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7 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Miles Ward 4e88305101 Name update 2026-05-06 14:14:09 -04:00
Miles Ward 20c585e3ed Name update 2026-05-06 14:13:38 -04:00
503432756 e1b7154b51 docs: add Linux network-boot runbook 2026-04-30 11:35:47 -04:00
Miles Ward 40064906de Name update 2026-04-30 02:30:05 -04:00
Miles Ward 49d0b00a8a v0.2.0 — pre-beta: per-MAC bindings, /metrics, themes, animated forge
This is the bulk pre-beta cleanup pass. Bumps the workspace to 0.2.0.
Test count is 56 -> 66 (+10), clippy is fully clean across the
workspace (was several dozen warnings).

## New features

**Per-MAC host bindings** (Tinkerbell smee pattern). New
`HostBindings` registry maps a MAC -> preferred boot target, persisted
to <work_dir>/hosts.json. The DHCP reply now embeds `?mac=${mac}` in
the boot.ipxe URL; iPXE substitutes the literal MAC client-side, so
the HTTP layer can short-circuit straight to the bound target instead
of rendering the menu. Reserved menu shortcuts (`_local`, `_gate`,
`_tools_menu`) are valid targets too. New /api/hosts CRUD + a Hosts
tab in the sidebar.

**Prometheus `/metrics`** endpoint. Tiny lock-free implementation —
just AtomicU64s and a Display impl, no `prometheus` / `metrics-rs`
dep. Counters: DHCP replies (per arch label), DHCP declined, TFTP
transfers (per status), TFTP bytes, HTTP requests (per route).
Gauges: ISO count, client count, gate count, gate-imaging, NFS active
mounts, uptime, build info. Plain text exposition format,
text/plain;version=0.0.4 content-type, no auth (all metric values are
non-sensitive counts).

**Light + dark themes**. CSS tokens on `:root` and
`:root[data-theme=light]`, swap by toggle button (top-right) or `T`
hotkey. Persisted in localStorage; pre-paint inline script avoids
dark<->light flash. Light palette designed against the Netbox Labs
reference screenshot — near-white surfaces, soft grey dividers,
accent unchanged for brand consistency. Terminal pane stays dark in
both themes (it's a console, that's the right read).

**Animated SVG logo + forge widget**. New `logo.svg` is a refined
silver/grey anvil. New `anvil-forge.svg` adds rising sparks and a
pulsing underglow via SMIL — pure SVG, no GIF, no JS animation loop.
Used:
  - in the **forge progress** widget on Dashboard + Forge Gate, paired
    with a `linear-gradient(warn -> accent)` bar with a moving sheen;
    goes idle (greyscale, no sheen) at zero imaging load
  - in the page-load `<div class=loader>` that replaces the old
    "Loading..." text

## Code cleanup pass

`cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets` is now warning-free. Spot
fixes across the tree:
  - `format!()`-into-`String` -> `std::fmt::Write::write!`
  - manual reverse comparators -> `Reverse`
  - `map_or(false, ...)` -> `is_some_and`
  - redundant closures -> method references
  - `r#"..."#` raw strings without `"` -> `r"..."`
  - `std::io::Error::new(Other, ...)` -> `Error::other`
  - `as i32` on `c.id()` -> `cast_signed()`
  - merged identical match arms

## Windows workflow validation

New integration test synthesizes an ISO9660 with the SOURCES\\BOOT.WIM
sentinel, uploads it, asserts:
  1. introspection labels it `windows_pe` with has_boot_wim=true,
  2. the boot entry is `BootKind::Wimboot` with all five canonical
     files (bootmgr, bootmgr.efi, bcd, boot.sdi, boot.wim),
  3. the rendered iPXE script chains wimboot with `initrd --name`
     entries for each file, and
  4. NO trust-store strings appear in the rendered output: bcdedit,
     testsigning, certutil, httpdisk, and test-signed are all
     explicitly forbidden as a hard guarantee.

WinPE bootstrap (startnet.cmd) picks up the Bootimus v0.1.58 lessons:
explicit `net start Workstation` before `net use` to avoid the SMB
client lazy-init race, and surfaces errors instead of blind retries.

## Docs

architecture.md gains a "Phase 5" section explaining the host-bindings
+ metrics + theming + Windows-test work, plus a refreshed "deferred
to Phase 6" list (real-hardware integration, autounattend library,
distro profile manifest, WoL trigger, syslog receiver, IPv6).
README updates the status line, the "what it does" list, and adds
the new Hosts/Terminal tab names.
2026-04-30 02:28:10 -04:00
Miles Ward a9c4f408a9 Name update 2026-04-30 00:02:29 -04:00
Miles Ward 3517c67831 Name update 2026-04-29 02:47:00 -04:00
69 changed files with 1455 additions and 18927 deletions
-16
View File
@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"Bash(cargo check *)",
"Bash(cargo build *)",
"Bash(cargo clippy *)",
"Bash(cargo fmt *)",
"Bash(cargo tree *)",
"Bash(cargo doc *)",
"Bash(cargo test --workspace --lib)",
"Bash(cargo test --workspace)",
"Bash(cargo --version)",
"Bash(rustc --version)"
]
}
}
+1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
/target
Cargo.lock
data/isos/*.iso
data/isos/*.partial
data/isos/*.meta.json
Generated
-4642
View File
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
+3 -31
View File
@@ -12,9 +12,9 @@ members = [
]
[workspace.package]
version = "0.5.1"
version = "0.3.0"
edition = "2021"
rust-version = "1.95"
rust-version = "1.80"
license = "MIT OR Apache-2.0"
repository = "https://gitea.milesward.dev/mward4/OpenPXE"
authors = ["OpenPXE contributors"]
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ axum = { version = "0.7", features = ["macros", "multipart", "http2"] }
tower = "0.5"
tower-http = { version = "0.6", features = ["fs", "trace", "cors", "limit"] }
hyper = "1.4"
reqwest = { version = "0.12", default-features = false, features = ["rustls-tls", "stream", "json"] }
reqwest = { version = "0.12", default-features = false, features = ["rustls-tls", "stream"] }
mime = "0.3"
mime_guess = "2.0"
@@ -53,38 +53,10 @@ uuid = { version = "1.10", features = ["v4", "serde"] }
time = { version = "0.3", features = ["serde", "serde-human-readable", "formatting", "macros"] }
sha2 = "0.10"
hex = "0.4"
bcrypt = "0.15"
once_cell = "1.19"
parking_lot = "0.12"
rust-embed = { version = "8.5", features = ["include-exclude"] }
# v0.4.67: pure-Rust NFSv3 client. Replaces the (deleted-in-v0.4.65)
# kernel-mount NFS path with an in-process implementation that works
# in any container — no kernel modules, no CAP_SYS_ADMIN, no
# subprocess. Ships alongside the userspace SMB consumer; operators
# pick whichever protocol their NAS prefers.
nfs3_client = { version = "0.9", features = ["tokio"] }
nfs3_types = "0.5"
# v0.5.0: SMTP for webhook notifications (Slack/Teams/Discord go over
# plain HTTP via reqwest; email needs a real SMTP client). rustls TLS
# to match reqwest and stay musl-static-friendly — no OpenSSL.
lettre = { version = "0.11", default-features = false, features = ["smtp-transport", "tokio1-rustls-tls", "builder", "hostname"] }
# v0.5.1: pure-Rust SAML 2.0 Service Provider. bergshamra does XML-DSig
# verification + exclusive c14n with RustCrypto (no OpenSSL/xmlsec/libxml2
# C deps), so the static musl binary stays OpenSSL-free — samael was
# rejected precisely because it hard-requires OpenSSL. We build the thin
# SP layer (AuthnRequest, metadata parse, SAMLResponse semantics) on top.
bergshamra = "0.4"
roxmltree = "0.21"
quick-xml = "0.40"
x509-parser = "0.18"
# flate2 default backend is miniz_oxide (pure Rust) — do NOT enable the
# zlib/zlib-ng C backends, which would break the musl-static build.
flate2 = "1.1"
base64 = "0.22"
openpxe-core = { path = "crates/core" }
openpxe-dhcp-proxy = { path = "crates/dhcp-proxy" }
openpxe-tftp = { path = "crates/tftp" }
+19 -19
View File
@@ -5,12 +5,12 @@ Container-native PXE boot server. A Rust reimplementation of
for Docker/OCI and OpenShift. Upload `.iso` files via the web UI; network
clients PXE-boot them.
> **Status:** v0.4.1 / pre-beta. Phases 15 complete: full PXE stack,
> **Status:** v0.2.0 / pre-beta. Phases 15 complete: full PXE stack,
> Queued Deployment queue, NFS-share ISO sources, live tracing log + an
> operator terminal, per-MAC host bindings, Prometheus `/metrics`,
> light/dark theme toggle, animated OpenPXE imaging-progress widget,
> chunked ISO uploads, and per-ISO boot passwords. The test suite and
> clippy are part of the release checklist. Ready for real-hardware validation.
> operator terminal, per-MAC host bindings (Tinkerbell-style),
> Prometheus `/metrics`, light/dark theme toggle, animated anvil
> imaging-progress widget. **66 tests passing**, clippy clean. Ready
> for real-hardware validation.
## Design non-negotiables
@@ -41,17 +41,18 @@ clients PXE-boot them.
Tools > Utilities / OpenPXE Shell / Network Card Info
Queued Deployment
```
6. **Queued Deployment queue** — the coordinated launch flow. A client that
6. **Queued Deployment queue** — the "horse race" launch flow. A client that
selects *Queued Deployment* gets a numbered position and waits. The
operator picks an ISO in the web UI and fires it to every waiting
client simultaneously.
7. **Web UI** (Netbox-style): sidebar nav (Dashboard / Network / Queue /
Storage / Hosts / Terminal / About), light + dark themes
(toggle top-right or press `T`), animated OpenPXE progress
7. **Web UI** (Netbox-style): sidebar nav (Dashboard / Network / Forge
Gate / Storage / Hosts / Terminal / About), light + dark themes
(toggle top-right or press `T`), animated anvil "forge progress"
widget when devices are imaging. All assets served from the binary —
no external requests.
8. **Per-MAC host bindings.** Pin a MAC to a boot target and the client
skips the menu, chains straight through.
skips the menu, chains straight through. Inspired by Tinkerbell's
`smee` MAC-prepended URL pattern.
9. **Prometheus metrics** at `/metrics` — DHCP replies by arch, TFTP
transfer counts and bytes, HTTP request counts by route, queue /
imaging gauges, uptime, build info. Plain text exposition format,
@@ -80,7 +81,7 @@ skip TFTP and respond with an HTTP URL.
./scripts/fetch-ipxe.sh
# 2. Build the container image (~3 min first time).
docker buildx build -f deploy/docker/Dockerfile -t openpxe:0.4.1 --load .
docker buildx build -f deploy/docker/Dockerfile -t openpxe:0.1.0 --load .
# 3. Run it on the box plugged into your PXE network. Set PUBLIC_IP to
# this host's LAN address so advertised iPXE URLs are reachable.
@@ -90,7 +91,7 @@ docker run -d --name openpxe \
-e OPENPXE_DHCP_MODE=proxy \
-v $PWD/data/isos:/var/lib/openpxe/isos \
-v $PWD/data/work:/var/lib/openpxe/work \
openpxe:0.4.1
openpxe:0.1.0
# 4. Open the UI and drop an ISO in.
open http://10.0.0.5
@@ -121,7 +122,7 @@ docker buildx create --name openpxe-multi --driver docker-container --use
# Build + push both linux/amd64 and linux/arm64 under one tag.
docker buildx build --builder openpxe-multi \
--platform linux/amd64,linux/arm64 \
-t ghcr.io/YOUR-ORG/openpxe:0.4.1 \
-t ghcr.io/YOUR-ORG/openpxe:0.1.0 \
--push \
-f deploy/docker/Dockerfile .
```
@@ -154,10 +155,10 @@ docker run --rm \
-v /my/iso-library:/seed:ro \
-v openpxe-data:/var/lib/openpxe/isos \
-e OPENPXE_PUBLIC_IP=10.0.0.5 \
openpxe:0.4.1 seed --from /seed
openpxe:0.1.0 seed --from /seed
# Dry run first to see what would be imported:
docker run --rm -v /my/iso-library:/seed:ro openpxe:0.4.1 seed --from /seed --dry-run
docker run --rm -v /my/iso-library:/seed:ro openpxe:0.1.0 seed --from /seed --dry-run
```
### Environment overrides
@@ -272,7 +273,7 @@ operational constraints inherited from the design:
## Queued Deployment
The coordinated launch flow, end to end:
The "horse race" launch flow, end to end:
1. A client boots and picks **Queued Deployment** in the PXE menu (or falls
through on timeout with the default `timeout_action`).
@@ -284,9 +285,8 @@ The coordinated launch flow, end to end:
The server broadcasts the assignment to every queued client via a
`tokio::sync::Notify`; each client's next poll returns the boot script
for the chosen image.
5. Every client chains the same image at effectively the same moment. The
queue stays visible until the operator releases entries, which keeps a
useful audit trail during hardware testing.
5. Every client chains the same image at effectively the same moment — the
queue releases and the horses run together.
No user-facing iPXE anywhere in this flow. The client only ever runs
scripts we generate; the operator only interacts with the web UI.
-17
View File
@@ -21,23 +21,6 @@ time.workspace = true
uuid.workspace = true
parking_lot.workspace = true
tokio = { workspace = true, features = ["sync", "rt", "macros", "time"] }
# bcrypt for the admin Forms auth (v0.4.5). Already in the workspace
# for per-ISO boot passwords; just re-exported here.
bcrypt.workspace = true
# v0.5.1: pure-Rust SAML 2.0 SP. bergshamra = XML-DSig verify + exclusive
# c14n (no OpenSSL/C). roxmltree/quick-xml parse + build SAML XML;
# x509-parser pulls the IdP signing cert out of metadata; flate2+base64
# encode the HTTP-Redirect binding's SAMLRequest.
bergshamra.workspace = true
roxmltree.workspace = true
quick-xml.workspace = true
x509-parser.workspace = true
flate2.workspace = true
base64.workspace = true
[dev-dependencies]
tempfile = "3.12"
# v0.5.1: generate a throwaway self-signed signing cert/key so SAML
# verification tests can produce genuinely signed SAMLResponses.
rcgen = "0.13"
+1 -4
View File
@@ -126,10 +126,7 @@ mod tests {
fn bootfile_names_stable() {
assert_eq!(ClientArch::LegacyX86.ipxe_bootfile(), Some("undionly.kpxe"));
assert_eq!(ClientArch::X64Uefi.ipxe_bootfile(), Some("snponly.efi"));
assert_eq!(
ClientArch::Arm64Uefi.ipxe_bootfile(),
Some("snponly-arm64.efi")
);
assert_eq!(ClientArch::Arm64Uefi.ipxe_bootfile(), Some("snponly-arm64.efi"));
assert_eq!(ClientArch::Unknown(0xFFFF).ipxe_bootfile(), None);
}
-353
View File
@@ -1,353 +0,0 @@
//! Operator authentication — Sonarr/Radarr-style single-admin Forms model.
//!
//! On a fresh install, no admin account exists; the WebUI's first-run
//! flow prompts the operator to create one. After that the chosen
//! credentials gate `/api/*` access. The admin can rotate username +
//! password from Settings → Account.
//!
//! Multi-user RBAC isn't a goal for OpenPXE — the user explicitly asked
//! for "you have access or you don't". When SSO is configured, additional
//! users come in through the IdP; the locally-stored admin is the
//! fallback owner who can change SSO config or the seal-breaker for an
//! IdP outage. So one record is enough.
//!
//! Storage policy mirrors [`crate::host_bindings::HostBindings`] and
//! [`crate::boot_log::BootLog`]: in-memory authoritative; disk is the
//! crash-survival cache; a corrupt `auth.json` falls back to "no admin
//! configured" rather than blocking startup, which puts the UI back
//! into setup mode rather than locking the operator out.
use parking_lot::RwLock;
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use std::path::PathBuf;
use std::sync::Arc;
use time::OffsetDateTime;
use crate::{Error, Result};
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct AdminAccount {
pub username: String,
/// bcrypt hash (cost 10). The plaintext password never leaves the
/// request that set it — same discipline as the per-ISO boot password.
pub password_hash: String,
#[serde(with = "time::serde::rfc3339")]
pub created_at: OffsetDateTime,
#[serde(with = "time::serde::rfc3339")]
pub updated_at: OffsetDateTime,
}
/// Public projection — no hash, safe to ship to the WebUI.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize)]
pub struct AdminPublic {
pub username: String,
#[serde(with = "time::serde::rfc3339")]
pub created_at: OffsetDateTime,
#[serde(with = "time::serde::rfc3339")]
pub updated_at: OffsetDateTime,
}
impl From<&AdminAccount> for AdminPublic {
fn from(a: &AdminAccount) -> Self {
Self {
username: a.username.clone(),
created_at: a.created_at,
updated_at: a.updated_at,
}
}
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, Serialize, Deserialize)]
struct Inner {
admin: Option<AdminAccount>,
}
/// In-memory + on-disk admin registry. Cheap to clone.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct AdminStore {
path: Arc<PathBuf>,
inner: Arc<RwLock<Inner>>,
}
impl AdminStore {
/// Load from `<work_dir>/auth.json`, or start empty. A bad file
/// logs a warning and falls back to "no admin configured" — better
/// to surface the setup flow than lock the operator out of their
/// own install.
#[must_use]
pub fn load_or_default(work_dir: &std::path::Path) -> Self {
let path = work_dir.join("auth.json");
let inner = match std::fs::read_to_string(&path) {
Ok(text) => match serde_json::from_str::<Inner>(&text) {
Ok(parsed) => parsed,
Err(e) => {
tracing::warn!(
target: "openpxe::auth",
"auth.json present but unreadable ({e}); starting in setup mode"
);
Inner::default()
}
},
Err(_) => Inner::default(),
};
Self {
path: Arc::new(path),
inner: Arc::new(RwLock::new(inner)),
}
}
/// Has an admin been bootstrapped? Drives the first-run / login
/// fork in the HTTP layer.
#[must_use]
pub fn is_configured(&self) -> bool {
self.inner.read().admin.is_some()
}
/// Public-safe snapshot for the WebUI.
#[must_use]
pub fn snapshot(&self) -> Option<AdminPublic> {
self.inner.read().admin.as_ref().map(AdminPublic::from)
}
/// First-run setup: create the admin account. Fails if one already
/// exists — the HTTP layer surfaces that as 409.
pub fn bootstrap(&self, username: &str, password: &str) -> Result<AdminPublic> {
validate_username(username)?;
validate_password(password)?;
let hash = bcrypt_hash(password)?;
let now = OffsetDateTime::now_utc();
let admin = AdminAccount {
username: username.trim().to_string(),
password_hash: hash,
created_at: now,
updated_at: now,
};
{
let mut g = self.inner.write();
if g.admin.is_some() {
return Err(Error::Invalid(
"admin account already configured".into(),
));
}
g.admin = Some(admin.clone());
}
self.persist();
tracing::info!(
target: "openpxe::auth",
username = %admin.username,
"admin account created (first-run setup)"
);
Ok((&admin).into())
}
/// Verify credentials. Returns the admin record (public projection)
/// on success, `Ok(None)` on mismatch, `Err` on systemic bcrypt
/// failure (treated as "auth not available right now" by callers).
pub fn verify(&self, username: &str, password: &str) -> Result<Option<AdminPublic>> {
let Some(admin) = self.inner.read().admin.clone() else {
return Ok(None);
};
if username.trim() != admin.username {
return Ok(None);
}
// bcrypt compares in constant time relative to the same hash.
// Doing the username check first is fine — a username mismatch
// returns immediately, but the only thing leaked is "this isn't
// the admin's username" which the operator already knows.
match bcrypt::verify(password, &admin.password_hash) {
Ok(true) => Ok(Some((&admin).into())),
Ok(false) => Ok(None),
Err(e) => Err(Error::Other(e.into())),
}
}
/// Rotate username and/or password. `current_password` must match
/// the *existing* hash — same flow as Sonarr's "current password
/// required to change". `new_username`/`new_password` are optional:
/// pass only what you want to change.
pub fn update_credentials(
&self,
current_password: &str,
new_username: Option<&str>,
new_password: Option<&str>,
) -> Result<AdminPublic> {
// Re-check ownership before any state mutation.
let existing = self
.inner
.read()
.admin
.clone()
.ok_or_else(|| Error::Invalid("no admin configured".into()))?;
match bcrypt::verify(current_password, &existing.password_hash) {
Ok(true) => {}
Ok(false) => return Err(Error::Invalid("current password is incorrect".into())),
Err(e) => return Err(Error::Other(e.into())),
}
let mut updated = existing.clone();
if let Some(u) = new_username {
validate_username(u)?;
updated.username = u.trim().to_string();
}
if let Some(p) = new_password {
validate_password(p)?;
updated.password_hash = bcrypt_hash(p)?;
}
updated.updated_at = OffsetDateTime::now_utc();
{
let mut g = self.inner.write();
g.admin = Some(updated.clone());
}
self.persist();
tracing::info!(
target: "openpxe::auth",
username = %updated.username,
"admin credentials updated"
);
Ok((&updated).into())
}
fn persist(&self) {
let snap = self.inner.read().clone();
let body = match serde_json::to_vec_pretty(&snap) {
Ok(b) => b,
Err(e) => {
tracing::warn!(target: "openpxe::auth", "serialize auth.json: {e}");
return;
}
};
if let Some(parent) = self.path.parent() {
let _ = std::fs::create_dir_all(parent);
}
let tmp = self.path.with_extension("json.tmp");
if let Err(e) = std::fs::write(&tmp, body) {
tracing::warn!(target: "openpxe::auth", "write auth.json tmp: {e}");
return;
}
if let Err(e) = std::fs::rename(&tmp, self.path.as_path()) {
tracing::warn!(target: "openpxe::auth", "rename auth.json: {e}");
}
}
}
fn validate_username(u: &str) -> Result<()> {
let u = u.trim();
if u.is_empty() {
return Err(Error::Invalid("username must not be empty".into()));
}
if u.len() > 64 {
return Err(Error::Invalid("username must be 64 chars or fewer".into()));
}
if !u.chars().all(|c| c.is_ascii_graphic() && c != ':') {
return Err(Error::Invalid(
"username must be ASCII printable with no ':' character".into(),
));
}
Ok(())
}
fn validate_password(p: &str) -> Result<()> {
if p.len() < 8 {
return Err(Error::Invalid(
"password must be at least 8 characters".into(),
));
}
if p.len() > 256 {
return Err(Error::Invalid(
"password must be 256 characters or fewer".into(),
));
}
Ok(())
}
fn bcrypt_hash(password: &str) -> Result<String> {
bcrypt::hash(password, bcrypt::DEFAULT_COST).map_err(|e| Error::Other(e.into()))
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use tempfile::tempdir;
#[test]
fn empty_after_load_when_no_file() {
let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
let s = AdminStore::load_or_default(dir.path());
assert!(!s.is_configured());
assert!(s.snapshot().is_none());
}
#[test]
fn bootstrap_then_verify_round_trip() {
let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
let s = AdminStore::load_or_default(dir.path());
let pub_ = s.bootstrap("admin", "hunter2hunter2").unwrap();
assert_eq!(pub_.username, "admin");
assert!(s.is_configured());
// Correct creds match; wrong creds don't.
assert!(s.verify("admin", "hunter2hunter2").unwrap().is_some());
assert!(s.verify("admin", "wrong").unwrap().is_none());
assert!(s.verify("nobody", "hunter2hunter2").unwrap().is_none());
}
#[test]
fn bootstrap_rejects_second_call() {
let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
let s = AdminStore::load_or_default(dir.path());
s.bootstrap("admin", "hunter2hunter2").unwrap();
let r = s.bootstrap("other", "anotherpass1");
assert!(matches!(r, Err(Error::Invalid(_))));
}
#[test]
fn round_trip_survives_disk_reload() {
let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
let s = AdminStore::load_or_default(dir.path());
s.bootstrap("admin", "hunter2hunter2").unwrap();
drop(s);
let s2 = AdminStore::load_or_default(dir.path());
assert!(s2.is_configured());
assert!(s2.verify("admin", "hunter2hunter2").unwrap().is_some());
}
#[test]
fn update_credentials_requires_current_password() {
let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
let s = AdminStore::load_or_default(dir.path());
s.bootstrap("admin", "hunter2hunter2").unwrap();
// Wrong current password → no change.
let r = s.update_credentials("nope", None, Some("newpassword1"));
assert!(matches!(r, Err(Error::Invalid(_))));
assert!(s.verify("admin", "hunter2hunter2").unwrap().is_some());
// Correct current password rotates only what's supplied.
s.update_credentials("hunter2hunter2", Some("alice"), Some("newpassword1"))
.unwrap();
assert!(s.verify("admin", "hunter2hunter2").unwrap().is_none());
assert!(s.verify("alice", "newpassword1").unwrap().is_some());
}
#[test]
fn update_credentials_partial_password_only_keeps_username() {
let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
let s = AdminStore::load_or_default(dir.path());
s.bootstrap("admin", "hunter2hunter2").unwrap();
s.update_credentials("hunter2hunter2", None, Some("newpassword1"))
.unwrap();
assert!(s.verify("admin", "newpassword1").unwrap().is_some());
}
#[test]
fn validates_username_and_password() {
let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
let s = AdminStore::load_or_default(dir.path());
assert!(s.bootstrap("", "hunter2hunter2").is_err());
assert!(s.bootstrap("ad:min", "hunter2hunter2").is_err()); // ':' reserved
assert!(s.bootstrap("admin", "short").is_err()); // <8 chars
// 65-char username is too long.
let long = "a".repeat(65);
assert!(s.bootstrap(&long, "hunter2hunter2").is_err());
}
}
-249
View File
@@ -1,249 +0,0 @@
//! Boot-event log — "who installed what, when, from where".
//!
//! Each `/boot/<entry>.ipxe` fetch that actually goes on to serve a boot
//! script lands an entry here. The log is bounded in memory (newest-first,
//! ring-buffered at [`BootLog::CAP`]) and is mirrored append-only to
//! `<work_dir>/boot_log.jsonl`. Mirrors `HostBindings`'s "in-memory is
//! authoritative, disk is a cache" policy — a corrupt log file should
//! never block PXE for the network.
//!
//! We deliberately don't push these onto the `LogBus` (the operator
//! terminal stream). The terminal already shows the http traces; the
//! Host log is a curated, persistent, easy-to-scan view of "what got
//! imaged on what hardware" and conflating the two would be noisy.
use parking_lot::RwLock;
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use std::collections::VecDeque;
use std::io::Write;
use std::net::IpAddr;
use std::path::PathBuf;
use std::sync::Arc;
use time::OffsetDateTime;
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct BootEvent {
#[serde(with = "time::serde::rfc3339")]
pub timestamp: OffsetDateTime,
/// Lowercase, colon-separated. `None` when iPXE didn't supply
/// `?mac=${mac}` in the chain URL (older bookmarks, custom scripts).
pub mac: Option<String>,
/// Connecting peer's IP — taken from the TCP socket when available
/// (PXE clients connect direct, no reverse proxy), and falls back to
/// `X-Forwarded-For` for the rare case where one is present.
pub ip: Option<IpAddr>,
/// `BootEntry::id` — the same id used in `/boot/<id>.ipxe`.
pub target_id: String,
/// Human-friendly label: the ISO's filename / volume label / entry
/// title. Pre-resolved at log time so the UI can render without
/// joining against the ISO store (and so "what image was installed?"
