v0.6.3: russh 0.61 security bump (CVE batch) + bergshamra 0.5 + axum 0.8

Security-driven dependency release.

- russh =0.55.0 (pinned) -> 0.61.2: closes the advisory batch reachable
  from our SFTP *client* path — unbounded/allocation-first packet
  parsing (CVE-2026-48110, CVE-2026-46702, CVE-2026-46673, HIGH) plus
  CVE-2026-48107 in client auth. A malicious or compromised SFTP server
  an operator pointed us at could previously OOM the PXE server. Also
  drops mlock on non-secret buffers (~21% SSH throughput upstream) —
  directly in the remote-share ISO streaming path. ring backend kept;
  zero code changes needed in sftp_share.rs.
- bergshamra 0.4 -> 0.5.1: the pin's blocking condition (stable
  RustCrypto generation, pkcs8 0.11) is now met upstream, so the
  =0.55.0 pin is deleted and its comment rewritten as history. 0.5 is
  secure-by-default for DSig (flags we already set explicitly) and
  fixes an XML-Enc DerivedKey fallthrough.
- axum 0.7 -> 0.8.9: route captures /:id -> {id} across the router and
  the /api/docs listing; ConnectInfo optional extraction moves to the
  Result form. Gains the HEAD content-length fix (iPXE/sanboot clients
  probe with HEAD before Range requests) and puts us back on the
  maintained line.

Validation: clippy clean, fmt clean, all 272 workspace tests green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>

.gitignore

@@ -11,3 +11,6 @@ data/work/
 .claude/settings.local.json
 .claude/worktrees/
 .claude/scheduled_tasks.lock
+
+# local editor / agent settings (not part of the project)
+.claude/

Cargo.toml

@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ members = [
 ]
 
 [workspace.package]
-version = "0.5.6"
+version = "0.6.3"
 edition = "2021"
 rust-version = "1.95"
 license = "MIT OR Apache-2.0"
@@ -20,21 +20,23 @@ repository = "https://gitea.milesward.dev/mward4/OpenPXE"
 authors = ["OpenPXE contributors"]
 
 [workspace.dependencies]
-tokio = { version = "1.40", features = ["full"] }
+tokio = { version = "1.52", features = ["full"] }
 tokio-util = { version = "0.7", features = ["io"] }
 tokio-stream = { version = "0.1", features = ["sync"] }
 futures = "0.3"
 async-trait = "0.1"
 
-dhcproto = "0.12"
-socket2 = { version = "0.5", features = ["all"] }
+# v0.6.2: dhcproto 0.15 drops the deprecated trust-dns-proto dependency
+# (replaced by hickory-proto) and carries three releases of DHCP option
+# coverage accumulated upstream — both directly relevant to the proxy core.
+dhcproto = "0.15"
+socket2 = { version = "0.6", features = ["all"] }
 bytes = "1.7"
-nom = "7.1"
 
-axum = { version = "0.7", features = ["macros", "multipart", "http2"] }
+axum = { version = "0.8", features = ["macros", "multipart", "http2"] }
 tower = "0.5"
 tower-http = { version = "0.6", features = ["fs", "trace", "cors", "limit"] }
-hyper = "1.4"
+hyper = "1.9"
 reqwest = { version = "0.12", default-features = false, features = ["rustls-tls", "stream", "json"] }
 
 serde = { version = "1.0", features = ["derive"] }
@@ -52,9 +54,11 @@ thiserror = "2.0"
 clap = { version = "4.5", features = ["derive", "env"] }
 uuid = { version = "1.10", features = ["v4", "serde"] }
 time = { version = "0.3", features = ["serde", "serde-human-readable", "formatting", "macros"] }
+# sha2 stays 0.10 deliberately: bergshamra-crypto requires ^0.10, and
+# bumping to 0.11 would split the RustCrypto digest stack in the tree.
 sha2 = "0.10"
 hex = "0.4"
-bcrypt = "0.15"
+bcrypt = "0.19"
 parking_lot = "0.12"
 rust-embed = { version = "8.5", features = ["include-exclude"] }
 
@@ -76,7 +80,7 @@ lettre = { version = "0.11", default-features = false, features = ["smtp-transpo
 # C deps), so the static musl binary stays OpenSSL-free — samael was
 # rejected precisely because it hard-requires OpenSSL. We build the thin
 # SP layer (AuthnRequest, metadata parse, SAMLResponse semantics) on top.
-bergshamra = "0.4"
+bergshamra = "0.5"
 roxmltree = "0.21"
 quick-xml = "0.40"
 x509-parser = "0.18"
@@ -95,24 +99,19 @@ base64 = "0.22"
 # binary via rustls + bergshamra — so SFTP adds ZERO new C/crypto deps
 # and the static-musl build stays OpenSSL-free.
 #
-# CRITICAL #2 — pinned to EXACTLY 0.55.0, the newest russh that
-# coexists with bergshamra-crypto (our SAML core). The RustCrypto
-# ecosystem is mid-transition: bergshamra-crypto pins a constellation of
-# release-CANDIDATE crates (`pkcs8 =0.11.0-rc.11` and its matching
-# pkcs5/spki RCs) that are API-incompatible with the STABLE versions of
-# the same crates in the same semver bucket. russh 0.56+ pulls those
-# stable crates (`pkcs5 0.8`), which silently replaces bergshamra's RC
-# copies and breaks compilation. russh ≤0.55 stays on the previous stable
-# generation (`pkcs5 0.7`, `ssh-key 0.6`), which unifies with bergshamra's
-# *stable* deps and leaves the RC bucket untouched — verified to compile.
-# 0.55 still has the merged `russh::keys` API (keys merged at 0.50).
-# IMPORTANT: do NOT bump russh past 0.55 until bergshamra-crypto adopts
-# the stable RustCrypto generation; 0.56+ will not compile in this tree.
+# CRITICAL #2 — history: this was pinned to =0.55.0 from v0.5.5 until
+# v0.6.3 because bergshamra-crypto pinned release-candidate RustCrypto
+# crates that conflicted with the stable generation russh 0.56+ pulls.
+# bergshamra 0.5 (2026-06) moved to the stable generation (pkcs8 0.11),
+# lifting the pin. v0.6.3 bumps to 0.61+, which also closes a batch of
+# RUSTSEC advisories reachable from the SFTP *client* path (unbounded
+# allocations in packet parsing — CVE-2026-48110/-46702/-46673 et al.)
+# and drops mlock on non-secret buffers (~21% SSH throughput upstream).
 #
 # SCP was deliberately rejected: the protocol is sequential-only (no
 # random access → no HTTP Range, unlike SFTP/NFS) and the mature SCP
 # crates wrap libssh2 (C + OpenSSL), which would break this build.
-russh = { version = "=0.55.0", default-features = false, features = ["ring"] }
+russh = { version = "0.61", default-features = false, features = ["ring"] }
 russh-sftp = "2.3"
 
 openpxe-core = { path = "crates/core" }

README.md

@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
 </p>
 
 <p align="center">
-  <img alt="release"   src="https://img.shields.io/badge/release-v0.5.5-2874d7" />
+  <img alt="release"   src="https://img.shields.io/badge/release-v0.6.0-2874d7" />
   <img alt="license"   src="https://img.shields.io/badge/license-MIT%20%7C%20Apache--2.0-59824f" />
   <img alt="rust"      src="https://img.shields.io/badge/built%20with-Rust-fb8841?logo=rust&logoColor=white" />
   <img alt="container" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/container--native-OCI%20%C2%B7%20OpenShift-2496ED?logo=docker&logoColor=white" />
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ Upload `.iso` files (or point at a remote share), and any machine on the network
 them — Linux installers, live tools, or stock Windows setup — with **zero iPXE knowledge
 required by the operator.**
 
-> **Status — v0.5.5, late pre-beta.** The full PXE stack, web UI, remote ISO libraries
+> **Status — v0.6.0, late pre-beta.** The full PXE stack, web UI, remote ISO libraries
 > (SMB/NFS/SFTP), Windows deployment, queued fleet rollout, SAML SSO, and Prometheus
 > metrics are implemented and test-covered. The release checklist gates every tag on the
 > full test suite + `clippy`. Currently in real-hardware validation.

crates/core/src/arch.rs

@@ -23,6 +23,25 @@ pub enum ClientArch {
     Unknown(u16),
 }
 
+/// Which iPXE network backend to advertise to a client (v0.6.1).
+///
+/// OpenPXE serves [`DriverMode::Firmware`] first (the firmware's own NIC
+/// stack, via `snponly`/`undionly`) and only escalates a specific MAC to
+/// [`DriverMode::Builtin`] (iPXE's bundled NIC drivers) automatically, when a
+/// firmware-net boot fails to chainload. There is no operator toggle — the
+/// DHCP proxy decides per client.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, Default, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+#[serde(rename_all = "snake_case")]
+pub enum DriverMode {
+    /// Reuse the firmware UNDI/SNP NIC stack (`snponly.efi`, `undionly.kpxe`).
+    /// Default, smallest, most reliable for chainloading.
+    #[default]
+    Firmware,
+    /// iPXE's own bundled NIC drivers (`ipxe.efi`, `ipxe.pxe`). Fallback for
+    /// hardware whose firmware NIC stack is missing or buggy.
+    Builtin,
+}
+
 impl ClientArch {
     #[must_use]
     pub fn from_option_93(value: u16) -> Self {
@@ -39,18 +58,47 @@ impl ClientArch {
     /// Default iPXE binary filename to return via TFTP for this architecture.
     /// Uses `snponly` variants which reuse the firmware's UNDI/SNP network
     /// stack — smaller binaries and broader hardware compatibility than the
-    /// all-drivers-included `ipxe.efi`.
+    /// all-drivers-included `ipxe.efi`. Equivalent to
+    /// [`Self::ipxe_bootfile_mode`] with [`DriverMode::Firmware`]; kept as a
+    /// convenience for the common firmware-net path.
     #[must_use]
     pub fn ipxe_bootfile(self) -> Option<&'static str> {
-        Some(match self {
-            Self::LegacyX86 => "undionly.kpxe",
-            Self::Ia32Uefi => "snponly-i386.efi",
-            Self::X64Uefi => "snponly.efi",
-            // ARM32 UEFI: upstream boot.ipxe.org does not publish a prebuilt
-            // snponly variant for this arch. We return None so the DHCP
-            // proxy declines rather than advertising a file we can't serve.
-            Self::Arm32Uefi | Self::Unknown(_) => return None,
-            Self::Arm64Uefi => "snponly-arm64.efi",
+        self.ipxe_bootfile_mode(DriverMode::Firmware)
+    }
+
+    /// iPXE binary filename for this architecture under a given network
+    /// [`DriverMode`].
+    ///
+    /// * [`DriverMode::Firmware`] — the `snponly`/`undionly` builds that reuse
+    ///   the firmware's UNDI/SNP NIC stack. Smallest, and the most reliable
+    ///   choice for chainloading because the firmware just proved its network
+    ///   works by downloading the NBP. This is the default first attempt.
+    /// * [`DriverMode::Builtin`] — the all-drivers `ipxe.efi`/`ipxe.pxe`
+    ///   builds that carry iPXE's *own* NIC drivers. The automatic fallback
+    ///   for clients whose firmware NIC stack is missing or buggy (v0.6.1):
+    ///   the DHCP proxy escalates a MAC to this mode when a firmware-net boot
+    ///   never completes the iPXE handoff. iPXE still includes the `snp`
+    ///   driver here too, so it degrades gracefully.
+    #[must_use]
+    pub fn ipxe_bootfile_mode(self, mode: DriverMode) -> Option<&'static str> {
+        Some(match (self, mode) {
+            // Legacy x86 BIOS: UNDI (firmware) vs full native-driver build.
+            (Self::LegacyX86, DriverMode::Firmware) => "undionly.kpxe",
+            (Self::LegacyX86, DriverMode::Builtin) => "ipxe.pxe",
+            // IA32 UEFI.
+            (Self::Ia32Uefi, DriverMode::Firmware) => "snponly-i386.efi",
+            (Self::Ia32Uefi, DriverMode::Builtin) => "ipxe-i386.efi",
+            // x86_64 UEFI — the overwhelmingly common modern client.
+            (Self::X64Uefi, DriverMode::Firmware) => "snponly.efi",
+            (Self::X64Uefi, DriverMode::Builtin) => "ipxe.efi",
+            // ARM64 UEFI.
+            (Self::Arm64Uefi, DriverMode::Firmware) => "snponly-arm64.efi",
+            (Self::Arm64Uefi, DriverMode::Builtin) => "ipxe-arm64.efi",
+            // ARM32 UEFI: upstream boot.ipxe.org publishes no prebuilt binary
+            // for this arch in either mode. Unknown arches likewise. Return
+            // None so the DHCP proxy declines rather than advertising a file
+            // we can't serve.
+            (Self::Arm32Uefi | Self::Unknown(_), _) => return None,
         })
     }
 
@@ -133,6 +181,58 @@ mod tests {
         assert_eq!(ClientArch::Unknown(0xFFFF).ipxe_bootfile(), None);
     }
 
+    #[test]
+    fn bootfile_default_is_firmware_mode() {
+        // The convenience method must equal the explicit Firmware mode.
+        for a in [
+            ClientArch::LegacyX86,
+            ClientArch::Ia32Uefi,
+            ClientArch::X64Uefi,
+            ClientArch::Arm64Uefi,
+            ClientArch::Arm32Uefi,
+            ClientArch::Unknown(0x99),
+        ] {
+            assert_eq!(
+                a.ipxe_bootfile(),
+                a.ipxe_bootfile_mode(DriverMode::Firmware)
+            );
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn builtin_mode_maps_to_all_drivers_binaries() {
+        assert_eq!(
+            ClientArch::LegacyX86.ipxe_bootfile_mode(DriverMode::Builtin),
+            Some("ipxe.pxe")
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            ClientArch::X64Uefi.ipxe_bootfile_mode(DriverMode::Builtin),
+            Some("ipxe.efi")
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            ClientArch::Ia32Uefi.ipxe_bootfile_mode(DriverMode::Builtin),
+            Some("ipxe-i386.efi")
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            ClientArch::Arm64Uefi.ipxe_bootfile_mode(DriverMode::Builtin),
+            Some("ipxe-arm64.efi")
+        );
+        // No binary for ARM32 / unknown in either mode.
+        assert_eq!(
+            ClientArch::Arm32Uefi.ipxe_bootfile_mode(DriverMode::Builtin),
+            None
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            ClientArch::Unknown(0x99).ipxe_bootfile_mode(DriverMode::Builtin),
+            None
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn driver_mode_default_is_firmware() {
+        assert_eq!(DriverMode::default(), DriverMode::Firmware);
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn firmware_class_detects_ipxe_over_pxeclient() {
         let c = FirmwareClass::classify(Some(b"PXEClient:Arch:00007"), Some(b"iPXE"));

crates/core/src/auth.rs

@@ -125,9 +125,7 @@ impl AdminStore {
         {
             let mut g = self.inner.write();
             if g.admin.is_some() {
-                return Err(Error::Invalid(
-                    "admin account already configured".into(),
-                ));
+                return Err(Error::Invalid("admin account already configured".into()));
             }
             g.admin = Some(admin.clone());
         }

crates/core/src/client.rs

@@ -12,11 +12,9 @@ use time::OffsetDateTime;
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
 pub enum ClientEvent {
     DhcpDiscover,
-    DhcpRequest,
     PxeBootServerRequest,
     TftpRead { file: String },
     HttpScriptFetch { target: String },
-    HttpIsoAsset { file: String },
 }
 
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
@@ -32,8 +30,6 @@ pub struct ClientSnapshot {
     // Events are left with default serialization (9-tuple) — they're
     // diagnostic only and not consumed by the UI today.
     pub events: Vec<(OffsetDateTime, ClientEvent)>,
-    /// The boot target (ISO id) last selected via the iPXE menu, if any.
-    pub selected_target: Option<String>,
 }
 
 #[derive(Debug, Default)]
@@ -66,7 +62,6 @@ impl ClientRegistry {
                 first_seen: now,
                 last_seen: now,
                 events: Vec::new(),
-                selected_target: None,
             });
         entry.last_seen = now;
         if ip.is_some() {
@@ -84,13 +79,6 @@ impl ClientRegistry {
         }
     }
 
-    pub fn set_selected_target(&self, mac: &str, target: Option<String>) {
-        let mut guard = self.inner.write();
-        if let Some(c) = guard.get_mut(mac) {
-            c.selected_target = target;
-        }
-    }
-
     #[must_use]
     pub fn list(&self) -> Vec<ClientSnapshot> {
         let guard = self.inner.read();
@@ -99,9 +87,4 @@ impl ClientRegistry {
         v.sort_by_key(|c| std::cmp::Reverse(c.last_seen));
         v
     }
-
-    #[must_use]
-    pub fn get(&self, mac: &str) -> Option<ClientSnapshot> {
-        self.inner.read().get(mac).cloned()
-    }
 }

crates/core/src/config.rs

@@ -40,10 +40,6 @@ pub struct NetworkConfig {
     pub dhcp_port: u16,
     /// UDP port for PXE Boot Server discovery. Standard is 4011.
     pub pxe_port: u16,
-    /// Optional allowlist of client MAC prefixes (OUI). Empty = serve everyone.
-    pub mac_allowlist: Vec<String>,
-    /// Optional allowlist of subnets (CIDR). Empty = serve everyone.
-    pub subnet_allowlist: Vec<String>,
 }
 
