yml

@@ -1,66 +1,42 @@
-# docker-compose for local / homelab deployment.
+# OpenPXE — single-host / homelab deployment.
 #
-# Two usage patterns:
+# One container: DHCP proxy + TFTP + iPXE chainload + HTTP (web UI, boot
+# scripts, and ISO range streaming).
 #
-#   1. Local MVP test — host network, proxy-DHCP off (don't fight your
+#   OPENPXE_PUBLIC_IP=192.168.1.49 docker compose up -d
-#      existing DHCP server on the LAN), TFTP + HTTP exposed on the host:
 #
-#         docker compose up openpxe-dev
+# (or put OPENPXE_PUBLIC_IP in a .env file beside this one). That's this
+# host's LAN IP, advertised to PXE clients so the iPXE URLs resolve —
+# OpenPXE refuses to start rather than advertise an address clients can't
+# reach, so compose errors out below if it's unset.
 #
-#   2. Real PXE deployment — host network, proxy-DHCP on, runs on a box
+# Host networking is REQUIRED: DHCPDISCOVER is a broadcast, and Docker
-#      plugged into the PXE network:
+# bridges / CNI overlays don't forward it into containers. In host mode
+# the container binds these ports directly on the host:
 #
-#         # First set OPENPXE_PUBLIC_IP to this host's LAN address in .env
+#   udp/67    DHCP proxy          udp/4011  PXE Boot Server
-#         docker compose up openpxe
+#   udp/69    TFTP                tcp/4200  web UI + HTTP boot assets
 #
-# On Linux hosts, `network_mode: host` gives the container direct access to
+# Web UI:  http://<this-host>:4200/
-# the physical NIC — required for DHCP proxy because CNI overlays and Docker
-# bridges do not forward DHCPDISCOVER broadcasts into containers.
-#
-# On macOS / Windows hosts, `network_mode: host` is limited — the daemon
-# runs in a Linux VM (Colima/Docker Desktop) so the "host" network is the
-# VM, not your Mac. Proxy-DHCP is not feasible on macOS; use `openpxe-dev`
-# with published ports and set DHCP-MODE=disabled.
 
 services:
-  # Real PXE deployment (Linux hosts).
   openpxe:
-    image: openpxe:0.1.0
+    image: gitea.milesward.dev/mward4/openpxe:latest
-    build:
+    container_name: openpxe
-      context: .
-      dockerfile: deploy/docker/Dockerfile
     restart: unless-stopped
     network_mode: host
+    # The binary carries cap_net_bind_service as a file capability, so it
+    # binds the low DHCP/TFTP ports as a non-root user — no privileged mode.
+    cap_add:
+      - NET_BIND_SERVICE
     environment:
-      # REQUIRED on multi-homed hosts. Set to this machine's LAN IP so the
+      OPENPXE_PUBLIC_IP: ${OPENPXE_PUBLIC_IP:?set this to the host LAN IP, e.g. 192.168.1.49}
-      # advertised iPXE URLs actually resolve from the PXE clients. Without
+      # Web UI + HTTP boot assets. 4200 keeps clear of anything on :80
-      # this, OpenPXE will refuse to start rather than advertise a
+      # (an Unraid webGUI, a reverse proxy, …).
-      # loopback address that can't be reached.
+      OPENPXE_HTTP_PORT: "4200"
-      OPENPXE_PUBLIC_IP: ${OPENPXE_PUBLIC_IP:?set this to the host LAN IP}
+      # proxy = coexist with the LAN's existing DHCP server (recommended).
       OPENPXE_DHCP_MODE: proxy
       OPENPXE_LOG: info
     volumes:
-      - ./data/isos:/var/lib/openpxe/isos
+      - ./data/isos:/var/lib/openpxe/isos   # uploaded / seeded .iso files
-      - ./data/work:/var/lib/openpxe/work
+      - ./data/work:/var/lib/openpxe/work   # settings, share state, scratch
-
-  # Dev / MVP container: published ports, DHCP disabled, HTTP on 8080.
-  # Use this on laptops where you want to curl the API or UI without
-  # running an actual PXE chain.
-  openpxe-dev:
-    image: openpxe:0.1.0
-    build:
-      context: .
-      dockerfile: deploy/docker/Dockerfile
-    environment:
-      OPENPXE_PUBLIC_IP: ${OPENPXE_PUBLIC_IP:-127.0.0.1}
-      OPENPXE_DHCP_MODE: disabled
-      OPENPXE_HTTP_PORT: "8080"
-      OPENPXE_TFTP_PORT: "6969"
-      OPENPXE_DHCP_PORT: "6767"
-      OPENPXE_LOG: info,openpxe=debug
-    ports:
-      - "8080:8080/tcp"
-      - "6969:6969/udp"
-    volumes:
-      - ./data/isos:/var/lib/openpxe/isos
-      - ./data/work:/var/lib/openpxe/work