/// survives the operator deleting the ISO later).
pub target_title: String,
}
/// In-memory ring + disk-backed append log of boot events. Cheap to
/// clone; the inner state is `Arc<RwLock<_>>`.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct BootLog {
path: Arc<PathBuf>,
inner: Arc<RwLock<VecDeque<BootEvent>>>,
}
impl BootLog {
/// Newest entries we retain in memory. Past this, the oldest gets
/// evicted — the on-disk JSONL keeps the full history for offline
/// inspection. 500 covers a typical install-day's worth without
/// turning the Hosts tab into a wall of text.
pub const CAP: usize = 500;
/// Load up to `CAP` newest events from `<work_dir>/boot_log.jsonl`,
/// or start empty if the file is missing / unreadable.
#[must_use]
pub fn load_or_default(work_dir: &std::path::Path) -> Self {
let path = work_dir.join("boot_log.jsonl");
let mut events = VecDeque::with_capacity(Self::CAP);
if let Ok(text) = std::fs::read_to_string(&path) {
for line in text.lines() {
if line.trim().is_empty() {
continue;
}
match serde_json::from_str::<BootEvent>(line) {
Ok(ev) => {
if events.len() == Self::CAP {
events.pop_front();
}
events.push_back(ev);
}
Err(e) => {
tracing::warn!(
target: "openpxe::boot_log",
"skipping unparseable boot_log line: {e}"
);
}
}
}
}
Self {
path: Arc::new(path),
inner: Arc::new(RwLock::new(events)),
}
}
/// Append an event. Persistence is best-effort and never blocks the
/// caller on a failed write (the in-memory copy is the source of
/// truth for the live UI; the JSONL is just for crash survival).
pub fn record(&self, ev: &BootEvent) {
// Push into the ring first so a slow / failing disk doesn't lose
// events for the live UI.
{
let mut g = self.inner.write();
if g.len() == Self::CAP {
g.pop_front();
}
g.push_back(ev.clone());
}
tracing::info!(
target: "openpxe::boot_log",
mac = ev.mac.as_deref().unwrap_or("?"),
ip = ev.ip.map(|i| i.to_string()).as_deref().unwrap_or("?"),
target = %ev.target_id,
"boot event"
);
// Append to disk. We tolerate write failures — they'd show up as
// missing entries on the next restart only.
let mut line = match serde_json::to_string(ev) {
Ok(s) => s,
Err(e) => {
tracing::warn!(target: "openpxe::boot_log", "serialize boot event: {e}");
return;
}
};
line.push('\n');
if let Some(parent) = self.path.parent() {
let _ = std::fs::create_dir_all(parent);
}
match std::fs::OpenOptions::new()
.create(true)
.append(true)
.open(self.path.as_path())
{
Ok(mut f) => {
if let Err(e) = f.write_all(line.as_bytes()) {
tracing::warn!(target: "openpxe::boot_log", "append boot_log.jsonl: {e}");
}
}
Err(e) => {
tracing::warn!(target: "openpxe::boot_log", "open boot_log.jsonl: {e}");
}
}
}
/// Newest-first snapshot, up to `CAP` entries.
#[must_use]
pub fn list(&self) -> Vec<BootEvent> {
let g = self.inner.read();
// VecDeque preserves insertion order; reverse so newest is first.
g.iter().rev().cloned().collect()
}
#[must_use]
pub fn len(&self) -> usize {
self.inner.read().len()
}
#[must_use]
pub fn is_empty(&self) -> bool {
self.len() == 0
}
/// Wipe in-memory + the on-disk file. Used by the `terminal clear`
/// equivalent or future operator action; not currently wired to a UI
/// button but exposed for completeness.
pub fn clear(&self) {
self.inner.write().clear();
let _ = std::fs::remove_file(self.path.as_path());
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use tempfile::tempdir;
fn ev(target: &str, mac: Option<&str>) -> BootEvent {
BootEvent {
timestamp: OffsetDateTime::now_utc(),
mac: mac.map(str::to_string),
ip: Some("10.0.0.42".parse().unwrap()),
target_id: target.into(),
target_title: format!("{target}.iso"),
}
}
#[test]
fn record_then_list_is_newest_first() {
let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
let log = BootLog::load_or_default(dir.path());
assert!(log.is_empty());
log.record(&ev("alpha", Some("aa:bb:cc:00:00:01")));
log.record(&ev("beta", Some("aa:bb:cc:00:00:02")));
let list = log.list();
assert_eq!(list.len(), 2);
assert_eq!(list[0].target_id, "beta");
assert_eq!(list[1].target_id, "alpha");
}
#[test]
fn round_trip_through_disk() {
let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
let log = BootLog::load_or_default(dir.path());
log.record(&ev("alpha", Some("aa:bb:cc:00:00:01")));
log.record(&ev("beta", None));
drop(log);
let log2 = BootLog::load_or_default(dir.path());
assert_eq!(log2.len(), 2);
let list = log2.list();
assert_eq!(list[0].target_id, "beta");
assert_eq!(list[1].target_id, "alpha");
assert!(list[0].mac.is_none());
assert_eq!(list[1].mac.as_deref(), Some("aa:bb:cc:00:00:01"));
}
#[test]
fn ring_evicts_oldest_past_cap() {
let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
let log = BootLog::load_or_default(dir.path());
for i in 0..(BootLog::CAP + 5) {
log.record(&ev(&format!("e{i}"), None));
}
assert_eq!(log.len(), BootLog::CAP);
let list = log.list();
// Newest first; the most recent push is the last index inserted.
assert_eq!(list[0].target_id, format!("e{}", BootLog::CAP + 4));
// Oldest in-memory should be the 6th push (0..5 were evicted).
assert_eq!(list[BootLog::CAP - 1].target_id, "e5");
}
#[test]
fn clear_wipes_memory_and_disk() {
let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
let log = BootLog::load_or_default(dir.path());
log.record(&ev("alpha", None));
log.clear();
assert!(log.is_empty());
let log2 = BootLog::load_or_default(dir.path());
assert!(log2.is_empty());
}
#[test]
fn corrupt_disk_lines_are_skipped_not_fatal() {
// Write a file with one valid + one garbage line; loader should
// surface the valid one and skip the garbage.
let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
let path = dir.path().join("boot_log.jsonl");
let valid = serde_json::to_string(&ev("ok", Some("aa:bb:cc:00:00:09"))).unwrap();
std::fs::write(&path, format!("{valid}\nNOT_JSON\n{valid}\n")).unwrap();
let log = BootLog::load_or_default(dir.path());
assert_eq!(log.len(), 2);
}
}
-375
View File
@@ -1,375 +0,0 @@
//! Operator-controlled branding overrides.
//!
//! The browser tab's logo (`/assets/logo.svg`) defaults to the bundled
//! rainbow-horizon mark. Operators who deploy OpenPXE behind their own
//! branding can upload a replacement that lives at
//! `<work_dir>/branding/logo.<ext>` and is served in preference to the
//! bundled SVG when present. Borrowed-from-FleetDM: tenant chrome, same
//! product.
//!
//! Storage policy mirrors `HostBindings` / `BootLog`: in-memory cache is
//! authoritative for the current process, disk is the source of truth on
//! restart, and a corrupt cache file falls back to the bundled default
//! rather than blocking startup.
use parking_lot::RwLock;
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
use std::sync::Arc;
/// Allowed MIME types for an uploaded logo. We deliberately keep this
/// narrow — anything that can be `<img src="...">`'d into the brand
/// block, no scripts. SVG carries the obvious XSS risk for raw inline
/// HTML; we always serve the bytes as a separate asset with a strict
/// content-type rather than inlining, so SVG is safe.
pub const ALLOWED_LOGO_MIMES: &[&str] = &[
"image/svg+xml",
"image/png",
"image/jpeg",
"image/webp",
"image/gif",
];
/// Disk cap for an uploaded logo. PXE WebUIs are operator-facing — even
/// a generous 2 MB cap is comfortable for any reasonable brand mark and
/// puts a clear bound on memory + serialization cost.
pub const MAX_LOGO_BYTES: usize = 2 * 1024 * 1024;
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, Serialize, Deserialize)]
struct Inner {
/// File name (relative to the branding dir) for the active logo, if
/// any. Always under `<work_dir>/branding/`; never an absolute path
/// from the operator.
logo_filename: Option<String>,
/// MIME of the active logo, mirroring `logo_filename`. Cached here
/// so the HTTP layer can set Content-Type without re-sniffing.
logo_mime: Option<String>,
/// Monotonic counter bumped on every set/clear. Surfaces as a
/// cache-bust token (`/assets/logo.svg?r=<rev>`) so the browser
/// fetches the new bytes the moment the operator swaps the logo —
/// the app version alone can't do this since it doesn't change on
/// upload. Persisted so the token stays stable across restarts and
/// keeps climbing across multiple swaps.
#[serde(default)]
rev: u64,
}
/// In-memory + on-disk override registry. Cheap to clone; locks are
/// brief. The `branding.json` cache lives alongside the active asset
/// inside `<work_dir>/branding/`.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct BrandingStore {
/// Root directory: `<work_dir>/branding/`. Created on first write.
dir: Arc<PathBuf>,
inner: Arc<RwLock<Inner>>,
}
impl BrandingStore {
/// Load (or initialise empty) from `<work_dir>/branding/`. Tolerates
/// missing directories, partial state, and corrupt JSON — a bad
/// cache should never block PXE for the network.
#[must_use]
pub fn load_or_default(work_dir: &Path) -> Self {
let dir = work_dir.join("branding");
let path = dir.join("branding.json");
let mut inner = Inner::default();
if let Ok(text) = std::fs::read_to_string(&path) {
match serde_json::from_str::<Inner>(&text) {
Ok(parsed) => {
// Sanity: if the JSON says we have a logo but the
// file is gone, clear the in-memory pointer so
// /assets/logo.svg falls back to the bundled SVG
// rather than 500ing on a missing file.
if let Some(name) = parsed.logo_filename.as_deref() {
if dir.join(name).is_file() {
inner = parsed;
} else {
tracing::warn!(
target: "openpxe::branding",
file = %name,
"branding.json points at missing file; clearing"
);
}
} else {
inner = parsed;
}
}
Err(e) => {
tracing::warn!(
target: "openpxe::branding",
"branding.json present but unreadable ({e}); starting empty"
);
}
}
}
Self {
dir: Arc::new(dir),
inner: Arc::new(RwLock::new(inner)),
}
}
/// Absolute path to the active logo, if one is set and present on
/// disk. `None` means the HTTP layer should serve the bundled SVG.
#[must_use]
pub fn logo_path(&self) -> Option<PathBuf> {
let g = self.inner.read();
g.logo_filename.as_deref().map(|n| self.dir.join(n))
}
/// MIME of the active logo, if any. The HTTP layer pairs this with
/// the bytes returned by [`Self::logo_path`].
#[must_use]
pub fn logo_mime(&self) -> Option<String> {
self.inner.read().logo_mime.clone()
}
/// Replace the active logo. Returns the chosen on-disk filename so
/// the caller can echo it back in the API response. Old logos are
/// removed best-effort.
pub fn set_logo(&self, mime: &str, ext: &str, bytes: &[u8]) -> std::io::Result<String> {
std::fs::create_dir_all(self.dir.as_path())?;
// Single canonical filename per upload — overwriting the old one
// (after clearing it) keeps the directory tidy and avoids any
// path-traversal concern: the operator never supplies the name.
let safe_ext = sanitize_ext(ext);
let filename = format!("logo.{safe_ext}");
let final_path = self.dir.join(&filename);
// Atomic write: tmp -> rename. Guarantees the file is either
// entirely the old logo or entirely the new one.
let tmp = final_path.with_extension(format!("{safe_ext}.tmp"));
std::fs::write(&tmp, bytes)?;
std::fs::rename(&tmp, &final_path)?;
// Clean up any sibling logo.<otherext> so there's exactly one
// canonical file at any time.
if let Ok(entries) = std::fs::read_dir(self.dir.as_path()) {
for e in entries.flatten() {
let p = e.path();
let name = p
.file_name()
.and_then(|s| s.to_str())
.unwrap_or("");
if name.starts_with("logo.") && name != filename {
let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&p);
}
}
}
{
let mut g = self.inner.write();
g.logo_filename = Some(filename.clone());
g.logo_mime = Some(mime.to_string());
g.rev = g.rev.wrapping_add(1);
}
self.persist();
tracing::info!(
target: "openpxe::branding",
file = %filename, mime = %mime, size = bytes.len(),
"custom logo installed"
);
Ok(filename)
}
/// Drop the override and return to the bundled SVG.
pub fn clear_logo(&self) -> std::io::Result<()> {
let removed = {
let mut g = self.inner.write();
let removed = g.logo_filename.take();
g.logo_mime = None;
g.rev = g.rev.wrapping_add(1);
removed
};
if let Some(name) = removed {
let p = self.dir.join(&name);
let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&p);
tracing::info!(target: "openpxe::branding", file = %name, "custom logo cleared");
}
self.persist();
Ok(())
}
/// Convenience: true if a custom logo is configured. Surfaces on
/// `/api/status` so the WebUI can show "Custom logo: yes" without
/// fetching the asset itself.
#[must_use]
pub fn has_logo(&self) -> bool {
self.inner.read().logo_filename.is_some()
}
/// Cache-bust token for the logo asset URL. Changes on every
/// set/clear so `/assets/logo.svg?r=<rev>` resolves to a fresh URL
/// whenever the operator swaps the brand mark. Stable otherwise.
#[must_use]
pub fn logo_rev(&self) -> u64 {
self.inner.read().rev
}
fn persist(&self) {
let snap = self.inner.read().clone();
let body = match serde_json::to_vec_pretty(&snap) {
Ok(b) => b,
Err(e) => {
tracing::warn!(target: "openpxe::branding", "serialize branding.json: {e}");
return;
}
};
if let Err(e) = std::fs::create_dir_all(self.dir.as_path()) {
tracing::warn!(target: "openpxe::branding", "mkdir branding/: {e}");
return;
}
let path = self.dir.join("branding.json");
let tmp = path.with_extension("json.tmp");
if let Err(e) = std::fs::write(&tmp, body) {
tracing::warn!(target: "openpxe::branding", "write branding.json tmp: {e}");
return;
}
if let Err(e) = std::fs::rename(&tmp, &path) {
tracing::warn!(target: "openpxe::branding", "rename branding.json: {e}");
}
}
}
/// Trim arbitrary operator-supplied extension strings to a small, safe
/// alphanumeric form. Anything weird collapses to `bin`. We never let
/// the extension affect the path beyond the final segment of `logo.<x>`.
fn sanitize_ext(ext: &str) -> String {
let lc: String = ext
.chars()
.filter(char::is_ascii_alphanumeric)
.map(|c| c.to_ascii_lowercase())
.collect();
if lc.is_empty() || lc.len() > 5 {
"bin".into()
} else {
lc
}
}
/// Pick a safe filesystem extension from a MIME type. Returns `None`
/// if the MIME isn't on the [`ALLOWED_LOGO_MIMES`] allowlist.
#[must_use]
pub fn ext_for_mime(mime: &str) -> Option<&'static str> {
match mime {
"image/svg+xml" => Some("svg"),
"image/png" => Some("png"),
"image/jpeg" => Some("jpg"),
"image/webp" => Some("webp"),
"image/gif" => Some("gif"),
_ => None,
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use tempfile::tempdir;
#[test]
fn empty_after_load_when_no_branding_dir() {
let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
let b = BrandingStore::load_or_default(dir.path());
assert!(!b.has_logo());
assert!(b.logo_path().is_none());
assert!(b.logo_mime().is_none());
}
#[test]
fn set_clear_round_trip_persists() {
let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
let b = BrandingStore::load_or_default(dir.path());
let name = b.set_logo("image/png", "png", b"\x89PNG\r\n\x1a\nfake").unwrap();
assert_eq!(name, "logo.png");
assert!(b.has_logo());
assert_eq!(b.logo_mime().as_deref(), Some("image/png"));
let p = b.logo_path().unwrap();
assert!(p.is_file());
// Re-open and confirm the override survives a restart.
drop(b);
let b2 = BrandingStore::load_or_default(dir.path());
assert!(b2.has_logo());
assert_eq!(b2.logo_mime().as_deref(), Some("image/png"));
// Clear; the file goes away and has_logo flips off.
b2.clear_logo().unwrap();
assert!(!b2.has_logo());
assert!(!p.exists());
}
#[test]
fn replacing_logo_removes_old_extension_sibling() {
// PNG then SVG; only the SVG should remain on disk.
let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
let b = BrandingStore::load_or_default(dir.path());
b.set_logo("image/png", "png", b"\x89PNG\r\n\x1a\nfake").unwrap();
b.set_logo("image/svg+xml", "svg", br#"<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"/>"#).unwrap();
let entries: Vec<_> = std::fs::read_dir(dir.path().join("branding"))
.unwrap()
.filter_map(|e| e.ok().map(|e| e.file_name().to_string_lossy().into_owned()))
.collect();
assert!(entries.iter().any(|n| n == "logo.svg"), "got {entries:?}");
assert!(!entries.iter().any(|n| n == "logo.png"), "stale PNG left over: {entries:?}");
}
#[test]
fn logo_rev_bumps_on_each_set_and_clear() {
let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
let b = BrandingStore::load_or_default(dir.path());
assert_eq!(b.logo_rev(), 0);
b.set_logo("image/png", "png", b"\x89PNG\r\n\x1a\nfake").unwrap();
assert_eq!(b.logo_rev(), 1);
b.set_logo("image/png", "png", b"\x89PNG\r\n\x1a\nfake2").unwrap();
assert_eq!(b.logo_rev(), 2);
b.clear_logo().unwrap();
assert_eq!(b.logo_rev(), 3);
// Survives a restart.
drop(b);
let b2 = BrandingStore::load_or_default(dir.path());
assert_eq!(b2.logo_rev(), 3);
}
#[test]
fn sanitize_ext_strips_separators_and_path_chars() {
assert_eq!(sanitize_ext("svg"), "svg");
// Path separators and non-alphanumerics filter out, leaving just
// letters. The remaining "etcpasswd" exceeds the 5-char cap so
// it collapses to `bin` rather than producing `etcpa`.
assert_eq!(sanitize_ext("../etc/passwd"), "bin");
// Short alphanumeric strip-through stays itself.
assert_eq!(sanitize_ext("../svg"), "svg");
assert_eq!(sanitize_ext(""), "bin");
assert_eq!(sanitize_ext("PNG"), "png");
// Anything past five chars is suspicious — collapse to `bin`.
assert_eq!(sanitize_ext("svgvvvv"), "bin");
}
#[test]
fn missing_file_referenced_by_json_resolves_to_empty() {
// If the operator nukes the file out from under the JSON cache,
// we should silently fall back to no-override rather than
// hanging on to a bogus path.
let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
let brand_dir = dir.path().join("branding");
std::fs::create_dir_all(&brand_dir).unwrap();
// Hand-write a branding.json claiming logo.png exists.
let inner = Inner {
logo_filename: Some("logo.png".into()),
logo_mime: Some("image/png".into()),
rev: 0,
};
std::fs::write(
brand_dir.join("branding.json"),
serde_json::to_vec_pretty(&inner).unwrap(),
)
.unwrap();
let b = BrandingStore::load_or_default(dir.path());
assert!(!b.has_logo(), "should fall back when referenced file is missing");
}
#[test]
fn ext_for_mime_only_accepts_known_types() {
assert_eq!(ext_for_mime("image/png"), Some("png"));
assert_eq!(ext_for_mime("image/svg+xml"), Some("svg"));
assert_eq!(ext_for_mime("application/octet-stream"), None);
assert_eq!(ext_for_mime("text/html"), None);
}
}
+3 -9
View File
@@ -56,9 +56,7 @@ impl ClientRegistry {
) {
let mut guard = self.inner.write();
let now = OffsetDateTime::now_utc();
let entry = guard
.entry(mac.to_string())
.or_insert_with(|| ClientSnapshot {
let entry = guard.entry(mac.to_string()).or_insert_with(|| ClientSnapshot {
mac: mac.to_string(),
last_ip: ip,
arch,
@@ -69,12 +67,8 @@ impl ClientRegistry {
selected_target: None,
});
entry.last_seen = now;
if ip.is_some() {
entry.last_ip = ip;
}
if arch.is_some() {
entry.arch = arch;
}
if ip.is_some() { entry.last_ip = ip; }
if arch.is_some() { entry.arch = arch; }
entry.events.push((now, event));
// Cap event history per client to keep memory bounded.
const MAX_EVENTS: usize = 64;
+5 -13
View File
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ pub struct Paths {
pub work_dir: PathBuf,
/// Directory containing bundled iPXE binaries (undionly.kpxe, snponly.efi, ...).
pub ipxe_dir: PathBuf,
/// Path to the wimboot binary for Windows ISOs (optional — feature-controlled).
/// Path to the wimboot binary for Windows ISOs (optional — feature-gated).
pub wimboot_path: Option<PathBuf>,
/// Directory under which Windows ISOs are extracted and served via SMB.
/// Only used when `settings.windows_enabled = true`. Defaults to
@@ -128,24 +128,16 @@ impl Config {
/// Call this after loading the TOML file so env takes precedence.
pub fn apply_env(&mut self) {
if let Ok(v) = std::env::var("OPENPXE_HTTP_PORT") {
if let Ok(p) = v.parse() {
self.server.http_port = p;
}
if let Ok(p) = v.parse() { self.server.http_port = p; }
}
if let Ok(v) = std::env::var("OPENPXE_TFTP_PORT") {
if let Ok(p) = v.parse() {
self.server.tftp_port = p;
}
if let Ok(p) = v.parse() { self.server.tftp_port = p; }
}
if let Ok(v) = std::env::var("OPENPXE_DHCP_PORT") {
if let Ok(p) = v.parse() {
self.network.dhcp_port = p;
}
if let Ok(p) = v.parse() { self.network.dhcp_port = p; }
}
if let Ok(v) = std::env::var("OPENPXE_PUBLIC_IP") {
if let Ok(ip) = v.parse() {
self.server.public_ip = Some(ip);
}
if let Ok(ip) = v.parse() { self.server.public_ip = Some(ip); }
}
if let Ok(v) = std::env::var("OPENPXE_DHCP_MODE") {
self.network.dhcp_mode = match v.to_ascii_lowercase().as_str() {
+6 -5
View File
@@ -1,9 +1,10 @@
//! Per-MAC host bindings.
//!
//! Operators can attach a preferred boot target (a `BootEntry::id`) to a
//! specific MAC address. When a client with that MAC arrives, the top-level
//! boot script chains straight to that target instead of showing the
//! interactive menu.
//! Inspired by the Tinkerbell `smee` "MAC-prepended URL" pattern: an
//! operator can attach a preferred boot target (a `BootEntry::id`) to a
//! specific MAC address. When a client with that MAC arrives, the
//! top-level boot script chains straight to that target instead of
//! showing the interactive menu.
//!
//! Use cases:
//! - "This rack of Dell servers always images with Ubuntu Server 24.04"
@@ -28,7 +29,7 @@ pub struct HostBinding {
/// don't have to worry about case.
pub mac: String,
/// Preferred boot entry id (matches a `BootEntry::id` in the iso
/// store) OR one of the reserved menu names: `_local`, `_queue`,
/// store) OR one of the reserved menu names: `_local`, `_gate`,
/// `_tools_menu`. Empty string falls back to the menu.
pub target: String,
/// Optional human-readable label shown in the UI (`"Tom's laptop"`,
+2 -15
View File
@@ -3,34 +3,21 @@
#![forbid(unsafe_code)]
pub mod arch;
pub mod auth;
pub mod boot_log;
pub mod branding;
pub mod client;
pub mod config;
pub mod error;
pub mod queue;
pub mod host_bindings;
pub mod log_bus;
pub mod metrics;
pub mod notify;
pub mod queue;
pub mod saml;
pub mod settings;
pub mod sso;
pub mod wol;
pub use arch::{ClientArch, FirmwareClass};
pub use auth::{AdminAccount, AdminPublic, AdminStore};
pub use boot_log::{BootEvent, BootLog};
pub use branding::{ext_for_mime, BrandingStore, ALLOWED_LOGO_MIMES, MAX_LOGO_BYTES};
pub use client::{ClientEvent, ClientRegistry, ClientSnapshot};
pub use config::{Config, DhcpMode, NetworkConfig, Paths, ServerConfig};
pub use error::{Error, Result};
pub use queue::{Gate, DeploymentQueue};
pub use host_bindings::{normalize_mac, HostBinding, HostBindings};
pub use log_bus::{LogBus, LogBusLayer, LogLine};
pub use metrics::{HttpRoute, Metrics};
pub use notify::{NotifyConfig, NotifyKind, NotifyStore};
pub use queue::{DeploymentQueue, QueueEntry};
pub use saml::{IdpMetadata, SamlError, SpParams, VerifiedPrincipal, VerifiedResponse};
pub use settings::{Settings, SettingsStore, TimeoutAction};
pub use sso::{SsoConfig, SsoStore};
+11 -62
View File
@@ -87,9 +87,7 @@ impl Metrics {
}
pub fn record_tftp_err(&self) {
self.inner
.tftp_transfers_err
.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
self.inner.tftp_transfers_err.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
}
// ── HTTP ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -183,10 +181,7 @@ impl Metrics {
"",
);
let _ = writeln!(
out,
"# HELP openpxe_tftp_transfers_total TFTP transfers, by status."
);
let _ = writeln!(out, "# HELP openpxe_tftp_transfers_total TFTP transfers, by status.");
let _ = writeln!(out, "# TYPE openpxe_tftp_transfers_total counter");
let _ = writeln!(
out,
@@ -206,10 +201,7 @@ impl Metrics {
"",
);
let _ = writeln!(
out,
"# HELP openpxe_http_requests_total HTTP requests served, by route family."
);
let _ = writeln!(out, "# HELP openpxe_http_requests_total HTTP requests served, by route family.");
let _ = writeln!(out, "# TYPE openpxe_http_requests_total counter");
for (label, counter) in [
("boot_script", &i.http_boot_script),
@@ -226,53 +218,14 @@ impl Metrics {
}
// Gauges.
write_gauge(
&mut out,
"openpxe_iso_count",
"ISOs currently registered (local + NFS).",
i.iso_count.load(Ordering::Relaxed),
"",
);
write_gauge(
&mut out,
"openpxe_client_count",
"PXE clients seen this process lifetime.",
i.client_count.load(Ordering::Relaxed),
"",
);
write_gauge(
&mut out,
"openpxe_queue_count",
"Clients currently waiting at the deployment queue.",
i.queue_count.load(Ordering::Relaxed),
"",
);
write_gauge(
&mut out,
"openpxe_queue_imaging",
"Clients currently imaging (queue + assigned target).",
i.queue_imaging.load(Ordering::Relaxed),
"",
);
write_gauge(
&mut out,
"openpxe_nfs_mounts_active",
"NFS shares currently mounted.",
i.nfs_mounts_active.load(Ordering::Relaxed),
"",
);
write_gauge(
&mut out,
"openpxe_uptime_seconds",
"Seconds since this OpenPXE instance started.",
uptime_secs,
"",
);
write_gauge(&mut out, "openpxe_iso_count", "ISOs currently registered (local + NFS).", i.iso_count.load(Ordering::Relaxed), "");
write_gauge(&mut out, "openpxe_client_count", "PXE clients seen this process lifetime.", i.client_count.load(Ordering::Relaxed), "");
write_gauge(&mut out, "openpxe_queue_count", "Clients currently waiting at the deployment queue.", i.queue_count.load(Ordering::Relaxed), "");
write_gauge(&mut out, "openpxe_queue_imaging", "Clients currently imaging (queue + assigned target).", i.queue_imaging.load(Ordering::Relaxed), "");
write_gauge(&mut out, "openpxe_nfs_mounts_active", "NFS shares currently mounted.", i.nfs_mounts_active.load(Ordering::Relaxed), "");
write_gauge(&mut out, "openpxe_uptime_seconds", "Seconds since this OpenPXE instance started.", uptime_secs, "");
let _ = writeln!(
out,
"# HELP openpxe_build_info Build metadata. Always 1; the version is in the label."