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize, Default)]
@@ -105,8 +101,6 @@ impl Default for NetworkConfig {
             dhcp_bind: IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::UNSPECIFIED),
             dhcp_port: 67,
             pxe_port: 4011,
-            mac_allowlist: Vec::new(),
-            subnet_allowlist: Vec::new(),
         }
     }
 }

crates/core/src/lib.rs

@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ pub mod settings;
 pub mod sso;
 pub mod wol;
 
-pub use arch::{ClientArch, FirmwareClass};
+pub use arch::{ClientArch, DriverMode, FirmwareClass};
 pub use auth::{AdminAccount, AdminPublic, AdminStore};
 pub use boot_log::{BootEvent, BootLog};
 pub use branding::{ext_for_mime, BrandingStore, LogoSlot, ALLOWED_LOGO_MIMES, MAX_LOGO_BYTES};
@@ -36,4 +36,4 @@ pub use profile::DeployProfile;
 pub use queue::{DeploymentQueue, QueueEntry};
 pub use saml::{IdpMetadata, SamlError, SpParams, VerifiedPrincipal, VerifiedResponse};
 pub use settings::{Settings, SettingsStore, TimeoutAction};
-pub use sso::{SsoConfig, SsoStore};
+pub use sso::{SsoConfig, SsoLoginInfo, SsoStore};

crates/core/src/notify.rs

@@ -303,7 +303,10 @@ mod tests {
             smtp_host: "smtp.example.com".into(),
             ..Default::default()
         });
-        assert!(matches!(r, Err(Error::Invalid(_))), "missing recipient should reject");
+        assert!(
+            matches!(r, Err(Error::Invalid(_))),
+            "missing recipient should reject"
+        );
         s.replace(NotifyConfig {
             enabled: true,
             kind: NotifyKind::Smtp,

crates/core/src/sso.rs

@@ -73,6 +73,23 @@ impl SsoConfig {
     }
 }
 
+/// The minimal, non-sensitive slice of the SSO config that the **pre-auth**
+/// login screen needs to render the "Sign in with …" button. Carries only
+/// the display affordances — never the metadata XML/URL or entity ID, which
+/// stay behind the auth-gated `/api/sso`. Served as part of the public
+/// `/api/me` so the button renders reliably whether or not anyone is signed
+/// in (v0.5.9: fixes the button vanishing because `/api/sso` 401s pre-auth).
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+pub struct SsoLoginInfo {
+    /// True only when SSO is *usable* (enabled AND a metadata source is
+    /// present) — i.e. clicking the button will actually reach an IdP.
+    pub enabled: bool,
+    /// Button label, e.g. "STC AD". Empty falls back to "SSO" in the UI.
+    pub idp_name: String,
+    /// Optional IdP logo rendered on the button. Empty = no image.
+    pub idp_logo_url: String,
+}
+
 /// In-memory + on-disk SSO settings registry.
 #[derive(Debug, Clone)]
 pub struct SsoStore {
@@ -111,6 +128,19 @@ impl SsoStore {
         self.inner.read().clone()
     }
 
+    /// Public, non-sensitive descriptor for the login screen. Safe to
+    /// expose pre-auth — it's exactly what the "Sign in with …" button
+    /// keys off, with no metadata/entity-ID leakage. v0.5.9.
+    #[must_use]
+    pub fn login_info(&self) -> SsoLoginInfo {
+        let cfg = self.inner.read();
+        SsoLoginInfo {
+            enabled: cfg.is_usable(),
+            idp_name: cfg.idp_name.clone(),
+            idp_logo_url: cfg.idp_logo_url.clone(),
+        }
+    }
+
     /// Replace the whole config in one shot. Light validation: metadata
     /// XML and URL are length-capped so an operator can't OOM us by
     /// pasting a 10 GiB blob; the IdP UI tab clamps the input visually,

crates/core/src/wol.rs

@@ -181,10 +181,7 @@ mod tests {
             Ipv4Addr::new(192, 168, 1, 255)
         );
         assert_eq!(
-            subnet_broadcast(
-                Ipv4Addr::new(10, 5, 3, 7),
-                Ipv4Addr::new(255, 255, 0, 0)
-            ),
+            subnet_broadcast(Ipv4Addr::new(10, 5, 3, 7), Ipv4Addr::new(255, 255, 0, 0)),
             Ipv4Addr::new(10, 5, 255, 255)
         );
     }
@@ -196,7 +193,8 @@ mod tests {
         // and confirm send_magic transmits the exact 102-byte packet.
         let rx = UdpSocket::bind(SocketAddrV4::new(Ipv4Addr::LOCALHOST, 0)).unwrap();
         let port = rx.local_addr().unwrap().port();
-        rx.set_read_timeout(Some(std::time::Duration::from_secs(2))).unwrap();
+        rx.set_read_timeout(Some(std::time::Duration::from_secs(2)))
+            .unwrap();
 
         let packet = magic_packet([0x0a, 0x1b, 0x2c, 0x3d, 0x4e, 0x5f]);
         let sent = send_magic(&packet, &[Ipv4Addr::LOCALHOST], port).unwrap();

crates/dhcp-proxy/Cargo.toml

@@ -18,3 +18,4 @@ tracing.workspace = true
 thiserror.workspace = true
 anyhow.workspace = true
 bytes.workspace = true
+parking_lot.workspace = true

crates/dhcp-proxy/src/escalation.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,237 @@
+//! Automatic per-MAC NIC driver-mode escalation (v0.6.1).
+//!
+//! OpenPXE serves the firmware-net iPXE build (`snponly`/`undionly`) by
+//! default — it's the most reliable choice for chainloading because the
+//! firmware just proved its network works by downloading the NBP. A minority
+//! of NICs have a missing or buggy firmware UNDI/SNP stack; those clients
+//! TFTP the binary fine, but then iPXE can't bring the link up, so the
+//! tell-tale second DHCP DISCOVER carrying the `iPXE` user-class never arrives
+//! and the machine eventually re-PXE-boots.
+//!
+//! We detect exactly that: a *fresh* firmware DISCOVER from a MAC whose
+//! previous firmware attempt was never confirmed by an iPXE handoff means the
+//! firmware-net build failed → escalate that MAC to [`DriverMode::Builtin`]
+//! (iPXE's own NIC drivers). The decision is sticky — once a MAC settles on a
+//! mode that completes the handoff, later boots go straight to it. There is no
+//! operator toggle; it just works, and the default (firmware) path is
+//! unchanged so hardware that already boots never regresses.
+
+use openpxe_core::DriverMode;
+use parking_lot::Mutex;
+use std::collections::HashMap;
+use std::time::{Duration, Instant};
+
+/// Multiple DISCOVERs within this window belong to the *same* boot (DHCP
+/// retransmits, plus the :4011 PXE Boot Server query that follows the :67
+/// DISCOVER). They must not be mistaken for a failed-and-retried boot.
+const SAME_BOOT_DEBOUNCE: Duration = Duration::from_secs(8);
+
+/// Forget a MAC's state after this long with no activity, so a transient
+/// escalation doesn't pin a client to Builtin forever and the map stays
+/// bounded over a long-running deployment.
+const ENTRY_TTL: Duration = Duration::from_mins(30);
+
+/// Hard cap on tracked MACs. Past this we evict the least-recently-seen
+/// entry — escalation is best-effort, never a memory-growth vector.
+const MAX_ENTRIES: usize = 4096;
+
+/// How often (at most) the whole map is swept for expired entries.
+/// Correctness doesn't depend on the sweep — a stale entry is also
+/// detected inline when its MAC next appears — so the sweep only bounds
+/// memory for MACs that never return, and amortizing it keeps the
+/// per-packet path O(1) instead of O(map).
+const PRUNE_INTERVAL: Duration = Duration::from_mins(1);
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy)]
+struct Entry {
+    mode: DriverMode,
+    /// True once we've served `mode` and are waiting for the iPXE handoff to
+    /// confirm it worked. A *new* boot arriving while this is still true means
+    /// the previous attempt failed and we should escalate.
+    awaiting_confirm: bool,
+    last_seen: Instant,
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug)]
+struct Inner {
+    map: HashMap<String, Entry>,
+    /// When the last full TTL sweep ran — see [`PRUNE_INTERVAL`].
+    last_prune: Instant,
+}
+
+impl Default for Inner {
+    fn default() -> Self {
+        Self {
+            map: HashMap::new(),
+            last_prune: Instant::now(),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// Tracks per-MAC driver-mode escalation. Cheap to share via `Arc`.
+#[derive(Debug, Default)]
+pub struct DriverEscalation {
+    inner: Mutex<Inner>,
+}
+
+impl DriverEscalation {
+    #[must_use]
+    pub fn new() -> Self {
+        Self::default()
+    }
+
+    /// Decide the driver mode for a firmware (PXEClient/HTTPClient) boot from
+    /// `mac`. `primary` is true for the main DHCP DISCOVER (:67) and false for
+    /// the PXE Boot Server query (:4011); only the primary path drives
+    /// escalation, and only when it's clearly a *new* boot (outside the
+    /// same-boot debounce). The :4011 path just echoes the current mode.
+    pub fn mode_for_firmware_attempt(&self, mac: &str, primary: bool) -> DriverMode {
+        self.decide_at(mac, primary, Instant::now())
+    }
+
+    /// Record that `mac` completed the iPXE handoff (a DISCOVER carrying the
+    /// `iPXE` user-class). The mode we last served worked, so stop awaiting
+    /// confirmation and keep it sticky for next time.
+    pub fn mark_ipxe_success(&self, mac: &str) {
+        self.confirm_at(mac, Instant::now());
+    }
+
+    fn decide_at(&self, mac: &str, primary: bool, now: Instant) -> DriverMode {
+        let mut g = self.inner.lock();
+        if now.duration_since(g.last_prune) >= PRUNE_INTERVAL {
+            g.map
+                .retain(|_, e| now.duration_since(e.last_seen) < ENTRY_TTL);
+            g.last_prune = now;
+        }
+        // Inline staleness check: a MAC whose entry outlived the TTL starts
+        // fresh even when the amortized sweep above hasn't caught it yet.
+        if g.map
+            .get(mac)
+            .is_some_and(|e| now.duration_since(e.last_seen) >= ENTRY_TTL)
+        {
+            g.map.remove(mac);
+        }
+
+        match g.map.get_mut(mac) {
+            None => {
+                g.map.insert(
+                    mac.to_owned(),
+                    Entry {
+                        mode: DriverMode::Firmware,
+                        // Only the primary DISCOVER opens a confirmation window.
+                        awaiting_confirm: primary,
+                        last_seen: now,
+                    },
+                );
+                if g.map.len() > MAX_ENTRIES {
+                    evict_oldest(&mut g.map);
+                }
+                DriverMode::Firmware
+            }
+            Some(entry) => {
+                let recent = now.duration_since(entry.last_seen) < SAME_BOOT_DEBOUNCE;
+                if primary && !recent {
+                    // A genuinely new boot. If the previous attempt was never
+                    // confirmed, the firmware-net build failed → escalate to
+                    // the all-drivers build. Builtin is the most capable build
+                    // we have, so it's the single escalation target (and a MAC
+                    // already on Builtin simply stays there).
+                    if entry.awaiting_confirm {
+                        entry.mode = DriverMode::Builtin;
+                    }
+                    entry.awaiting_confirm = true;
+                }
+                entry.last_seen = now;
+                entry.mode
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    fn confirm_at(&self, mac: &str, now: Instant) {
+        let mut g = self.inner.lock();
+        if let Some(e) = g.map.get_mut(mac) {
+            e.awaiting_confirm = false;
+            e.last_seen = now;
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+fn evict_oldest(map: &mut HashMap<String, Entry>) {
+    if let Some(oldest) = map
+        .iter()
+        .min_by_key(|(_, e)| e.last_seen)
+        .map(|(k, _)| k.clone())
+    {
+        map.remove(&oldest);
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn firmware_first_then_escalates_on_unconfirmed_retry() {
+        let e = DriverEscalation::new();
+        let t0 = Instant::now();
+        // Boot 1, primary DISCOVER: firmware.
+        assert_eq!(e.decide_at("aa", true, t0), DriverMode::Firmware);
+        // Same boot's :4011 query (+1s, within debounce): still firmware, no escalation.
+        assert_eq!(
+            e.decide_at("aa", false, t0 + Duration::from_secs(1)),
+            DriverMode::Firmware
+        );
+        // Firmware net failed → no iPXE handoff → machine re-PXE-boots much
+        // later: escalate to builtin drivers.
+        assert_eq!(
+            e.decide_at("aa", true, t0 + Duration::from_mins(1)),
+            DriverMode::Builtin
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn builtin_is_sticky_after_success() {
+        let e = DriverEscalation::new();
+        let t0 = Instant::now();
+        assert_eq!(e.decide_at("bb", true, t0), DriverMode::Firmware);
+        assert_eq!(
+            e.decide_at("bb", true, t0 + Duration::from_mins(1)),
+            DriverMode::Builtin
+        );
+        // Builtin worked this time — confirm the handoff.
+        e.confirm_at("bb", t0 + Duration::from_secs(61));
+        // Next cold boot goes straight to builtin (no wasted firmware attempt).
+        assert_eq!(
+            e.decide_at("bb", true, t0 + Duration::from_mins(2)),
+            DriverMode::Builtin
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn confirmed_firmware_never_escalates() {
+        let e = DriverEscalation::new();
+        let t0 = Instant::now();
+        assert_eq!(e.decide_at("cc", true, t0), DriverMode::Firmware);
+        // snponly worked: handoff confirmed.
+        e.confirm_at("cc", t0 + Duration::from_secs(2));
+        // A later boot stays on firmware — no spurious escalation.
+        assert_eq!(
+            e.decide_at("cc", true, t0 + Duration::from_mins(5)),
+            DriverMode::Firmware
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn stale_entry_is_forgotten_and_resets_to_firmware() {
+        let e = DriverEscalation::new();
+        let t0 = Instant::now();
+        assert_eq!(e.decide_at("dd", true, t0), DriverMode::Firmware);
+        assert_eq!(
+            e.decide_at("dd", true, t0 + Duration::from_mins(1)),
+            DriverMode::Builtin
+        );
+        // After the TTL with no activity the entry is pruned → fresh firmware.
+        let later = t0 + Duration::from_mins(1) + ENTRY_TTL + Duration::from_secs(1);
+        assert_eq!(e.decide_at("dd", true, later), DriverMode::Firmware);
+    }
+}

crates/dhcp-proxy/src/lib.rs

@@ -17,7 +17,9 @@
 //!   clients silently drop them.
 #![forbid(unsafe_code)]
 
+pub mod escalation;
 pub mod reply;
 pub mod server;
 
+pub use escalation::DriverEscalation;
 pub use server::DhcpProxyServer;

crates/dhcp-proxy/src/reply.rs

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
 //!     pass, or the HTTP URL of the boot script once iPXE has chained.
 
 use dhcproto::v4::{DhcpOption, Message, MessageType, Opcode, OptionCode};
-use openpxe_core::{ClientArch, FirmwareClass};
+use openpxe_core::{ClientArch, DriverMode, FirmwareClass};
 use std::net::Ipv4Addr;
 
 /// Where the reply directs the client next.
@@ -31,6 +31,11 @@ pub struct ReplyContext<'a> {
     pub our_ip: Ipv4Addr,
     pub arch: ClientArch,
     pub class: FirmwareClass,
+    /// Which iPXE network backend to advertise for this client. The DHCP
+    /// proxy fills this from the automatic per-MAC escalation state: normally
+    /// [`DriverMode::Firmware`], escalated to [`DriverMode::Builtin`] for a
+    /// MAC whose firmware-net boot failed to chainload (v0.6.1).
+    pub driver_mode: DriverMode,
     /// Public base URL (scheme://host[:port]) used in HTTP directives.
     pub public_base_url: &'a str,
 }
@@ -52,9 +57,13 @@ pub fn decide(ctx: &ReplyContext<'_>) -> BootDirective {
         },
         FirmwareClass::HttpClient => {
             // UEFI HTTP boot: client wants an http:// URL in option 67
-            // pointing at an EFI executable. We serve ipxe.efi over HTTP;
-            // it'll then do the same script-fetch the iPXE path does.
-            let name = ctx.arch.ipxe_bootfile().unwrap_or("snponly.efi");
+            // pointing at an EFI executable. We serve the iPXE EFI build for
+            // the negotiated driver mode over HTTP; it'll then do the same
+            // script-fetch the iPXE path does.
+            let name = ctx
+                .arch
+                .ipxe_bootfile_mode(ctx.driver_mode)
+                .unwrap_or("snponly.efi");
             BootDirective::HttpScript {
                 url: format!(
                     "{}/ipxe/{}",
@@ -63,7 +72,7 @@ pub fn decide(ctx: &ReplyContext<'_>) -> BootDirective {
                 ),
             }
         }
-        FirmwareClass::PxeClient => match ctx.arch.ipxe_bootfile() {
+        FirmwareClass::PxeClient => match ctx.arch.ipxe_bootfile_mode(ctx.driver_mode) {
             Some(name) => BootDirective::TftpIpxe {
                 filename: name.to_string(),
             },

crates/dhcp-proxy/src/server.rs

@@ -1,10 +1,11 @@
 //! UDP listener loop for the DHCP proxy. Accepts on :67 (and :4011 on a
 //! second socket) and dispatches each datagram through the pure reply logic.
 