);
let _ = writeln!(out, "# HELP openpxe_build_info Build metadata. Always 1; the version is in the label.");
let _ = writeln!(out, "# TYPE openpxe_build_info gauge");
let _ = writeln!(out, "openpxe_build_info{{version=\"{version}\"}} 1");
@@ -306,11 +259,7 @@ mod tests {
m.record_http(HttpRoute::Api);
m.set_iso_count(3);
let out = m.render("0.2.0", 42);
assert_eq!(
out.matches("# TYPE openpxe_dhcp_replies_total counter")
.count(),
1
);
assert_eq!(out.matches("# TYPE openpxe_dhcp_replies_total counter").count(), 1);
assert_eq!(out.matches("# TYPE openpxe_iso_count gauge").count(), 1);
assert!(out.contains("openpxe_dhcp_replies_total{arch=\"uefi\"} 1"));
assert!(out.contains("openpxe_dhcp_replies_total{arch=\"bios\"} 1"));
-362
View File
@@ -1,362 +0,0 @@
//! Webhook / email notification configuration.
//!
//! v0.5.0: OpenPXE can ping a chat webhook or send an email when
//! something noteworthy happens (a machine PXE-booted an image, a
//! deployment was assigned, a WoL was sent). One active provider at a
//! time, chosen by `kind` — dead-simple for an L1 tech: pick Slack,
//! paste the incoming-webhook URL, done.
//!
//! This module owns only the *configuration* (validation + persistence
//! to `<work_dir>/notify.json`). The actual sending — HTTP POST for the
//! chat providers, SMTP for email — lives in the http-api crate, which
//! already carries an HTTP client and the SMTP dependency. Keeping the
//! network I/O out of `core` matches how `BrandingStore`/`SsoStore`
//! stay pure config stores.
//!
//! Secrets note: the SMTP password is persisted in `notify.json`
//! alongside the rest of the config (0644 like the other state files).
//! It is never echoed back through the API — the snapshot used for the
//! GET response blanks it (see `Self::redacted`).
use parking_lot::RwLock;
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use std::path::PathBuf;
use std::sync::Arc;
use crate::{Error, Result};
const MAX_URL_LEN: usize = 2048;
const MAX_FIELD_LEN: usize = 512;
/// Which notification transport is active.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Default, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(rename_all = "lowercase")]
pub enum NotifyKind {
/// Slack incoming webhook (`{ "text": ... }`).
#[default]
Slack,
/// Discord webhook (`{ "content": ... }`).
Discord,
/// Microsoft Teams incoming webhook (legacy MessageCard JSON).
Teams,
/// Email via SMTP.
Smtp,
}
impl NotifyKind {
/// True when this kind drives a chat webhook (POST a JSON body to a
/// single URL) rather than SMTP.
#[must_use]
pub fn is_webhook(self) -> bool {
matches!(self, Self::Slack | Self::Discord | Self::Teams)
}
}
/// Operator-configurable notification settings. Single provider active
/// at a time; the inactive fields are kept so switching providers
/// doesn't wipe the other one's values.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct NotifyConfig {
#[serde(default)]
pub enabled: bool,
#[serde(default)]
pub kind: NotifyKind,
/// Incoming-webhook URL for Slack / Discord / Teams.
#[serde(default)]
pub webhook_url: String,
// ── SMTP fields (used when kind == Smtp) ──
#[serde(default)]
pub smtp_host: String,
#[serde(default = "default_smtp_port")]
pub smtp_port: u16,
#[serde(default)]
pub smtp_username: String,
#[serde(default)]
pub smtp_password: String,
/// `From:` address. Falls back to `smtp_username` when blank.
#[serde(default)]
pub smtp_from: String,
/// `To:` address (single recipient — keep it simple).
#[serde(default)]
pub smtp_to: String,
/// Use implicit TLS (port 465). When false we use STARTTLS on the
/// configured port (587 typical). Either way the connection is
/// encrypted — we never offer plaintext SMTP.
#[serde(default)]
pub smtp_implicit_tls: bool,
}
fn default_smtp_port() -> u16 {
587
}
impl NotifyConfig {
/// True when enabled and the active provider has the fields it
/// needs to actually send.
#[must_use]
pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
if !self.enabled {
return false;
}
if self.kind.is_webhook() {
!self.webhook_url.trim().is_empty()
} else {
!self.smtp_host.trim().is_empty() && !self.smtp_to.trim().is_empty()
}
}
/// A copy safe to return over the API: the SMTP password is blanked
/// (replaced with a non-empty sentinel only when one is set, so the
/// UI can show "configured" without leaking it).
#[must_use]
pub fn redacted(&self) -> NotifyConfig {
let mut c = self.clone();
if !c.smtp_password.is_empty() {
c.smtp_password = SECRET_SENTINEL.to_string();
}
c
}
}
/// Returned by the API in place of a stored password. When the UI PUTs
/// this value back unchanged we keep the existing password rather than
/// overwriting it with the sentinel.
pub const SECRET_SENTINEL: &str = "__keep__";
/// In-memory + on-disk notification config registry.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct NotifyStore {
path: Arc<PathBuf>,
inner: Arc<RwLock<NotifyConfig>>,
}
impl NotifyStore {
#[must_use]
pub fn load_or_default(work_dir: &std::path::Path) -> Self {
let path = work_dir.join("notify.json");
let cfg = match std::fs::read_to_string(&path) {
Ok(text) => serde_json::from_str::<NotifyConfig>(&text).unwrap_or_else(|e| {
tracing::warn!(
target: "openpxe::notify",
"notify.json unreadable ({e}); starting with defaults"
);
NotifyConfig::default()
}),
Err(_) => NotifyConfig::default(),
};
Self {
path: Arc::new(path),
inner: Arc::new(RwLock::new(cfg)),
}
}
#[must_use]
pub fn snapshot(&self) -> NotifyConfig {
self.inner.read().clone()
}
/// Replace the whole config. `incoming.smtp_password == SECRET_SENTINEL`
/// is treated as "keep the existing password" so the UI never has to
/// round-trip the real secret.
pub fn replace(&self, mut incoming: NotifyConfig) -> Result<NotifyConfig> {
incoming.webhook_url = incoming.webhook_url.trim().to_string();
incoming.smtp_host = incoming.smtp_host.trim().to_string();
incoming.smtp_username = incoming.smtp_username.trim().to_string();
incoming.smtp_from = incoming.smtp_from.trim().to_string();
incoming.smtp_to = incoming.smtp_to.trim().to_string();
// Preserve the stored password when the UI sends the sentinel.
if incoming.smtp_password == SECRET_SENTINEL {
incoming
.smtp_password
.clone_from(&self.inner.read().smtp_password);
}
// Length caps.
if incoming.webhook_url.len() > MAX_URL_LEN {
return Err(Error::Invalid(format!(
"webhook URL exceeds {MAX_URL_LEN}-char cap"
)));
}
for (name, v) in [
("smtp_host", &incoming.smtp_host),
("smtp_username", &incoming.smtp_username),
("smtp_from", &incoming.smtp_from),
("smtp_to", &incoming.smtp_to),
] {
if v.len() > MAX_FIELD_LEN {
return Err(Error::Invalid(format!(
"{name} exceeds {MAX_FIELD_LEN}-char cap"
)));
}
}
// Validate the active provider only when enabling.
if incoming.enabled {
if incoming.kind.is_webhook() {
if incoming.webhook_url.is_empty() {
return Err(Error::Invalid(
"a webhook URL is required to enable chat notifications".into(),
));
}
if !incoming.webhook_url.starts_with("https://")
&& !incoming.webhook_url.starts_with("http://")
{
return Err(Error::Invalid(
"webhook URL must start with http:// or https://".into(),
));
}
} else {
if incoming.smtp_host.is_empty() {
return Err(Error::Invalid(
"SMTP host is required to enable email notifications".into(),
));
}
if incoming.smtp_to.is_empty() {
return Err(Error::Invalid(
"a recipient (To) is required to enable email notifications".into(),
));
}
if incoming.smtp_port == 0 {
return Err(Error::Invalid("SMTP port must be non-zero".into()));
}
}
}
{
let mut g = self.inner.write();
*g = incoming.clone();
}
self.persist();
tracing::info!(
target: "openpxe::notify",
enabled = incoming.enabled, kind = ?incoming.kind,
"notification configuration updated"
);
Ok(incoming)
}
fn persist(&self) {
let snap = self.inner.read().clone();
let body = match serde_json::to_vec_pretty(&snap) {
Ok(b) => b,
Err(e) => {
tracing::warn!(target: "openpxe::notify", "serialize notify.json: {e}");
return;
}
};
if let Some(parent) = self.path.parent() {
let _ = std::fs::create_dir_all(parent);
}
let tmp = self.path.with_extension("json.tmp");
if let Err(e) = std::fs::write(&tmp, body) {
tracing::warn!(target: "openpxe::notify", "write notify.json tmp: {e}");
return;
}
if let Err(e) = std::fs::rename(&tmp, self.path.as_path()) {
tracing::warn!(target: "openpxe::notify", "rename notify.json: {e}");
}
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use tempfile::tempdir;
#[test]
fn default_disabled_not_usable() {
let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
let s = NotifyStore::load_or_default(dir.path());
assert!(!s.snapshot().enabled);
assert!(!s.snapshot().is_usable());
}
#[test]
fn slack_requires_url_when_enabled() {
let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
let s = NotifyStore::load_or_default(dir.path());
let r = s.replace(NotifyConfig {
enabled: true,
kind: NotifyKind::Slack,
..Default::default()
});
assert!(matches!(r, Err(Error::Invalid(_))));
s.replace(NotifyConfig {
enabled: true,
kind: NotifyKind::Slack,
webhook_url: "https://hooks.slack.com/services/XXX".into(),
..Default::default()
})
.unwrap();
assert!(s.snapshot().is_usable());
}
#[test]
fn smtp_requires_host_and_recipient() {
let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
let s = NotifyStore::load_or_default(dir.path());
let r = s.replace(NotifyConfig {
enabled: true,
kind: NotifyKind::Smtp,
smtp_host: "smtp.example.com".into(),
..Default::default()
});
assert!(matches!(r, Err(Error::Invalid(_))), "missing recipient should reject");
s.replace(NotifyConfig {
enabled: true,
kind: NotifyKind::Smtp,
smtp_host: "smtp.example.com".into(),
smtp_port: 587,
smtp_to: "[email protected]".into(),
smtp_from: "[email protected]".into(),
..Default::default()
})
.unwrap();
assert!(s.snapshot().is_usable());
}
#[test]
fn password_sentinel_preserves_stored_secret() {
let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
let s = NotifyStore::load_or_default(dir.path());
s.replace(NotifyConfig {
enabled: true,
kind: NotifyKind::Smtp,
smtp_host: "smtp.example.com".into(),
smtp_port: 587,
smtp_to: "[email protected]".into(),
smtp_password: "s3cret".into(),
..Default::default()
})
.unwrap();
// Redacted snapshot hides the password behind the sentinel.
assert_eq!(s.snapshot().redacted().smtp_password, SECRET_SENTINEL);
// PUTting the sentinel back keeps the real password.
s.replace(NotifyConfig {
enabled: true,
kind: NotifyKind::Smtp,
smtp_host: "smtp.example.com".into(),
smtp_port: 587,
smtp_to: "[email protected]".into(),
smtp_password: SECRET_SENTINEL.into(),
..Default::default()
})
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(s.snapshot().smtp_password, "s3cret");
}
#[test]
fn webhook_url_scheme_enforced() {
let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
let s = NotifyStore::load_or_default(dir.path());
let r = s.replace(NotifyConfig {
enabled: true,
kind: NotifyKind::Discord,
webhook_url: "ftp://example.com/hook".into(),
..Default::default()
});
assert!(matches!(r, Err(Error::Invalid(_))));
}
}
+24 -28
View File
@@ -1,16 +1,16 @@
//! Queued Deployment queue.
//!
//! When a client selects "Queued Deployment" at the PXE menu, iPXE POSTs to
//! `/api/queue/join` and receives a queue position. It then enters a poll
//! `/api/queue/join` and receives a gate position. It then enters a poll
//! loop hitting `/api/queue/poll/<id>`; the server holds the request open
//! until either (a) the operator assigns an ISO from the WebUI, in which
//! case the poll returns an iPXE `chain` URL, or (b) the poll times out
//! (iPXE's HTTP client has its own timeout), in which case iPXE re-POSTs.
//!
//! The WebUI shows the queue (`GET /api/queue`) and issues
//! The WebUI shows the queue (`GET /api/gate`) and issues
//! `POST /api/queue/assign { iso_id, entry_ids: [...] }` to launch a single
//! ISO across many queued clients at once. Every waiting machine receives
//! the assignment without operator visits at the rack.
//! ISO across many gated clients at once. This is the "horse-race gate"
//! UX the user asked for — every horse leaves the line simultaneously.
use parking_lot::RwLock;
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
@@ -23,11 +23,11 @@ use uuid::Uuid;
use crate::ClientArch;
/// Per-client queue state visible to the WebUI.
/// Per-gate state visible to the WebUI.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct QueueEntry {
pub struct Gate {
pub id: String,
/// 1-based queue position — position 1 is whoever got there first.
/// 1-based race-gate position — position 1 is whoever got there first.
pub position: u32,
pub mac: String,
pub ip: Option<IpAddr>,
@@ -55,8 +55,8 @@ struct QueueEntryInner {
}
impl QueueEntryInner {
fn snapshot(&self) -> QueueEntry {
QueueEntry {
fn snapshot(&self) -> Gate {
Gate {
id: self.id.clone(),
position: self.position,
mac: self.mac.clone(),
@@ -80,25 +80,21 @@ impl DeploymentQueue {
Arc::new(Self::default())
}
/// Add a client to the queue. Returns the current queue snapshot. If the
/// MAC is already queued, the existing entry is returned unchanged —
/// Add a client to the gate. Returns the new `Gate` snapshot. If the
/// MAC is already queued, the existing gate is returned unchanged —
/// retrying iPXE clients don't duplicate their slot.
pub fn join(&self, mac: &str, ip: Option<IpAddr>, arch: Option<ClientArch>) -> QueueEntry {
pub fn join(&self, mac: &str, ip: Option<IpAddr>, arch: Option<ClientArch>) -> Gate {
let now = OffsetDateTime::now_utc();
let mut guard = self.inner.write();
if let Some(existing) = guard.values_mut().find(|g| g.mac == mac) {
existing.last_poll_at = now;
if ip.is_some() {
existing.ip = ip;
}
if arch.is_some() {
existing.arch = arch;
}
if ip.is_some() { existing.ip = ip; }
if arch.is_some() { existing.arch = arch; }
return existing.snapshot();
}
// Queue position = max(position) + 1, or 1 if empty.
// Race position = max(position) + 1, or 1 if empty.
let next_pos = guard.values().map(|g| g.position).max().unwrap_or(0) + 1;
let id = Uuid::new_v4().to_string();
let inner = QueueEntryInner {
@@ -117,24 +113,24 @@ impl DeploymentQueue {
snap
}
/// Look up the `Notify` primitive for a given queue entry id, for long-polling.
/// Look up the `Notify` primitive for a given gate id, for long-polling.
#[must_use]
pub fn notifier(&self, entry_id: &str) -> Option<Arc<Notify>> {
self.inner.read().get(entry_id).map(|g| g.notify.clone())
}
/// Update the last-poll timestamp (keeps the queue's "live" indicator
/// Update the last-poll timestamp (keeps the gate's "live" indicator
/// fresh in the UI) and return the current snapshot. Returns None if
/// the entry was released/expired between requests.
pub fn touch(&self, entry_id: &str) -> Option<QueueEntry> {
/// the gate was released/expired between requests.
pub fn touch(&self, entry_id: &str) -> Option<Gate> {
let mut guard = self.inner.write();
let g = guard.get_mut(entry_id)?;
g.last_poll_at = OffsetDateTime::now_utc();
Some(g.snapshot())
}
/// Operator assigns an ISO entry (boot_entry id) to one or more clients.
/// Returns the number of queue entries that were updated. Entries not in the
/// Operator assigns an ISO entry (boot_entry id) to one or more gates.
/// Returns the number of gates that were updated. Gates not in the
/// queue are silently skipped.
pub fn assign(&self, entry_ids: &[String], target: &str) -> usize {
let mut guard = self.inner.write();
@@ -149,9 +145,9 @@ impl DeploymentQueue {
updated
}
/// Remove a queue entry and return its final snapshot. Called after the client
/// Remove a gate and return its final snapshot. Called after the client
/// has successfully chained onto its assignment.
pub fn release(&self, entry_id: &str) -> Option<QueueEntry> {
pub fn release(&self, entry_id: &str) -> Option<Gate> {
let mut guard = self.inner.write();
let g = guard.remove(entry_id)?;
g.notify.notify_waiters();
@@ -166,7 +162,7 @@ impl DeploymentQueue {
}
#[must_use]
pub fn list(&self) -> Vec<QueueEntry> {
pub fn list(&self) -> Vec<Gate> {
let guard = self.inner.read();
let mut v: Vec<_> = guard.values().map(QueueEntryInner::snapshot).collect();
v.sort_by_key(|g| g.position);
-188
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//! AuthnRequest construction + HTTP-Redirect binding encoding.
//!
//! For SP-initiated login we build an `<AuthnRequest>`, then encode it for the
//! HTTP-Redirect binding: raw DEFLATE (RFC 1951) → base64 → percent-encode,
//! appended as the `SAMLRequest` query parameter. AuthnRequests are sent
//! unsigned in this release (the IdP must not require client signatures).
use std::fmt::Write as _;
use std::io::Write as _;
use base64::Engine;
use flate2::write::DeflateEncoder;
use flate2::Compression;
use time::format_description::well_known::Rfc3339;
use time::OffsetDateTime;
use super::{SamlError, SpParams};
const NS_PROTOCOL: &str = "urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol";
const NS_ASSERTION: &str = "urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion";
const NAMEID_EMAIL: &str = "urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.1:nameid-format:emailAddress";
const BINDING_POST: &str = "urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:bindings:HTTP-POST";
/// A built AuthnRequest, ready to redirect the browser to the IdP.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct AuthnRequest {
/// The request `ID` — the caller records this so the matching response's
/// `InResponseTo` can be correlated (replay/CSRF protection).
pub id: String,
/// The full IdP URL to 302 the browser to (includes `SAMLRequest` and,
/// when supplied, `RelayState`).
pub location: String,
}
/// Build an AuthnRequest targeting `idp_sso_url` and encode it for the
/// HTTP-Redirect binding. `relay_state`, if given, round-trips back to us via
/// the response (we use it to send the operator to their intended page).
pub fn build(
sp: &SpParams,
idp_sso_url: &str,
relay_state: Option<&str>,
) -> Result<AuthnRequest, SamlError> {
let id = format!("_{}", uuid::Uuid::new_v4().simple());
let issue_instant = OffsetDateTime::now_utc()
.replace_nanosecond(0)
.unwrap_or_else(|_| OffsetDateTime::now_utc())
.format(&Rfc3339)
.map_err(|e| SamlError::Timestamp(e.to_string()))?;
let xml = format!(
r#"<samlp:AuthnRequest xmlns:samlp="{NS_PROTOCOL}" xmlns:saml="{NS_ASSERTION}" ID="{id}" Version="2.0" IssueInstant="{instant}" Destination="{dest}" ProtocolBinding="{BINDING_POST}" AssertionConsumerServiceURL="{acs}"><saml:Issuer>{issuer}</saml:Issuer><samlp:NameIDPolicy Format="{NAMEID_EMAIL}" AllowCreate="true"/></samlp:AuthnRequest>"#,
instant = issue_instant,
dest = xml_escape(idp_sso_url),
acs = xml_escape(&sp.acs_url),
issuer = xml_escape(&sp.entity_id),
);
let encoded = deflate_base64(&xml)?;
let sep = if idp_sso_url.contains('?') { '&' } else { '?' };
let mut location = format!("{idp_sso_url}{sep}SAMLRequest={}", pct_encode(&encoded));
if let Some(rs) = relay_state {
location.push_str("&RelayState=");
location.push_str(&pct_encode(rs));
}
Ok(AuthnRequest { id, location })
}
/// Raw-DEFLATE then base64 — the HTTP-Redirect binding's `SAMLRequest` payload.
fn deflate_base64(xml: &str) -> Result<String, SamlError> {
let mut enc = DeflateEncoder::new(Vec::new(), Compression::default());
enc.write_all(xml.as_bytes())
.and_then(|()| enc.try_finish())
.map_err(|e| SamlError::Xml(format!("deflate: {e}")))?;
let compressed = enc
.finish()
.map_err(|e| SamlError::Xml(format!("deflate: {e}")))?;
Ok(base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD.encode(compressed))
}
/// Percent-encode a query-string component (RFC 3986 unreserved set passes
/// through; everything else is `%XX`).
fn pct_encode(s: &str) -> String {
let mut out = String::with_capacity(s.len() * 3);
for b in s.bytes() {
match b {
b'A'..=b'Z' | b'a'..=b'z' | b'0'..=b'9' | b'-' | b'_' | b'.' | b'~' => {
out.push(b as char);
}
_ => {
let _ = write!(out, "%{b:02X}");
}
}
}
out
}
fn xml_escape(s: &str) -> String {
let mut out = String::with_capacity(s.len());
for c in s.chars() {
match c {
'&' => out.push_str("&amp;"),
'<' => out.push_str("&lt;"),
'>' => out.push_str("&gt;"),
'"' => out.push_str("&quot;"),
'\'' => out.push_str("&apos;"),
_ => out.push(c),
}
}
out
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use flate2::read::DeflateDecoder;
use std::io::Read;
fn sp() -> SpParams {
SpParams {
entity_id: "https://pxe.example.com".into(),
acs_url: "https://pxe.example.com/api/sso/acs".into(),
}
}
fn pct_decode(s: &str) -> Vec<u8> {
let bytes = s.as_bytes();
let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(bytes.len());
let mut i = 0;
while i < bytes.len() {
if bytes[i] == b'%' && i + 2 < bytes.len() {
let hi = (bytes[i + 1] as char).to_digit(16).unwrap();
let lo = (bytes[i + 2] as char).to_digit(16).unwrap();
out.push((hi * 16 + lo) as u8);
i += 3;
} else {
out.push(bytes[i]);
i += 1;
}
}
out
}
#[test]
fn id_is_ncname_and_location_has_request() {
let req = build(&sp(), "https://idp.example.com/sso", Some("/dashboard")).unwrap();
assert!(req.id.starts_with('_'));
assert!(req
.location
.starts_with("https://idp.example.com/sso?SAMLRequest="));
assert!(req.location.contains("&RelayState=%2Fdashboard"));
}
#[test]
fn redirect_payload_round_trips_to_our_authn_request() {
let req = build(&sp(), "https://idp.example.com/sso", None).unwrap();
// Pull SAMLRequest value out of the query string.
let q = req.location.split("SAMLRequest=").nth(1).unwrap();
let val = q.split('&').next().unwrap();
let compressed = base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD
.decode(pct_decode(val))
.unwrap();
let mut inflate = DeflateDecoder::new(&compressed[..]);
let mut xml = String::new();
inflate.read_to_string(&mut xml).unwrap();
let doc = roxmltree::Document::parse(&xml).unwrap();
let root = doc.root_element();
assert_eq!(root.tag_name().name(), "AuthnRequest");
assert_eq!(root.attribute("ID").unwrap(), req.id);
assert_eq!(
root.attribute("AssertionConsumerServiceURL").unwrap(),
"https://pxe.example.com/api/sso/acs"
);
let issuer = root
.descendants()
.find(|n| n.tag_name().name() == "Issuer")
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(issuer.text().unwrap(), "https://pxe.example.com");
}
#[test]
fn existing_query_uses_ampersand_separator() {
let req = build(&sp(), "https://idp.example.com/sso?foo=bar", None).unwrap();
assert!(req.location.contains("?foo=bar&SAMLRequest="));
}
}
-241
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//! IdP metadata parsing + SP metadata generation.
//!
//! We parse only what the SP flow needs: the IdP Entity ID, its
//! `SingleSignOnService` endpoints (HTTP-Redirect / HTTP-POST), and the
//! X.509 signing certificate(s). Everything else in the document is ignored.
use base64::Engine;
use super::{SamlError, SpParams};
/// SAML 2.0 binding URIs.
pub const BINDING_REDIRECT: &str = "urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:bindings:HTTP-Redirect";
pub const BINDING_POST: &str = "urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:bindings:HTTP-POST";
/// The subset of an IdP's `EntityDescriptor` the SP flow consumes.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct IdpMetadata {
/// The IdP's Entity ID — we require incoming assertions to be issued by it.
pub entity_id: String,
/// SSO endpoint for the HTTP-Redirect binding (where we send AuthnRequests).
pub sso_redirect_url: Option<String>,
/// SSO endpoint for the HTTP-POST binding (fallback target).
pub sso_post_url: Option<String>,
/// DER-encoded X.509 signing certificate(s). More than one appears during
/// key rotation; verification tries each.
pub signing_certs_der: Vec<Vec<u8>>,
}
impl IdpMetadata {
/// Parse an IdP `EntityDescriptor` document.