+use crate::escalation::DriverEscalation;
 use crate::reply::{build_reply, decide, BootDirective, ReplyContext};
 use dhcproto::v4::{DhcpOption, Message, OptionCode};
 use dhcproto::{Decodable, Decoder, Encodable, Encoder};
-use openpxe_core::{ClientArch, ClientEvent, ClientRegistry, FirmwareClass};
+use openpxe_core::{ClientArch, ClientEvent, ClientRegistry, DriverMode, FirmwareClass};
 use socket2::{Domain, Protocol, Socket, Type};
 use std::net::{IpAddr, Ipv4Addr, SocketAddr, SocketAddrV4};
 use std::sync::Arc;
@@ -18,6 +19,9 @@ pub struct DhcpProxyServer {
     public_base_url: String,
     clients: Arc<ClientRegistry>,
     metrics: openpxe_core::Metrics,
+    /// Automatic per-MAC NIC driver-mode escalation (v0.6.1). Shared across
+    /// the :67 and :4011 listener tasks via the server `Arc`.
+    escalation: DriverEscalation,
 }
 
 impl DhcpProxyServer {
@@ -38,6 +42,7 @@ impl DhcpProxyServer {
             public_base_url,
             clients,
             metrics,
+            escalation: DriverEscalation::new(),
         }
     }
 
@@ -126,11 +131,30 @@ impl DhcpProxyServer {
             },
         );
 
+        // Automatic NIC driver-mode selection (v0.6.1). The default is
+        // firmware-net (snponly/undionly). A successful iPXE handoff confirms
+        // the current mode works for this MAC; a fresh firmware boot whose
+        // predecessor never handed off escalates the MAC to iPXE's built-in
+        // NIC drivers. No operator toggle — the firmware path is unchanged so
+        // hardware that already boots never regresses.
+        let driver_mode = match class {
+            FirmwareClass::IpxeUserClass => {
+                self.escalation.mark_ipxe_success(&mac);
+                DriverMode::Firmware // unused: this path serves the HTTP script
+            }
+            FirmwareClass::PxeClient | FirmwareClass::HttpClient => self
+                .escalation
+                .mode_for_firmware_attempt(&mac, label == "67"),
+            // Unreachable: FirmwareClass::Other returned above.
+            FirmwareClass::Other => DriverMode::Firmware,
+        };
+
         let ctx = ReplyContext {
             request: &request,
             our_ip: self.our_ip,
             arch,
             class,
+            driver_mode,
             public_base_url: &self.public_base_url,
         };
         let directive = decide(&ctx);
@@ -154,7 +178,7 @@ impl DhcpProxyServer {
         sock.send_to(&out, dest).await?;
         tracing::info!(
             target: "openpxe::dhcp",
-            mac=%mac, arch=arch.as_str(), class=?class, dest=%dest, directive=?directive,
+            mac=%mac, arch=arch.as_str(), class=?class, driver=?driver_mode, dest=%dest, directive=?directive,
             "PXE reply sent"
         );
         Ok(())
@@ -213,11 +237,16 @@ fn bind_udp(bind: IpAddr, port: u16, broadcast: bool) -> anyhow::Result<UdpSocke
 }
 
 fn format_mac(chaddr: &[u8]) -> String {
-    let take = chaddr.iter().take(6).copied().collect::<Vec<_>>();
-    take.iter()
-        .map(|b| format!("{b:02x}"))
-        .collect::<Vec<_>>()
-        .join(":")
+    use std::fmt::Write;
+    // One allocation — this runs for every PXE datagram we answer.
+    let mut s = String::with_capacity(17);
+    for (i, b) in chaddr.iter().take(6).enumerate() {
+        if i > 0 {
+            s.push(':');
+        }
+        let _ = write!(s, "{b:02x}");
+    }
+    s
 }
 
 /// Walk raw DHCP options looking for option 93 (Client System Architecture)

crates/http-api/src/app.rs

@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ use openpxe_core::{
     encoding::pct_encode, ext_for_mime, wol, BootEvent, ClientEvent, DeployProfile, Error,
     LogoSlot, NotifyConfig, Settings, SsoConfig, ALLOWED_LOGO_MIMES, MAX_LOGO_BYTES,
 };
-use openpxe_ipxe_assets::asset_bytes;
+use openpxe_ipxe_assets::asset_slice;
 use openpxe_iso_store::{
     render_template, IsoCategory, IsoMeta, IsoSource, NfsAddRequest, SftpAddRequest, SmbAddRequest,
     SmbState, UnattendedKind, UnattendedMeta,
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ pub fn build_router(state: AppState) -> Router {
         .route("/branding/pxe-logo", get(ui_pxe_logo))
         // iPXE script endpoints.
         .route("/boot.ipxe", get(boot_top_menu))
-        .route("/boot/:filename", get(boot_sub))
+        .route("/boot/{filename}", get(boot_sub))
         // v0.5.2: unattended answer-file *serving* — public (like /iso),
         // because the booting installer fetches these with no session.
         // `/unattended/:id` serves a Kickstart/Preseed with `{{HOSTNAME}}`
@@ -80,12 +80,12 @@ pub fn build_router(state: AppState) -> Router {
         // autoinstall (`…/<ctx>/user-data` + `/meta-data`), where `<ctx>`
         // base64url-encodes the per-host hostname/ip/mac. Management
         // (upload/list/delete) lives under the gated `/api/unattended`.
-        .route("/unattended/:id", get(serve_unattended))
-        .route("/unattended/:id/:ctx/:sub", get(serve_unattended_seed))
+        .route("/unattended/{id}", get(serve_unattended))
+        .route("/unattended/{id}/{ctx}/{sub}", get(serve_unattended_seed))
         // Bundled binaries and raw ISO access.
-        .route("/ipxe/:name", get(ipxe_binary))
-        .route("/iso/:filename", get(iso_raw))
-        .route("/iso/:id/*path", get(iso_file))
+        .route("/ipxe/{name}", get(ipxe_binary))
+        .route("/iso/{filename}", get(iso_raw))
+        .route("/iso/{id}/{*path}", get(iso_file))
         // Container health/readiness probes. `/healthz` is always 200 OK
         // while the HTTP task is alive. `/readyz` additionally requires at
         // least one bundled iPXE binary (without one, no client can PXE).
@@ -93,23 +93,23 @@ pub fn build_router(state: AppState) -> Router {
         .route("/readyz", get(readyz))
         // JSON API.
         .route("/api/isos", get(api_list_isos).post(api_upload_iso))
-        .route("/api/isos/:id", delete(api_delete_iso))
+        .route("/api/isos/{id}", delete(api_delete_iso))
         .route("/api/uploads", post(api_upload_begin))
         .route(
-            "/api/uploads/:upload_id",
+            "/api/uploads/{upload_id}",
             put(api_upload_chunk).delete(api_upload_abort),
         )
         // Per-ISO password prompt. PUT body `{ "password": "..." }`
         // sets, `{ "password": null }` (or DELETE) clears.
         .route(
-            "/api/isos/:id/password",
+            "/api/isos/{id}/password",
             axum::routing::put(api_set_iso_password).delete(api_clear_iso_password),
         )
         // v0.4.4: per-ISO menu category (Os / Tools). Drives whether the
         // image appears under Linux/Windows Installers (default) or in
         // the Tools submenu next to memtest / shell / NIC info.
         .route(
-            "/api/isos/:id/category",
+            "/api/isos/{id}/category",
             axum::routing::put(api_set_iso_category),
         )
         // v0.4.4: filesystem free-space telemetry for the ISO directory's
@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ pub fn build_router(state: AppState) -> Router {
         // logo). v0.5.2: split into three slots — `light` / `dark` /
         // `client`. Multipart upload to POST; DELETE clears one slot.
         .route(
-            "/api/branding/logo/:slot",
+            "/api/branding/logo/{slot}",
             post(api_branding_upload).delete(api_branding_clear),
         )
         // v0.5.2: unattended-install answer-file management (gated).
@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ pub fn build_router(state: AppState) -> Router {
             "/api/unattended",
             get(api_unattended_list).post(api_unattended_upload),
         )
-        .route("/api/unattended/:id", delete(api_unattended_delete))
+        .route("/api/unattended/{id}", delete(api_unattended_delete))
         // v0.4.4: self-rendered API reference, served as JSON so the UI
         // can format it consistently with the rest of the chrome. Lives
         // under the Settings tab — operators chasing an integration get
@@ -161,12 +161,12 @@ pub fn build_router(state: AppState) -> Router {
         .route("/api/settings", get(api_get_settings).put(api_put_settings))
         .route("/api/queue", get(api_list_queue))
         .route("/api/queue/join", get(api_queue_join))
-        .route("/api/queue/poll/:entry_id", get(api_queue_poll))
+        .route("/api/queue/poll/{entry_id}", get(api_queue_poll))
         .route("/api/queue/assign", post(api_queue_assign))
         // v0.5.2: per-device deployment profile (auto hostname / IP /
         // unattended file) set from the queue "Profile" button.
-        .route("/api/queue/:entry_id/profile", put(api_queue_set_profile))
-        .route("/api/queue/:entry_id", delete(api_queue_release))
+        .route("/api/queue/{entry_id}/profile", put(api_queue_set_profile))
+        .route("/api/queue/{entry_id}", delete(api_queue_release))
         // v0.4.65: SMB share manager (userspace via smbclient). The
         // kernel-mount NFS routes that v0.4.64 shipped are gone — they
         // didn't work on hosts whose kernel lacked the nfs client
@@ -177,8 +177,8 @@ pub fn build_router(state: AppState) -> Router {
             "/api/smb-shares",
             get(api_smb_shares_list).post(api_smb_shares_add),
         )
-        .route("/api/smb-shares/:id", delete(api_smb_shares_remove))
-        .route("/api/smb-shares/:id/scan", post(api_smb_shares_scan))
+        .route("/api/smb-shares/{id}", delete(api_smb_shares_remove))
+        .route("/api/smb-shares/{id}/scan", post(api_smb_shares_scan))
         // v0.4.67: NFSv3 share manager (pure-Rust in-process client).
         // Ships alongside SMB. Routes are parallel so the UI can
         // reuse the same form/error/hint rendering for both.
@@ -186,8 +186,8 @@ pub fn build_router(state: AppState) -> Router {
             "/api/nfs-shares",
             get(api_nfs_shares_list).post(api_nfs_shares_add),
         )
-        .route("/api/nfs-shares/:id", delete(api_nfs_shares_remove))
-        .route("/api/nfs-shares/:id/scan", post(api_nfs_shares_scan))
+        .route("/api/nfs-shares/{id}", delete(api_nfs_shares_remove))
+        .route("/api/nfs-shares/{id}/scan", post(api_nfs_shares_scan))
         // v0.5.5: SFTP-over-SSH share manager (pure-Rust russh client).
         // Parallel to SMB/NFS so the UI reuses the same form/error/hint
         // rendering. Like NFS, SFTP-sourced ISOs support Range requests.
@@ -195,8 +195,8 @@ pub fn build_router(state: AppState) -> Router {
             "/api/sftp-shares",
             get(api_sftp_shares_list).post(api_sftp_shares_add),
         )
-        .route("/api/sftp-shares/:id", delete(api_sftp_shares_remove))
-        .route("/api/sftp-shares/:id/scan", post(api_sftp_shares_scan))
+        .route("/api/sftp-shares/{id}", delete(api_sftp_shares_remove))
+        .route("/api/sftp-shares/{id}/scan", post(api_sftp_shares_scan))
         // Phase 4: Network info (read-only) + DNS edit.
         .route("/api/network", get(api_network).put(api_network_put))
         // Phase 4: live-log stream + recent buffer for the Terminal tab.
@@ -208,10 +208,10 @@ pub fn build_router(state: AppState) -> Router {
         // Phase 5: per-MAC host bindings. Operator
         // pins a MAC to a boot entry; /boot.ipxe?mac=... chains directly.
         .route("/api/hosts", get(api_hosts_list).post(api_hosts_upsert))
-        .route("/api/hosts/:mac", delete(api_hosts_remove))
+        .route("/api/hosts/{mac}", delete(api_hosts_remove))
         // v0.5.0: Wake-on-LAN a bound host. Sends a magic packet to the
         // limited broadcast + the server's own subnet broadcast.
-        .route("/api/hosts/:mac/wol", post(api_hosts_wol))
+        .route("/api/hosts/{mac}/wol", post(api_hosts_wol))
         // Rolling "host log" of boot events: what image actually
         // started installing on what MAC/IP, and when. Persisted to disk.
         .route("/api/boot-log", get(api_boot_log))
@@ -406,6 +406,22 @@ fn bundled_logo_response() -> Response {
 /// brand mark falls back to the *default* background for the PXE screen
 /// (the WebUI still renders the SVG natively in the top-left).
 async fn ui_pxe_logo(State(state): State<AppState>) -> Response {
+    // The composite is a pure function of the uploaded logo, so the
+    // encoded PNG is cached keyed on the branding revision — an upload
+    // or clear bumps the rev and invalidates it. The response headers
+    // stay `no-cache` (clients must refetch); only the server-side
+    // ~50-200 ms decode/compose/encode is skipped per boot.
+    let rev = state.branding.logo_rev();
+    let cached = state
+        .pxe_bg_cache
+        .lock()
+        .as_ref()
+        .filter(|(r, _)| *r == rev)
+        .map(|(_, png)| png.clone());
+    if let Some(png) = cached {
+        return pxe_png_response(png);
+    }
+
     // Resolve the operator's raster upload, if any and if it's a format
     // iPXE/our compositor can consume. SVG (or a missing/unreadable
     // file) yields `None`, which composes the default background.
@@ -450,6 +466,12 @@ async fn ui_pxe_logo(State(state): State<AppState>) -> Response {
                 .into_response();
         }
     };
+    let png = bytes::Bytes::from(composed);
+    *state.pxe_bg_cache.lock() = Some((rev, png.clone()));
+    pxe_png_response(png)
+}
+
+fn pxe_png_response(png: bytes::Bytes) -> Response {
     (
         [
             (header::CONTENT_TYPE, HeaderValue::from_static("image/png")),
@@ -460,7 +482,7 @@ async fn ui_pxe_logo(State(state): State<AppState>) -> Response {
                 HeaderValue::from_static("no-cache, max-age=0"),
             ),
         ],
-        composed,
+        png,
     )
         .into_response()
 }
@@ -498,14 +520,15 @@ fn text_plain(body: String) -> Response {
 /// to the bound target instead of rendering the menu.
 async fn boot_top_menu(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
-    peer: Option<ConnectInfo<SocketAddr>>,
+    peer: Result<ConnectInfo<SocketAddr>, axum::extract::rejection::ExtensionRejection>,
     Query(p): Query<BootMenuParams>,
 ) -> Response {
     // `ConnectInfo` is only populated when axum was started with
     // `into_make_service_with_connect_info` (production path). Tests
     // call the router via `oneshot`, which skips that wiring — we
     // tolerate it by treating the peer as unknown rather than 500ing.
-    let peer_ip = peer.map(|c| c.0.ip());
+    // (axum 0.8: `Result<T, Rejection>` is the optional-extractor form.)
+    let peer_ip = peer.ok().map(|c| c.0.ip());
     state
         .metrics
         .record_http(openpxe_core::HttpRoute::BootScript);
@@ -597,11 +620,12 @@ struct BootSubParams {
 
 async fn boot_sub(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
-    peer: Option<ConnectInfo<SocketAddr>>,
+    peer: Result<ConnectInfo<SocketAddr>, axum::extract::rejection::ExtensionRejection>,
     AxumPath(filename): AxumPath<String>,
     Query(p): Query<BootSubParams>,
 ) -> Response {
-    let peer_ip = peer.map(|c| c.0.ip());
+    // axum 0.8: `Result<T, Rejection>` is the optional-extractor form.
+    let peer_ip = peer.ok().map(|c| c.0.ip());
     // `/boot/<name>.ipxe` where `<name>` is either one of our reserved
     // submenu names (prefixed `_`) or a boot entry id.
     let name = filename.strip_suffix(".ipxe").unwrap_or(&filename);
@@ -638,7 +662,23 @@ async fn boot_sub(
                                     ));
                                 }
                                 Some(token) => {
-                                    match state.iso_store.verify_password(&iso.id, token) {
+                                    // bcrypt verify costs ~100-200 ms of pure
+                                    // CPU and this path is unauthenticated —
+                                    // run it on the blocking pool so password
+                                    // probes can't stall the workers that are
+                                    // streaming ISO bytes to imaging machines.
+                                    let store = state.iso_store.clone();
+                                    let iso_id = iso.id.clone();
+                                    let tok = token.to_string();
+                                    let verdict = match tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || {
+                                        store.verify_password(&iso_id, &tok)
+                                    })
+                                    .await
+                                    {
+                                        Ok(v) => v,
+                                        Err(e) => Err(openpxe_core::Error::Other(e.into())),
+                                    };
+                                    match verdict {
                                         Ok(true) => { /* fall through to render the entry */ }
                                         Ok(false) => {
                                             // Don't log the candidate — just the
@@ -735,9 +775,15 @@ async fn ipxe_binary(AxumPath(name): AxumPath<String>) -> Response {
     if name.contains('/') || name.contains('\\') {
         return (StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST, "invalid name").into_response();
     }
-    let Some(bytes) = asset_bytes(&name) else {
+    let Some(data) = asset_slice(&name) else {
         return (StatusCode::NOT_FOUND, "no such ipxe asset").into_response();
     };
+    // Release builds embed the asset in rodata — serve it without the
+    // ~1 MiB per-request heap copy `into_owned` would cost.
+    let bytes = match data {
+        std::borrow::Cow::Borrowed(b) => bytes::Bytes::from_static(b),
+        std::borrow::Cow::Owned(v) => bytes::Bytes::from(v),
+    };
     (
         [
             (
@@ -768,7 +814,10 @@ async fn iso_raw(
     };
     match &meta.source {
         IsoSource::Local => {
-            let Some(path) = state.iso_store.iso_path_for(id) else {
+            // `local_path(&meta)` reuses the meta we already cloned —
+            // `iso_path_for(id)` would re-lock and deep-clone it again,
+            // hundreds of times per sanboot install.
+            let Some(path) = state.iso_store.local_path(&meta) else {
                 return (StatusCode::NOT_FOUND, "no such iso").into_response();
             };
             match stream_file_range(&path, headers.get(header::RANGE)).await {
@@ -1027,15 +1076,25 @@ fn parse_range(h: Option<&HeaderValue>, total: u64) -> Option<(u64, u64, bool)>
             return Some((total.saturating_sub(n), total.saturating_sub(1), true));
         }
     }
-    let mut parts = spec.splitn(2, '-');
-    let start = parts
-        .next()
-        .and_then(|s| s.parse::<u64>().ok())
-        .unwrap_or(0);
-    let end = parts
-        .next()
-        .and_then(|s| s.parse::<u64>().ok())
-        .unwrap_or(total.saturating_sub(1));
+    // RFC 7233 §3.1: a Range header we can't parse is *ignored* (200 +
+    // full body), never coerced into a bogus 206 claiming the whole
+    // file. Only `first-pos[-last-pos]` with numeric positions reaches
+    // the partial path; `None` is reserved for syntactically valid but
+    // unsatisfiable ranges (→ 416).
+    let full = Some((0, total.saturating_sub(1), false));
+    let Some((start_s, end_s)) = spec.split_once('-') else {
+        return full;
+    };
+    let Ok(start) = start_s.trim().parse::<u64>() else {
+        return full;
+    };
+    let end = if end_s.trim().is_empty() {
+        total.saturating_sub(1)
+    } else if let Ok(e) = end_s.trim().parse::<u64>() {
+        e
+    } else {
+        return full;
+    };
     if start >= total {
         return None;
     }
@@ -1503,13 +1562,13 @@ async fn api_docs() -> Json<serde_json::Value> {
                      "summary": "List ISOs (local + NFS) with size, family, boot entries, category."},
                     {"method": "POST", "path": "/api/isos",
                      "summary": "Legacy single-shot multipart upload. Prefer /api/uploads for big files."},
-                    {"method": "DELETE", "path": "/api/isos/:id",
+                    {"method": "DELETE", "path": "/api/isos/{id}",
                      "summary": "Delete a local ISO and its sidecar metadata."},
-                    {"method": "PUT", "path": "/api/isos/:id/password",
+                    {"method": "PUT", "path": "/api/isos/{id}/password",
                      "summary": "Set or update an ISO's boot password (bcrypt-hashed; plaintext never stored)."},
-                    {"method": "DELETE", "path": "/api/isos/:id/password",
+                    {"method": "DELETE", "path": "/api/isos/{id}/password",
                      "summary": "Clear an ISO's boot password."},
-                    {"method": "PUT", "path": "/api/isos/:id/category",
+                    {"method": "PUT", "path": "/api/isos/{id}/category",
                      "summary": "Set the menu category. Body: { \"category\": \"os\" | \"tools\" }."},
                 ],
             },
@@ -1518,9 +1577,9 @@ async fn api_docs() -> Json<serde_json::Value> {
                 "endpoints": [
                     {"method": "POST", "path": "/api/uploads",
                      "summary": "Begin a chunked upload session. Body: { \"filename\", \"size_bytes\" }."},
-                    {"method": "PUT", "path": "/api/uploads/:upload_id",
+                    {"method": "PUT", "path": "/api/uploads/{upload_id}",
                      "summary": "Append a chunk. Headers: x-openpxe-upload-offset, x-openpxe-upload-complete."},
-                    {"method": "DELETE", "path": "/api/uploads/:upload_id",
+                    {"method": "DELETE", "path": "/api/uploads/{upload_id}",
                      "summary": "Abort a chunked upload session and remove the .partial file."},
                 ],
             },
@@ -1531,9 +1590,9 @@ async fn api_docs() -> Json<serde_json::Value> {
                      "summary": "List configured SMB shares with connection state and iso counts."},
                     {"method": "POST", "path": "/api/smb-shares",
                      "summary": "Register an SMB share. Body: { server, share, guest, username?, password?, port? }."},
-                    {"method": "DELETE", "path": "/api/smb-shares/:id",
+                    {"method": "DELETE", "path": "/api/smb-shares/{id}",
                      "summary": "Forget a share and drop its entries from the ISO store."},
-                    {"method": "POST", "path": "/api/smb-shares/:id/scan",
+                    {"method": "POST", "path": "/api/smb-shares/{id}/scan",
                      "summary": "Re-list a share for new ISOs."},
                 ],
             },
@@ -1544,9 +1603,9 @@ async fn api_docs() -> Json<serde_json::Value> {
                      "summary": "List configured NFSv3 shares with connection state and iso counts."},
                     {"method": "POST", "path": "/api/nfs-shares",
                      "summary": "Register an NFSv3 share. Body: { server, export, port? }. Auth is AUTH_SYS only; access control is by client IP on the server side."},
-                    {"method": "DELETE", "path": "/api/nfs-shares/:id",
+                    {"method": "DELETE", "path": "/api/nfs-shares/{id}",
                      "summary": "Forget a share and drop its entries from the ISO store."},
-                    {"method": "POST", "path": "/api/nfs-shares/:id/scan",
+                    {"method": "POST", "path": "/api/nfs-shares/{id}/scan",
                      "summary": "Re-list a share for new ISOs."},
                 ],
             },
@@ -1557,9 +1616,9 @@ async fn api_docs() -> Json<serde_json::Value> {
                      "summary": "List configured SFTP-over-SSH shares with connection state and iso counts."},
                     {"method": "POST", "path": "/api/sftp-shares",
                      "summary": "Register an SFTP share. Body: { server, export, username, port?, password? | private_key? + passphrase? }. The server's SSH host key is pinned trust-on-first-use."},
-                    {"method": "DELETE", "path": "/api/sftp-shares/:id",
+                    {"method": "DELETE", "path": "/api/sftp-shares/{id}",
                      "summary": "Forget a share, drop its entries from the ISO store, and scrub its credentials file."},
-                    {"method": "POST", "path": "/api/sftp-shares/:id/scan",
+                    {"method": "POST", "path": "/api/sftp-shares/{id}/scan",
                      "summary": "Re-list a share for new ISOs."},
                 ],
             },
@@ -1579,9 +1638,9 @@ async fn api_docs() -> Json<serde_json::Value> {
                      "summary": "Current runtime settings (Windows toggle, timeout, dns hint, …)."},
                     {"method": "PUT", "path": "/api/settings",
                      "summary": "Replace runtime settings. Guards against enabling Windows when wimboot isn't bundled."},
-                    {"method": "POST", "path": "/api/branding/logo/:slot",
+                    {"method": "POST", "path": "/api/branding/logo/{slot}",
                      "summary": "Upload a custom logo for a slot (light | dark | client). Multipart 'file', PNG/SVG/JPEG/WebP/GIF up to 2 MB. The client slot is raster-only."},
-                    {"method": "DELETE", "path": "/api/branding/logo/:slot",
+                    {"method": "DELETE", "path": "/api/branding/logo/{slot}",
                      "summary": "Remove the custom logo for a slot and revert to the bundled mark."},
                     {"method": "GET", "path": "/branding/pxe-logo",
                      "summary": "Raster form of the operator's 'client' logo for the iPXE menu's `console --picture`. Default background when unset/SVG."},
@@ -1622,9 +1681,9 @@ async fn api_docs() -> Json<serde_json::Value> {
                      "summary": "List uploaded answer files (Kickstart / Preseed / Autoinstall / Windows answer file)."},
                     {"method": "POST", "path": "/api/unattended",
                      "summary": "Upload an answer file (multipart 'file', .ks/.cfg/.seed/.yaml/.yml/.xml/user-data, up to 1 MB)."},
-                    {"method": "DELETE", "path": "/api/unattended/:id",
+                    {"method": "DELETE", "path": "/api/unattended/{id}",
                      "summary": "Delete an uploaded answer file."},
-                    {"method": "GET", "path": "/unattended/:id",
+                    {"method": "GET", "path": "/unattended/{id}",
                      "summary": "Public: serve an answer file with {{HOSTNAME}}/{{IP}}/{{MAC}} substituted from the query string."},
                 ],
             },
@@ -1635,9 +1694,9 @@ async fn api_docs() -> Json<serde_json::Value> {
                      "summary": "List queue entries (waiting + assigned, with any deployment profile)."},
                     {"method": "POST", "path": "/api/queue/assign",
                      "summary": "Assign a target image to queued clients. Body: { target, entry_ids }."},
-                    {"method": "PUT", "path": "/api/queue/:entry_id/profile",
+                    {"method": "PUT", "path": "/api/queue/{entry_id}/profile",
                      "summary": "Set a queued device's deployment profile. Body: { auto_hostname?, auto_ip?, unattended_file? }."},
-                    {"method": "DELETE", "path": "/api/queue/:entry_id",
+                    {"method": "DELETE", "path": "/api/queue/{entry_id}",
                      "summary": "Release a queue entry without assigning."},
                 ],
             },
@@ -1648,9 +1707,9 @@ async fn api_docs() -> Json<serde_json::Value> {
                      "summary": "List per-MAC boot bindings."},
                     {"method": "POST", "path": "/api/hosts",
                      "summary": "Pin a MAC to a boot target. Body: { mac, target, label, auto_hostname?, auto_ip?, unattended_file? }."},
-                    {"method": "DELETE", "path": "/api/hosts/:mac",
+                    {"method": "DELETE", "path": "/api/hosts/{mac}",
                      "summary": "Remove a binding."},
-                    {"method": "POST", "path": "/api/hosts/:mac/wol",
+                    {"method": "POST", "path": "/api/hosts/{mac}/wol",
                      "summary": "Send a Wake-on-LAN magic packet to a bound MAC (limited + subnet broadcast)."},
                     {"method": "GET", "path": "/api/boot-log",
                      "summary": "Ring of recent boot events (timestamp, mac, ip, target)."},

crates/http-api/src/auth.rs

@@ -154,10 +154,15 @@ pub fn session_cookie(session: &str) -> String {
 
 fn parse_cookie(headers: &axum::http::HeaderMap) -> Option<String> {
     // `Cookie: a=b; c=d` parsing — small enough not to drag in a crate.
+    // Two-step strip (name, then '=') keeps this allocation-free per
+    // candidate and can't match a longer cookie name sharing the prefix.
     let raw = headers.get(header::COOKIE)?.to_str().ok()?;
     for part in raw.split(';') {
         let part = part.trim();
-        if let Some(v) = part.strip_prefix(&format!("{SESSION_COOKIE}=")) {
+        if let Some(v) = part
+            .strip_prefix(SESSION_COOKIE)
+            .and_then(|rest| rest.strip_prefix('='))
+        {
             return Some(v.to_string());
         }
     }
@@ -246,7 +251,14 @@ pub async fn api_setup(State(state): State<AppState>, Json(body): Json<SetupBody
         )
             .into_response();
     }
-    match state.admin.bootstrap(&body.username, &body.password) {
+    // bcrypt hashing is ~100-200 ms of pure CPU (and `bootstrap` also
+    // persists to disk synchronously) — keep it off the async workers.
+    let admin = state.admin.clone();
+    let result =
+        tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || admin.bootstrap(&body.username, &body.password))
+            .await
+            .unwrap_or_else(|e| Err(openpxe_core::Error::Other(e.into())));
+    match result {
         Ok(pub_) => {
             let session = state.sessions.create(&pub_.username);
             login_response(StatusCode::CREATED, &pub_, &session)
@@ -271,8 +283,13 @@ pub struct LoginBody {
 pub async fn api_login(State(state): State<AppState>, Json(body): Json<LoginBody>) -> Response {
     // Brief, deliberately vague — "invalid credentials" rather than
     // "no such user" / "wrong password". Same anti-enumeration posture
-    // as Sonarr/Radarr.
-    let pub_ = match state.admin.verify(&body.username, &body.password) {
+    // as Sonarr/Radarr. The bcrypt verify is ~100-200 ms of pure CPU on
+    // an unauthenticated endpoint, so it runs on the blocking pool.
+    let admin = state.admin.clone();
+    let verdict = tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || admin.verify(&body.username, &body.password))
+        .await
+        .unwrap_or_else(|e| Err(openpxe_core::Error::Other(e.into())));
+    let pub_ = match verdict {
         Ok(Some(u)) => u,
         Ok(None) => {
             return (
@@ -319,6 +336,12 @@ pub async fn api_me(State(state): State<AppState>, headers: axum::http::HeaderMa
     // and the logo asset is public, so this leaks nothing sensitive.
     let has_custom_logo = state.branding.has_any_web_logo();
     let logo_rev = state.branding.logo_rev();
+    // v0.5.9: ship the non-sensitive SSO descriptor with every /api/me so
+    // the pre-auth login screen can render the "Sign in with …" button
+    // reliably. Previously the button keyed off the auth-gated /api/sso,
+    // which 401s when logged out — the button only survived on a stale
+    // in-memory config and vanished on any fresh login-page load.
+    let sso = state.sso.login_info();
     if !state.admin.is_configured() {
         return (
             StatusCode::OK,
@@ -327,6 +350,7 @@ pub async fn api_me(State(state): State<AppState>, headers: axum::http::HeaderMa
                 "authenticated": false,
                 "has_custom_logo": has_custom_logo,
                 "logo_rev": logo_rev,
+                "sso": sso,
             })),
         )
             .into_response();
@@ -343,6 +367,7 @@ pub async fn api_me(State(state): State<AppState>, headers: axum::http::HeaderMa
                 "session_user": u,
                 "has_custom_logo": has_custom_logo,
                 "logo_rev": logo_rev,
+                "sso": sso,
             })),
         )
             .into_response(),
@@ -353,6 +378,7 @@ pub async fn api_me(State(state): State<AppState>, headers: axum::http::HeaderMa
                 "authenticated": false,
                 "has_custom_logo": has_custom_logo,
                 "logo_rev": logo_rev,
+                "sso": sso,
             })),
         )
             .into_response(),
@@ -385,11 +411,18 @@ pub async fn api_update_credentials(
         )
             .into_response();
     }
-    let result = state.admin.update_credentials(
+    // Two bcrypt operations (verify current + hash new) plus a sync disk
+    // persist — run the lot on the blocking pool.
+    let admin = state.admin.clone();
+    let result = tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || {
+        admin.update_credentials(
             &body.current_password,
             body.new_username.as_deref(),
             body.new_password.as_deref(),
-    );
+        )
+    })
+    .await
+    .unwrap_or_else(|e| Err(openpxe_core::Error::Other(e.into())));
     match result {
         Ok(pub_) => {
             state.sessions.revoke_all();