///
/// Robust to namespace-prefix variation (matches on local element names),
/// since IdPs disagree on prefixes (`md:`, `ns0:`, default, …).
pub fn parse(xml: &str) -> Result<Self, SamlError> {
let doc = roxmltree::Document::parse(xml).map_err(|e| SamlError::Xml(e.to_string()))?;
let root = doc.root_element();
// The signing IDP descriptor. Some metadata wraps multiple
// descriptors (AA, SP) in one document; we want IDPSSODescriptor.
let idp_desc = root
.descendants()
.find(|n| n.is_element() && n.tag_name().name() == "IDPSSODescriptor")
.ok_or_else(|| SamlError::Metadata("IDPSSODescriptor".into()))?;
// Entity ID lives on the EntityDescriptor (root, or an ancestor of the
// IDPSSODescriptor when several are nested).
let entity_id = idp_desc
.ancestors()
.find_map(|n| {
if n.tag_name().name() == "EntityDescriptor" {
n.attribute("entityID")
} else {
None
}
})
.or_else(|| root.attribute("entityID"))
.map(str::to_owned)
.ok_or_else(|| SamlError::Metadata("entityID".into()))?;
let mut sso_redirect_url = None;
let mut sso_post_url = None;
for sso in idp_desc
.children()
.filter(|n| n.is_element() && n.tag_name().name() == "SingleSignOnService")
{
let binding = sso.attribute("Binding").unwrap_or("");
let location = sso.attribute("Location").map(str::to_owned);
match binding {
BINDING_REDIRECT if sso_redirect_url.is_none() => sso_redirect_url = location,
BINDING_POST if sso_post_url.is_none() => sso_post_url = location,
_ => {}
}
}
// Signing certs: KeyDescriptor with use="signing" or no use attribute
// (a bare KeyDescriptor is valid for both signing and encryption).
let mut signing_certs_der = Vec::new();
for kd in idp_desc
.children()
.filter(|n| n.is_element() && n.tag_name().name() == "KeyDescriptor")
{
match kd.attribute("use") {
Some("signing") | None => {}
Some(_) => continue, // encryption-only key — skip
}
for cert_node in kd
.descendants()
.filter(|n| n.is_element() && n.tag_name().name() == "X509Certificate")
{
let b64: String = node_text(&cert_node)
.chars()
.filter(|c| !c.is_whitespace())
.collect();
if b64.is_empty() {
continue;
}
let der = base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD
.decode(b64.as_bytes())
.map_err(|e| SamlError::Base64(e.to_string()))?;
signing_certs_der.push(der);
}
}
if signing_certs_der.is_empty() {
return Err(SamlError::NoSigningCert);
}
Ok(Self {
entity_id,
sso_redirect_url,
sso_post_url,
signing_certs_der,
})
}
/// Preferred SSO destination for an outbound AuthnRequest: HTTP-Redirect
/// if advertised, otherwise HTTP-POST.
pub fn sso_destination(&self) -> Option<&str> {
self.sso_redirect_url
.as_deref()
.or(self.sso_post_url.as_deref())
}
}
/// Build our SP `EntityDescriptor` XML so an IdP admin can import OpenPXE as a
/// relying party. Advertises the ACS URL (HTTP-POST binding) and an emailAddress
/// NameID format — matching what the response path expects.
pub fn build_sp_metadata(sp: &SpParams) -> String {
let entity = xml_escape(&sp.entity_id);
let acs = xml_escape(&sp.acs_url);
format!(
r#"<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<EntityDescriptor xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:metadata" entityID="{entity}">
<SPSSODescriptor AuthnRequestsSigned="false" WantAssertionsSigned="true" protocolSupportEnumeration="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol">
<NameIDFormat>urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.1:nameid-format:emailAddress</NameIDFormat>
<AssertionConsumerService Binding="{BINDING_POST}" Location="{acs}" index="0" isDefault="true"/>
</SPSSODescriptor>
</EntityDescriptor>
"#
)
}
/// Collect the concatenated text of an element's direct text children.
fn node_text(n: &roxmltree::Node<'_, '_>) -> String {
n.children()
.filter(roxmltree::Node::is_text)
.filter_map(|c| c.text())
.collect()
}
/// Minimal XML attribute/text escaping for the values we interpolate.
fn xml_escape(s: &str) -> String {
let mut out = String::with_capacity(s.len());
for c in s.chars() {
match c {
'&' => out.push_str("&amp;"),
'<' => out.push_str("&lt;"),
'>' => out.push_str("&gt;"),
'"' => out.push_str("&quot;"),
'\'' => out.push_str("&apos;"),
_ => out.push(c),
}
}
out
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
// A trimmed-down Keycloak-style IdP descriptor (cert body is a stand-in;
// signing tests build real certs in the parent module's tests).
const SAMPLE: &str = r#"<md:EntityDescriptor xmlns:md="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:metadata"
xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"
entityID="https://idp.example.com/realms/fleet">
<md:IDPSSODescriptor protocolSupportEnumeration="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol">
<md:KeyDescriptor use="signing">
<ds:KeyInfo><ds:X509Data><ds:X509Certificate>
QUJDREVG
</ds:X509Certificate></ds:X509Data></ds:KeyInfo>
</md:KeyDescriptor>
<md:KeyDescriptor use="encryption">
<ds:KeyInfo><ds:X509Data><ds:X509Certificate>WlpaWg==</ds:X509Certificate></ds:X509Data></ds:KeyInfo>
</md:KeyDescriptor>
<md:SingleSignOnService Binding="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:bindings:HTTP-Redirect"
Location="https://idp.example.com/realms/fleet/protocol/saml"/>
<md:SingleSignOnService Binding="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:bindings:HTTP-POST"
Location="https://idp.example.com/realms/fleet/protocol/saml"/>
</md:IDPSSODescriptor>
</md:EntityDescriptor>"#;
#[test]
fn parses_entity_sso_and_signing_cert() {
let m = IdpMetadata::parse(SAMPLE).unwrap();
assert_eq!(m.entity_id, "https://idp.example.com/realms/fleet");
assert_eq!(
m.sso_redirect_url.as_deref(),
Some("https://idp.example.com/realms/fleet/protocol/saml")
);
assert!(m.sso_post_url.is_some());
// Only the signing KeyDescriptor's cert is collected (ABCDEF), not the
// encryption one (ZZZZ).
assert_eq!(m.signing_certs_der.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(m.signing_certs_der[0], b"ABCDEF");
}
#[test]
fn missing_signing_cert_is_rejected() {
let xml = r#"<EntityDescriptor xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:metadata" entityID="x">
<IDPSSODescriptor>
<SingleSignOnService Binding="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:bindings:HTTP-Redirect" Location="https://x/sso"/>
</IDPSSODescriptor></EntityDescriptor>"#;
assert!(matches!(
IdpMetadata::parse(xml),
Err(SamlError::NoSigningCert)
));
}
#[test]
fn missing_idp_descriptor_is_rejected() {
let xml = r#"<EntityDescriptor xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:metadata" entityID="x"></EntityDescriptor>"#;
assert!(matches!(
IdpMetadata::parse(xml),
Err(SamlError::Metadata(_))
));
}
#[test]
fn sp_metadata_contains_entity_and_acs() {
let sp = SpParams {
entity_id: "https://pxe.example.com".into(),
acs_url: "https://pxe.example.com/api/sso/acs".into(),
};
let xml = build_sp_metadata(&sp);
assert!(xml.contains(r#"entityID="https://pxe.example.com""#));
assert!(xml.contains("https://pxe.example.com/api/sso/acs"));
assert!(xml.contains(BINDING_POST));
// Must be well-formed.
roxmltree::Document::parse(&xml).unwrap();
}
}
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@@ -1,92 +0,0 @@
//! Pure-Rust SAML 2.0 Service Provider (v0.5.1).
//!
//! This module implements the SP half of a SAML Web-Browser-SSO profile:
//!
//! * [`metadata`] — parse the IdP's `EntityDescriptor` (SSO URLs + signing
//! certificates) and build *our* SP metadata for the IdP admin to import.
//! * [`authn_request`] — build an `AuthnRequest` and encode it for the
//! HTTP-Redirect binding.
//! * [`response`] — decode a `SAMLResponse`, **verify its XML signature**
//! against the IdP's pinned certificate (via the pure-Rust `bergshamra`
//! crate — no OpenSSL/libxml2/xmlsec, so the static musl binary stays
//! C-free), then enforce the SP-side semantic checks (Status, Destination,
//! Audience, time bounds) that are where SAML SPs actually get attacked.
//!
//! Stateful checks (replay of assertion IDs, correlating `InResponseTo`
//! against requests *we* issued, gating IdP-initiated login) live in the
//! HTTP layer — [`response::consume`] is deliberately stateless and returns
//! the IDs the caller needs to perform them.
//!
//! Access model: any assertion the IdP authenticates and we cryptographically
//! verify yields an operator [`VerifiedPrincipal`]. OpenPXE is single-tier —
//! there is no per-user role table — and the local admin account remains a
//! guaranteed fallback owner regardless of SSO state.
pub mod authn_request;
pub mod metadata;
pub mod response;
pub use authn_request::AuthnRequest;
pub use metadata::IdpMetadata;
pub use response::{VerifiedPrincipal, VerifiedResponse};
use thiserror::Error;
/// Default clock-skew tolerance applied to assertion time bounds. SAML IdPs
/// and SPs rarely have perfectly synced clocks; 60s matches common practice
/// (Shibboleth/FleetDM defaults are in this ballpark).
pub const DEFAULT_CLOCK_SKEW_SECS: i64 = 60;
/// Runtime SP parameters, derived from [`crate::SsoConfig`] + the advertised
/// public base URL by the HTTP layer.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct SpParams {
/// Our SP Entity ID (the `<Issuer>` we send and the `Audience` we require
/// in responses). Defaults to the public base URL when the operator left
/// the Entity ID field blank.
pub entity_id: String,
/// The Assertion Consumer Service URL the IdP POSTs the response to —
/// `<public_base_url>/api/sso/acs`.
pub acs_url: String,
}
/// Everything that can go wrong consuming a SAML response. Kept coarse on
/// purpose: the HTTP layer logs the detail and shows the operator a generic
/// "SSO sign-in failed" — we never leak which specific check tripped to the
/// browser, since that aids an attacker probing the SP.
#[derive(Debug, Error)]
pub enum SamlError {
#[error("SAML XML parse error: {0}")]
Xml(String),
#[error("IdP metadata is missing a required element: {0}")]
Metadata(String),
#[error("no usable IdP signing certificate in metadata")]
NoSigningCert,
#[error("signature verification failed: {0}")]
Signature(String),
#[error("the signature does not cover the assertion we read")]
SignatureScope,
#[error("SAML response status was not Success: {0}")]
Status(String),
#[error("response is missing a required element: {0}")]
MissingElement(String),
#[error("encrypted assertions are not supported in this release")]
EncryptedAssertionUnsupported,
#[error("expected exactly one assertion, found {0}")]
AssertionCount(usize),
#[error("issuer mismatch: response was not issued by the configured IdP")]
IssuerMismatch,
#[error("audience mismatch: assertion is not addressed to this service provider")]
AudienceMismatch,
#[error("response destination does not match our ACS URL")]
DestinationMismatch,
#[error("assertion is expired or not yet valid")]
TimeBounds,
#[error("invalid SAML timestamp: {0}")]
Timestamp(String),
#[error("base64 decode failed: {0}")]
Base64(String),
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests;
-294
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@@ -1,294 +0,0 @@
//! SAMLResponse consumption: signature verification + SP-side validation.
//!
//! [`consume`] is intentionally **stateless** — it verifies the XML signature
//! against the IdP's pinned certificate(s) and enforces every check that can
//! be made from the response alone (Status, Destination, Issuer, Audience,
//! time bounds, signature scope). It then returns the `assertion_id` and
//! `in_response_to` so the HTTP layer can perform the *stateful* checks it
//! owns: replay rejection, correlating the request we issued, and gating
//! IdP-initiated login.
use roxmltree::{Document, Node};
use time::format_description::well_known::Rfc3339;
use time::{Duration, OffsetDateTime};
use super::metadata::IdpMetadata;
use super::{SamlError, SpParams};
const STATUS_SUCCESS: &str = "urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:status:Success";
/// The verified subject of a SAML assertion. OpenPXE is single-tier, so this
/// is all an operator session needs.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct VerifiedPrincipal {
/// The `<NameID>` value (an email, per our requested NameID format).
pub name_id: String,
/// Email used as the session identity. Equals `name_id` for the
/// emailAddress NameID format.
pub email: String,
/// Human-readable display name, if the IdP sent one as an attribute.
pub display_name: Option<String>,
}
/// Result of a successful [`consume`]. The IDs/expiry feed the HTTP layer's
/// stateful checks.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct VerifiedResponse {
pub principal: VerifiedPrincipal,
/// `InResponseTo` from the response, if present. `None` = unsolicited
/// (IdP-initiated) — the HTTP layer only accepts that when the operator
/// enabled it.
pub in_response_to: Option<String>,
/// The assertion's `ID` — used by the caller as the replay-guard key.
pub assertion_id: String,
/// The assertion's expiry (`Conditions/@NotOnOrAfter`) — the replay
/// guard can drop the consumed ID after this instant.
pub assertion_expiry: OffsetDateTime,
/// `AuthnStatement/@SessionIndex`, if present (useful for future SLO).
pub session_index: Option<String>,
}
/// Verify and validate a decoded `SAMLResponse` XML document.
pub fn consume(
xml: &str,
sp: &SpParams,
idp: &IdpMetadata,
now: OffsetDateTime,
clock_skew: Duration,
) -> Result<VerifiedResponse, SamlError> {
// 1. Cryptographically verify the signature against the pinned IdP cert(s).
// `trusted_keys_only` ignores any cert embedded in the document's
// KeyInfo, so an attacker can't substitute their own key.
let verified_uris = verify_signature(xml, &idp.signing_certs_der)?;
// 2. Parse for semantic validation.
let doc = Document::parse(xml).map_err(|e| SamlError::Xml(e.to_string()))?;
let root = doc.root_element();
if root.tag_name().name() != "Response" {
return Err(SamlError::MissingElement("Response".into()));
}
let response_id = root.attribute("ID").map(str::to_owned);
let in_response_to = root.attribute("InResponseTo").map(str::to_owned);
// 3. Status must be Success.
let status_value = root
.descendants()
.find(|n| n.is_element() && n.tag_name().name() == "StatusCode")
.and_then(|sc| sc.attribute("Value"))
.unwrap_or("");
if status_value != STATUS_SUCCESS && !status_value.ends_with(":Success") {
return Err(SamlError::Status(status_value.to_owned()));
}
// 4. Destination (if the IdP set one) must be our ACS.
if let Some(dest) = root.attribute("Destination") {
if !urls_equal(dest, &sp.acs_url) {
return Err(SamlError::DestinationMismatch);
}
}
// 5. Exactly one (unencrypted) Assertion.
if root
.descendants()
.any(|n| n.is_element() && n.tag_name().name() == "EncryptedAssertion")
{
return Err(SamlError::EncryptedAssertionUnsupported);
}
let assertions: Vec<Node<'_, '_>> = root
.children()
.filter(|c| c.is_element() && c.tag_name().name() == "Assertion")
.collect();
if assertions.len() != 1 {
return Err(SamlError::AssertionCount(assertions.len()));
}
let assertion = assertions[0];
let assertion_id = assertion
.attribute("ID")
.map(str::to_owned)
.ok_or_else(|| SamlError::MissingElement("Assertion/@ID".into()))?;
// 6. The signature must actually cover the assertion we're about to trust:
// either the assertion itself, the enclosing response, or the whole
// document. (bergshamra's strict_verification already constrains where
// the signed element may sit; this ties it to *our* assertion.)
let covers_assertion = verified_uris.iter().any(|u| {
u.is_empty()
|| u == &format!("#{assertion_id}")
|| response_id
.as_ref()
.is_some_and(|rid| u == &format!("#{rid}"))
});
if !covers_assertion {
return Err(SamlError::SignatureScope);
}
// 7. Issuer must be the configured IdP.
let issuer = first_child(assertion, "Issuer")
.map(text_of)
.unwrap_or_default();
if !idp.entity_id.is_empty() && issuer != idp.entity_id {
return Err(SamlError::IssuerMismatch);
}
// 8. Subject → NameID + SubjectConfirmationData time/recipient checks.
let subject = first_child(assertion, "Subject")
.ok_or_else(|| SamlError::MissingElement("Subject".into()))?;
let name_id = first_child(subject, "NameID")
.map(text_of)
.filter(|s| !s.is_empty())
.ok_or_else(|| SamlError::MissingElement("NameID".into()))?;
if let Some(scd) = subject
.descendants()
.find(|n| n.is_element() && n.tag_name().name() == "SubjectConfirmationData")
{
if let Some(recipient) = scd.attribute("Recipient") {
if !urls_equal(recipient, &sp.acs_url) {
return Err(SamlError::DestinationMismatch);
}
}
if let Some(noa) = scd.attribute("NotOnOrAfter") {
let noa = parse_instant(noa)?;
if now >= noa + clock_skew {
return Err(SamlError::TimeBounds);
}
}
}
// 9. Conditions: time window + audience.
let conditions = first_child(assertion, "Conditions");
if let Some(cond) = conditions {
if let Some(nb) = cond.attribute("NotBefore") {
let nb = parse_instant(nb)?;
if now < nb - clock_skew {
return Err(SamlError::TimeBounds);
}
}
}
let assertion_expiry = conditions
.and_then(|c| c.attribute("NotOnOrAfter"))
.map(parse_instant)
.transpose()?
.ok_or_else(|| SamlError::MissingElement("Conditions/@NotOnOrAfter".into()))?;
if now >= assertion_expiry + clock_skew {
return Err(SamlError::TimeBounds);
}
let audience_ok = conditions.is_some_and(|c| {
c.descendants()
.filter(|n| n.is_element() && n.tag_name().name() == "Audience")
.any(|a| text_of(a) == sp.entity_id)
});
if !audience_ok {
return Err(SamlError::AudienceMismatch);
}
// 10. Optional: SessionIndex + display-name attribute.
let session_index = assertion
.descendants()
.find(|n| n.is_element() && n.tag_name().name() == "AuthnStatement")
.and_then(|a| a.attribute("SessionIndex"))
.map(str::to_owned);
let display_name = extract_display_name(assertion);
Ok(VerifiedResponse {
principal: VerifiedPrincipal {
email: name_id.clone(),
name_id,
display_name,
},
in_response_to,
assertion_id,
assertion_expiry,
session_index,
})
}
/// Verify the document's XML-DSig against each pinned IdP cert in turn
/// (handles key rotation), returning the verified `<Reference>` URIs.
fn verify_signature(xml: &str, certs_der: &[Vec<u8>]) -> Result<Vec<String>, SamlError> {
let mut last_err = String::from("no signing certificate matched");
for der in certs_der {
let key = match bergshamra::keys::loader::load_x509_cert_der(der) {
Ok(k) => k,
Err(e) => {
last_err = e.to_string();
continue;
}
};
let mut km = bergshamra::keys::KeysManager::new();
km.add_key(key);
// trusted_keys_only: only ever trust the pinned IdP key, never an
// inline KeyInfo cert. strict_verification: XSW positional defense.
let ctx = bergshamra::DsigContext::new(km)
.with_trusted_keys_only(true)
.with_strict_verification(true);
match bergshamra::verify(&ctx, xml) {
Ok(bergshamra::VerifyResult::Valid { references, .. }) => {
return Ok(references.into_iter().map(|r| r.uri).collect());
}
Ok(bergshamra::VerifyResult::Invalid { reason }) => last_err = reason,
Err(e) => last_err = e.to_string(),
}
}
Err(SamlError::Signature(last_err))
}
/// Pull a display name from the assertion's attribute statement, trying the
/// common attribute names IdPs use (FleetDM checks the same set).
fn extract_display_name(assertion: Node<'_, '_>) -> Option<String> {
const WANTED: &[&str] = &[
"name",
"displayname",
"cn",
"urn:oid:2.5.4.3",
"http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/claims/name",
];
for attr in assertion
.descendants()
.filter(|n| n.is_element() && n.tag_name().name() == "Attribute")
{
let key = attr
.attribute("Name")
.or_else(|| attr.attribute("FriendlyName"))
.unwrap_or("")
.to_ascii_lowercase();
if WANTED.contains(&key.as_str()) {
if let Some(val) = attr
.descendants()
.find(|n| n.is_element() && n.tag_name().name() == "AttributeValue")
{
let v = text_of(val);
if !v.is_empty() {
return Some(v);
}
}
}
}
None
}
fn first_child<'a, 'i>(n: Node<'a, 'i>, local: &str) -> Option<Node<'a, 'i>> {
n.children()
.find(|c| c.is_element() && c.tag_name().name() == local)
}
fn text_of(n: Node<'_, '_>) -> String {
n.children()
.filter(Node::is_text)
.filter_map(|c| c.text())
.collect::<String>()
.trim()
.to_owned()
}
/// Parse an `xs:dateTime` (e.g. `2026-05-31T12:00:00.000Z`).
fn parse_instant(s: &str) -> Result<OffsetDateTime, SamlError> {
OffsetDateTime::parse(s.trim(), &Rfc3339).map_err(|e| SamlError::Timestamp(format!("{s}: {e}")))
}
/// Compare two URLs for SAML endpoint-matching purposes: exact, or differing
/// only by a single trailing slash.
fn urls_equal(a: &str, b: &str) -> bool {
a == b || a.trim_end_matches('/') == b.trim_end_matches('/')
}
-287
View File
@@ -1,287 +0,0 @@
//! End-to-end SAML SP tests.
//!
//! We mint a throwaway self-signed cert/key with `rcgen`, sign a SAML Response
//! template with `bergshamra::sign` (the same engine that verifies it), and
//! drive [`response::consume`] through the accept path and every reject path.
//! This proves both the signature wiring and the SP-semantic checks.
use time::format_description::well_known::Rfc3339;
use time::{Duration, OffsetDateTime};
use super::metadata::IdpMetadata;
use super::{response, SamlError, SpParams};
const SP_ENTITY: &str = "https://pxe.example.com";
const ACS: &str = "https://pxe.example.com/api/sso/acs";
const IDP_ENTITY: &str = "https://idp.example.com/realms/fleet";
const EMAIL: &str = "[email protected]";
struct TestIdp {
cert_der: Vec<u8>,
key_pem: String,
}
fn test_idp() -> TestIdp {
let ck = rcgen::generate_simple_self_signed(vec!["idp.example.com".to_string()]).unwrap();
TestIdp {
cert_der: ck.cert.der().as_ref().to_vec(),
key_pem: ck.key_pair.serialize_pem(),
}
}
fn fmt(t: OffsetDateTime) -> String {
t.replace_nanosecond(0).unwrap().format(&Rfc3339).unwrap()
}
/// Knobs for building a response template — defaults are a valid response.
struct Resp {
issuer: String,
audience: String,
status: String,
not_before: OffsetDateTime,
not_on_or_after: OffsetDateTime,
in_response_to: Option<String>,
recipient: String,
}
impl Default for Resp {
fn default() -> Self {
let now = OffsetDateTime::now_utc();
Self {
issuer: IDP_ENTITY.into(),
audience: SP_ENTITY.into(),
status: "urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:status:Success".into(),
not_before: now - Duration::minutes(5),
not_on_or_after: now + Duration::hours(1),
in_response_to: Some("_req-abc".into()),
recipient: ACS.into(),
}
}
}
impl Resp {
/// The unsigned template (a `<ds:Signature>` with empty values).
fn template(&self) -> String {
let now = fmt(OffsetDateTime::now_utc());
let irt = self
.in_response_to
.as_ref()
.map(|v| format!(r#" InResponseTo="{v}""#))
.unwrap_or_default();
format!(
r##"<samlp:Response xmlns:samlp="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol" xmlns:saml="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion" ID="_resp1" Version="2.0" IssueInstant="{now}" Destination="{ACS}"{irt}>
<saml:Issuer>{issuer}</saml:Issuer>
<samlp:Status><samlp:StatusCode Value="{status}"/></samlp:Status>
<saml:Assertion ID="_assertion1" Version="2.0" IssueInstant="{now}">
<saml:Issuer>{issuer}</saml:Issuer>
<ds:Signature xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">
<ds:SignedInfo>
<ds:CanonicalizationMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"/>
<ds:SignatureMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#ecdsa-sha256"/>
<ds:Reference URI="#_assertion1">
<ds:Transforms>
<ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#enveloped-signature"/>
<ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"/>
</ds:Transforms>
<ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#sha256"/>
<ds:DigestValue></ds:DigestValue>
</ds:Reference>
</ds:SignedInfo>
<ds:SignatureValue></ds:SignatureValue>
</ds:Signature>
<saml:Subject>
<saml:NameID Format="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.1:nameid-format:emailAddress">{EMAIL}</saml:NameID>
<saml:SubjectConfirmation Method="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:cm:bearer">
<saml:SubjectConfirmationData Recipient="{recipient}" NotOnOrAfter="{noa}"{irt}/>
</saml:SubjectConfirmation>
</saml:Subject>
<saml:Conditions NotBefore="{nb}" NotOnOrAfter="{noa}">
<saml:AudienceRestriction><saml:Audience>{audience}</saml:Audience></saml:AudienceRestriction>
</saml:Conditions>
<saml:AuthnStatement AuthnInstant="{now}" SessionIndex="sess-123">
<saml:AuthnContext><saml:AuthnContextClassRef>urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:ac:classes:Password</saml:AuthnContextClassRef></saml:AuthnContext>
</saml:AuthnStatement>
<saml:AttributeStatement>
<saml:Attribute Name="displayName"><saml:AttributeValue>Miles Ward</saml:AttributeValue></saml:Attribute>
</saml:AttributeStatement>
</saml:Assertion>
</samlp:Response>"##,
issuer = self.issuer,
status = self.status,
audience = self.audience,
recipient = self.recipient,
nb = fmt(self.not_before),
noa = fmt(self.not_on_or_after),
)
}
}
fn sign(template: &str, key_pem: &str) -> String {
let key = bergshamra::keys::loader::load_pem_auto(key_pem.as_bytes(), None)
.expect("load test signing key");
let mut km = bergshamra::keys::KeysManager::new();
km.add_key(key);
let ctx = bergshamra::DsigContext::new(km);
bergshamra::sign(&ctx, template).expect("sign test response")
}
fn sp() -> SpParams {
SpParams {
entity_id: SP_ENTITY.into(),
acs_url: ACS.into(),
}
}
fn idp(cert_der: Vec<u8>) -> IdpMetadata {
IdpMetadata {
entity_id: IDP_ENTITY.into(),
sso_redirect_url: None,
sso_post_url: None,
signing_certs_der: vec![cert_der],
}
}
fn consume(xml: &str, cert_der: Vec<u8>) -> Result<response::VerifiedResponse, SamlError> {
response::consume(
xml,
&sp(),
&idp(cert_der),
OffsetDateTime::now_utc(),
Duration::seconds(60),
)
}
#[test]
fn good_response_yields_principal() {
let t = test_idp();
let signed = sign(&Resp::default().template(), &t.key_pem);
let out = consume(&signed, t.cert_der).expect("valid response should verify");
assert_eq!(out.principal.email, EMAIL);
assert_eq!(out.principal.name_id, EMAIL);
assert_eq!(out.principal.display_name.as_deref(), Some("Miles Ward"));
assert_eq!(out.in_response_to.as_deref(), Some("_req-abc"));
assert_eq!(out.assertion_id, "_assertion1");
assert_eq!(out.session_index.as_deref(), Some("sess-123"));
}
#[test]
fn tampered_assertion_is_rejected() {
let t = test_idp();
let signed = sign(&Resp::default().template(), &t.key_pem);
// Flip the subject email after signing — breaks the digest.
let tampered = signed.replace(EMAIL, "[email protected]");
assert_ne!(signed, tampered);
assert!(matches!(
consume(&tampered, t.cert_der),
Err(SamlError::Signature(_) | SamlError::SignatureScope)
));
}
#[test]
fn unsigned_response_is_rejected() {
let t = test_idp();
// Feed the *unsigned* template (empty SignatureValue) straight in.
let unsigned = Resp::default().template();
assert!(matches!(
consume(&unsigned, t.cert_der),
Err(SamlError::Signature(_))
));
}
#[test]
fn wrong_signing_key_is_rejected() {
let signer = test_idp();
let other = test_idp(); // different keypair pinned as the "IdP" cert
let signed = sign(&Resp::default().template(), &signer.key_pem);
assert!(matches!(
consume(&signed, other.cert_der),
Err(SamlError::Signature(_))
));
}
#[test]
fn wrong_audience_is_rejected() {
let t = test_idp();
let r = Resp {
audience: "https://someone-else.example".into(),
..Resp::default()
};
let signed = sign(&r.template(), &t.key_pem);
assert!(matches!(
consume(&signed, t.cert_der),
Err(SamlError::AudienceMismatch)
));
}
#[test]
fn expired_assertion_is_rejected() {
let t = test_idp();
let now = OffsetDateTime::now_utc();
let r = Resp {
not_before: now - Duration::hours(2),
not_on_or_after: now - Duration::hours(1),
..Resp::default()
};
let signed = sign(&r.template(), &t.key_pem);
assert!(matches!(
consume(&signed, t.cert_der),
Err(SamlError::TimeBounds)
));
}
#[test]
fn future_assertion_is_rejected() {
let t = test_idp();
let now = OffsetDateTime::now_utc();
let r = Resp {
not_before: now + Duration::hours(1),
not_on_or_after: now + Duration::hours(2),
..Resp::default()
};
let signed = sign(&r.template(), &t.key_pem);
assert!(matches!(
consume(&signed, t.cert_der),
Err(SamlError::TimeBounds)
));
}
#[test]
fn wrong_issuer_is_rejected() {
let t = test_idp();
let r = Resp {
issuer: "https://evil-idp.example".into(),
..Resp::default()
};
let signed = sign(&r.template(), &t.key_pem);
assert!(matches!(
consume(&signed, t.cert_der),
Err(SamlError::IssuerMismatch)
));
}
#[test]
fn non_success_status_is_rejected() {
let t = test_idp();
let r = Resp {
status: "urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:status:Requester".into(),
..Resp::default()
};
let signed = sign(&r.template(), &t.key_pem);
assert!(matches!(
consume(&signed, t.cert_der),
Err(SamlError::Status(_))
));
}
#[test]
fn idp_initiated_has_no_in_response_to() {
// No InResponseTo => the HTTP layer must gate it behind allow_idp_initiated.
let t = test_idp();
let r = Resp {
in_response_to: None,
..Resp::default()
};
let signed = sign(&r.template(), &t.key_pem);
let out = consume(&signed, t.cert_der).expect("unsolicited but otherwise valid");
assert!(out.in_response_to.is_none());
}
+8 -14
View File
@@ -48,9 +48,9 @@ pub struct Settings {
pub default_local_hdd: bool,
/// When a client hits the Queued Deployment item, how long (seconds) to
/// hold it in queue before giving up and falling back to the menu.