crates/http-api/src/ipxe_script.rs

@@ -61,16 +61,24 @@ pub fn render_menu(isos: &[IsoMeta], settings: &Settings, base_url: &str) -> Str
     // returns a full-screen 1024×768 PNG now — the operator's logo on a
     // dark field, or a default OpenPXE mark when none is uploaded. The
     // `--top 290` reserves the top band (where the logo paints) so the
-    // menu text lands below it. On an iPXE build *with* `IMAGE_PNG` +
-    // `CONSOLE_FRAMEBUFFER` (our x86_64 UEFI binaries, built from source
-    // — see deploy/docker/Dockerfile) this paints the background and
-    // overlays the menu. On a build *without* PNG support (the fetched
-    // BIOS/i386/arm64 binaries) the whole `console --picture …` command
-    // fails and the `|| console` resets to a clean full-screen text
-    // menu. Either way there's no ASCII placeholder anymore.
+    // menu text lands below it.
+    //
+    // v0.5.7: gate the whole command behind `iseq ${platform} efi`.
+    // `console --picture` needs IMAGE_PNG + CONSOLE_FRAMEBUFFER, which
+    // only our from-source UEFI binaries carry (x86_64/arm64 UEFI — see
+    // deploy/docker/Dockerfile). The fetched BIOS `undionly.kpxe` has
+    // neither, and on legacy BIOS the `--picture` attempt misbehaves
+    // *before* the trailing `|| console` fallback can recover (it tries
+    // to set a framebuffer mode the BIOS console can't honour). Guarding
+    // on platform means BIOS clients never issue the command at all —
+    // they drop straight to the plain text menu — while UEFI clients
+    // still get the graphical background. A PNG-less UEFI build (e.g. the
+    // upstream i386-efi baseline) still falls back gracefully through the
+    // same `|| console`. No operator toggle needed; mixed BIOS+UEFI
+    // fleets each get the right treatment automatically.
     let _ = writeln!(
         s,
-        "console --picture {base}/branding/pxe-logo --top 290 || console"
+        "iseq ${{platform}} efi && console --picture {base}/branding/pxe-logo --top 290 || console"
     );
     // Map iPXE's ${{buildarch}} + ${{platform}} into the human form the
     // user asked for (e.g. "x86 BIOS", "x86_64 UEFI", "arm64 UEFI").
@@ -101,12 +109,13 @@ pub fn render_menu(isos: &[IsoMeta], settings: &Settings, base_url: &str) -> Str
     } else {
         let _ = writeln!(s, "item --gap -- (no Linux ISOs uploaded)");
     }
-    if settings.windows_enabled && has_family(isos, is_windows_family) {
+    // v0.5.8: Windows just works — no Settings toggle. Show the Windows
+    // installers submenu whenever a Windows ISO is present; entries boot
+    // via HTTP sanboot of the raw ISO, so no SMB/extraction is required.
+    if has_family(isos, is_windows_family) {
         let _ = writeln!(s, "item windows          Windows Installers  >");
-    } else if settings.windows_enabled {
-        let _ = writeln!(s, "item --gap -- (no Windows ISOs uploaded)");
     } else {
-        let _ = writeln!(s, "item --gap -- (Windows support disabled in Settings)");
+        let _ = writeln!(s, "item --gap -- (no Windows ISOs uploaded)");
     }
     let _ = writeln!(
         s,

crates/http-api/src/notify.rs

@@ -105,7 +105,11 @@ async fn send_email(cfg: &NotifyConfig, subject: &str, body: &str) -> Result<(),
             .trim()
             .parse()
             .map_err(|e| format!("invalid To address '{}': {e}", cfg.smtp_to))?)
-        .subject(if subject.is_empty() { "OpenPXE" } else { subject })
+        .subject(if subject.is_empty() {
+            "OpenPXE"
+        } else {
+            subject
+        })
         .body(body.to_string())
         .map_err(|e| format!("could not build email: {e}"))?;
 

crates/http-api/src/snapshots/openpxe_http_api__ipxe_script__password_tests__render_menu_snapshot.snap

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ expression: rendered
 set base-url http://10.0.0.5
 set esc:hex 1b
 set cls ${esc:string}[2J
-console --picture http://10.0.0.5/branding/pxe-logo --top 290 || console
+iseq ${platform} efi && console --picture http://10.0.0.5/branding/pxe-logo --top 290 || console
 set arch-label ${buildarch} ${platform}
 iseq ${buildarch} i386   && iseq ${platform} pcbios && set arch-label x86 BIOS         || iseq ${buildarch} x86_64 && iseq ${platform} efi    && set arch-label x86_64 UEFI      || iseq ${buildarch} arm64  && iseq ${platform} efi    && set arch-label arm64 UEFI       || true
 :menu
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ item --gap -- ------------------------- Default -------------------------
 item local            Boot from Local HDD
 item --gap -- ----------------------- Installers -----------------------
 item --gap -- (no Linux ISOs uploaded)
-item --gap -- (Windows support disabled in Settings)
+item --gap -- (no Windows ISOs uploaded)
 item --gap -- -------------------------- Tools --------------------------
 item tools            Tools  >
 item --gap -- ---------------------- Queued Deployment ---------------------

crates/http-api/src/state.rs

@@ -11,6 +11,10 @@ use openpxe_iso_store::{
 use std::sync::Arc;
 use time::OffsetDateTime;
 
+/// Cached composited PXE boot-menu background: `(logo_rev, encoded PNG)`.
+/// See `AppState::pxe_bg_cache`.
+pub type PxeBgCache = Arc<parking_lot::Mutex<Option<(u64, bytes::Bytes)>>>;
+
 #[derive(Clone)]
 pub struct AppState {
     pub iso_store: IsoStore,
@@ -29,6 +33,12 @@ pub struct AppState {
     /// operator hasn't uploaded anything, the WebUI serves the bundled
     /// rainbow-horizon mark.
     pub branding: BrandingStore,
+    /// v0.6.2: cache of the composited PXE boot-menu background PNG,
+    /// keyed on the branding logo revision. Composing costs ~50-200 ms
+    /// of image decode/encode and **every** booting client fetches it
+    /// for `console --picture` — caching makes that one compose per
+    /// logo change instead of one per boot.
+    pub pxe_bg_cache: PxeBgCache,
     /// Forms-auth admin record + first-run bootstrap state. When
     /// `admin.is_configured() == false`, the auth middleware passes
     /// every request through and `/api/me` reports `setup_required`.

crates/http-api/tests/full_flow.rs

@@ -116,6 +116,7 @@ async fn build_state() -> (AppState, tempfile::TempDir) {
         hosts,
         boot_log,
         branding,
+        pxe_bg_cache: openpxe_http_api::state::PxeBgCache::default(),
         admin,
         sessions,
         sso,
@@ -693,7 +694,7 @@ async fn log_recent_returns_buffered_lines() {
 }
 
 #[tokio::test]
-async fn windows_iso_renders_clean_wimboot_script_with_no_trust_store_writes() {
+async fn windows_iso_renders_clean_sanboot_script_with_no_trust_store_writes() {
     // Synthesize an ISO with a Windows volume label + the sources/boot.wim
     // sentinel so introspection labels it WindowsPe with has_boot_wim.
     let mut buf = vec![0u8; 32 * 2048];
@@ -763,38 +764,35 @@ async fn windows_iso_renders_clean_wimboot_script_with_no_trust_store_writes() {
         "introspection should detect sources/boot.wim sentinel"
     );
 
-    // The boot entry should be a wimboot kind with the canonical 5-file
-    // chain documented in the LinusTechTips iPXE-Windows guide.
+    // v0.5.8: Windows boots via iPXE HTTP sanboot of the raw ISO — no SMB,
+    // no extraction, no in-ISO file serving, no operator toggle. The boot
+    // entry is a `san_boot_iso` kind pointing at the raw image.
     let entry = &meta["boot_entries"][0];
-    assert_eq!(entry["kind"]["kind"], "wimboot");
-    let files = entry["kind"]["files"].as_array().unwrap();
-    let names: Vec<&str> = files.iter().map(|f| f[0].as_str().unwrap()).collect();
-    assert!(names.contains(&"bootmgr"));
-    assert!(names.contains(&"bootmgr.efi"));
-    assert!(names.contains(&"bcd"));
-    assert!(names.contains(&"boot.sdi"));
-    assert!(names.contains(&"boot.wim"));
+    assert_eq!(entry["kind"]["kind"], "san_boot_iso");
+    let iso_url = entry["kind"]["iso_url"].as_str().unwrap();
+    assert!(
+        std::path::Path::new(iso_url)
+            .extension()
+            .is_some_and(|e| e.eq_ignore_ascii_case("iso")),
+        "sanboot should target the raw ISO, got: {iso_url}"
+    );
 
     // Render the entry script and verify:
-    //   1. It uses wimboot
-    //   2. All 5 files are referenced via `initrd --name`
-    //   3. NO trust-store / driver / testsigning operations slip in
+    //   1. It uses `sanboot` against the raw ISO over HTTP
+    //   2. NO trust-store / driver / testsigning operations slip in
     let entry_id = entry["id"].as_str().unwrap();
     let url = format!("/boot/{entry_id}.ipxe");
     let (s, body) = get(&app, &url).await;
     assert_eq!(s, StatusCode::OK);
     let script = String::from_utf8(body).unwrap();
-    assert!(script.contains("kernel "), "missing kernel line:\n{script}");
     assert!(
-        script.contains("ipxe/wimboot"),
-        "missing wimboot loader:\n{script}"
+        script.contains("sanboot"),
+        "missing sanboot line:\n{script}"
     );
-    for tag in ["bootmgr", "bootmgr.efi", "bcd", "boot.sdi", "boot.wim"] {
     assert!(
-            script.contains(&format!("initrd --name {tag}")),
-            "missing `initrd --name {tag}` line:\n{script}"
+        script.contains(&format!("/{iso_url}")),
+        "sanboot should reference the raw ISO url:\n{script}"
     );
-    }
     // Hard guarantees we never want to see in any client-facing script.
     let lower = script.to_lowercase();
     for forbidden in [
@@ -1491,9 +1489,10 @@ async fn api_docs_lists_known_endpoints() {
     }
     for needle in [
         "/api/isos",
-        "/api/isos/:id/category",
+        // v0.6.3: docs use axum 0.8's `{param}` capture syntax.
+        "/api/isos/{id}/category",
         "/api/storage/disk",
-        "/api/branding/logo/:slot",
+        "/api/branding/logo/{slot}",
         "/api/unattended",
         "/api/boot-log",
         "/metrics",

crates/ipxe-assets/src/lib.rs

@@ -6,43 +6,40 @@
 //! missing, that architecture simply won't have PXE support — we log at
 //! startup and serve what we have.
 //!
-//! Filename convention (matches `ClientArch::ipxe_bootfile`):
+//! Filename convention (matches `ClientArch::ipxe_bootfile_mode`):
+//!
+//! DriverMode::Firmware (default — reuse the firmware UNDI/SNP NIC stack):
 //!   - `undionly.kpxe`       — Legacy x86 BIOS
 //!   - `snponly-i386.efi`    — IA32 UEFI
 //!   - `snponly.efi`         — x86_64 UEFI
-//!   - `snponly-arm32.efi`   — ARM32 UEFI
 //!   - `snponly-arm64.efi`   — ARM64 UEFI
-//!   - `ipxe.efi` (fallback) — UEFI with bundled drivers, if snponly fails on a NIC
+//!
+//! DriverMode::Builtin (v0.6.1 automatic fallback — iPXE's own NIC drivers,
+//! advertised when a firmware-net boot fails to chainload):
+//!   - `ipxe.pxe`            — Legacy x86 BIOS
+//!   - `ipxe-i386.efi`       — IA32 UEFI
+//!   - `ipxe.efi`            — x86_64 UEFI (built from source with PNG)
+//!   - `ipxe-arm64.efi`      — ARM64 UEFI
+//!
 //!   - `wimboot`             — Windows boot shim (fetched separately for WIM chains)
 #![forbid(unsafe_code)]
 
-use openpxe_core::ClientArch;
+use openpxe_core::{ClientArch, DriverMode};
 use rust_embed::Embed;
 
 #[derive(Embed)]
 #[folder = "../../assets/ipxe/"]
 #[include = "*.kpxe"]
 #[include = "*.efi"]
+#[include = "*.pxe"]
 #[include = "wimboot"]
 pub struct IpxeAssets;
 
-/// Return the embedded iPXE binary for `arch`, or `None` if we didn't bundle
-/// one for that architecture.
-#[must_use]
-pub fn bootfile_bytes(arch: ClientArch) -> Option<Vec<u8>> {
-    let name = arch.ipxe_bootfile()?;
-    IpxeAssets::get(name).map(|f| f.data.into_owned())
-}
-
-/// Return a named asset directly (e.g. `wimboot`, or a fallback `ipxe.efi`).
-#[must_use]
-pub fn asset_bytes(name: &str) -> Option<Vec<u8>> {
-    IpxeAssets::get(name).map(|f| f.data.into_owned())
-}
-
-/// Same as [`asset_bytes`] but returns the embedded slice directly,
-/// avoiding the heap copy when the caller only needs to read the
-/// payload. Falls back to None for unknown names.
+/// Return a named embedded asset (e.g. `snponly.efi`, `wimboot`) as a
+/// `Cow` over the embedded bytes. In release builds the data is borrowed
+/// straight from the binary's rodata — **zero copy** — which matters
+/// because the TFTP and HTTP serving paths hit this for every boot
+/// (`ipxe.efi` is ~1 MiB). Debug builds read from disk and return Owned.
 #[must_use]
 pub fn asset_slice(name: &str) -> Option<std::borrow::Cow<'static, [u8]>> {
     IpxeAssets::get(name).map(|f| f.data)
@@ -56,25 +53,42 @@ pub fn list_assets() -> Vec<String> {
         .collect()
 }
 
-/// Log at startup which iPXE binaries are present and which are missing.
+/// Log at startup which iPXE binaries are present and which are missing, for
+/// both driver modes. The Firmware-mode binaries are required for PXE on each
+/// arch; the Builtin-mode binaries are the optional automatic NIC-driver
+/// fallback (v0.6.1) — without one, escalation simply can't help that arch.
 pub fn log_availability() {
     let have: std::collections::HashSet<String> = list_assets().into_iter().collect();
-    let needed = [
-        (ClientArch::LegacyX86, "undionly.kpxe"),
-        (ClientArch::Ia32Uefi, "snponly-i386.efi"),
-        (ClientArch::X64Uefi, "snponly.efi"),
-        // ARM32 UEFI deferred — no upstream snponly binary published.
-        (ClientArch::Arm64Uefi, "snponly-arm64.efi"),
+    let arches = [
+        ClientArch::LegacyX86,
+        ClientArch::Ia32Uefi,
+        ClientArch::X64Uefi,
+        // ARM32 UEFI deferred — no upstream binary published in either mode.
+        ClientArch::Arm64Uefi,
     ];
-    for (arch, name) in needed {
+    for arch in arches {
+        for mode in [DriverMode::Firmware, DriverMode::Builtin] {
+            let Some(name) = arch.ipxe_bootfile_mode(mode) else {
+                continue;
+            };
             if have.contains(name) {
-            tracing::info!(target: "openpxe::ipxe", "bundled iPXE for {}: {}", arch.as_str(), name);
-        } else {
+                tracing::info!(
+                    target: "openpxe::ipxe",
+                    "bundled iPXE for {} [{mode:?}]: {name}", arch.as_str()
+                );
+            } else if mode == DriverMode::Firmware {
                 tracing::warn!(
                     target: "openpxe::ipxe",
-                "MISSING iPXE binary for {}: {} — clients of this arch will not PXE boot",
-                arch.as_str(), name
+                    "MISSING iPXE binary for {} [{mode:?}]: {name} — clients of this arch will not PXE boot",
+                    arch.as_str()
+                );
+            } else {
+                tracing::info!(
+                    target: "openpxe::ipxe",
+                    "no built-in-driver fallback for {} [{mode:?}]: {name} — auto NIC driver escalation unavailable for this arch",
+                    arch.as_str()
                 );
             }
         }
+    }
 }

crates/iso-store/src/entry.rs

@@ -25,9 +25,11 @@ pub enum BootKind {
         wimboot_url: String,
         files: Vec<(String, String)>,
     },
-    /// Last-resort: SAN-boot the ISO as an emulated CD. Only works for small
-    /// ISOs (<~1 GiB) and older distros. Kept for completeness, not the
-    /// default.
+    /// SAN-boot the raw ISO as an emulated CD (iPXE `sanboot`). The emulated
+    /// CD is backed by on-demand HTTP range reads, so ISO size is *not* a
+    /// constraint — this is the primary path for Windows (v0.5.8) and for any
+    /// El Torito-bootable image we don't special-case: ESXi/VMvisor
+    /// installers, BSDs, firmware/diagnostic tools, custom spins (v0.6.0).
     SanBootIso { iso_url: String },
 }
 

crates/iso-store/src/introspect.rs

@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
 use std::io::{Read, Seek, SeekFrom};
 use std::path::Path;
 
-#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize, Default)]
 #[serde(rename_all = "snake_case")]
 pub enum DistroFamily {
     DebianUbuntu,
@@ -22,10 +22,22 @@ pub enum DistroFamily {
     Arch,
     Alpine,
     WindowsPe,
+    #[default]
     Unknown,
 }
 