/// hold it at the gate before giving up and falling back to the menu.
/// 0 = forever.
pub queue_wait_max_secs: u32,
pub gate_wait_max_secs: u32,
/// Optional DNS server advertised on the Network tab. Purely
/// informational today — OpenPXE does not run a DNS server, but
@@ -67,8 +67,11 @@ pub enum TimeoutAction {
/// Chain the "Boot from Local HDD" entry.
LocalHdd,
/// Put the client into the deployment queue, waiting for operator
/// assignment.
/// assignment. The serde alias keeps v0.2.0 settings.json files
/// readable after the v0.3.0 rename — old `"gated_deployment"`
/// values deserialize transparently.
#[default]
#[serde(alias = "gated_deployment")]
QueuedDeployment,
}
@@ -81,7 +84,7 @@ impl Default for Settings {
smb_host_override: String::new(),
extra_kernel_args: String::new(),
default_local_hdd: true,
queue_wait_max_secs: 0,
gate_wait_max_secs: 0,
dns_server: String::new(),
}
}
@@ -112,10 +115,7 @@ impl SettingsStore {
},
Err(_) => Settings::default(),
};
Arc::new(Self {
path,
inner: RwLock::new(initial),
})
Arc::new(Self { path, inner: RwLock::new(initial) })
}
#[must_use]
@@ -181,12 +181,6 @@ mod tests {
assert!(s.windows_enabled);
}
#[test]
fn settings_serialize_queue_naming() {
let text = serde_json::to_string(&Settings::default()).unwrap();
assert!(text.contains("queue_wait_max_secs"));
}
#[test]
fn corrupt_file_falls_back_to_default() {
let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
-390
View File
@@ -1,390 +0,0 @@
//! SAML SSO configuration — FleetDM-shaped.
//!
//! The operator pastes their IdP's metadata XML (or its URL) and a
//! human-readable label. As of v0.5.1 the SAML login flow is wired
//! end-to-end (see [`crate::saml`]): SP-initiated AuthnRequest, the ACS
//! endpoint, pure-Rust signature verification, and operator-session
//! minting. This module owns only the persisted *configuration*.
//!
//! Shape borrowed from <https://github.com/fleetdm/fleet>'s app-config
//! SSO block, minus the user-RBAC fields (OpenPXE is single-tier: any
//! IdP-authenticated user the SP cryptographically verifies gets an
//! operator session; there is no per-user role table). Entity ID is
//! exposed (FleetDM-style) but defaults to the advertised public base
//! URL when blank, which is what most IdPs expect anyway.
use parking_lot::RwLock;
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use std::path::PathBuf;
use std::sync::Arc;
use crate::{Error, Result};
/// The configurable surface. `metadata` and `metadata_url` are mutually
/// exclusive at apply time (one or the other identifies the IdP); the
/// store keeps both fields so an operator can switch between them
/// without losing the inactive one.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct SsoConfig {
/// Master switch — when false, all SSO machinery (planned for a
/// later release) is skipped regardless of the rest of the fields.
#[serde(default)]
pub enabled: bool,
/// Display name shown on the WebUI's login screen as the "Sign in
/// with X" button label. Empty/whitespace falls back to "SSO".
#[serde(default)]
pub idp_name: String,
/// Optional HTTPS URL pointing at the IdP's brand logo. Rendered
/// next to `idp_name` on the WebUI's login screen (FleetDM-style).
/// Length-capped at [`MAX_URL_LEN`]; empty is fine.
#[serde(default)]
pub idp_logo_url: String,
/// Raw SAML metadata XML pasted by the operator. Mutually exclusive
/// with `metadata_url`; if both are set, the URL wins at apply time
/// (operators typically forget about a stale XML paste).
#[serde(default)]
pub metadata: String,
/// HTTPS URL where the IdP serves its metadata. Loaded lazily by the
/// future SAML flow; not validated here beyond a basic length cap.
#[serde(default)]
pub metadata_url: String,
/// SP Entity ID advertised to the IdP — mirrors FleetDM's "Entity ID".
/// Must exactly match the SP/Relying-Party entry configured on the IdP.
/// Empty falls back to the advertised public base URL at runtime, which
/// is what most IdPs expect. Length-capped at [`MAX_URL_LEN`].
#[serde(default)]
pub entity_id: String,
/// Allow IdP-initiated login — an unsolicited `<Response>` POSTed to the
/// ACS with no `InResponseTo`. Mirrors FleetDM's "Allow SSO login
/// initiated by identity provider". Default off; SP-initiated (the
/// "Sign in with X" button) is always allowed regardless.
#[serde(default)]
pub allow_idp_initiated: bool,
}
impl SsoConfig {
/// Returns `true` only when the config is *usable* — enabled, and
/// at least one of metadata/metadata_url is present. The future
/// login flow will key off this; for v0.4.5 the WebUI uses it to
/// surface a yellow "configured but not live yet" hint.
#[must_use]
pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
self.enabled && (!self.metadata.trim().is_empty() || !self.metadata_url.trim().is_empty())
}
}
/// In-memory + on-disk SSO settings registry.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct SsoStore {
path: Arc<PathBuf>,
inner: Arc<RwLock<SsoConfig>>,
}
impl SsoStore {
/// Load from `<work_dir>/sso.json`, or start with the default empty
/// (`enabled = false`) config. A corrupt file falls back to default
/// rather than blocking startup.
#[must_use]
pub fn load_or_default(work_dir: &std::path::Path) -> Self {
let path = work_dir.join("sso.json");
let cfg = match std::fs::read_to_string(&path) {
Ok(text) => match serde_json::from_str::<SsoConfig>(&text) {
Ok(parsed) => parsed,
Err(e) => {
tracing::warn!(
target: "openpxe::sso",
"sso.json present but unreadable ({e}); starting with default config"
);
SsoConfig::default()
}
},
Err(_) => SsoConfig::default(),
};
Self {
path: Arc::new(path),
inner: Arc::new(RwLock::new(cfg)),
}
}
#[must_use]
pub fn snapshot(&self) -> SsoConfig {
self.inner.read().clone()
}
/// Replace the whole config in one shot. Light validation: metadata
/// XML and URL are length-capped so an operator can't OOM us by
/// pasting a 10 GiB blob; the IdP UI tab clamps the input visually,
/// but the server enforces a hard ceiling regardless.
pub fn replace(&self, mut cfg: SsoConfig) -> Result<SsoConfig> {
cfg.idp_name = cfg.idp_name.trim().to_string();
cfg.idp_logo_url = cfg.idp_logo_url.trim().to_string();
cfg.metadata = cfg.metadata.trim().to_string();
cfg.metadata_url = cfg.metadata_url.trim().to_string();
cfg.entity_id = cfg.entity_id.trim().to_string();
if cfg.entity_id.len() > MAX_URL_LEN {
return Err(Error::Invalid(format!(
"entity_id exceeds {MAX_URL_LEN}-char cap"
)));
}
if cfg.metadata.len() > MAX_METADATA_BYTES {
return Err(Error::Invalid(format!(
"metadata XML exceeds {MAX_METADATA_BYTES}-byte cap"
)));
}
if cfg.metadata_url.len() > MAX_URL_LEN {
return Err(Error::Invalid(format!(
"metadata_url exceeds {MAX_URL_LEN}-char cap"
)));
}
if cfg.idp_logo_url.len() > MAX_URL_LEN {
return Err(Error::Invalid(format!(
"idp_logo_url exceeds {MAX_URL_LEN}-char cap"
)));
}
if !cfg.metadata_url.is_empty()
&& !cfg.metadata_url.starts_with("http://")
&& !cfg.metadata_url.starts_with("https://")
{
return Err(Error::Invalid(
"metadata_url must start with http:// or https://".into(),
));
}
if !cfg.idp_logo_url.is_empty()
&& !cfg.idp_logo_url.starts_with("http://")
&& !cfg.idp_logo_url.starts_with("https://")
{
return Err(Error::Invalid(
"idp_logo_url must start with http:// or https://".into(),
));
}
// If they're trying to *enable* the integration but haven't
// supplied either source, reject — saves a "configured but
// unusable" surprise later.
if cfg.enabled && cfg.metadata.is_empty() && cfg.metadata_url.is_empty() {
return Err(Error::Invalid(
"enable SSO requires either metadata XML or a metadata URL".into(),
));
}
{
let mut g = self.inner.write();
*g = cfg.clone();
}
self.persist();
tracing::info!(
target: "openpxe::sso",
enabled = cfg.enabled,
idp = %cfg.idp_name,
has_xml = !cfg.metadata.is_empty(),
has_url = !cfg.metadata_url.is_empty(),
"sso configuration updated"
);
Ok(cfg)
}
fn persist(&self) {
let snap = self.inner.read().clone();
let body = match serde_json::to_vec_pretty(&snap) {
Ok(b) => b,
Err(e) => {
tracing::warn!(target: "openpxe::sso", "serialize sso.json: {e}");
return;
}
};
if let Some(parent) = self.path.parent() {
let _ = std::fs::create_dir_all(parent);
}
let tmp = self.path.with_extension("json.tmp");
if let Err(e) = std::fs::write(&tmp, body) {
tracing::warn!(target: "openpxe::sso", "write sso.json tmp: {e}");
return;
}
if let Err(e) = std::fs::rename(&tmp, self.path.as_path()) {
tracing::warn!(target: "openpxe::sso", "rename sso.json: {e}");
}
}
}
/// Saturation caps. The numbers are generous for any real IdP metadata
/// document — Okta's largest is ~50 KB, Azure AD's ~30 KB.
const MAX_METADATA_BYTES: usize = 1024 * 1024;
const MAX_URL_LEN: usize = 2048;
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use tempfile::tempdir;
#[test]
fn default_is_disabled_and_empty() {
let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
let s = SsoStore::load_or_default(dir.path());
let cfg = s.snapshot();
assert!(!cfg.enabled);
assert!(cfg.metadata.is_empty());
assert!(cfg.metadata_url.is_empty());
assert!(!cfg.is_usable());
}
#[test]
fn replace_metadata_url_round_trip_via_disk() {
let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
let s = SsoStore::load_or_default(dir.path());
s.replace(SsoConfig {
enabled: true,
idp_name: "Okta".into(),
metadata: String::new(),
metadata_url: "https://idp.example.com/metadata".into(),
idp_logo_url: String::new(),
entity_id: String::new(),
allow_idp_initiated: false,
})
.unwrap();
drop(s);
let s2 = SsoStore::load_or_default(dir.path());
let cfg = s2.snapshot();
assert!(cfg.enabled);
assert!(cfg.is_usable());
assert_eq!(cfg.idp_name, "Okta");
assert_eq!(cfg.metadata_url, "https://idp.example.com/metadata");
}
#[test]
fn replace_xml_paste_is_accepted() {
let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
let s = SsoStore::load_or_default(dir.path());
let xml = r#"<EntityDescriptor xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:metadata">test</EntityDescriptor>"#;
s.replace(SsoConfig {
enabled: true,
idp_name: "Test IdP".into(),
metadata: xml.into(),
metadata_url: String::new(),
idp_logo_url: String::new(),
entity_id: String::new(),
allow_idp_initiated: false,
})
.unwrap();
assert!(s.snapshot().is_usable());
}
#[test]
fn enable_without_source_is_rejected() {
let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
let s = SsoStore::load_or_default(dir.path());
let r = s.replace(SsoConfig {
enabled: true,
idp_name: "Okta".into(),
metadata: String::new(),
metadata_url: String::new(),
idp_logo_url: String::new(),
entity_id: String::new(),
allow_idp_initiated: false,
});
assert!(matches!(r, Err(Error::Invalid(_))));
// …and a disabled blank config is fine.
s.replace(SsoConfig::default()).unwrap();
}
#[test]
fn metadata_url_must_be_http_scheme() {
let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
let s = SsoStore::load_or_default(dir.path());
let r = s.replace(SsoConfig {
enabled: false,
idp_name: String::new(),
metadata: String::new(),
metadata_url: "ftp://idp.example.com/metadata".into(),
idp_logo_url: String::new(),
entity_id: String::new(),
allow_idp_initiated: false,
});
assert!(matches!(r, Err(Error::Invalid(_))));
}
#[test]
fn idp_logo_url_must_be_http_scheme() {
// v0.4.6: SSO settings learned an idp_logo_url so the login
// screen can render the FleetDM-style "Sign in with <IdP-logo>"
// affordance. Same scheme rule as metadata_url.
let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
let s = SsoStore::load_or_default(dir.path());
let r = s.replace(SsoConfig {
enabled: false,
idp_name: "Okta".into(),
metadata: String::new(),
metadata_url: String::new(),
idp_logo_url: "data:image/png;base64,...".into(),
entity_id: String::new(),
allow_idp_initiated: false,
});
assert!(matches!(r, Err(Error::Invalid(_))));
// Real HTTPS URL is fine.
s.replace(SsoConfig {
enabled: false,
idp_name: "Okta".into(),
metadata: String::new(),
metadata_url: String::new(),
idp_logo_url: "https://idp.example.com/logo.png".into(),
entity_id: String::new(),
allow_idp_initiated: false,
})
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(
s.snapshot().idp_logo_url,
"https://idp.example.com/logo.png"
);
}
#[test]
fn entity_id_and_idp_initiated_round_trip() {
// v0.5.1: SP Entity ID + IdP-initiated toggle persist across reload.
let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
let s = SsoStore::load_or_default(dir.path());
s.replace(SsoConfig {
enabled: true,
idp_name: "Keycloak".into(),
metadata: String::new(),
metadata_url: "https://idp.example.com/metadata".into(),
idp_logo_url: String::new(),
entity_id: "https://pxe.example.com".into(),
allow_idp_initiated: true,
})
.unwrap();
drop(s);
let cfg = SsoStore::load_or_default(dir.path()).snapshot();
assert_eq!(cfg.entity_id, "https://pxe.example.com");
assert!(cfg.allow_idp_initiated);
}
#[test]
fn entity_id_cap_enforced() {
let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
let s = SsoStore::load_or_default(dir.path());
let r = s.replace(SsoConfig {
enabled: false,
idp_name: String::new(),
metadata: String::new(),
metadata_url: String::new(),
idp_logo_url: String::new(),
entity_id: "x".repeat(MAX_URL_LEN + 1),
allow_idp_initiated: false,
});
assert!(matches!(r, Err(Error::Invalid(_))));
}
#[test]
fn metadata_size_cap_enforced() {
let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
let s = SsoStore::load_or_default(dir.path());
let oversize = "a".repeat(MAX_METADATA_BYTES + 1);
let r = s.replace(SsoConfig {
enabled: false,
idp_name: String::new(),
metadata: oversize,
metadata_url: String::new(),
idp_logo_url: String::new(),
entity_id: String::new(),
allow_idp_initiated: false,
});
assert!(matches!(r, Err(Error::Invalid(_))));
}
}
-210
View File
@@ -1,210 +0,0 @@
//! Wake-on-LAN.
//!
//! v0.5.0: from the Hosts tab, an operator can wake a bound machine.
//! WoL is a "magic packet" — six `0xFF` bytes followed by the target
//! MAC repeated sixteen times (102 bytes total) — broadcast on the
//! local segment. The NIC's WoL logic matches the repeated MAC and
//! powers the board on.
//!
//! ## Why this is trivial and safe in our container
//!
//! - It's a single UDP datagram to a broadcast address. No privileged
//! *local* port is needed (we bind an ephemeral source port); the
//! destination port is conventionally 9 (discard) or 7 (echo), and
//! nothing actually listens there — the magic is in the payload, not
//! the port. So WoL works without any extra capability.
//! - We send to the limited broadcast `255.255.255.255` (stays on the
//! local link) and, when the caller knows the server's own subnet
//! broadcast, to that too — directed broadcast reaches the right VLAN
//! even when the host bridges multiple segments.
//!
//! ## Limits
//!
//! WoL only crosses L2. If the target is on a different subnet than the
//! OpenPXE host, the intervening router must be configured to forward
//! directed broadcasts (most aren't, by design). For the common case —
//! OpenPXE and its PXE clients on the same VLAN — the limited broadcast
//! is enough.
use crate::{Error, Result};
use std::net::{Ipv4Addr, SocketAddrV4, UdpSocket};
/// Conventional WoL destination port. 9 (discard) is the de-facto
/// default; the port is immaterial since the match is on the payload.
const WOL_PORT: u16 = 9;
/// Parse a MAC string in any common form (`aa:bb:cc:dd:ee:ff`,
/// `aa-bb-...`, `aabb.ccdd.eeff`, or bare hex) into six octets.
///
/// Returns `Error::Invalid` if it doesn't resolve to exactly six bytes.
pub fn parse_mac(mac: &str) -> Result<[u8; 6]> {
// Strip every non-hex-digit, then expect exactly 12 hex chars.
let hex: String = mac.chars().filter(char::is_ascii_hexdigit).collect();
if hex.len() != 12 {
return Err(Error::Invalid(format!(
"invalid MAC '{mac}': expected 6 octets (12 hex digits), got {}",
hex.len()
)));
}
let mut out = [0u8; 6];
for (i, byte) in out.iter_mut().enumerate() {
// Each octet is two hex chars; unwrap is safe — we validated
// the length and that every char is a hex digit above.
*byte = u8::from_str_radix(&hex[i * 2..i * 2 + 2], 16)
.map_err(|e| Error::Invalid(format!("invalid MAC '{mac}': {e}")))?;
}
Ok(out)
}
/// Build the 102-byte magic packet for `mac`.
#[must_use]
pub fn magic_packet(mac: [u8; 6]) -> [u8; 102] {
let mut pkt = [0u8; 102];
// 6 bytes of 0xFF.
for b in &mut pkt[..6] {
*b = 0xFF;
}
// MAC repeated 16 times.
for rep in 0..16 {
let start = 6 + rep * 6;
pkt[start..start + 6].copy_from_slice(&mac);
}
pkt
}
/// Send a Wake-on-LAN magic packet for `mac` to every address in
/// `broadcasts` (e.g. `255.255.255.255` plus the server's subnet
/// broadcast). Returns the number of broadcast addresses the packet was
/// successfully sent to; errors only if the MAC is malformed or the
/// socket can't be opened at all.
pub fn wake(mac: &str, broadcasts: &[Ipv4Addr]) -> Result<usize> {
let parsed = parse_mac(mac)?;
let packet = magic_packet(parsed);
// Always include the limited broadcast even if the caller didn't —
// it's the one that works with zero network configuration.
let mut targets: Vec<Ipv4Addr> = vec![Ipv4Addr::BROADCAST];
for b in broadcasts {
if !targets.contains(b) {
targets.push(*b);
}
}
let sent = send_magic(&packet, &targets, WOL_PORT)?;
tracing::info!(
target: "openpxe::wol",
mac = %mac, broadcasts = sent,
"Wake-on-LAN magic packet sent"
);
Ok(sent)
}
/// Open a broadcast-enabled UDP socket and send `packet` to every
/// `target:port`. Returns how many sends succeeded. Errors if the
/// socket can't be opened or if *no* target accepted the packet.
fn send_magic(packet: &[u8], targets: &[Ipv4Addr], port: u16) -> Result<usize> {
// Bind an ephemeral local UDP port on all interfaces. SO_BROADCAST
// must be enabled to send to a broadcast address.
let sock = UdpSocket::bind(SocketAddrV4::new(Ipv4Addr::UNSPECIFIED, 0))
.map_err(|e| Error::Invalid(format!("could not open WoL socket: {e}")))?;
sock.set_broadcast(true)
.map_err(|e| Error::Invalid(format!("could not enable broadcast: {e}")))?;
let mut sent = 0usize;
for &addr in targets {
match sock.send_to(packet, SocketAddrV4::new(addr, port)) {
Ok(_) => sent += 1,
Err(e) => {
tracing::warn!(
target: "openpxe::wol",
broadcast = %addr,
"WoL send failed: {e}"
);
}
}
}
if sent == 0 {
return Err(Error::Invalid(
"Wake-on-LAN: no broadcast address accepted the packet".into(),
));
}
Ok(sent)
}
/// Compute the IPv4 broadcast address for `ip`/`mask`, if both parse.
/// Used so the caller can include the server's own subnet broadcast
/// alongside the limited broadcast.
#[must_use]
pub fn subnet_broadcast(ip: Ipv4Addr, mask: Ipv4Addr) -> Ipv4Addr {
let ip = u32::from(ip);
let mask = u32::from(mask);
Ipv4Addr::from(ip | !mask)
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn parse_mac_accepts_common_forms() {
let want = [0xaa, 0xbb, 0xcc, 0xdd, 0xee, 0xff];
assert_eq!(parse_mac("aa:bb:cc:dd:ee:ff").unwrap(), want);
assert_eq!(parse_mac("AA-BB-CC-DD-EE-FF").unwrap(), want);
assert_eq!(parse_mac("aabb.ccdd.eeff").unwrap(), want);
assert_eq!(parse_mac("aabbccddeeff").unwrap(), want);
}
#[test]
fn parse_mac_rejects_bad_length() {
assert!(parse_mac("aa:bb:cc").is_err());
assert!(parse_mac("").is_err());
assert!(parse_mac("zz:bb:cc:dd:ee:ff").is_err()); // non-hex stripped → too short
}
#[test]
fn magic_packet_shape() {
let pkt = magic_packet([0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06]);
assert_eq!(&pkt[..6], &[0xFF; 6]);
// First MAC repetition.
assert_eq!(&pkt[6..12], &[0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06]);
// Last (16th) repetition ends the packet.
assert_eq!(&pkt[96..102], &[0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06]);
}
#[test]
fn subnet_broadcast_computes() {
assert_eq!(
subnet_broadcast(
Ipv4Addr::new(192, 168, 1, 49),
Ipv4Addr::new(255, 255, 255, 0)
),
Ipv4Addr::new(192, 168, 1, 255)
);
assert_eq!(
subnet_broadcast(
Ipv4Addr::new(10, 5, 3, 7),
Ipv4Addr::new(255, 255, 0, 0)
),
Ipv4Addr::new(10, 5, 255, 255)
);
}
#[test]
fn send_magic_delivers_intact_packet_over_loopback() {
// Deterministic round-trip that doesn't depend on the sandbox
// permitting a real L2 broadcast: bind a receiver on loopback
// and confirm send_magic transmits the exact 102-byte packet.
let rx = UdpSocket::bind(SocketAddrV4::new(Ipv4Addr::LOCALHOST, 0)).unwrap();
let port = rx.local_addr().unwrap().port();
rx.set_read_timeout(Some(std::time::Duration::from_secs(2))).unwrap();
let packet = magic_packet([0x0a, 0x1b, 0x2c, 0x3d, 0x4e, 0x5f]);
let sent = send_magic(&packet, &[Ipv4Addr::LOCALHOST], port).unwrap();
assert_eq!(sent, 1);
let mut buf = [0u8; 128];
let n = rx.recv(&mut buf).unwrap();
assert_eq!(n, 102, "magic packet should be 102 bytes");
assert_eq!(&buf[..102], &packet[..]);
}
}
+4 -14
View File
@@ -56,17 +56,11 @@ pub fn decide(ctx: &ReplyContext<'_>) -> BootDirective {
// it'll then do the same script-fetch the iPXE path does.
let name = ctx.arch.ipxe_bootfile().unwrap_or("snponly.efi");
BootDirective::HttpScript {
url: format!(
"{}/ipxe/{}",
ctx.public_base_url.trim_end_matches('/'),
name
),
url: format!("{}/ipxe/{}", ctx.public_base_url.trim_end_matches('/'), name),
}
}
FirmwareClass::PxeClient => match ctx.arch.ipxe_bootfile() {
Some(name) => BootDirective::TftpIpxe {
filename: name.to_string(),
},
Some(name) => BootDirective::TftpIpxe { filename: name.to_string() },
None => BootDirective::Ignore,
},
FirmwareClass::Other => BootDirective::Ignore,
@@ -113,16 +107,12 @@ pub fn build_reply(ctx: &ReplyContext<'_>, directive: &BootDirective) -> Option<
match directive {
BootDirective::TftpIpxe { filename } => {
opts.insert(DhcpOption::TFTPServerName(
ctx.our_ip.to_string().into_bytes(),
));
opts.insert(DhcpOption::TFTPServerName(ctx.our_ip.to_string().into_bytes()));
opts.insert(DhcpOption::BootfileName(filename.as_bytes().to_vec()));
}
BootDirective::HttpScript { url } => {
opts.insert(DhcpOption::BootfileName(url.as_bytes().to_vec()));
opts.insert(DhcpOption::TFTPServerName(
ctx.our_ip.to_string().into_bytes(),
));
opts.insert(DhcpOption::TFTPServerName(ctx.our_ip.to_string().into_bytes()));
}
BootDirective::Ignore => return None,
}
+11 -32
View File
@@ -4,7 +4,9 @@
use crate::reply::{build_reply, decide, BootDirective, ReplyContext};
use dhcproto::v4::{DhcpOption, Message, OptionCode};
use dhcproto::{Decodable, Decoder, Encodable, Encoder};
use openpxe_core::{ClientArch, ClientEvent, ClientRegistry, FirmwareClass};
use openpxe_core::{
ClientArch, ClientEvent, ClientRegistry, FirmwareClass,
};
use socket2::{Domain, Protocol, Socket, Type};
use std::net::{IpAddr, Ipv4Addr, SocketAddr, SocketAddrV4};
use std::sync::Arc;
@@ -84,22 +86,11 @@ impl DhcpProxyServer {
) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
let request = Message::decode(&mut Decoder::new(data))?;
let vendor_class = request
.opts()
.get(OptionCode::ClassIdentifier)
.and_then(|o| {
if let DhcpOption::ClassIdentifier(v) = o {
Some(v.as_slice())
} else {
None
}
let vendor_class = request.opts().get(OptionCode::ClassIdentifier).and_then(|o| {
if let DhcpOption::ClassIdentifier(v) = o { Some(v.as_slice()) } else { None }
});
let user_class = request.opts().get(OptionCode::UserClass).and_then(|o| {
if let DhcpOption::UserClass(v) = o {
Some(v.as_slice())
} else {
None
}
if let DhcpOption::UserClass(v) = o { Some(v.as_slice()) } else { None }
});
let class = FirmwareClass::classify(vendor_class, user_class);
if matches!(class, FirmwareClass::Other) {
@@ -144,9 +135,7 @@ impl DhcpProxyServer {
}
self.metrics.record_dhcp_reply(arch.as_str());
let Some(reply) = build_reply(&ctx, &directive) else {
return Ok(());
};
let Some(reply) = build_reply(&ctx, &directive) else { return Ok(()); };
let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(512);
reply.encode(&mut Encoder::new(&mut out))?;
@@ -214,10 +203,7 @@ fn bind_udp(bind: IpAddr, port: u16, broadcast: bool) -> anyhow::Result<UdpSocke
fn format_mac(chaddr: &[u8]) -> String {
let take = chaddr.iter().take(6).copied().collect::<Vec<_>>();
take.iter()
.map(|b| format!("{b:02x}"))
.collect::<Vec<_>>()
.join(":")
take.iter().map(|b| format!("{b:02x}")).collect::<Vec<_>>().join(":")
}
/// Walk raw DHCP options looking for option 93 (Client System Architecture)
@@ -231,17 +217,10 @@ fn extract_raw_arch(packet: &[u8]) -> Option<u16> {
let mut i = 0;
while i < opts.len() {
let code = opts[i];
if code == 0xff {
return None;
} // END
if code == 0x00 {
if code == 0xff { return None; } // END
if code == 0x00 { i += 1; continue; } // PAD
i += 1;
continue;
} // PAD
i += 1;
if i >= opts.len() {
return None;
}
if i >= opts.len() { return None; }
let len = opts[i] as usize;
i += 1;
if code == 93 && len >= 2 && i + 2 <= opts.len() {
-23
View File
@@ -4,10 +4,6 @@ version.workspace = true
edition.workspace = true
license.workspace = true
authors.workspace = true
# v0.5.0: inherit the workspace repository so CARGO_PKG_REPOSITORY is
# populated at build time — the About-tab update check derives the
# Gitea releases API URL from it.
repository.workspace = true
description = "HTTP server: ISO uploads, iPXE script generation, ISO streaming"
[lints]
@@ -35,17 +31,6 @@ bytes.workspace = true
futures.workspace = true
mime.workspace = true
mime_guess.workspace = true
uuid.workspace = true
# v0.4.5 Forms auth: lock-free session store and cookie helpers.
parking_lot.workspace = true
# v0.5.0: outbound HTTP for chat webhooks (Slack/Teams/Discord) and the
# About-tab "check for updates" call to the Gitea releases API; SMTP for
# email notifications. Both use rustls so the static musl binary stays
# OpenSSL-free.
reqwest.workspace = true
lettre.workspace = true
# v0.5.1: decode the base64 SAMLResponse at the ACS endpoint.
base64.workspace = true
[dev-dependencies]
tokio = { workspace = true, features = ["macros", "rt", "rt-multi-thread", "time"] }
@@ -53,11 +38,3 @@ tower = { workspace = true }
tempfile = "3.12"
serde_json = { workspace = true }
time = { workspace = true }
# v0.4.61: integration tests need to generate real PNG bytes for the
# `/branding/pxe-logo` compositor; hand-rolled CRCs are too fragile.
image = { version = "0.25", default-features = false, features = ["png"] }
# v0.5.1: the SAML ACS integration tests mint a throwaway IdP keypair
# (rcgen) and sign a SAMLResponse with bergshamra so the happy-path,
# replay, and IdP-initiated-gating flows exercise real signatures.
rcgen = "0.13"
bergshamra = { workspace = true }
+115 -1668
View File
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
-516
View File
@@ -1,516 +0,0 @@
//! Forms auth layer — sessions, login, setup, middleware.