-#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+/// Bumped whenever the introspection logic changes in a way that should
+/// re-classify already-uploaded ISOs. On startup the store re-runs
+/// `introspect` on any *local* ISO whose persisted report predates this
+/// revision (see `IsoStore::load_from_disk`), so an upgrade fixes stale
+/// metadata — e.g. a Windows 11 ISO tagged `Unknown` by an older binary —
+/// without the operator having to delete and re-upload it.
+///
+/// rev 1 (v0.5.9): added El Torito boot-catalog detection + broadened
+/// Windows (UDF/UTF-16) detection becomes retroactive.
+pub const INTROSPECT_REV: u32 = 1;
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, Serialize, Deserialize)]
 pub struct IntrospectionReport {
     pub family: DistroFamily,
     pub volume_label: Option<String>,
@@ -35,17 +47,28 @@ pub struct IntrospectionReport {
     pub initrd_paths: Vec<String>,
     /// True if `sources/boot.wim` present — Windows install media.
     pub has_boot_wim: bool,
+    /// True if the ISO carries an El Torito boot catalog — i.e. it is
+    /// bootable by BIOS/UEFI firmware and therefore by iPXE `sanboot`
+    /// (emulated CD). This is the authoritative "can this boot at all?"
+    /// signal for ISOs we can't classify as Linux or Windows (BSDs, ESXi,
+    /// firmware tools, custom spins). A *data* ISO (e.g. a VMware vCenter
+    /// appliance bundle) has no boot catalog and reports `false`. v0.5.9.
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub el_torito: bool,
+    /// Revision of the introspection logic that produced this report. Old
+    /// `meta.json` files without the field deserialize as 0, which is
+    /// below [`INTROSPECT_REV`], triggering a one-time re-introspect on
+    /// the next startup. v0.5.9.
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub introspect_rev: u32,
 }
 
 /// Probe an ISO file on disk. Never fails — on unrecoverable IO error we log
 /// and return an `Unknown` family so the uploader still sees a record.
 pub fn introspect(path: &Path) -> IntrospectionReport {
     let mut report = IntrospectionReport {
-        family: DistroFamily::Unknown,
-        volume_label: None,
-        kernel_path: None,
-        initrd_paths: Vec::new(),
-        has_boot_wim: false,
+        introspect_rev: INTROSPECT_REV,
+        ..Default::default()
     };
 
     let Ok(mut f) = std::fs::File::open(path) else {
@@ -68,6 +91,11 @@ pub fn introspect(path: &Path) -> IntrospectionReport {
         }
     }
 
+    // Does the ISO have an El Torito boot catalog? This is what decides
+    // whether an ISO we *can't* otherwise classify is bootable at all —
+    // a bootable ISO sanboots; a data/appliance ISO (no catalog) can't.
+    report.el_torito = detect_el_torito(&mut f);
+
     // Cheap content scan: read the first ~64 MiB, look for signature filenames.
     // This is enough to identify `sources/boot.wim` (Windows) and common
     // kernel/initrd paths for the major Linux distros.
@@ -75,7 +103,13 @@ pub fn introspect(path: &Path) -> IntrospectionReport {
     let scan_bytes = 64 * 1024 * 1024;
     let mut buf = vec![0u8; 1024 * 1024];
     let mut read_total = 0usize;
-    let mut haystack = Vec::with_capacity(scan_bytes.min(32 * 1024 * 1024));
+    // Size the haystack to what will actually be read — the scan cap or
+    // the file itself, whichever is smaller — so the fill never reallocs
+    // and a small ISO doesn't reserve the full 64 MiB.
+    let file_len = f.metadata().map_or(usize::MAX, |m| {
+        usize::try_from(m.len()).unwrap_or(usize::MAX)
+    });
+    let mut haystack = Vec::with_capacity(scan_bytes.min(file_len));
     while read_total < scan_bytes {
         let n = f.read(&mut buf).unwrap_or(0);
         if n == 0 {
@@ -85,12 +119,37 @@ pub fn introspect(path: &Path) -> IntrospectionReport {
         read_total += n;
     }
 
+    // `sources/boot.wim` is the definitive Windows-install-media marker
+    // when the ISO exposes ASCII (ISO9660/Joliet) names. `contains_ascii`
+    // is case-insensitive, so one form covers BOOT.WIM / boot.wim and the
+    // backslash variant.
     if contains_ascii(&haystack, b"sources/boot.wim")
-        || contains_ascii(&haystack, b"SOURCES/BOOT.WIM")
-        || contains_ascii(&haystack, b"SOURCES\\BOOT.WIM")
+        || contains_ascii(&haystack, b"sources\\boot.wim")
     {
         report.has_boot_wim = true;
+        report.family = DistroFamily::WindowsPe;
+    }
+
+    // v0.5.8: broaden Windows detection. Modern Windows 10/11 ISOs are
+    // UDF — filenames are stored as UTF-16 (so the ASCII scan above misses
+    // them) and the volume label is a cryptic Microsoft string (so
+    // `family_from_label` misses it too). Booting is via HTTP sanboot of
+    // the raw ISO (no boot.wim extraction), so we only need the *family*.
+    // Catch the common cases: well-known Windows markers in either ASCII
+    // or UTF-16LE within the first 16 MiB, plus a filename hint.
     if report.family == DistroFamily::Unknown {
+        let head = &haystack[..haystack.len().min(16 * 1024 * 1024)];
+        let ascii_markers: [&[u8]; 4] = [
+            b"bootmgr",
+            b"sources/install.wim",
+            b"sources/install.esd",
+            b"efi/microsoft",
+        ];
+        let utf16_markers = ["bootmgr", "boot.wim", "install.wim", "microsoft"];
+        let looks_windows = ascii_markers.iter().any(|m| contains_ascii(head, m))
+            || utf16_markers.iter().any(|m| contains_utf16le_ci(head, m))
+            || filename_looks_windows(path);
+        if looks_windows {
             report.family = DistroFamily::WindowsPe;
         }
     }
@@ -158,6 +217,83 @@ fn contains_ascii(haystack: &[u8], needle: &[u8]) -> bool {
         .any(|w| w.eq_ignore_ascii_case(needle))
 }
 
+/// Case-insensitive search for an ASCII string encoded as UTF-16LE — the
+/// way UDF (and thus modern Windows ISOs) store filenames. Each character
+/// is two bytes: the ASCII low byte (compared case-insensitively) followed
+/// by a 0 high byte. v0.5.8.
+fn contains_utf16le_ci(haystack: &[u8], ascii: &str) -> bool {
+    let n = ascii.len();
+    if n == 0 || haystack.len() < n * 2 {
+        return false;
+    }
+    let lower: Vec<u8> = ascii.bytes().map(|b| b.to_ascii_lowercase()).collect();
+    haystack.windows(n * 2).any(|w| {
+        lower
+            .iter()
+            .enumerate()
+            .all(|(i, &c)| w[i * 2 + 1] == 0 && w[i * 2].to_ascii_lowercase() == c)
+    })
+}
+
+/// Filename heuristic: a stock Windows ISO almost always carries an obvious
+/// token in its name (e.g. `..._windows_11_...`, `Win10`, `winserver`).
+/// Used only as a last-resort family hint when the content scan and volume
+/// label are inconclusive. v0.5.8.
+fn filename_looks_windows(path: &Path) -> bool {
+    let name = path
+        .file_name()
+        .and_then(|s| s.to_str())
+        .unwrap_or("")
+        .to_ascii_lowercase();
+    const TOKENS: [&str; 6] = [
+        "windows",
+        "winpe",
+        "win10",
+        "win11",
+        "winserver",
+        "win-server",
+    ];
+    TOKENS.iter().any(|t| name.contains(t))
+}
+
+/// The boot-system identifier string in an El Torito Boot Record Volume
+/// Descriptor (offset 7, NUL-padded to 32 bytes).
+const EL_TORITO_ID: &[u8] = b"EL TORITO SPECIFICATION";
+
+/// Detect an El Torito boot catalog — the marker that an ISO is bootable
+/// by BIOS/UEFI firmware (and thus by iPXE `sanboot`).
+///
+/// The ISO9660 Volume Descriptor Set starts at LBA 16 (offset 0x8000) and
+/// runs one 2048-byte descriptor per sector until a Set Terminator
+/// (type 0xFF). A Boot Record descriptor (type 0x00) whose 32-byte boot
+/// system identifier reads "EL TORITO SPECIFICATION" means the image
+/// declares an El Torito boot catalog. We only confirm its presence — we
+/// don't parse the catalog (sanboot/the firmware does that). The walk is
+/// capped so a malformed/huge image can't spin us. v0.5.9.
+fn detect_el_torito(f: &mut std::fs::File) -> bool {
+    let mut vd = [0u8; 2048];
+    for lba in 16u64..32 {
+        if f.seek(SeekFrom::Start(lba * 2048)).is_err() || f.read_exact(&mut vd).is_err() {
+            return false;
+        }
+        // Every descriptor in the set carries the "CD001" magic; once it's
+        // missing we've walked off the end of a valid set.
+        if &vd[1..6] != b"CD001" {
+            return false;
+        }
+        match vd[0] {
+            // Boot Record descriptor carrying the El Torito signature.
+            0x00 if vd[7..7 + EL_TORITO_ID.len()] == *EL_TORITO_ID => return true,
+            // Volume Descriptor Set Terminator — nothing bootable found.
+            0xFF => return false,
+            // Any other descriptor (incl. a non-El-Torito boot record) —
+            // keep walking the set.
+            _ => {}
+        }
+    }
+    false
+}
+
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests {
     use super::*;
@@ -179,4 +315,72 @@ mod tests {
         assert_eq!(family_from_label("ARCH_202604"), DistroFamily::Arch);
         assert_eq!(family_from_label("weird-custom"), DistroFamily::Unknown);
     }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn utf16le_marker_matches_case_insensitively() {
+        // "boot.wim" encoded UTF-16LE, mixed case — UDF stores Windows
+        // filenames this way, which the ASCII scan can't see.
+        let s = "BOOT.WIM";
+        let utf16: Vec<u8> = s.bytes().flat_map(|b| [b, 0]).collect();
+        let mut hay = vec![0u8; 8];
+        hay.extend_from_slice(&utf16);
+        hay.extend_from_slice(&[1, 2, 3]);
+        assert!(contains_utf16le_ci(&hay, "boot.wim"));
+        assert!(contains_utf16le_ci(&hay, "Boot.Wim"));
+        assert!(!contains_utf16le_ci(&hay, "install.wim"));
+        // An ASCII (not UTF-16) occurrence must NOT match the UTF-16 scan.
+        assert!(!contains_utf16le_ci(b"boot.wim plain ascii", "boot.wim"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn el_torito_boot_catalog_detected() {
+        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+        // Helper: stamp a 2048-byte descriptor at `lba` with type + magic.
+        let stamp = |img: &mut [u8], lba: usize, ty: u8| {
+            let off = lba * 2048;
+            img[off] = ty;
+            img[off + 1..off + 6].copy_from_slice(b"CD001");
+        };
+
+        // Bootable image: PVD @16, El Torito Boot Record @17, terminator @18.
+        let mut boot = vec![0u8; 2048 * 19];
+        stamp(&mut boot, 16, 0x01);
+        stamp(&mut boot, 17, 0x00);
+        boot[17 * 2048 + 7..17 * 2048 + 7 + EL_TORITO_ID.len()].copy_from_slice(EL_TORITO_ID);
+        stamp(&mut boot, 18, 0xFF);
+        let bp = dir.path().join("boot.iso");
+        std::fs::write(&bp, &boot).unwrap();
+        let mut f = std::fs::File::open(&bp).unwrap();
+        assert!(
+            detect_el_torito(&mut f),
+            "El Torito boot record should match"
+        );
+
+        // Data/appliance image: PVD @16, terminator @17, no boot record.
+        let mut data = vec![0u8; 2048 * 18];
+        stamp(&mut data, 16, 0x01);
+        stamp(&mut data, 17, 0xFF);
+        let dp = dir.path().join("data.iso");
+        std::fs::write(&dp, &data).unwrap();
+        let mut f2 = std::fs::File::open(&dp).unwrap();
+        assert!(!detect_el_torito(&mut f2), "data ISO has no boot catalog");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn filename_hint_catches_windows_isos() {
+        use std::path::Path;
+        assert!(filename_looks_windows(Path::new(
+            "en-us_windows_11_iot_enterprise_ltsc_2024_x64_dvd.iso"
+        )));
+        assert!(filename_looks_windows(Path::new(
+            "Win10_22H2_English_x64.iso"
+        )));
+        assert!(filename_looks_windows(Path::new("winserver2022.iso")));
+        assert!(!filename_looks_windows(Path::new(
+            "ubuntu-24.04-desktop.iso"
+        )));
+        assert!(!filename_looks_windows(Path::new(
+            "Rocky-9.4-x86_64-dvd.iso"
+        )));
+    }
 }

crates/iso-store/src/nfs_share.rs

@@ -57,14 +57,14 @@
 //! UI to ask for. (If a future server needs Kerberos or non-default
 //! uid mapping we can add those, but for ISO read access nobody does.)
 
-use crate::introspect::{DistroFamily, IntrospectionReport};
+use crate::introspect::IntrospectionReport;
 use crate::store::{generate_boot_entries_for, slugify_str, IsoSource, IsoStore};
 use bytes::Bytes;
 use nfs3_client::tokio::TokioConnector;
 use nfs3_client::Nfs3ConnectionBuilder;
 use nfs3_types::nfs3::{
-    self as nfs3, diropargs3, entry3, filename3, nfs_fh3, GETATTR3args, LOOKUP3args,
-    Nfs3Result, READ3args, READDIR3args,
+    self as nfs3, diropargs3, entry3, filename3, nfs_fh3, GETATTR3args, LOOKUP3args, Nfs3Result,
+    READ3args, READDIR3args,
 };
 use nfs3_types::rpc::{auth_unix, opaque_auth};
 use nfs3_types::xdr_codec::Opaque;
@@ -220,10 +220,7 @@ impl NfsShareManager {
     /// Register an NFS share. Validates, probes connectivity by
     /// performing a real MOUNT3 + READDIR3, and registers the
     /// resulting ISOs with the store.
-    pub async fn add(
-        &self,
-        req: NfsAddRequest,
-    ) -> std::result::Result<NfsShare, NfsShareError> {
+    pub async fn add(&self, req: NfsAddRequest) -> std::result::Result<NfsShare, NfsShareError> {
         let server = normalize_server(&req.server);
         let export = req.export.trim().to_string();
         if server.is_empty() {
@@ -258,7 +255,9 @@ impl NfsShareManager {
         if let Err(e) = self.rescan_inner(&id).await {
             let m = self.get(&id);
             return Err(NfsShareError {
-                error: m.as_ref().and_then(|m| m.last_error.clone())
+                error: m
+                    .as_ref()
+                    .and_then(|m| m.last_error.clone())
                     .unwrap_or_else(|| e.to_string()),
                 stderr: String::new(),
                 hint: m.and_then(|m| m.last_hint),
@@ -333,8 +332,7 @@ impl NfsShareManager {
             return Err(Error::Invalid(format!("invalid filename '{filename}'")));
         }
 
-        let (tx, rx) =
-            tokio::sync::mpsc::channel::<std::io::Result<Bytes>>(STREAM_BUFFER_DEPTH);
+        let (tx, rx) = tokio::sync::mpsc::channel::<std::io::Result<Bytes>>(STREAM_BUFFER_DEPTH);
         let server = share.server.clone();
         let export = share.export.clone();
         let port = share.port;
@@ -358,16 +356,11 @@ impl NfsShareManager {
             if let Err(e) = result {
                 // Best-effort signal of the error to the consumer.
                 // If the receiver has already dropped we just exit.
-                let _ = tx
-                    .send(Err(std::io::Error::other(e.to_string())))
-                    .await;
+                let _ = tx.send(Err(std::io::Error::other(e.to_string()))).await;
             }
         });
 
-        Ok(NfsStream {
-            rx,
-            _task: task,
-        })
+        Ok(NfsStream { rx, _task: task })
     }
 
     // ── internals ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -399,13 +392,7 @@ impl NfsShareManager {
             // Same approach as SMB: no real introspection over the
             // network in v0.4.67. The boot-entry generator falls back
             // to filename-based sanboot detection.
-            let report = IntrospectionReport {
-                family: DistroFamily::Unknown,
-                volume_label: None,
-                kernel_path: None,
-                initrd_paths: Vec::new(),
-                has_boot_wim: false,
-            };
+            let report = IntrospectionReport::default();
             let boot_entries = generate_boot_entries_for(&iso_id, &entry.filename, &report);
             let source = IsoSource::Nfs {
                 share_id: share.id.clone(),
@@ -988,8 +975,14 @@ mod tests {
         // the allow-list and the secure/insecure angle.
         let h = hint_for("connect failed: MNT3ERR_ACCES").unwrap();
         let lc = h.to_lowercase();
-        assert!(lc.contains("insecure") || lc.contains("privileged"), "got: {h}");
-        assert!(lc.contains("allow") || lc.contains("permission"), "got: {h}");
+        assert!(
+            lc.contains("insecure") || lc.contains("privileged"),
+            "got: {h}"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            lc.contains("allow") || lc.contains("permission"),
+            "got: {h}"
+        );
     }
 
     #[test]

crates/iso-store/src/sftp_share.rs

@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@
 //! hint}` error shape is shared so the storage tab renders all three
 //! protocols through one code path.
 
-use crate::introspect::{DistroFamily, IntrospectionReport};
+use crate::introspect::IntrospectionReport;
 use crate::store::{generate_boot_entries_for, slugify_str, IsoSource, IsoStore};
 use bytes::Bytes;
 use openpxe_core::{Error, Result};
@@ -480,13 +480,7 @@ impl SftpShareManager {
             // register `Unknown` and let the boot-entry generator fall
             // back to filename-based detection. SFTP *could* do bounded
             // PVD reads (it has random access) — a follow-up can add it.
-            let report = IntrospectionReport {
-                family: DistroFamily::Unknown,
-                volume_label: None,
-                kernel_path: None,
-                initrd_paths: Vec::new(),
-                has_boot_wim: false,
-            };
+            let report = IntrospectionReport::default();
             let boot_entries = generate_boot_entries_for(&iso_id, &entry.filename, &report);
             let source = IsoSource::Sftp {
                 share_id: share.id.clone(),

crates/iso-store/src/smb_share.rs

@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@
 //! streaming. A follow-up release can add libsmbclient-based seek if
 //! a real workload needs it.
 
-use crate::introspect::{DistroFamily, IntrospectionReport};
+use crate::introspect::IntrospectionReport;
 use crate::store::{generate_boot_entries_for, slugify_str, IsoSource, IsoStore};
 use openpxe_core::{Error, Result};
 use parking_lot::Mutex;
@@ -231,10 +231,7 @@ impl SmbShareManager {
 
     /// Add or refresh a share. Validates the input, writes a creds
     /// file, probes connectivity, and scans for ISOs.
-    pub async fn add(
-        &self,
-        req: SmbAddRequest,
-    ) -> std::result::Result<SmbShare, SmbShareError> {
+    pub async fn add(&self, req: SmbAddRequest) -> std::result::Result<SmbShare, SmbShareError> {
         let server = normalize_server(&req.server);
         let share = req.share.trim().trim_start_matches('/').to_string();
         if server.is_empty() {
@@ -309,7 +306,9 @@ impl SmbShareManager {
         if let Err(e) = self.rescan_inner(&id).await {
             let m = self.get(&id);
             return Err(SmbShareError {
-                error: m.as_ref().and_then(|m| m.last_error.clone())
+                error: m
+                    .as_ref()
+                    .and_then(|m| m.last_error.clone())
                     .unwrap_or_else(|| e.to_string()),
                 stderr: String::new(),
                 hint: m.and_then(|m| m.last_hint),
@@ -365,11 +364,7 @@ impl SmbShareManager {
     /// throttling concurrent smbclients) would need to await without
     /// changing the call sites.
     #[allow(clippy::unused_async)]
-    pub async fn stream_iso(
-        &self,
-        share_id: &str,
-        filename: &str,
-    ) -> Result<SmbStream> {
+    pub async fn stream_iso(&self, share_id: &str, filename: &str) -> Result<SmbStream> {
         let share = self
             .get(share_id)
             .ok_or_else(|| Error::Invalid(format!("no such SMB share '{share_id}'")))?;
@@ -377,9 +372,7 @@ impl SmbShareManager {
         // share root. smbclient itself accepts only filenames at the
         // share root in our `get` form, but belt-and-suspenders.
         if filename.contains('/') || filename.contains('\\') || filename.contains("..") {
-            return Err(Error::Invalid(format!(
-                "invalid filename '{filename}'"
-            )));
+            return Err(Error::Invalid(format!("invalid filename '{filename}'")));
         }
         let creds = share
             .creds_path
@@ -470,13 +463,7 @@ impl SmbShareManager {
             // and the operator gets *something* bootable. A follow-up
             // release can do a bounded `smbclient get` of the first
             // 64 KiB for real detection.
-            let report = IntrospectionReport {
-                family: DistroFamily::Unknown,
-                volume_label: None,
-                kernel_path: None,
-                initrd_paths: Vec::new(),
-                has_boot_wim: false,
-            };
+            let report = IntrospectionReport::default();
             let boot_entries = generate_boot_entries_for(&iso_id, &entry.filename, &report);
             let source = IsoSource::Smb {
                 share_id: share.id.clone(),
@@ -543,10 +530,7 @@ impl SmbShareManager {
                 } else {
                     String::new()
                 };
-                return Err((
-                    format!("could not exec smbclient: {e}"),
-                    stderr,
-                ));
+                return Err((format!("could not exec smbclient: {e}"), stderr));
             }
         };
         if !output.status.success() {
@@ -757,10 +741,7 @@ fn parse_ls_iso(out: &str) -> Vec<SmbListEntry> {
 
 /// Pre-flight TCP probe to `server:port`. Format matches v0.4.64 NFS
 /// probe so the UI banner reads consistently.
-async fn tcp_probe(
-    server: &str,
-    port: u16,
-) -> std::result::Result<(), (String, String)> {
+async fn tcp_probe(server: &str, port: u16) -> std::result::Result<(), (String, String)> {
     use tokio::net::TcpStream;
     let addr = format!("{server}:{port}");
     match tokio::time::timeout(PROBE_TIMEOUT, TcpStream::connect(&addr)).await {
@@ -937,8 +918,8 @@ mod tests {
         // exec error in `error` plus an empty `stderr`. The
         // SmbShareError constructor's hint_for fallback checks error
         // too, so this pattern needs to translate as well.
-        let h2 = hint_for("could not exec smbclient: No such file or directory (os error 2)")
-            .unwrap();
+        let h2 =
+            hint_for("could not exec smbclient: No such file or directory (os error 2)").unwrap();
         assert!(h2.contains("smbclient"));
     }
 

crates/iso-store/src/store.rs

@@ -223,7 +223,8 @@ impl IsoStore {
                 continue;
             }
             if let Ok(text) = tokio::fs::read_to_string(&p).await {
-                if let Ok(meta) = serde_json::from_str::<IsoMeta>(&text) {
+                if let Ok(mut meta) = serde_json::from_str::<IsoMeta>(&text) {
+                    self.reintrospect_if_stale(&mut meta).await;
                     self.insert(meta);
                 }
             }
@@ -231,6 +232,46 @@ impl IsoStore {
         Ok(())
     }
 
+    /// v0.5.9: re-run introspection on a *local* ISO whose persisted report
+    /// predates the current logic. ISOs uploaded by an older binary carry a
+    /// stale family/boot profile — most visibly a Windows 11 ISO tagged
+    /// `Unknown` before the UDF/El-Torito detection landed, which then shows
+    /// as "won't boot" forever. Re-probing on startup fixes them in place,
+    /// no delete-and-re-upload. Bounded: only `Local` sources (we have the
+    /// bytes locally) below [`introspect::INTROSPECT_REV`], so it runs at
+    /// most once per ISO per upgrade. The probe reads up to ~64 MiB, so we
+    /// push it onto the blocking pool to keep the async runtime responsive.
+    async fn reintrospect_if_stale(&self, meta: &mut IsoMeta) {
+        if !matches!(meta.source, IsoSource::Local)
+            || meta.introspection.introspect_rev >= crate::introspect::INTROSPECT_REV
+        {
+            return;
+        }
+        let path = self.iso_path(&meta.id);
+        if !path.exists() {
+            return;
+        }
+        let Ok(fresh) = tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || introspect(&path)).await else {
+            tracing::warn!(target: "openpxe::iso", id = %meta.id, "re-introspect task failed");
+            return;
+        };
+        let before = meta.introspection.family;
+        meta.introspection = fresh;
+        meta.boot_entries = generate_boot_entries(&meta.id, &meta.filename, &meta.introspection);
+        if let Err(e) = self.persist_meta(meta).await {
+            tracing::warn!(target: "openpxe::iso", id = %meta.id, "re-introspect persist: {e}");
+            return;
+        }
+        tracing::info!(
+            target: "openpxe::iso",
+            id = %meta.id,
+            from = ?before,
+            to = ?meta.introspection.family,
+            el_torito = meta.introspection.el_torito,
+            "re-introspected stale ISO metadata"
+        );
+    }
+
     fn insert(&self, meta: IsoMeta) {
         self.inner.write().isos.insert(meta.id.clone(), meta);
     }
@@ -301,9 +342,18 @@ impl IsoStore {
     /// SMB sources or when the file is missing.
     pub fn iso_path_for(&self, id: &str) -> Option<PathBuf> {
         let meta = self.get(id)?;
+        self.local_path(&meta)
+    }
+
+    /// Same resolution as [`Self::iso_path_for`], but for a meta the
+    /// caller already holds — skips the second registry lock + deep
+    /// clone, which matters on the per-range-request ISO serving path
+    /// (a sanboot install issues hundreds of those).
+    #[must_use]
+    pub fn local_path(&self, meta: &IsoMeta) -> Option<PathBuf> {
         match &meta.source {
             IsoSource::Local => {
-                let path = self.iso_path(id);
+                let path = self.iso_path(&meta.id);
                 if path.exists() {
                     Some(path)
                 } else {
@@ -557,22 +607,22 @@ fn generate_boot_entries(id: &str, filename: &str, r: &IntrospectionReport) -> V
         .clone()
         .unwrap_or_else(|| filename.to_string());
     match r.family {
-        DistroFamily::WindowsPe if r.has_boot_wim => {
-            // Standard wimboot chain. Paths are in-ISO; the HTTP layer maps
-            // `iso/<id>/<path>` to on-disk extraction via ISO9660 lookup.
-            let base = format!("iso/{id}");
+        DistroFamily::WindowsPe => {
+            // v0.5.8: boot Windows directly via iPXE HTTP sanboot. iPXE
+            // exposes the raw ISO as an emulated CD backed by on-demand
+            // HTTP range reads, and Windows Setup boots from it. This
+            // replaces the old wimboot+SMB chain, which (a) needed an SMB
+            // server the host often can't provide (port 445 collisions),
+            // (b) served in-ISO files via an ISO9660 lookup that failed on
+            // UDF-only Windows 11 ISOs, and (c) required an operator
+            // toggle. sanboot needs none of that — just the HTTP port,
+            // which works in any environment. The unmodified, stock ISO is
+            // served at iso/<id>.iso; nothing is injected into Windows.
             vec![BootEntry {
-                id: format!("{id}-winpe"),
-                title: format!("{title} (Windows / wimboot)"),
-                kind: BootKind::Wimboot {
-                    wimboot_url: "ipxe/wimboot".to_string(),
-                    files: vec![
-                        ("bootmgr".into(), format!("{base}/bootmgr")),
-                        ("bootmgr.efi".into(), format!("{base}/bootmgr.efi")),
-                        ("bcd".into(), format!("{base}/boot/bcd")),
-                        ("boot.sdi".into(), format!("{base}/boot/boot.sdi")),
-                        ("boot.wim".into(), format!("{base}/sources/boot.wim")),
-                    ],
+                id: format!("{id}-windows"),
+                title: format!("{title} (Windows)"),
+                kind: BootKind::SanBootIso {
+                    iso_url: format!("iso/{id}.iso"),
                 },
             }]
         }
@@ -598,15 +648,33 @@ fn generate_boot_entries(id: &str, filename: &str, r: &IntrospectionReport) -> V
             }]
         }
         _ => {
-            // Last-resort SAN boot. Won't work for large modern ISOs, but
-            // lets the ISO at least appear in the menu.
+            // No Windows-install media and no Linux kernel/initrd. Decide
+            // whether the ISO is bootable at all (v0.6.0):
+            //   * `el_torito` — it carries a boot catalog, so iPXE sanboots
+            //     the raw image as an emulated CD: BSDs, ESXi/VMvisor
+            //     installers, firmware tools, custom spins. The emulated CD
+            //     is backed by HTTP range reads, so ISO size is a non-issue
+            //     (this is the same path Windows uses since v0.5.8) — hence
+            //     no more "may fail for >1GiB ISOs" disclaimer.
+            //   * `introspect_rev == 0` — a remote-share ISO we couldn't
+            //     introspect (SMB/NFS/SFTP listings don't seek into the ISO).
+            //     Offer sanboot optimistically rather than hide a
+            //     likely-bootable installer.
+            // Otherwise it's a local image we *did* introspect and found to
+            // carry no boot catalog — a data/appliance ISO (e.g. a VMware
+            // vCenter Server Appliance bundle). It genuinely cannot boot, so
+            // we expose no menu entry; the dashboard flags it instead.
+            if r.el_torito || r.introspect_rev == 0 {
                 vec![BootEntry {
                     id: format!("{id}-sanboot"),
-                title: format!("{title} (SAN boot — may fail for >1GiB ISOs)"),
+                    title,
                     kind: BootKind::SanBootIso {
                         iso_url: format!("iso/{id}.iso"),
                     },
                 }]
+            } else {
+                Vec::new()
+            }
         }
     }
 }
@@ -680,6 +748,49 @@ mod tests {
         assert!(!s.contains(" --- "), "stray ---: {s}");
     }
 
+    #[test]
+    fn boot_entries_respect_el_torito_and_source() {
+        use crate::introspect::INTROSPECT_REV;
+
+        // ESXi / VMvisor installer shape: bootable (carries an El Torito
+        // catalog) but not classifiable as Windows or Linux. Must yield a
+        // single sanboot entry so it's selectable + boots via emulated CD.
+        let esxi = IntrospectionReport {
+            family: DistroFamily::Unknown,
+            volume_label: Some("ESXI-7.0U3".into()),
+            el_torito: true,
+            introspect_rev: INTROSPECT_REV,
+            ..Default::default()
+        };
+        let e = generate_boot_entries("esxi", "VMware-VMvisor-Installer-7.0U3n.iso", &esxi);
+        assert_eq!(e.len(), 1, "ESXi should get exactly one boot entry");
+        assert!(matches!(e[0].kind, BootKind::SanBootIso { .. }));
+        // Clean title — no stale ">1GiB may fail" disclaimer.
+        assert!(!e[0].title.contains("may fail"), "title: {}", e[0].title);
+
+        // VCSA / data-appliance shape: locally introspected (rev set), no
+        // boot catalog, not Windows/Linux. Genuinely unbootable → no entry,
+        // so it stays out of the iPXE menu (the dashboard flags it instead).
+        let vcsa = IntrospectionReport {
+            family: DistroFamily::Unknown,
+            el_torito: false,
+            introspect_rev: INTROSPECT_REV,
+            ..Default::default()
+        };
+        assert!(
+            generate_boot_entries("vcsa", "VMware-VCSA-all-8.0.iso", &vcsa).is_empty(),
+            "data/appliance ISO must produce no boot entry"
+        );
+
+        // Remote-share ISO: never introspected (rev 0, no random access over
+        // SMB/NFS/SFTP). Assume bootable and offer sanboot rather than hide a
+        // likely-bootable installer.
+        let remote = IntrospectionReport::default();
+        let r = generate_boot_entries("remote", "unknown-remote.iso", &remote);
+        assert_eq!(r.len(), 1, "remote (uninspected) ISO keeps a sanboot entry");
+        assert!(matches!(r[0].kind, BootKind::SanBootIso { .. }));
+    }
+
     fn fake_meta(id: &str) -> IsoMeta {
         IsoMeta {
             id: id.into(),
@@ -687,13 +798,7 @@ mod tests {
             size_bytes: 0,
             sha256_hex: None,
             uploaded_at: OffsetDateTime::now_utc(),
-            introspection: IntrospectionReport {
-                family: DistroFamily::Unknown,
-                volume_label: None,
-                kernel_path: None,
-                initrd_paths: vec![],
-                has_boot_wim: false,
-            },
+            introspection: IntrospectionReport::default(),
             boot_entries: vec![],
             source: IsoSource::Local,
             password_hash: None,

crates/openpxe/src/main.rs

@@ -192,6 +192,7 @@ async fn main() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
         hosts: hosts.clone(),
         boot_log: boot_log.clone(),
         branding: branding.clone(),
+        pxe_bg_cache: openpxe_http_api::state::PxeBgCache::default(),
         admin: admin.clone(),
         sessions: sessions.clone(),
         sso: sso.clone(),

crates/tftp/src/server.rs

@@ -7,12 +7,12 @@
 //! `tftpd`/`in.tftpd` works and is why TFTP is awkward behind stateful NAT:
 //! the ephemeral ports must be reachable from the client.
 //!
-//! We only serve files from `openpxe_ipxe_assets::asset_bytes` — that is,
+//! We only serve files from `openpxe_ipxe_assets::asset_slice` — that is,
 //! the bundled iPXE binaries and wimboot. No filesystem is ever opened, so
 //! `../` path traversal attempts simply return ENOENT.
 
 use openpxe_core::{ClientEvent, ClientRegistry};
-use openpxe_ipxe_assets::asset_bytes;
+use openpxe_ipxe_assets::asset_slice;
 use socket2::{Domain, Protocol, Socket, Type};
 use std::net::{IpAddr, SocketAddr};
 use std::sync::Arc;
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ use tokio::net::UdpSocket;
 