//!
//! Three states:
//!
//! * **Unconfigured** (`AdminStore::is_configured() == false`). The
//! middleware passes every request through — there's no one to gate
//! against. The UI's `/api/me` returns `setup_required: true` and the
//! front-end pushes the operator into the first-run flow.
//! * **Logged in**. The session cookie maps to an in-memory session
//! record with an idle expiry; `/api/me` returns the username.
//! * **Logged out**. The middleware bounces `/api/*` (with the PXE
//! allowlist below) to `401 Unauthorized`; the front-end intercepts
//! that and shows `/login`.
//!
//! Allowlist for unauthenticated access *after* the admin is set up:
//!
//! * everything outside `/api/*` (the WebUI bundle, asset chrome, PXE
//! script endpoints, the bundled iPXE/wimboot binaries, ISO bytes,
//! liveness/readiness probes, the Prometheus scrape) — these are
//! read-only or PXE-essential and breaking them locks out booting
//! machines that have no way to authenticate;
//! * `/api/setup`, `/api/login`, `/api/me` (the auth surface itself);
//! * `/api/queue/join`, `/api/queue/poll/:entry_id` (iPXE long-poll for
//! Queued Deployment — the iPXE client can't send a session cookie).
//!
//! Everything else inside `/api/*` requires a valid session.
use crate::state::AppState;
use axum::{
body::Body,
extract::{Request, State},
http::{header, HeaderValue, StatusCode},
middleware::Next,
response::{IntoResponse, Response},
Json,
};
use openpxe_core::AdminPublic;
use parking_lot::RwLock;
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use serde_json::json;
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::sync::Arc;
use std::time::{Duration, Instant};
use uuid::Uuid;
/// Idle session lifetime. Sliding — every authenticated request resets
/// the expiry. 24h is the Sonarr default and matches what most operators
/// expect for an on-prem admin console.
const SESSION_TTL: Duration = Duration::from_hours(24);
/// Name of the cookie we set/read. Distinct from a generic `session=`
/// to avoid collisions with anything else sharing the host.
pub const SESSION_COOKIE: &str = "openpxe_session";
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
struct Session {
username: String,
expires_at: Instant,
}
/// In-memory session table. Cheap to clone (Arc-shared) and contention
/// is rare — operators sign in once per browser session.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default)]
pub struct SessionStore {
inner: Arc<RwLock<HashMap<String, Session>>>,
}
impl SessionStore {
/// Mint a fresh session for `username` and return the opaque cookie
/// value. UUID v4 gives us 122 random bits — comfortably more than
/// the 64-128 bits typical for session IDs.
#[must_use]
pub fn create(&self, username: &str) -> String {
let id = Uuid::new_v4().simple().to_string();
let session = Session {
username: username.to_string(),
expires_at: Instant::now() + SESSION_TTL,
};
self.inner.write().insert(id.clone(), session);
id
}
/// Resolve a cookie value to the owning username, refreshing the
/// idle timer. Returns `None` for missing / expired sessions and
/// proactively evicts the expired entry so the map doesn't grow
/// unbounded across long-lived deployments.
pub fn touch(&self, id: &str) -> Option<String> {
let mut g = self.inner.write();
let s = g.get_mut(id)?;
if s.expires_at <= Instant::now() {
g.remove(id);
return None;
}
s.expires_at = Instant::now() + SESSION_TTL;
Some(s.username.clone())
}
/// Invalidate one session (the user's `/api/logout`).
pub fn revoke(&self, id: &str) {
self.inner.write().remove(id);
}
/// Invalidate every session — used after a credentials rotation so
/// stale cookies for the old password can't keep operating.
pub fn revoke_all(&self) {
self.inner.write().clear();
}
/// Periodic / opportunistic GC. Not currently scheduled (we evict
/// on touch), but exposed for a future janitor task.
pub fn gc(&self) {
let now = Instant::now();
self.inner.write().retain(|_, s| s.expires_at > now);
}
#[must_use]
pub fn len(&self) -> usize {
self.inner.read().len()
}
#[must_use]
pub fn is_empty(&self) -> bool {
self.len() == 0
}
}
// ── Cookie helpers ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
fn cookie_attrs(value: &str, max_age: Option<i64>) -> String {
// Same flags FleetDM and Sonarr ship by default:
// - HttpOnly: blocks JS access (XSS containment)
// - SameSite=Lax: allows top-level GET navigations from the IdP
// to land authenticated when SSO arrives, but blocks
// cross-site POST CSRF;
// - Path=/: the cookie applies to the whole app;
// - no Secure flag yet — many operators host on plain http://
// LAN IPs (Unraid templates default to that); we'll add Secure
// opportunistically when we add a TLS terminator option.
// SESSION_TTL fits in 32 bits comfortably (24h ≈ 86400 seconds); we
// never overflow i64, but clippy's `cast_possible_wrap` lint wants
// us to be explicit. `cast_signed` is the documented form.
let lifetime = max_age.unwrap_or_else(|| SESSION_TTL.as_secs().cast_signed());
format!("{SESSION_COOKIE}={value}; Path=/; HttpOnly; SameSite=Lax; Max-Age={lifetime}")
}
/// Build the `Set-Cookie` header value that establishes a fresh operator
/// session with the default 24h TTL. Exposed so the SAML ACS handler can
/// attach an operator session to its post-login redirect, exactly as the
/// Forms-login path does via [`login_response`].
#[must_use]
pub fn session_cookie(session: &str) -> String {
cookie_attrs(session, None)
}
fn parse_cookie(headers: &axum::http::HeaderMap) -> Option<String> {
// `Cookie: a=b; c=d` parsing — small enough not to drag in a crate.
let raw = headers.get(header::COOKIE)?.to_str().ok()?;
for part in raw.split(';') {
let part = part.trim();
if let Some(v) = part.strip_prefix(&format!("{SESSION_COOKIE}=")) {
return Some(v.to_string());
}
}
None
}
// ── Middleware ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
/// Return `true` if `path` is on the allowlist and should bypass the
/// session check. The middleware applies this rule only when the admin
/// account is configured; before then everything is open.
fn is_public_path(path: &str) -> bool {
// Non-API paths: WebUI bundle, PXE chain, ISO bytes, health probes,
// metrics. All read-only / PXE-essential.
if !path.starts_with("/api/") {
return true;
}
// Auth surface and iPXE long-poll endpoints (no cookie available).
// The SAML SP endpoints are pre-auth by nature — the operator hasn't a
// session yet when they start (or arrive from) the IdP. `/api/sso`
// (the config GET/PUT, no trailing slash) stays gated.
matches!(
path,
"/api/setup"
| "/api/login"
| "/api/logout"
| "/api/me"
| "/api/sso/login"
| "/api/sso/acs"
| "/api/sso/metadata"
) || path.starts_with("/api/queue/join")
|| path.starts_with("/api/queue/poll/")
}
/// Axum middleware: gate `/api/*` behind a valid session, with the
/// allowlist above. `State<AppState>` reaches in for the admin store +
/// session store.
pub async fn require_auth(
State(state): State<AppState>,
req: Request<Body>,
next: Next,
) -> Response {
// Bypass entirely while unconfigured. The /api/setup endpoint is
// the only one that can flip this back to "configured", and it
// refuses to run a second time. Tests + fresh installs ride this
// path.
if !state.admin.is_configured() {
return next.run(req).await;
}
let path = req.uri().path();
if is_public_path(path) {
return next.run(req).await;
}
// Authenticated path. The cookie must be present, map to a live
// session, and the TTL refresh happens as a side-effect.
let token = parse_cookie(req.headers());
if let Some(t) = token {
if state.sessions.touch(&t).is_some() {
return next.run(req).await;
}
}
(
StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED,
Json(json!({ "error": "authentication required" })),
)
.into_response()
}
// ── Handlers ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
pub struct SetupBody {
pub username: String,
pub password: String,
}
/// First-run setup. Refuses to run once an admin already exists — that
/// guards against a leaked WebUI being re-bootstrapped by an attacker
/// who's seen the deployment URL. After bootstrap, the new session
/// cookie is set so the operator goes straight to the dashboard.
pub async fn api_setup(State(state): State<AppState>, Json(body): Json<SetupBody>) -> Response {
if state.admin.is_configured() {
return (
StatusCode::CONFLICT,
Json(json!({ "error": "admin account already configured" })),
)
.into_response();
}
match state.admin.bootstrap(&body.username, &body.password) {
Ok(pub_) => {
let session = state.sessions.create(&pub_.username);
login_response(StatusCode::CREATED, &pub_, &session)
}
Err(openpxe_core::Error::Invalid(msg)) => {
(StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST, Json(json!({ "error": msg }))).into_response()
}
Err(e) => (
StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
Json(json!({ "error": format!("{e}") })),
)
.into_response(),
}
}
#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
pub struct LoginBody {
pub username: String,
pub password: String,
}
pub async fn api_login(State(state): State<AppState>, Json(body): Json<LoginBody>) -> Response {
// Brief, deliberately vague — "invalid credentials" rather than
// "no such user" / "wrong password". Same anti-enumeration posture
// as Sonarr/Radarr.
let pub_ = match state.admin.verify(&body.username, &body.password) {
Ok(Some(u)) => u,
Ok(None) => {
return (
StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED,
Json(json!({ "error": "invalid username or password" })),
)
.into_response();
}
Err(e) => {
return (
StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
Json(json!({ "error": format!("{e}") })),
)
.into_response();
}
};
let session = state.sessions.create(&pub_.username);
login_response(StatusCode::OK, &pub_, &session)
}
pub async fn api_logout(State(state): State<AppState>, headers: axum::http::HeaderMap) -> Response {
if let Some(t) = parse_cookie(&headers) {
state.sessions.revoke(&t);
}
// Stomp the cookie unconditionally — even if the request didn't
// carry one, the browser shouldn't keep a stale value.
let mut resp = StatusCode::NO_CONTENT.into_response();
resp.headers_mut().insert(
header::SET_COOKIE,
HeaderValue::from_str(&cookie_attrs("", Some(0))).unwrap(),
);
resp
}
/// Status surface for the front-end shell. Returns four cases:
///
/// * `setup_required: true` — no admin yet; show first-run page.
/// * `authenticated: false` — admin exists, no session; show login.
/// * `authenticated: true` + `user` — let the dashboard load.
pub async fn api_me(State(state): State<AppState>, headers: axum::http::HeaderMap) -> Response {
// v0.5.0: include branding bootstrap so the pre-auth login/setup
// screens can render the FleetDM-style full-width custom logo (and
// cache-bust it) without an extra round trip. `/api/me` is public,
// and the logo asset is public, so this leaks nothing sensitive.
let has_custom_logo = state.branding.has_logo();
let logo_rev = state.branding.logo_rev();
if !state.admin.is_configured() {
return (
StatusCode::OK,
Json(json!({
"setup_required": true,
"authenticated": false,
"has_custom_logo": has_custom_logo,
"logo_rev": logo_rev,
})),
)
.into_response();
}
let token = parse_cookie(&headers);
let username = token.as_deref().and_then(|t| state.sessions.touch(t));
match username {
Some(u) => (
StatusCode::OK,
Json(json!({
"setup_required": false,
"authenticated": true,
"user": state.admin.snapshot(),
"session_user": u,
"has_custom_logo": has_custom_logo,
"logo_rev": logo_rev,
})),
)
.into_response(),
None => (
StatusCode::OK,
Json(json!({
"setup_required": false,
"authenticated": false,
"has_custom_logo": has_custom_logo,
"logo_rev": logo_rev,
})),
)
.into_response(),
}
}
#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
pub struct UpdateCredentialsBody {
pub current_password: String,
#[serde(default)]
pub new_username: Option<String>,
#[serde(default)]
pub new_password: Option<String>,
}
/// Rotate the admin's username and/or password. Auth middleware has
/// already proved the caller owns a session; we additionally require
/// the *current* password to prove "person at the keyboard right now".
/// On success we issue a fresh session cookie keyed to the (possibly
/// new) username and revoke every prior session so a stolen cookie
/// from before the rotation stops working.
pub async fn api_update_credentials(
State(state): State<AppState>,
Json(body): Json<UpdateCredentialsBody>,
) -> Response {
if !state.admin.is_configured() {
return (
StatusCode::CONFLICT,
Json(json!({ "error": "no admin configured" })),
)
.into_response();
}
let result = state.admin.update_credentials(
&body.current_password,
body.new_username.as_deref(),
body.new_password.as_deref(),
);
match result {
Ok(pub_) => {
state.sessions.revoke_all();
let session = state.sessions.create(&pub_.username);
login_response(StatusCode::OK, &pub_, &session)
}
Err(openpxe_core::Error::Invalid(msg)) => {
(StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST, Json(json!({ "error": msg }))).into_response()
}
Err(e) => (
StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
Json(json!({ "error": format!("{e}") })),
)
.into_response(),
}
}
#[derive(Debug, Serialize)]
struct LoginPayload<'a> {
user: &'a AdminPublic,
authenticated: bool,
}
fn login_response(status: StatusCode, user: &AdminPublic, session: &str) -> Response {
let body = Json(LoginPayload {
user,
authenticated: true,
});
let mut resp = (status, body).into_response();
resp.headers_mut().insert(
header::SET_COOKIE,
HeaderValue::from_str(&cookie_attrs(session, None)).unwrap(),
);
resp
}
// ── Tests ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn session_create_touch_revoke() {
let s = SessionStore::default();
assert!(s.is_empty());
let t = s.create("admin");
assert_eq!(s.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(s.touch(&t).as_deref(), Some("admin"));
s.revoke(&t);
assert!(s.is_empty());
// Stale token doesn't error, just returns None.
assert!(s.touch(&t).is_none());
}
#[test]
fn session_revoke_all_clears() {
let s = SessionStore::default();
let _ = s.create("a");
let _ = s.create("b");
assert_eq!(s.len(), 2);
s.revoke_all();
assert!(s.is_empty());
}
#[test]
fn public_path_allowlist() {
// PXE + chrome paths bypass auth.
for p in [
"/",
"/assets/app.js",
"/boot.ipxe",
"/boot/fake.ipxe",
"/iso/fake.iso",
"/ipxe/snponly.efi",
"/healthz",
"/readyz",
"/metrics",
// v0.4.6: iPXE fetches this for `console --picture` before
// it can possibly have a session cookie.
"/branding/pxe-logo",
] {
assert!(is_public_path(p), "expected {p} to be public");
}
// Auth surface itself is public.
for p in ["/api/setup", "/api/login", "/api/logout", "/api/me"] {
assert!(is_public_path(p), "expected {p} to be public");
}
// v0.5.1: SAML SP endpoints are pre-auth (no session yet).
for p in ["/api/sso/login", "/api/sso/acs", "/api/sso/metadata"] {
assert!(is_public_path(p), "expected {p} to be public");
}
// iPXE long-poll endpoints are public (no cookie available).
assert!(is_public_path("/api/queue/join"));
assert!(is_public_path("/api/queue/poll/abc"));
// Everything else under /api/* must auth.
for p in [
"/api/isos",
"/api/isos/x/category",
"/api/storage/disk",
"/api/branding/logo",
"/api/sso",
"/api/hosts",
] {
assert!(!is_public_path(p), "expected {p} to require auth");
}
}
#[test]
fn cookie_parse_picks_session_value() {
let mut h = axum::http::HeaderMap::new();
h.insert(
header::COOKIE,
HeaderValue::from_str(&format!("foo=bar; {SESSION_COOKIE}=abc123; baz=qux")).unwrap(),
);
assert_eq!(parse_cookie(&h).as_deref(), Some("abc123"));
// Different name → None.
let mut h2 = axum::http::HeaderMap::new();
h2.insert(header::COOKIE, HeaderValue::from_str("foo=bar").unwrap());
assert!(parse_cookie(&h2).is_none());
// No cookie header at all → None.
assert!(parse_cookie(&axum::http::HeaderMap::new()).is_none());
}
}
+35 -407
View File
@@ -23,22 +23,12 @@
//! There is intentionally no UI path to upload a custom `.ipxe` script.
use openpxe_core::{Settings, TimeoutAction};
use openpxe_iso_store::introspect::DistroFamily;
use openpxe_iso_store::{BootEntry, BootKind, IsoMeta};
use openpxe_iso_store::introspect::DistroFamily;
use std::fmt::Write as _;
/// Top-level OpenPXE boot menu. Serialized identically for BIOS and UEFI
/// clients because iPXE normalises the menu primitives across firmwares.
///
/// v0.4.69: rendered with an iVentoy-style graphical frame — a
/// `console --picture` directive paints a full-screen PNG background
/// (the operator's uploaded logo on a dark field, or the default
/// OpenPXE mark) with the menu text overlaid below a reserved top
/// margin, plus a footer carrying version + arch + firmware kind. On
/// iPXE binaries built with `IMAGE_PNG` + `CONSOLE_FRAMEBUFFER` (our
/// x86_64 UEFI binaries, compiled from source) the background paints;
/// on binaries without PNG support the `|| console` fallback yields a
/// clean text menu. The old ASCII wordmark has been removed.
#[must_use]
pub fn render_menu(isos: &[IsoMeta], settings: &Settings, base_url: &str) -> String {
let mut s = String::new();
@@ -57,45 +47,11 @@ pub fn render_menu(isos: &[IsoMeta], settings: &Settings, base_url: &str) -> Str
let _ = writeln!(s, "set base-url {base}");
let _ = writeln!(s, "set esc:hex 1b");
let _ = writeln!(s, "set cls ${{esc:string}}[2J");
// v0.4.69: graphical background. `/branding/pxe-logo` always
// returns a full-screen 1024×768 PNG now — the operator's logo on a
// dark field, or a default OpenPXE mark when none is uploaded. The
// `--top 290` reserves the top band (where the logo paints) so the
// menu text lands below it. On an iPXE build *with* `IMAGE_PNG` +
// `CONSOLE_FRAMEBUFFER` (our x86_64 UEFI binaries, built from source
// — see deploy/docker/Dockerfile) this paints the background and
// overlays the menu. On a build *without* PNG support (the fetched
// BIOS/i386/arm64 binaries) the whole `console --picture …` command
// fails and the `|| console` resets to a clean full-screen text
// menu. Either way there's no ASCII placeholder anymore.
let _ = writeln!(
s,
"console --picture {base}/branding/pxe-logo --top 290 || console"
);
// Map iPXE's ${{buildarch}} + ${{platform}} into the human form the
// user asked for (e.g. "x86 BIOS", "x86_64 UEFI", "arm64 UEFI").
// iPXE evaluates `iseq` lazily, so we only set whichever line
// matches. Anything not on the allowlist falls through to a generic
// `<buildarch> <platform>` display.
let _ = writeln!(s, "set arch-label ${{buildarch}} ${{platform}}");
let _ = writeln!(
s,
"iseq ${{buildarch}} i386 && iseq ${{platform}} pcbios && set arch-label x86 BIOS || iseq ${{buildarch}} x86_64 && iseq ${{platform}} efi && set arch-label x86_64 UEFI || iseq ${{buildarch}} arm64 && iseq ${{platform}} efi && set arch-label arm64 UEFI || true"
);
let _ = writeln!(s, ":menu");
let _ = writeln!(s, "menu OpenPXE - network boot menu");
// v0.4.69: the ASCII wordmark is gone — the graphical background
// (set via `console --picture` above) carries the branding now.
let _ = writeln!(s, "item --gap");
let _ = writeln!(
s,
"item --gap -- ------------------------- Default -------------------------"
);
let _ = writeln!(s, "item --gap -- ------------------------- Default -------------------------");
let _ = writeln!(s, "item local Boot from Local HDD");
let _ = writeln!(
s,
"item --gap -- ----------------------- Installers -----------------------"
);
let _ = writeln!(s, "item --gap -- ----------------------- Installers -----------------------");
if has_family(isos, is_linux_family) {
let _ = writeln!(s, "item linux Linux Installers >");
} else {
@@ -108,67 +64,28 @@ pub fn render_menu(isos: &[IsoMeta], settings: &Settings, base_url: &str) -> Str
} else {
let _ = writeln!(s, "item --gap -- (Windows support disabled in Settings)");
}
let _ = writeln!(
s,
"item --gap -- -------------------------- Tools --------------------------"
);
let _ = writeln!(s, "item --gap -- -------------------------- Tools --------------------------");
let _ = writeln!(s, "item tools Tools >");
let _ = writeln!(
s,
"item --gap -- ---------------------- Queued Deployment ---------------------"
);
let _ = writeln!(s, "item --gap -- ---------------------- Queued Deployment ---------------------");
let _ = writeln!(s, "item queue Queued Deployment (join queue)");
let _ = writeln!(s, "item --gap");
let _ = writeln!(s, "item --key x exit Exit iPXE");
// v0.4.6 footer line. Sits just above the `choose` line so it's
// always visible regardless of how the menu paginates. iPXE
// interpolates `${arch-label}` (set near the top of this script)
// and `${version}` is the binary-baked iPXE version — *not* the
// OpenPXE version — so we hard-code the OpenPXE version string
// here.
let openpxe_version = env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION");
let _ = writeln!(s, "item --gap");
let _ = writeln!(
s,
"item --gap -- OpenPXE v{openpxe_version} - ${{arch-label}}"
);
if matches!(settings.timeout_action, TimeoutAction::Stay) {
let _ = writeln!(s, "choose --default {default_item} target || goto menu");
} else {
let _ = writeln!(
s,
"choose --default {default_item} --timeout {timeout_ms} target || goto menu"
);
let _ = writeln!(s, "choose --default {default_item} --timeout {timeout_ms} target || goto menu");
}
// iPXE's `||` is strict about what follows. Each test uses `goto menu`
// as the fallthrough target so the parser never sees a bare `||` with
// trailing whitespace — some iPXE builds reject that.
let _ = writeln!(
s,
"iseq ${{target}} local && chain {base}/boot/_local.ipxe || goto menu"
);
let _ = writeln!(
s,
"iseq ${{target}} linux && chain {base}/boot/_linux_menu.ipxe || goto menu"
);
let _ = writeln!(
s,
"iseq ${{target}} windows && chain {base}/boot/_windows_menu.ipxe || goto menu"
);
let _ = writeln!(
s,
"iseq ${{target}} tools && chain {base}/boot/_tools_menu.ipxe || goto menu"
);
let _ = writeln!(
s,
"iseq ${{target}} queue && chain {base}/boot/_queue.ipxe || goto menu"
);
let _ = writeln!(
s,
"iseq ${{target}} exit && exit || goto menu"
);
let _ = writeln!(s, "iseq ${{target}} local && chain {base}/boot/_local.ipxe || goto menu");
let _ = writeln!(s, "iseq ${{target}} linux && chain {base}/boot/_linux_menu.ipxe || goto menu");
let _ = writeln!(s, "iseq ${{target}} windows && chain {base}/boot/_windows_menu.ipxe || goto menu");
let _ = writeln!(s, "iseq ${{target}} tools && chain {base}/boot/_tools_menu.ipxe || goto menu");
let _ = writeln!(s, "iseq ${{target}} queue && chain {base}/boot/_queue.ipxe || goto menu");
let _ = writeln!(s, "iseq ${{target}} exit && exit || goto menu");
let _ = writeln!(s, "goto menu");
s
}
@@ -178,51 +95,25 @@ pub fn render_menu(isos: &[IsoMeta], settings: &Settings, base_url: &str) -> Str
#[must_use]
pub fn render_family_menu(isos: &[IsoMeta], base_url: &str, is_windows: bool) -> String {
let base = base_url.trim_end_matches('/');
let title = if is_windows {
"Windows Installers"
} else {
"Linux Installers"
};
let title = if is_windows { "Windows Installers" } else { "Linux Installers" };
let label = if is_windows { "windows" } else { "linux" };
let mut s = String::new();
let _ = writeln!(s, "#!ipxe");
let _ = writeln!(s, "set base-url {base}");
let _ = writeln!(s, ":menu");
let _ = writeln!(s, "menu OpenPXE - {title}");
let filter: fn(DistroFamily) -> bool = if is_windows {
is_windows_family
} else {
is_linux_family
};
let filter: fn(DistroFamily) -> bool =
if is_windows { is_windows_family } else { is_linux_family };
let mut count = 0;
for iso in isos {
if !filter(iso.introspection.family) {
continue;
}
// v0.4.4: ISOs the operator flipped to the Tools category move
// out of the OS installer submenus entirely — they only appear
// under Tools. Without this filter the operator would see the
// same ISO in both menus.
if matches!(iso.category, openpxe_iso_store::IsoCategory::Tools) {
continue;
}
if !filter(iso.introspection.family) { continue; }
for entry in &iso.boot_entries {
let size_label = fmt_size_mib(iso.size_bytes);
let key = hotkey_for_index(count);
// Visual hint: a leading `*` marks password-protected entries.