 // TFTP opcodes.
 const OP_RRQ: u16 = 1;
+const OP_WRQ: u16 = 2;
 const OP_DATA: u16 = 3;
 const OP_ACK: u16 = 4;
 const OP_ERROR: u16 = 5;
@@ -89,16 +90,34 @@ async fn handle_rrq(
     metrics: openpxe_core::Metrics,
 ) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
     let Some(req) = parse_rrq(&packet) else {
+        // Not a well-formed RRQ. A WRQ deserves an explicit refusal —
+        // legacy clients retry a silently-dropped write until they time
+        // out; an ERROR packet fails them fast with a readable reason.
+        if packet.len() >= 2 && u16::from_be_bytes([packet[0], packet[1]]) == OP_WRQ {
+            let sock = bind_udp(bind_ip, 0)?;
+            let _ = send_error(&sock, peer, ERR_ILLEGAL_OP, "writes not supported").await;
+        }
         return Ok(());
     };
     let Request {
-        filename, options, ..
+        filename,
+        mode,
+        options,
     } = req;
 
     // Per-transfer ephemeral socket.
     let sock = bind_udp(bind_ip, 0)?;
 
-    let Some(file_bytes) = asset_bytes(&filename) else {
+    // We serve binary boot artifacts; netascii line-ending translation
+    // would corrupt them. Refuse loudly instead of timing out silently —
+    // matters for legacy clients that default to netascii.
+    if !mode.eq_ignore_ascii_case("octet") {
+        let _ = send_error(&sock, peer, ERR_NOT_DEFINED, "only octet mode is supported").await;
+        tracing::info!(target: "openpxe::tftp", peer=%peer, %mode, "rejected non-octet transfer");
+        return Ok(());
+    }
+
+    let Some(file_bytes) = asset_slice(&filename) else {
         let _ = send_error(&sock, peer, ERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND, "no such file").await;
         tracing::info!(target: "openpxe::tftp", peer=%peer, file=%filename, "404");
         clients.record(
@@ -262,7 +281,6 @@ async fn handle_rrq(
 #[derive(Debug)]
 struct Request {
     filename: String,
-    #[allow(dead_code)]
     mode: String,
     options: Vec<(String, String)>,
 }
@@ -393,17 +411,13 @@ fn bind_udp(bind: IpAddr, port: u16) -> anyhow::Result<UdpSocket> {
     Ok(UdpSocket::from_std(std_sock)?)
 }
 
-#[allow(dead_code)]
-const _UNUSED: (u16, u16) = (ERR_NOT_DEFINED, ERR_ILLEGAL_OP);
-
-/// Pure-logic helper used by the unit tests below and (in a refactor) by
-/// `handle_rrq`. Given a position in the file and the window, return the
-/// (block_no, chunk_len) list this window will emit. Useful as a sanity
-/// check that our windowing math matches the wire behavior the spec
-/// requires — tested against edge cases (exact-blksize tail, short tail,
-/// single-block window).
-#[must_use]
-pub fn plan_window(
+/// Pure-logic mirror of `handle_rrq`'s windowing math, exercised by the
+/// unit tests below. Given a position in the file and the window, return
+/// the (block_no, chunk_len) list this window will emit — tested against
+/// edge cases (exact-blksize tail, short tail, single-block window,
+/// block-number wraparound).
+#[cfg(test)]
+fn plan_window(
     total: usize,
     offset: usize,
     blksize: usize,

crates/webui/src/app.js

@@ -160,20 +160,36 @@
   // tint borrowed from Bootimus v0.1.62. Returns {ok, reason}.
   function bootability(iso, settings) {
     const fam = iso.introspection.family;
-    const isWin = fam === 'windows_pe';
-    if (isWin && !settings.windows_enabled) {
-      return { ok: false, reason: 'Windows boot disabled in Settings' };
-    }
-    if (!isWin && !iso.introspection.kernel_path && fam !== 'windows_pe') {
-      // Linux without a detected kernel falls through to sanboot which
-      // rarely works for >1 GiB ISOs.
-      if (iso.size_bytes > 1.5 * 1024 * 1024 * 1024) {
-        return { ok: false, reason: 'no kernel/initrd detected; ISO too large for sanboot fallback' };
-      }
-      return { ok: true, warn: 'no kernel detected — sanboot fallback may not work' };
-    }
+    // v0.5.8: Windows ISOs boot via iPXE HTTP sanboot of the raw image —
+    // no Settings toggle, no SMB, no size limit. Always bootable.
+    if (fam === 'windows_pe') {
       return { ok: true };
     }
+    // Linux with a detected kernel/initrd — direct kernel+initrd boot.
+    if (iso.introspection.kernel_path) {
+      return { ok: true };
+    }
+    // v0.5.9: any other ISO that carries an El Torito boot catalog is
+    // bootable via iPXE sanboot (emulated CD) — BSDs, ESXi, firmware
+    // tools, custom Linux spins. This replaces the old "> 1.5 GB ⇒
+    // unbootable" size guess with the authoritative on-disk boot signal,
+    // so a large bootable ISO is no longer mislabeled and a Windows ISO
+    // re-introspected on upgrade lights up correctly.
+    if (iso.introspection.el_torito) {
+      return { ok: true, warn: 'generic bootable ISO — boots via sanboot (emulated CD)' };
+    }
+    // Remote-share ISOs aren't introspected (no random access over the
+    // network), so el_torito is unknown — assume bootable and let sanboot
+    // try rather than cry wolf.
+    const remote = iso.source && iso.source.kind && iso.source.kind !== 'local';
+    if (remote) {
+      return { ok: true, warn: 'remote ISO — not introspected; sanboot is attempted at boot' };
+    }
+    // Local ISO with no Windows/Linux boot files and no El Torito catalog:
+    // a data/appliance image (e.g. a VMware vCenter bundle), not a bootable
+    // installer.
+    return { ok: false, reason: 'data/appliance ISO — no El Torito boot catalog and no Windows/Linux installer files, so it can’t be PXE-booted' };
+  }
 
   // v0.5.2: pretty label for an unattended file's detected kind.
   function unattendedKindLabel(k) {
@@ -288,14 +304,23 @@
         el('div', {class: 'card'}, el('div', {class: 'stat'}, [
           el('div', {class: 'label'}, 'Images available'),
           el('div', {class: 'value'}, String(isos.length)),
-          el('div', {class: 'trend'},
-            isos.filter(i => i.introspection.family === 'windows_pe').length + ' Windows · ' +
-            isos.filter(i => i.introspection.family !== 'windows_pe').length + ' Linux  ·  ' +
+          el('div', {class: 'trend'}, (() => {
+            // v0.5.9: count families honestly. Anything that isn't a known
+            // Linux family or Windows lands in "other" (data/appliance ISOs
+            // like VMware VCSA, or as-yet-unclassified images) instead of
+            // being lumped under "Linux".
+            const LINUX = ['debian_ubuntu', 'rhel_fedora', 'opensuse', 'arch', 'alpine'];
+            const win = isos.filter(i => i.introspection.family === 'windows_pe').length;
+            const lin = isos.filter(i => LINUX.includes(i.introspection.family)).length;
+            const other = isos.length - win - lin;
             // v0.4.67+v0.5.5: count all remote-share protocols. Label
             // generically since operators may use any mix of SMB/NFS/SFTP.
-            ((status.smb_share_reachable || 0) + (status.nfs_share_reachable || 0) + (status.sftp_share_reachable || 0)) +
-            ' remote share' +
-            (((status.smb_share_reachable || 0) + (status.nfs_share_reachable || 0) + (status.sftp_share_reachable || 0)) === 1 ? '' : 's')),
+            const remote = (status.smb_share_reachable || 0) + (status.nfs_share_reachable || 0) + (status.sftp_share_reachable || 0);
+            const parts = [win + ' Windows', lin + ' Linux'];
+            if (other > 0) parts.push(other + ' other');
+            parts.push(remote + ' remote share' + (remote === 1 ? '' : 's'));
+            return parts.join('  ·  ');
+          })()),
         ])),
         el('div', {class: 'card'}, el('div', {class: 'stat'}, [
           el('div', {class: 'label'}, 'Uptime'),
@@ -340,7 +365,7 @@
       const settings = status.settings;
       const problems = isos.map(i => ({i, b: bootability(i, settings)})).filter(x => !x.b.ok);
       const problemsBlock = problems.length ? el('div', {class:'card'}, [
-        el('header', {}, [el('h2', {}, 'Images that won\'t boot with current settings')]),
+        el('header', {}, [el('h2', {}, 'Non-bootable images')]),
         el('div', {class:'body'},
           problems.map(({i, b}) => el('div', {class:'row-warn'},
             '⚠ ' + i.filename + ' — ' + b.reason)))
@@ -533,6 +558,9 @@
                                 style:'display:none', id:'file'});
       const prog = el('div', {class:'progress', id:'prog'}, el('div', {class:'bar', id:'bar'}));
       const upMsg = el('div', {class:'msg', id:'upmsg'});
+      // v0.5.8: cancel button — shown only while an upload is in flight.
+      const cancelUpload = el('button', {class:'danger', type:'button',
+        style:'display:none;margin-top:12px', id:'cancel-upload'}, 'Cancel upload');
 
       drop.onclick = () => file.click();
       drop.addEventListener('dragover', e => { e.preventDefault(); drop.classList.add('hover'); });
@@ -575,6 +603,16 @@
         };
 
         let uploadId = null;
+        // v0.5.8: cancel + leave-page guard. The AbortController stops the
+        // in-flight chunk; the beforeunload listener warns the operator
+        // that navigating away aborts the upload (the server-side partial
+        // is then cleaned up by the DELETE in the catch below).
+        const ac = new AbortController();
+        let canceled = false;
+        const warnLeave = (e) => { e.preventDefault(); e.returnValue = ''; return ''; };
+        window.addEventListener('beforeunload', warnLeave);
+        cancelUpload.style.display = '';
+        cancelUpload.onclick = () => { canceled = true; ac.abort(); };
         setStatus('Preparing upload for ' + f.name + ' (' + fmtBytes(f.size) + ')');
         prog.classList.add('active');
         bar.style.width = '1%';
@@ -601,6 +639,7 @@
                 'x-openpxe-upload-complete': complete ? 'true' : 'false',
               },
               body: f.slice(offset, end),
+              signal: ac.signal,
             });
             if (!r.ok) throw new Error(await failText(r));
             const j = await r.json();
@@ -616,8 +655,15 @@
             try { await fetch('/api/uploads/' + encodeURIComponent(uploadId), {method: 'DELETE'}); }
             catch {}
           }
+          if (canceled || (err && err.name === 'AbortError')) {
+            setStatus('Upload canceled — partial file discarded.', '');
+          } else {
             setStatus('Upload failed: ' + (err && err.message ? err.message : String(err)), 'err');
+          }
         } finally {
+          window.removeEventListener('beforeunload', warnLeave);
+          cancelUpload.style.display = 'none';
+          cancelUpload.onclick = null;
           prog.classList.remove('active');
           if (!upMsg.className.includes('ok')) bar.style.width = '0';
         }
@@ -629,7 +675,11 @@
       // *next* row of the table. Keeps the markup flat and avoids the
       // overhead of a real modal.
       const rowsAndEditors = [];
-      isos.forEach(i => {
+      // v0.5.8: list Available images alphabetically by filename
+      // (case-insensitive, natural numeric order) instead of newest-first.
+      const sortedIsos = [...isos].sort((a, b) =>
+        (a.filename || '').localeCompare(b.filename || '', undefined, { sensitivity: 'base', numeric: true }));
+      sortedIsos.forEach(i => {
         const b = bootability(i, settings);
         // v0.4.65: SMB userspace consumer (smbclient).
         // v0.4.67: NFS back as in-process Rust client (nfs3_client).
@@ -1164,7 +1214,7 @@
         diskCard,
         el('div', {class:'card'}, [
           el('header', {}, el('h2', {}, 'Upload ISO')),
-          el('div', {class:'body'}, [drop, file, prog, upMsg]),
+          el('div', {class:'body'}, [drop, file, prog, upMsg, cancelUpload]),
         ]),
         // v0.5.1: SMB + NFS unified into one "Remote shares" card with a
         // protocol dropdown. Backend endpoints are unchanged; this is a
@@ -2252,7 +2302,9 @@
     // own self-contained <form>; when SSO is enabled, a distinct
     // "Sign in with …" button sits below a divider — the credential
     // fields no longer double as the SSO trigger.
-    const ssoLive = ssoConfig && ssoConfig.enabled && (ssoConfig.metadata_url || ssoConfig.metadata);
+    // `enabled` from /api/me already means "usable" (enabled AND a metadata
+    // source is configured), so the button only shows when SSO will work.
+    const ssoLive = !!(ssoConfig && ssoConfig.enabled);
     const ssoBlock = ssoLive
       ? el('div', {class:'sso-block'}, [
           el('div', {class:'auth-divider'}, el('span', {}, 'or')),
@@ -2497,10 +2549,12 @@
         ])));
       return;
     }
-    // Preload the SSO config so the login card can offer the operator
-    // an "Sign in with X" button when configured. Failure is harmless.
-    try { ssoConfig = await fetch('/api/sso').then(r => r.ok ? r.json() : null); }
-    catch { ssoConfig = null; }
+    // v0.5.9: the login card's "Sign in with …" button keys off the SSO
+    // descriptor that /api/me now carries (public, non-sensitive: enabled
+    // + idp_name + idp_logo_url). It's available signed in or out, so the
+    // button is static — it no longer relied on the auth-gated /api/sso,
+    // which 401s pre-auth and made the button vanish on fresh login loads.
+    ssoConfig = me.sso || null;
 
     if (me.setup_required) {
       showAuthScreen('setup');

scripts/build-ipxe.sh

@@ -41,15 +41,31 @@ DEST="${1:-$ROOT/assets/ipxe}"
 WORK="$(mktemp -d)"
 trap 'rm -rf "$WORK"' EXIT
 
-# Pinned upstream iPXE. Rolling master is fine functionally, but a pin
-# keeps builds reproducible and protects against a transient master
-# breakage. Bump deliberately.
+# Pinned upstream iPXE. Rolling master is fine functionally, but a pin keeps
+# builds reproducible, protects against a transient master breakage, and —
+# crucially for the Docker image — busting this value invalidates the cached
+# ipxe-build layer so an "update iPXE" release actually recompiles from the
+# new upstream. Bump deliberately to a recent master commit.
+#
+# v0.6.1: ipxe/ipxe master @ 2026-06-09 (newer NIC drivers + EFI fixes;
+# mirrors iVentoy 1.0.35 "Update iPXE").
 IPXE_REPO="https://github.com/ipxe/ipxe.git"
-IPXE_REF="${IPXE_REF:-master}"
+IPXE_REF="${IPXE_REF:-95ffbf4745553e8a207922389929e1943c0237c0}"
 
-echo ">> cloning iPXE ($IPXE_REF)"
-git clone --depth 1 --branch "$IPXE_REF" "$IPXE_REPO" "$WORK/ipxe" 2>/dev/null \
-  || git clone "$IPXE_REPO" "$WORK/ipxe"
+echo ">> fetching iPXE ($IPXE_REF)"
+# Shallow-fetch the exact ref: works for a full commit SHA (GitHub allows
+# reachable-SHA1-in-want) and for branch/tag names. Fall back to a full
+# clone + checkout if the server refuses a direct fetch of this ref.
+git init -q "$WORK/ipxe"
+git -C "$WORK/ipxe" remote add origin "$IPXE_REPO"
+if git -C "$WORK/ipxe" fetch -q --depth 1 origin "$IPXE_REF"; then
+  git -C "$WORK/ipxe" checkout -q FETCH_HEAD
+else
+  echo "   direct fetch failed; falling back to full clone + checkout"
+  rm -rf "$WORK/ipxe"
+  git clone -q "$IPXE_REPO" "$WORK/ipxe"
+  git -C "$WORK/ipxe" checkout -q "$IPXE_REF"
+fi
 SRC="$WORK/ipxe/src"
 
 echo ">> applying OpenPXE config overrides (PNG + framebuffer + console cmd)"

scripts/fetch-ipxe.sh

@@ -29,11 +29,19 @@ mkdir -p "$DEST"
 # Upstream uses arch-scoped subdirectories; we flatten to the names our
 # ClientArch::ipxe_bootfile() expects.
 declare -a MAP=(
+  # DriverMode::Firmware (default) — reuse the firmware UNDI/SNP NIC stack.
   "undionly.kpxe=undionly.kpxe"
   "snponly.efi=x86_64-efi/snponly.efi"
   "snponly-i386.efi=i386-efi/snponly.efi"
   "snponly-arm64.efi=arm64-efi/snponly.efi"
-  "ipxe.efi=x86_64-efi/ipxe.efi"          # fallback with bundled drivers
+  # DriverMode::Builtin (v0.6.1 automatic fallback) — iPXE's own all-drivers
+  # builds, advertised by the DHCP proxy to a MAC whose firmware NIC stack
+  # failed to chainload. (x86_64 ipxe.efi is rebuilt from source with PNG in
+  # build-ipxe.sh and overlaid on top of this fetched baseline.)
+  "ipxe.efi=x86_64-efi/ipxe.efi"
+  "ipxe.pxe=ipxe.pxe"
+  "ipxe-i386.efi=i386-efi/ipxe.efi"
+  "ipxe-arm64.efi=arm64-efi/ipxe.efi"
 )
 
 BASE="https://boot.ipxe.org"