// ASCII only — iPXE's menu console mangles non-ASCII on some
// firmwares.
let lock = if iso.is_password_protected() {
"*"
} else {
" "
};
let _ = writeln!(
s,
"item {}{} {}[{:>6}] {}",
s, "item {}{} [{:>6}] {}",
key,
entry.id,
lock,
size_label,
escape_label(&entry.title),
);
@@ -235,18 +126,8 @@ pub fn render_family_menu(isos: &[IsoMeta], base_url: &str, is_windows: bool) ->
let _ = writeln!(s, "item --gap");
let _ = writeln!(s, "item --key b back < Back to main menu");
let _ = writeln!(s, "choose target || goto menu");
let _ = writeln!(
s,
"iseq ${{target}} back && chain {base}/boot.ipxe || goto menu"
);
// Pass `?mac=${mac}` so the per-entry handler can record the booting
// client into the Host log. iPXE substitutes `${mac}` before
// the HTTP fetch; if the firmware can't resolve it the literal
// `${mac}` is sent and the server treats it as "unknown".
let _ = writeln!(
s,
"chain {base}/boot/${{target}}.ipxe?mac=${{mac}} || goto menu"
);
let _ = writeln!(s, "iseq ${{target}} back && chain {base}/boot.ipxe || goto menu");
let _ = writeln!(s, "chain {base}/boot/${{target}}.ipxe || goto menu");
s
}
@@ -267,52 +148,15 @@ fn hotkey_for_index(i: usize) -> String {
}
}
/// Tools submenu — Utilities, Shell, NIC Info, Reboot, Exit to firmware,
/// plus any ISOs the operator flipped to [`IsoCategory::Tools`] in the
/// Storage tab. The category-Tools ISOs render first so frequently used
/// recovery / hardware tools are reachable with a single number key
/// before the built-in shortcuts.
/// Tools submenu — Utilities, Shell, NIC Info, Reboot, Exit to firmware.
#[must_use]
pub fn render_tools_menu(isos: &[IsoMeta], base_url: &str) -> String {
pub fn render_tools_menu(base_url: &str) -> String {
let base = base_url.trim_end_matches('/');
let mut s = String::new();
let _ = writeln!(s, "#!ipxe");
let _ = writeln!(s, "set base-url {base}");
let _ = writeln!(s, ":menu");
let _ = writeln!(s, "menu OpenPXE - Tools");
// Operator-categorized tool ISOs (hotkeys 1..9), each chained the
// same way as a per-family menu pick — through the boot-entry id
// route, carrying `?mac=${mac}` for Host log attribution.
let mut count = 0;
for iso in isos {
if !matches!(iso.category, openpxe_iso_store::IsoCategory::Tools) {
continue;
}
for entry in &iso.boot_entries {
let size_label = fmt_size_mib(iso.size_bytes);
let key = hotkey_for_index(count);
let lock = if iso.is_password_protected() {
"*"
} else {
" "
};
let _ = writeln!(
s,
"item {}{} {}[{:>6}] {}",
key,
entry.id,
lock,
size_label,
escape_label(&entry.title),
);
count += 1;
}
}
if count > 0 {
let _ = writeln!(s, "item --gap");
}
let _ = writeln!(s, "item --key u util Utilities (memtest, ...)");
let _ = writeln!(s, "item --key s shell OpenPXE Shell");
let _ = writeln!(s, "item --key n nic Network Card Info");
@@ -322,36 +166,13 @@ pub fn render_tools_menu(isos: &[IsoMeta], base_url: &str) -> String {
let _ = writeln!(s, "item --gap");
let _ = writeln!(s, "item --key b back < Back to main menu");
let _ = writeln!(s, "choose target || goto menu");
let _ = writeln!(
s,
"iseq ${{target}} util && chain {base}/boot/_util.ipxe || goto menu"
);
let _ = writeln!(
s,
"iseq ${{target}} shell && chain {base}/boot/_shell.ipxe || goto menu"
);
let _ = writeln!(
s,
"iseq ${{target}} nic && chain {base}/boot/_nic.ipxe || goto menu"
);
let _ = writeln!(
s,
"iseq ${{target}} reboot && reboot || goto menu"
);
let _ = writeln!(
s,
"iseq ${{target}} firmware && exit 0 || goto menu"
);
let _ = writeln!(
s,
"iseq ${{target}} back && chain {base}/boot.ipxe || goto menu"
);
// Fall-through for category-Tools ISO ids — same as the family
// submenu, carrying `?mac=${mac}` for the boot log.
let _ = writeln!(
s,
"chain {base}/boot/${{target}}.ipxe?mac=${{mac}} || goto menu"
);
let _ = writeln!(s, "iseq ${{target}} util && chain {base}/boot/_util.ipxe || goto menu");
let _ = writeln!(s, "iseq ${{target}} shell && chain {base}/boot/_shell.ipxe || goto menu");
let _ = writeln!(s, "iseq ${{target}} nic && chain {base}/boot/_nic.ipxe || goto menu");
let _ = writeln!(s, "iseq ${{target}} reboot && reboot || goto menu");
let _ = writeln!(s, "iseq ${{target}} firmware && exit 0 || goto menu");
let _ = writeln!(s, "iseq ${{target}} back && chain {base}/boot.ipxe || goto menu");
let _ = writeln!(s, "goto menu");
s
}
@@ -364,15 +185,8 @@ pub fn render_local_hdd(base_url: &str) -> String {
let mut s = String::new();
let _ = writeln!(s, "#!ipxe");
let _ = writeln!(s, "# Boot from Local HDD - platform-sensitive");
let _ = writeln!(
s,
"iseq ${{platform}} pcbios && sanboot --no-describe --drive 0x80 || goto uefi"
);
let _ = writeln!(s, ":uefi");
let _ = writeln!(
s,
"# UEFI path: fall through to the firmware's next boot entry"
);
let _ = writeln!(s, "iseq ${{platform}} pcbios && sanboot --no-describe --drive 0x80 || ");
let _ = writeln!(s, "# UEFI path: fall through to the firmware's next boot entry");
let _ = writeln!(s, "exit 0");
let _ = writeln!(s, "# If the above exit returns, loop back to the main menu");
let _ = writeln!(s, "chain {base}/boot.ipxe");
@@ -393,14 +207,8 @@ pub fn render_util(base_url: &str) -> String {
let _ = writeln!(s, "item --gap");
let _ = writeln!(s, "item back < Back");
let _ = writeln!(s, "choose target || goto menu");
let _ = writeln!(
s,
"iseq ${{target}} memtest && chain {base}/ipxe/memtest.bin || goto menu"
);
let _ = writeln!(
s,
"iseq ${{target}} back && chain {base}/boot/_tools_menu.ipxe || goto menu"
);
let _ = writeln!(s, "iseq ${{target}} memtest && chain {base}/ipxe/memtest.bin || ");
let _ = writeln!(s, "iseq ${{target}} back && chain {base}/boot/_tools_menu.ipxe || ");
let _ = writeln!(s, "goto menu");
s
}
@@ -447,10 +255,7 @@ pub fn render_queue_entry(base_url: &str) -> String {
let base = base_url.trim_end_matches('/');
let mut s = String::new();
let _ = writeln!(s, "#!ipxe");
let _ = writeln!(
s,
"# Queued Deployment - join the queue and wait for operator"
);
let _ = writeln!(s, "# Queued Deployment - join the queue and wait for operator");
let _ = writeln!(s, "echo Joining deployment queue...");
// imgfetch writes the body to a file in iPXE's transient FS; we read
// the queue entry id out of the Location-style header by asking the server
@@ -467,11 +272,7 @@ pub fn render_entry(entry: &BootEntry, settings: &Settings, base_url: &str) -> S
let _ = writeln!(s, "#!ipxe");
let _ = writeln!(s, "set base-url {base}");
match &entry.kind {
BootKind::LinuxKernel {
kernel_url,
initrd_urls,
args,
} => {
BootKind::LinuxKernel { kernel_url, initrd_urls, args } => {
let mut cmdline = args.cmdline.replace("${base-url}", base);
if !settings.extra_kernel_args.trim().is_empty() {
cmdline.push(' ');
@@ -522,178 +323,5 @@ fn has_family(isos: &[IsoMeta], pred: fn(DistroFamily) -> bool) -> bool {
}
fn escape_label(s: &str) -> String {
s.chars()
.map(|c| match c {
'\n' | '\r' => ' ',
c => c,
})
.collect()
}
/// Render the password-prompt script for a protected boot entry.
///
/// Flow on the client:
/// 1. iPXE clears any leftover ${password}, prints a banner naming the
/// ISO so the operator knows what they're being asked for.
/// 2. `read --secret password` accepts input without echoing it to
/// the screen.
/// 3. An empty input bails back to the main menu (lets the operator
/// back out of a misclick).
/// 4. Otherwise the script chains the same /boot/<id>.ipxe URL but
/// with `?token=${password:uristring}`. iPXE's `:uristring`
/// modifier URL-encodes the value so `&`, `?`, `=`, spaces, etc.
/// survive transport.
/// 5. The server replies with either the boot script (correct
/// password) or [`render_password_failed`] (wrong password). On
/// transport failure we fall back to the main menu.
#[must_use]
pub fn render_password_prompt(entry_id: &str, iso_filename: &str, base_url: &str) -> String {
let base = base_url.trim_end_matches('/');
let label = escape_label(iso_filename);
let mut s = String::new();
let _ = writeln!(s, "#!ipxe");
let _ = writeln!(s, "# OpenPXE password prompt for {label}");
let _ = writeln!(s, "echo");
let _ = writeln!(s, "echo ==========================================");
let _ = writeln!(s, "echo This image requires a password");
let _ = writeln!(s, "echo {label}");
let _ = writeln!(s, "echo (enter alone returns to main menu)");
let _ = writeln!(s, "echo ==========================================");
let _ = writeln!(s, "set password ");
let _ = writeln!(s, "read --secret password");
let _ = writeln!(
s,
"iseq ${{password}} \"\" && chain {base}/boot.ipxe || goto submit"
);
let _ = writeln!(s, ":submit");
let _ = writeln!(s, "echo Verifying...");
// Carry `mac=${mac}` alongside the token so a successful unlock
// records the actual client MAC into the Host log. On
// older iPXE that can't resolve `${mac}` the server just stores it
// as "unknown" rather than refusing to boot.
let _ = writeln!(
s,
"chain {base}/boot/{entry_id}.ipxe?token=${{password:uristring}}&mac=${{mac}} \
|| chain {base}/boot.ipxe"
);
s
}
/// Render the "wrong password" script. Tells the operator, sleeps for
/// two seconds (gives the eye time to register the message and dampens
/// brute-force rate without help from the server), and chains back to
/// the same entry — which sends them through the prompt flow again.
#[must_use]
pub fn render_password_failed(entry_id: &str, base_url: &str) -> String {
let base = base_url.trim_end_matches('/');
let mut s = String::new();
let _ = writeln!(s, "#!ipxe");
let _ = writeln!(s, "echo");
let _ = writeln!(s, "echo Wrong password.");
let _ = writeln!(s, "sleep 2");
let _ = writeln!(
s,
"chain {base}/boot/{entry_id}.ipxe || chain {base}/boot.ipxe"
);
s
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod password_tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn prompt_uses_secret_read_and_uri_escape() {
let s = render_password_prompt("alpha-linux", "Alpha Test.iso", "http://10.0.0.5");
assert!(s.starts_with("#!ipxe\n"));
assert!(s.contains("read --secret password"));
assert!(s.contains("Alpha Test.iso"));
// URI-string modifier on the var so passwords with `&`/spaces survive.
assert!(s.contains("token=${password:uristring}"));
// Empty enter sends back to the main menu, not back into the prompt
// (avoids a wedged client if the operator chose by mistake).
assert!(s.contains("&& chain http://10.0.0.5/boot.ipxe || goto submit"));
// Never log/echo the value.
assert!(!s.contains("echo ${password"));
}
#[test]
fn failed_chains_back_to_entry() {
let s = render_password_failed("alpha-linux", "http://10.0.0.5");
assert!(s.contains("Wrong password."));
// Re-target the entry so the prompt flow runs again.
assert!(s.contains("chain http://10.0.0.5/boot/alpha-linux.ipxe"));
}
#[test]
fn top_menu_has_polished_branding_and_arch_footer() {
// v0.4.69: the menu emits a `console --picture` line that paints
// a full-screen PNG background (the operator's logo, or the
// default OpenPXE mark) reserving a top margin for it, then
// falls back to a clean text console on iPXE builds without PNG
// support. The ASCII wordmark is gone — the graphical
// background carries the branding now. A single-line footer
// still carries the OpenPXE version + arch.
let settings = Settings::default();
let s = render_menu(&[], &settings, "http://10.0.0.5");
assert!(
s.contains("console --picture http://10.0.0.5/branding/pxe-logo"),
"missing console --picture line:\n{s}"
);
// The picture call reserves a top margin for the logo band.
assert!(s.contains("--top 290"), "missing --top margin:\n{s}");
// Picture-or-text-console must be a single statement so older
// iPXE parsers don't choke on the chain.
assert!(s.contains("|| console"), "missing graceful fallback:\n{s}");
// The ASCII wordmark must be GONE — its removal is the whole
// point of v0.4.69's graphical background.
assert!(
!s.contains("___ ___ __ __ ___"),
"ASCII banner should have been removed:\n{s}"
);
// Footer with version + arch interpolation. The version comes
// from CARGO_PKG_VERSION at compile time.
let version = env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION");
assert!(
s.contains(&format!("OpenPXE v{version}")),
"footer missing OpenPXE version:\n{s}"
);
assert!(
s.contains("${arch-label}"),
"footer missing arch-label interpolation:\n{s}"
);
// No website URL — the design brief calls that out as tacky.
assert!(
!s.to_ascii_lowercase().contains("openpxe.com"),
"footer should not advertise the website:\n{s}"
);
// Arch-label mapping covers the three labels from the brief:
// "x86 BIOS", "x86_64 UEFI", "arm64 UEFI".
assert!(s.contains("x86 BIOS"), "{s}");
assert!(s.contains("x86_64 UEFI"), "{s}");
assert!(s.contains("arm64 UEFI"), "{s}");
}
#[test]
fn generated_scripts_do_not_emit_bare_or_trailing_fallbacks() {
let settings = Settings::default();
let scripts = [
render_menu(&[], &settings, "http://10.0.0.5"),
render_tools_menu(&[], "http://10.0.0.5"),
render_local_hdd("http://10.0.0.5"),
render_util("http://10.0.0.5"),
render_shell("http://10.0.0.5"),
render_nic_info("http://10.0.0.5"),
render_queue_entry("http://10.0.0.5"),
render_password_failed("alpha-linux", "http://10.0.0.5"),
];
for script in scripts {
for line in script.lines() {
assert!(
!line.trim_end().ends_with("||"),
"bare iPXE fallback operator in line: {line}\nscript:\n{script}"
);
}
}
}
s.chars().map(|c| match c { '\n' | '\r' => ' ', c => c }).collect()
}
+10 -33
View File
@@ -31,9 +31,7 @@ pub fn lookup(iso_path: &Path, in_iso_path: &str) -> Option<FileLocation> {
.split('/')
.filter(|c| !c.is_empty())
.collect();
if components.is_empty() {
return None;
}
if components.is_empty() { return None; }
walk(&mut f, root.offset, root.length, &components)
}
@@ -42,16 +40,11 @@ fn read_root_directory(f: &mut std::fs::File) -> Option<FileLocation> {
let mut pvd = [0u8; 2048];
f.seek(SeekFrom::Start(16 * SECTOR)).ok()?;
f.read_exact(&mut pvd).ok()?;
if pvd[0] != 0x01 || &pvd[1..6] != b"CD001" {
return None;
}
if pvd[0] != 0x01 || &pvd[1..6] != b"CD001" { return None; }
// Root directory record is at offset 156, length 34.
let rec = &pvd[156..156 + 34];
let (offset, length) = parse_dir_record_ext(rec)?;
Some(FileLocation {
offset: offset * SECTOR,
length,
})
Some(FileLocation { offset: offset * SECTOR, length })
}
/// Walk components down the directory tree starting at `dir_offset`.
@@ -73,29 +66,21 @@ fn walk(
if len == 0 {
// Padding to sector boundary.
let next = (i / SECTOR as usize + 1) * SECTOR as usize;
if next <= i {
break;
}
if next <= i { break; }
i = next;
continue;
}
if i + len > dir.len() {
break;
}
if i + len > dir.len() { break; }
let rec = &dir[i..i + len];
let name = dir_record_name(rec);
let is_dir = (rec.get(25).copied().unwrap_or(0) & 0x02) != 0;
// Skip "." (0x00) and ".." (0x01) pseudo-entries.
let is_pseudo = matches!(rec.get(32).copied(), Some(1))
&& rec.get(33).copied() == Some(0x00)
let is_pseudo = matches!(rec.get(32).copied(), Some(1)) && rec.get(33).copied() == Some(0x00)
|| matches!(rec.get(32).copied(), Some(1)) && rec.get(33).copied() == Some(0x01);
if !is_pseudo && name.eq_ignore_ascii_case(target) {
let (child_off, child_len) = parse_dir_record_ext(rec)?;
if rest.is_empty() && !is_dir {
return Some(FileLocation {
offset: child_off * SECTOR,
length: child_len,
});
return Some(FileLocation { offset: child_off * SECTOR, length: child_len });
} else if !rest.is_empty() && is_dir {
return walk(f, child_off * SECTOR, child_len, rest);
}
@@ -109,9 +94,7 @@ fn walk(
/// Layout per ISO9660: bytes 2..10 extent LBA (LE+BE duplicate), 10..18
/// data length (LE+BE duplicate). We trust the little-endian copy.
fn parse_dir_record_ext(rec: &[u8]) -> Option<(u64, u64)> {
if rec.len() < 34 {
return None;
}
if rec.len() < 34 { return None; }
let lba = u32::from_le_bytes(rec[2..6].try_into().ok()?) as u64;
let len = u32::from_le_bytes(rec[10..14].try_into().ok()?) as u64;
Some((lba, len))
@@ -121,15 +104,9 @@ fn parse_dir_record_ext(rec: &[u8]) -> Option<(u64, u64)> {
/// `;1` version suffix.
fn dir_record_name(rec: &[u8]) -> String {
let name_len = *rec.get(32).unwrap_or(&0) as usize;
if name_len == 0 || rec.len() < 33 + name_len {
return String::new();
}
if name_len == 0 || rec.len() < 33 + name_len { return String::new(); }
let raw = &rec[33..33 + name_len];
let s = String::from_utf8_lossy(raw).to_string();
// Strip `;N` version suffix.
if let Some(i) = s.rfind(';') {
s[..i].to_string()
} else {
s
}
if let Some(i) = s.rfind(';') { s[..i].to_string() } else { s }
}
-4
View File
@@ -14,15 +14,11 @@
#![forbid(unsafe_code)]
pub mod app;
pub mod auth;
pub mod ipxe_script;
pub mod iso_fs;
pub mod log_stream;
pub mod notify;
pub mod saml_routes;
pub mod state;
pub mod terminal;
pub mod uploads;
pub use app::build_router;
pub use state::AppState;
+5 -9
View File
@@ -36,11 +36,9 @@ pub async fn stream(
let rx = state.log_bus.subscribe();
let live = BroadcastStream::new(rx).map(|res| match res {
Ok(line) => Ok(Event::default().data(line_json(&line))),
Err(tokio_stream::wrappers::errors::BroadcastStreamRecvError::Lagged(n)) => {
Ok(Event::default()
Err(tokio_stream::wrappers::errors::BroadcastStreamRecvError::Lagged(n)) => Ok(Event::default()
.event("lagged")
.data(json!({ "skipped": n }).to_string()))
}
.data(json!({ "skipped": n }).to_string())),
});
Sse::new(recent_stream.chain(live))
@@ -57,11 +55,9 @@ pub async fn recent(State(state): State<AppState>) -> Json<serde_json::Value> {
/// keep streaming new lines as they arrive).
pub async fn clear(State(state): State<AppState>) -> Json<serde_json::Value> {
state.log_bus.clear();
state.log_bus.push(
"info",
"openpxe::terminal",
"log buffer cleared by operator",
);
state
.log_bus
.push("info", "openpxe::terminal", "log buffer cleared by operator");
Json(json!({ "ok": true }))
}
-138
View File
@@ -1,138 +0,0 @@
//! Notification *delivery* — the network half of the notify feature.
//!
//! `openpxe_core::notify` owns the config + persistence; this module
//! turns a `NotifyConfig` + a message into an actual delivery:
//!
//! - Slack / Discord / Teams → HTTP POST of a provider-shaped JSON
//! body to the operator's incoming-webhook URL (via `reqwest`).
//! - SMTP → a TLS email via `lettre`.
//!
//! Every send is best-effort and time-bounded: a flaky webhook must
//! never wedge a PXE boot. Callers fire these from a detached task.
use openpxe_core::{NotifyConfig, NotifyKind};
use std::time::Duration;
/// Hard ceiling on any single delivery so a hung endpoint can't pin a
/// task forever.
const SEND_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(10);
/// Deliver `body` (with an optional `subject`, used as the email
/// subject / chat bold-line) using the active provider in `cfg`.
/// Returns `Ok(())` on success, or a human-readable error suitable for
/// surfacing in the "Send test" response.
pub async fn send(cfg: &NotifyConfig, subject: &str, body: &str) -> Result<(), String> {
if !cfg.is_usable() {
return Err("notifications are not enabled / fully configured".into());
}
match cfg.kind {
NotifyKind::Slack | NotifyKind::Discord | NotifyKind::Teams => {
send_webhook(cfg, subject, body).await
}
NotifyKind::Smtp => send_email(cfg, subject, body).await,
}
}
async fn send_webhook(cfg: &NotifyConfig, subject: &str, body: &str) -> Result<(), String> {
// Each chat platform wants a different JSON shape for an incoming
// webhook. Keep the bodies minimal and plain-text-ish so they
// render cleanly everywhere.
let combined = if subject.is_empty() {
body.to_string()
} else {
format!("*{subject}*\n{body}")
};
let payload = match cfg.kind {
NotifyKind::Slack => serde_json::json!({ "text": combined }),
NotifyKind::Discord => serde_json::json!({ "content": combined }),
NotifyKind::Teams => serde_json::json!({
// Legacy MessageCard — the format every Teams "Incoming
// Webhook" connector still accepts.
"@type": "MessageCard",
"@context": "https://schema.org/extensions",
"summary": if subject.is_empty() { "OpenPXE" } else { subject },
"title": subject,
"text": body,
}),
NotifyKind::Smtp => unreachable!("smtp handled separately"),
};
let client = reqwest::Client::builder()
.timeout(SEND_TIMEOUT)
.build()
.map_err(|e| format!("could not build HTTP client: {e}"))?;
let resp = client
.post(&cfg.webhook_url)
.json(&payload)
.send()
.await
.map_err(|e| format!("webhook POST failed: {e}"))?;
let status = resp.status();
if status.is_success() {
Ok(())
} else {
let snippet = resp
.text()
.await
.unwrap_or_default()
.chars()
.take(200)
.collect::<String>();
Err(format!("webhook returned HTTP {status}: {snippet}"))
}
}
async fn send_email(cfg: &NotifyConfig, subject: &str, body: &str) -> Result<(), String> {
use lettre::transport::smtp::authentication::Credentials;
use lettre::{AsyncSmtpTransport, AsyncTransport, Message, Tokio1Executor};
let from = if cfg.smtp_from.trim().is_empty() {
cfg.smtp_username.trim()
} else {
cfg.smtp_from.trim()
};
if from.is_empty() {
return Err("SMTP requires a From address (or a username to fall back to)".into());
}
let email = Message::builder()
.from(
from.parse()
.map_err(|e| format!("invalid From address '{from}': {e}"))?,
)
.to(cfg
.smtp_to
.trim()
.parse()
.map_err(|e| format!("invalid To address '{}': {e}", cfg.smtp_to))?)
.subject(if subject.is_empty() { "OpenPXE" } else { subject })
.body(body.to_string())
.map_err(|e| format!("could not build email: {e}"))?;
// Implicit TLS (465) vs STARTTLS (587). We never send plaintext.
let mut builder = if cfg.smtp_implicit_tls {
AsyncSmtpTransport::<Tokio1Executor>::relay(&cfg.smtp_host)
.map_err(|e| format!("SMTP relay setup failed: {e}"))?
} else {
AsyncSmtpTransport::<Tokio1Executor>::starttls_relay(&cfg.smtp_host)
.map_err(|e| format!("SMTP STARTTLS setup failed: {e}"))?
}
.port(cfg.smtp_port)
.timeout(Some(SEND_TIMEOUT));
// Auth is optional — some internal relays accept unauthenticated
// mail from trusted hosts. Only attach credentials when a username
// is set.
if !cfg.smtp_username.trim().is_empty() {
builder = builder.credentials(Credentials::new(
cfg.smtp_username.trim().to_string(),
cfg.smtp_password.clone(),
));
}
let mailer = builder.build();
mailer
.send(email)
.await
.map(|_| ())
.map_err(|e| format!("SMTP send failed: {e}"))
}
-338
View File
@@ -1,338 +0,0 @@
//! SAML 2.0 Service Provider HTTP endpoints (v0.5.1).
//!
//! * `GET /api/sso/login` — SP-initiated: build an AuthnRequest, record its
//! ID, and 302 the browser to the IdP.
//! * `POST /api/sso/acs` — Assertion Consumer Service: verify + validate
//! the IdP's `SAMLResponse`, perform the stateful checks (InResponseTo
//! correlation, IdP-initiated gating, assertion replay), mint an operator
//! session, and 302 to the dashboard. (Mirrors FleetDM's `/sso/callback`.)
//! * `GET /api/sso/metadata` — serve our SP metadata XML for IdP import.
//!
//! Stateless crypto + semantic validation live in `openpxe_core::saml`; this
//! module owns only the HTTP glue and the in-memory state the SP needs.
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::sync::Arc;
use std::time::{Duration as StdDuration, Instant};
use axum::{
body::Body,
extract::{Form, Query, State},
http::{header, StatusCode},
response::{IntoResponse, Response},
};
use base64::Engine;
use parking_lot::Mutex;
use serde::Deserialize;
use time::{Duration, OffsetDateTime};
use openpxe_core::saml::{self, metadata::IdpMetadata, SamlError, SpParams};
use openpxe_core::SsoConfig;
use crate::auth;
use crate::state::AppState;
/// Outstanding AuthnRequest IDs live at most this long before a matching
/// response is considered stale (covers a slow human at the IdP login form).
const REQUEST_TTL: StdDuration = StdDuration::from_mins(10);
/// How long we fetch-cache IdP metadata loaded from a URL.
const METADATA_FETCH_TIMEOUT: StdDuration = StdDuration::from_secs(10);
/// In-memory SAML runtime state. Cheap to clone (Arc-shared).
#[derive(Clone, Default)]
pub struct SamlRuntime {
/// request_id → issued_at. Correlates a response's `InResponseTo` to a
/// request *we* actually sent (replay / CSRF defense for SP-initiated).
outstanding: Arc<Mutex<HashMap<String, Instant>>>,
/// assertion_id → expiry. A consumed assertion may not be replayed.
consumed: Arc<Mutex<HashMap<String, Instant>>>,
/// Cache of IdP metadata fetched from a URL: (url, parsed).
metadata_cache: Arc<Mutex<Option<(String, IdpMetadata)>>>,
}
impl SamlRuntime {
/// Record an AuthnRequest we just sent.
pub fn register_request(&self, id: &str) {
let mut g = self.outstanding.lock();
prune(&mut g);
g.insert(id.to_owned(), Instant::now());
}
/// Consume an outstanding request ID, returning `true` if it was present
/// and still fresh. A miss means the response doesn't correlate to any
/// live request we issued.
pub fn take_request(&self, id: &str) -> bool {
let mut g = self.outstanding.lock();
prune(&mut g);
g.remove(id).is_some()
}
/// Record a consumed assertion. Returns `false` if it was already
/// consumed (a replay) — in which case the caller must reject.
pub fn record_assertion(&self, id: &str, expiry: OffsetDateTime) -> bool {
let mut g = self.consumed.lock();
prune(&mut g);
if g.contains_key(id) {
return false;
}
let ttl = (expiry - OffsetDateTime::now_utc())
.max(Duration::ZERO)
.unsigned_abs();
g.insert(id.to_owned(), Instant::now() + ttl);
true
}
fn cached_metadata(&self, url: &str) -> Option<IdpMetadata> {
let g = self.metadata_cache.lock();
match &*g {
Some((cached_url, md)) if cached_url == url => Some(md.clone()),
_ => None,
}
}
fn cache_metadata(&self, url: String, md: IdpMetadata) {
*self.metadata_cache.lock() = Some((url, md));
}
}
/// Drop expired entries so neither map grows unbounded.
fn prune(map: &mut HashMap<String, Instant>) {
let now = Instant::now();
// For the request map this over-prunes (entries store issued_at, not
// expiry), so cap by REQUEST_TTL; the consumed map stores absolute
// expiry instants. Using saturating logic keeps both correct: request
// entries older than REQUEST_TTL go, consumed entries past expiry go.
map.retain(|_, &mut t| now.saturating_duration_since(t) < REQUEST_TTL || t > now);
}
// ─── GET /api/sso/login ───────────────────────────────────────────────────
#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
pub struct LoginQuery {
/// Optional local path to return to after login (becomes RelayState).
#[serde(default)]
pub next: Option<String>,
}
pub async fn sso_login(State(state): State<AppState>, Query(q): Query<LoginQuery>) -> Response {
let cfg = state.sso.snapshot();
if !cfg.is_usable() {
return redirect("/?sso_error=unavailable");
}
let idp = match resolve_idp_metadata(&state, &cfg).await {
Ok(m) => m,
Err(e) => {
tracing::warn!(target: "openpxe::saml", "sso_login: metadata unavailable: {e}");
return redirect("/?sso_error=metadata");
}
};
let Some(dest) = idp.sso_destination().map(str::to_owned) else {
tracing::warn!(target: "openpxe::saml", "sso_login: IdP metadata has no SSO endpoint");
return redirect("/?sso_error=metadata");
};
let sp = sp_params(&state, &cfg);
let relay = safe_local_path(q.next.as_deref());
match saml::authn_request::build(&sp, &dest, Some(&relay)) {
Ok(req) => {
state.saml.register_request(&req.id);
redirect(&req.location)
}
Err(e) => {
tracing::warn!(target: "openpxe::saml", "sso_login: build AuthnRequest failed: {e}");
redirect("/?sso_error=request")
}
}
}
// ─── POST /api/sso/acs ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
pub struct AcsForm {
#[serde(rename = "SAMLResponse")]
pub saml_response: String,
#[serde(rename = "RelayState", default)]
pub relay_state: Option<String>,
}
pub async fn sso_acs(State(state): State<AppState>, Form(form): Form<AcsForm>) -> Response {
let cfg = state.sso.snapshot();
if !cfg.is_usable() {
return redirect("/?sso_error=unavailable");
}
let xml = match base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD.decode(form.saml_response.as_bytes())
{
Ok(bytes) => String::from_utf8_lossy(&bytes).into_owned(),
Err(e) => {
tracing::warn!(target: "openpxe::saml", "acs: base64 decode failed: {e}");
return redirect("/?sso_error=1");
}
};
let idp = match resolve_idp_metadata(&state, &cfg).await {
Ok(m) => m,
Err(e) => {
tracing::warn!(target: "openpxe::saml", "acs: metadata unavailable: {e}");
return redirect("/?sso_error=metadata");
}
};
let sp = sp_params(&state, &cfg);
// Signature verification + semantic checks are CPU-bound — keep them off
// the async executor.
let now = OffsetDateTime::now_utc();
let skew = Duration::seconds(saml::DEFAULT_CLOCK_SKEW_SECS);
let verify = {
let xml = xml.clone();
let sp = sp.clone();
tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || saml::response::consume(&xml, &sp, &idp, now, skew))
.await
};
let verified = match verify {
Ok(Ok(v)) => v,
Ok(Err(e)) => {
// Never leak which specific check failed to the browser.
tracing::warn!(target: "openpxe::saml", "acs: response rejected: {e}");
return redirect("/?sso_error=1");
}
Err(join) => {
tracing::error!(target: "openpxe::saml", "acs: verify task panicked: {join}");
return redirect("/?sso_error=1");
}
};
// Stateful checks the core deliberately left to us.
match &verified.in_response_to {
Some(id) => {
if !state.saml.take_request(id) {
tracing::warn!(target: "openpxe::saml", "acs: InResponseTo matches no live request");
return redirect("/?sso_error=1");
}
}
None => {
if !cfg.allow_idp_initiated {
tracing::warn!(target: "openpxe::saml", "acs: IdP-initiated login is disabled");
return redirect("/?sso_error=idp_initiated");
}
}
}
if !state
.saml
.record_assertion(&verified.assertion_id, verified.assertion_expiry)
{
tracing::warn!(target: "openpxe::saml", "acs: assertion replay rejected");
return redirect("/?sso_error=1");
}
// Success → mint an operator session keyed to the verified email.
let session = state.sessions.create(&verified.principal.email);
tracing::info!(
target: "openpxe::saml",
email = %verified.principal.email,
idp_initiated = verified.in_response_to.is_none(),
"SAML SSO sign-in"
);
// safe_local_path already maps None / unsafe values to "/".
let relay = safe_local_path(form.relay_state.as_deref());
redirect_with_session(&relay, &session)
}
// ─── GET /api/sso/metadata ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
pub async fn sso_metadata(State(state): State<AppState>) -> Response {
let cfg = state.sso.snapshot();
let sp = sp_params(&state, &cfg);
let xml = saml::metadata::build_sp_metadata(&sp);
(
StatusCode::OK,
[(header::CONTENT_TYPE, "application/samlmetadata+xml")],
xml,
)
.into_response()
}
// ─── helpers ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
/// Derive runtime SP parameters from config + the advertised public base URL.
fn sp_params(state: &AppState, cfg: &SsoConfig) -> SpParams {
let base = state.public_base_url.trim_end_matches('/');
let entity_id = if cfg.entity_id.trim().is_empty() {
base.to_owned()
} else {
cfg.entity_id.trim().to_owned()
};
SpParams {
entity_id,
acs_url: format!("{base}/api/sso/acs"),
}
}
/// Resolve the IdP metadata: prefer the metadata URL (fetched + cached) per
/// the "URL wins" rule, else parse the pasted XML.
async fn resolve_idp_metadata(state: &AppState, cfg: &SsoConfig) -> Result<IdpMetadata, SamlError> {
let url = cfg.metadata_url.trim();
if !url.is_empty() {
if let Some(md) = state.saml.cached_metadata(url) {
return Ok(md);
}
let body = fetch_metadata(url).await?;
let md = IdpMetadata::parse(&body)?;
state.saml.cache_metadata(url.to_owned(), md.clone());
return Ok(md);
}
if !cfg.metadata.trim().is_empty() {
return IdpMetadata::parse(&cfg.metadata);
}
Err(SamlError::Metadata("no metadata source configured".into()))
}
async fn fetch_metadata(url: &str) -> Result<String, SamlError> {
let client = reqwest::Client::builder()
.timeout(METADATA_FETCH_TIMEOUT)
.build()
.map_err(|e| SamlError::Metadata(format!("http client: {e}")))?;
let resp = client
.get(url)
.send()
.await
.map_err(|e| SamlError::Metadata(format!("fetch {url}: {e}")))?;
if !resp.status().is_success() {
return Err(SamlError::Metadata(format!(
"fetch {url}: HTTP {}",
resp.status()
)));
}
resp.text()
.await
.map_err(|e| SamlError::Metadata(format!("read {url}: {e}")))
}
/// Only permit a same-site path (single leading slash) as a redirect target —
/// blocks open-redirect / protocol-relative (`//evil.com`) abuse of RelayState.
fn safe_local_path(p: Option<&str>) -> String {
match p {
Some(p) if p.starts_with('/') && !p.starts_with("//") => p.to_owned(),
_ => "/".to_owned(),
}
}
fn redirect(location: &str) -> Response {
Response::builder()
.status(StatusCode::FOUND)
.header(header::LOCATION, location)
.body(Body::empty())
.map_or_else(
|_| StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR.into_response(),
IntoResponse::into_response,
)
}
fn redirect_with_session(location: &str, session: &str) -> Response {
Response::builder()
.status(StatusCode::FOUND)
.header(header::LOCATION, location)
.header(header::SET_COOKIE, auth::session_cookie(session))
.body(Body::empty())
.map_or_else(
|_| StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR.into_response(),
IntoResponse::into_response,
)
}
+7 -53
View File
@@ -1,11 +1,5 @@
use crate::auth::SessionStore;
use crate::saml_routes::SamlRuntime;
use crate::uploads::UploadSessions;
use openpxe_core::{
AdminStore, BootLog, BrandingStore, ClientRegistry, DeploymentQueue, HostBindings, LogBus,
Metrics, NotifyStore, SettingsStore, SsoStore,
};
use openpxe_iso_store::{IsoStore, NfsShareManager, SmbManager, SmbShareManager};
use openpxe_core::{ClientRegistry, DeploymentQueue, HostBindings, LogBus, Metrics, SettingsStore};
use openpxe_iso_store::{IsoStore, NfsManager, SmbManager};
use std::sync::Arc;
use time::OffsetDateTime;
@@ -19,33 +13,6 @@ pub struct AppState {
/// these MACs requests `/boot.ipxe`, we chain straight to the
/// configured target instead of rendering the menu.
pub hosts: HostBindings,
/// Persistent boot-event log surfaced under the Hosts tab. Records
/// every `/boot/<entry>.ipxe` chain that goes on to serve a script
/// (i.e. an image actually starting to install on a machine).
pub boot_log: BootLog,
/// Operator-controlled UI overrides (custom logo). When the
/// operator hasn't uploaded anything, the WebUI serves the bundled
/// rainbow-horizon mark.
pub branding: BrandingStore,
/// Forms-auth admin record + first-run bootstrap state. When
/// `admin.is_configured() == false`, the auth middleware passes
/// every request through and `/api/me` reports `setup_required`.
pub admin: AdminStore,
/// In-memory session table for active operator logins. Cleared on
/// process restart (sessions are tied to UI state, not persisted —
/// matches Sonarr/Radarr behaviour).
pub sessions: SessionStore,
/// SAML SSO configuration (persisted IdP metadata, Entity ID, toggles).
pub sso: SsoStore,
/// v0.5.1: in-memory SAML runtime state — outstanding AuthnRequest IDs
/// (for InResponseTo correlation), consumed-assertion replay guard, and
/// a cache of fetched IdP metadata. Tied to process lifetime, like
/// `sessions`; a restart simply invalidates any in-flight SSO login.
pub saml: SamlRuntime,
/// v0.5.0: webhook / email notification config (Slack/Teams/Discord/
/// SMTP). Drives the fire-and-forget pings on boot events and powers
/// the Advanced tab's config + "Send test" button.
pub notify: NotifyStore,
/// Lock-free metrics counters surfaced at `/metrics` in Prometheus
/// text format. Cheap to clone (handles to atomics).
pub metrics: Metrics,
@@ -53,24 +20,11 @@ pub struct AppState {
/// `smb_dir` at startup; `None` in pure-Linux-only deployments where
/// Windows support is not wired in. Settings toggle drives start/stop.
pub smb: Option<Arc<SmbManager>>,
/// v0.4.65: SMB share manager — userspace consumer of remote SMB
/// shares via Samba's `smbclient` CLI. Replaces the kernel-mount
/// NFS path that v0.4.64 shipped; that path didn't work on hosts
/// (Unraid, etc.) whose kernel ships without the nfs/cifs client
/// modules, and no container-side configuration could fix it.
/// `smbclient` does the SMB protocol over a plain TCP socket in
/// userspace — works in any container, no special caps required.
pub smb_shares: SmbShareManager,
/// v0.4.67: NFSv3 share manager — pure-Rust userspace consumer
/// via the `nfs3_client` crate. Ships alongside the SMB manager
/// so operators pick whichever protocol their NAS prefers.
/// In-process (no subprocess); supports HTTP Range requests on
/// NFS-sourced ISOs because NFSv3 READ3 takes an explicit offset.
pub nfs_shares: NfsShareManager,
/// Browser chunked upload state. Multipart uploads still go straight
/// through `IsoStore`, but the UI uses sessions so large ISO transfers
/// can show deterministic progress and leave visible partial files.
pub uploads: UploadSessions,
/// NFS share manager. Always present (mounting is opt-in by the
/// operator from the Storage tab); `add()` requires `mount.nfs` to be
/// available in the runtime image. Surfaces errors per-mount rather
/// than failing the global state.
pub nfs: NfsManager,
/// Live log bus consumed by the Terminal tab via SSE. Operator-issued
/// terminal commands also push synthetic lines onto it so the tail
/// shows them inline.
+98 -254
View File
@@ -31,17 +31,12 @@ pub async fn run_command(
) -> impl IntoResponse {
let line = req.command.trim();
if line.is_empty() {
return (
StatusCode::OK,
Json(json!({ "output": HELP_TEXT, "ok": true })),
);
return (StatusCode::OK, Json(json!({ "output": HELP_TEXT, "ok": true })));
}
// Echo the typed command into the live log so the Terminal tab shows
// operator activity in-band with server-emitted log lines.
state
.log_bus
.push("info", "openpxe::terminal", format!("> {line}"));
state.log_bus.push("info", "openpxe::terminal", format!("> {line}"));
let argv = shell_split(line);
if argv.is_empty() {
@@ -60,11 +55,7 @@ pub async fn run_command(
// so reading the live tail tells the same story as scrolling the
// terminal pane.
let mirror = if output.len() > 1024 {
format!(
"{}\n... ({} bytes truncated)",
&output[..1024],
output.len() - 1024
)
format!("{}\n... ({} bytes truncated)", &output[..1024], output.len() - 1024)
} else {
output.clone()
};
@@ -87,15 +78,9 @@ async fn dispatch(state: &AppState, argv: &[String]) -> Result<String, String> {
"status" => Ok(status_text(state)),
"isos" | "images" => Ok(isos_text(state)),
"clients" => Ok(clients_text(state)),
"queue" => queue_command(state, tail).await,
// `smb` controls the outbound Samba server for Windows
// install media. `share` lists/manages remote SMB shares
// OpenPXE pulls ISOs from (v0.4.65). `nfs` is the parallel
// command for remote NFSv3 shares (v0.4.67, in-process via
// nfs3_client — not the v0.4.64 kernel-mount path).
"share" | "smb-share" => smb_share_command(state, tail).await,
"queue" => gate_command(state, tail).await,
"nfs" => nfs_command(state, tail).await,
"smb" => smb_command(state, tail).await,
"nfs" => nfs_share_command(state, tail).await,
"log" => log_command(state, tail),
"whoami" => Ok("operator".to_string()),
"echo" => Ok(tail.join(" ")),
@@ -111,52 +96,32 @@ async fn dispatch(state: &AppState, argv: &[String]) -> Result<String, String> {
fn status_text(s: &AppState) -> String {
let isos = s.iso_store.list();
let clients = s.clients.list();
let queue_entries = s.queue.list();
let gates = s.queue.list();
let smb = s.smb.as_ref().map(|m| m.snapshot());
let smb_shares = s.smb_shares.list();
let smb_reachable = smb_shares.iter().filter(|m| m.reachable).count();
// v0.4.67: NFSv3 sources too.
let nfs_shares = s.nfs_shares.list();
let nfs_reachable = nfs_shares.iter().filter(|m| m.reachable).count();
let nfs = s.nfs.list();
let nfs_active = nfs.iter().filter(|m| m.mounted).count();
format!(
"OpenPXE {ver}\n\
base url: {base}\n\
interface: {nic}\n\
uptime: {up}\n\
isos: {n_isos} (local: {n_local}, smb: {n_smb}, nfs: {n_nfs})\n\
isos: {n_isos} (local: {n_local}, nfs: {n_nfs})\n\
clients: {n_clients}\n\
queue: {n_entries}\n\
smb server: {smb}\n\
smb shares: {n_smb_total} configured ({n_smb_active} reachable)\n\
nfs shares: {n_nfs_total} configured ({n_nfs_active} reachable)\n",
smb: {smb}\n\
nfs mounts: {n_total} configured ({n_active} active)\n",
ver = env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION"),
base = s.public_base_url,
nic = if s.nic_name.is_empty() {
"?"
} else {
s.nic_name.as_str()
},
nic = if s.nic_name.is_empty() { "?" } else { s.nic_name.as_str() },
up = uptime_string(s),
n_isos = isos.len(),
n_local = isos
.iter()
.filter(|i| matches!(i.source, openpxe_iso_store::IsoSource::Local))
.count(),
n_smb = isos
.iter()
.filter(|i| matches!(i.source, openpxe_iso_store::IsoSource::Smb { .. }))
.count(),
n_nfs = isos
.iter()
.filter(|i| matches!(i.source, openpxe_iso_store::IsoSource::Nfs { .. }))
.count(),
n_local = isos.iter().filter(|i| matches!(i.source, openpxe_iso_store::IsoSource::Local)).count(),
n_nfs = isos.iter().filter(|i| !matches!(i.source, openpxe_iso_store::IsoSource::Local)).count(),
n_clients = clients.len(),
n_entries = queue_entries.len(),
n_entries = gates.len(),
smb = smb.map_or_else(|| "(disabled)".into(), |s| format!("{s:?}")),
n_smb_total = smb_shares.len(),
n_smb_active = smb_reachable,
n_nfs_total = nfs_shares.len(),
n_nfs_active = nfs_reachable,
n_total = nfs.len(),
n_active = nfs_active,
)
}
@@ -174,9 +139,7 @@ fn isos_text(s: &AppState) -> String {
for i in isos {
let src = match i.source {
openpxe_iso_store::IsoSource::Local => "local".to_string(),
openpxe_iso_store::IsoSource::Smb { share_id, .. } => format!("smb:{share_id}"),
// v0.4.67: NFSv3 via in-process nfs3_client.
openpxe_iso_store::IsoSource::Nfs { share_id, .. } => format!("nfs:{share_id}"),
openpxe_iso_store::IsoSource::Nfs { mount_id, .. } => format!("nfs:{mount_id}"),
};
let _ = writeln!(
out,
@@ -196,7 +159,11 @@ fn clients_text(s: &AppState) -> String {
return "(no clients yet)".into();
}
let mut out = String::new();
let _ = writeln!(out, "{:<19} {:<16} {:<8} LAST SEEN", "MAC", "IP", "EVENTS");
let _ = writeln!(
out,
"{:<19} {:<16} {:<8} LAST SEEN",
"MAC", "IP", "EVENTS"
);
for c in clients {
let ip = c.last_ip.map_or_else(|| "-".into(), |i| i.to_string());
let _ = writeln!(
@@ -213,35 +180,35 @@ fn clients_text(s: &AppState) -> String {
out
}
// ── queue ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
// ── gate ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
// `async` for symmetry with the other dispatch helpers — queue operations
// `async` for symmetry with the other dispatch helpers — gate operations
// are sync today but might grow to await on a database in a future phase.
#[allow(clippy::unused_async)]
async fn queue_command(s: &AppState, args: &[String]) -> Result<String, String> {
async fn gate_command(s: &AppState, args: &[String]) -> Result<String, String> {
match args.first().map(String::as_str) {
None | Some("list") => {
let entries = s.queue.list();
if entries.is_empty() {
return Ok("(queue empty)".into());
let gs = s.queue.list();
if gs.is_empty() {
return Ok("(no gates)".into());
}
let mut out = String::new();
for entry in entries {
for g in gs {
let _ = writeln!(
out,
"#{:<3} {:<19} {:<16} target={}",
entry.position,
entry.mac,
entry.id,
entry.assigned_target.unwrap_or_else(|| "-".into())
g.position,
g.mac,
g.id,
g.assigned_target.unwrap_or_else(|| "-".into())
);
}
Ok(out)
}
Some("assign-all") => {
let target = args
.get(1)
.ok_or_else(|| "usage: queue assign-all <iso_boot_entry_id>".to_string())?;
let target = args.get(1).ok_or_else(|| {
"usage: gate assign-all <iso_boot_entry_id>".to_string()
})?;
let found = s
.iso_store
.list()
@@ -252,166 +219,59 @@ async fn queue_command(s: &AppState, args: &[String]) -> Result<String, String>
}
let ids: Vec<_> = s.queue.list().into_iter().map(|g| g.id).collect();
let n = s.queue.assign(&ids, target);
Ok(format!("assigned {n} queue entries -> {target}"))
Ok(format!("assigned {n} gates -> {target}"))
}
Some("assign") => {
let entry_id = args
.get(1)
.ok_or_else(|| "usage: queue assign <entry_id> <iso_boot_entry_id>".to_string())?;
.ok_or_else(|| "usage: gate assign <entry_id> <iso_boot_entry_id>".to_string())?;
let target = args
.get(2)
.ok_or_else(|| "usage: queue assign <entry_id> <iso_boot_entry_id>".to_string())?;
.ok_or_else(|| "usage: gate assign <entry_id> <iso_boot_entry_id>".to_string())?;
let n = s.queue.assign(std::slice::from_ref(entry_id), target);
if n == 0 {
return Err(format!("no such queue entry: {entry_id}"));
return Err(format!("no such gate: {entry_id}"));
}
Ok(format!("assigned 1 queue entry -> {target}"))
Ok(format!("assigned 1 gate -> {target}"))
}
Some("release") => {
let entry_id = args
.get(1)
.ok_or_else(|| "usage: queue release <entry_id>".to_string())?;
let entry_id = args.get(1).ok_or_else(|| "usage: gate release <entry_id>".to_string())?;
match s.queue.release(entry_id) {
Some(_) => Ok(format!("released {entry_id}")),
None => Err(format!("no such queue entry: {entry_id}")),
None => Err(format!("no such gate: {entry_id}")),
}
}
Some(other) => Err(format!(
"unknown queue subcommand: {other}\ntry: queue [list|assign-all|assign|release]"
"unknown gate subcommand: {other}\ntry: gate [list|assign-all|assign|release]"
)),
}
}
// ── share (v0.4.65: SMB shares) ─────────────────────────────────────────
// ── nfs ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
async fn smb_share_command(s: &AppState, args: &[String]) -> Result<String, String> {
async fn nfs_command(s: &AppState, args: &[String]) -> Result<String, String> {
match args.first().map(String::as_str) {
None | Some("list") => {
let shares = s.smb_shares.list();
if shares.is_empty() {
return Ok("(no SMB shares configured)".into());
let mounts = s.nfs.list();
if mounts.is_empty() {
return Ok("(no NFS mounts configured)".into());
}
let mut out = String::new();
let _ = writeln!(
out,
"{:<24} {:<7} {:<6} {:<6} TARGET",
"ID", "STATUS", "AUTH", "ISOS"
"{:<24} {:<6} {:<7} {:<6} TARGET",
"ID", "VER", "STATUS", "ISOS"
);
for m in shares {
let status = if m.reachable { "ok" } else { "down" };
let auth = if m.guest { "guest" } else { "user" };
for m in mounts {
let status = if m.mounted { "ok" } else { "down" };
let _ = writeln!(
out,
"{:<24} {:<7} {:<6} {:<6} //{}/{}",
truncate(&m.id, 24),
status,
auth,
m.iso_count,
m.server,
m.share,
);
if let Some(e) = m.last_error {
let _ = writeln!(out, " error: {e}");
}
if let Some(h) = m.last_hint {
let _ = writeln!(out, " hint: {h}");
}
}
Ok(out)
}
Some("add") => {
// share add //server/share [guest|user:password]
let target = args
.get(1)
.ok_or_else(|| {
"usage: share add //server/share [guest|user:password]".to_string()
})?;
// Accept either `//server/share` (UNC-style) or
// `server:share` (shorter to type).
let stripped = target.trim_start_matches('/').trim_start_matches('\\');
let (server, share) = if let Some((s, p)) = stripped.split_once('/') {
(s, p)
} else if let Some((s, p)) = stripped.split_once(':') {
(s, p)
} else {
return Err("target must be '//server/share' or 'server:share'".into());
};
// Auth spec: "guest" or "user:password". Default: guest.
let auth = args.get(2).cloned().unwrap_or_else(|| "guest".into());
let (guest, username, password) = if auth == "guest" {
(true, None, None)
} else if let Some((u, p)) = auth.split_once(':') {
(false, Some(u.to_string()), Some(p.to_string()))
} else {
return Err("auth must be 'guest' or 'user:password'".into());
};
let req = openpxe_iso_store::SmbAddRequest {
server: server.to_string(),
share: share.to_string(),
username,
password,
guest,
port: None,
};
match s.smb_shares.add(req).await {
Ok(m) => Ok(format!("added {} ({} isos)", m.id, m.iso_count)),
Err(e) => {
let mut out = format!("add failed: {}", e.error);
if let Some(h) = e.hint {
out.push_str("\nhint: ");
out.push_str(&h);
}
Err(out)
}
}
}
Some("remove") => {
let id = args
.get(1)
.ok_or_else(|| "usage: share remove <id>".to_string())?;
match s.smb_shares.remove(id).await {
Ok(()) => Ok(format!("removed {id}")),
Err(e) => Err(format!("remove failed: {e}")),
}
}
Some("scan") => {
let id = args
.get(1)
.ok_or_else(|| "usage: share scan <id>".to_string())?;
match s.smb_shares.rescan(id).await {
Ok(n) => Ok(format!("re-scanned {id}: {n} isos")),
Err(e) => Err(format!("scan failed: {e}")),
}
}
Some(other) => Err(format!(
"unknown share subcommand: {other}\ntry: share [list|add|remove|scan]"
)),
}
}
// ── nfs (v0.4.67: in-process NFSv3 via nfs3_client) ────────────────────
async fn nfs_share_command(s: &AppState, args: &[String]) -> Result<String, String> {
match args.first().map(String::as_str) {
None | Some("list") => {
let shares = s.nfs_shares.list();
if shares.is_empty() {
return Ok("(no NFS shares configured)".into());
}
let mut out = String::new();
let _ = writeln!(
out,
"{:<24} {:<7} {:<6} TARGET",
"ID", "STATUS", "ISOS"
);
for m in shares {
let status = if m.reachable { "ok" } else { "down" };
let _ = writeln!(
out,
"{:<24} {:<7} {:<6} {}:{}",
"{:<24} {:<6} {:<7} {:<6} {}:{}",
truncate(&m.id, 24),
match m.version {
openpxe_iso_store::NfsVersion::V3 => "v3",
openpxe_iso_store::NfsVersion::V41 => "v4.1",
},
status,
m.iso_count,
m.server,
@@ -420,58 +280,50 @@ async fn nfs_share_command(s: &AppState, args: &[String]) -> Result<String, Stri
if let Some(e) = m.last_error {
let _ = writeln!(out, " error: {e}");
}
if let Some(h) = m.last_hint {
let _ = writeln!(out, " hint: {h}");
}
}
Ok(out)
}
Some("add") => {
// nfs add <server>:<export> [port]
Some("mount") => {
// nfs mount <server>:<export> [v3|v41] [ro|rw]
let target = args
.get(1)
.ok_or_else(|| "usage: nfs add <server>:<export> [port]".to_string())?;
.ok_or_else(|| "usage: nfs mount <server>:<export> [v3|v41] [ro|rw]".to_string())?;
let (server, export) = target
.split_once(':')
.ok_or_else(|| "target must be 'server:/export'".to_string())?;
let port = args.get(2).and_then(|s| s.parse::<u16>().ok());
let version = match args.get(2).map(String::as_str) {
Some("v3") => openpxe_iso_store::NfsVersion::V3,
Some("v41") | None => openpxe_iso_store::NfsVersion::V41,
Some(other) => return Err(format!("unknown nfs version: {other} (expect v3 or v41)")),
};
let read_only = !matches!(args.get(3).map(String::as_str), Some("rw"));
let req = openpxe_iso_store::NfsAddRequest {
server: server.to_string(),
export: export.to_string(),
port,
version,
read_only,
};
match s.nfs_shares.add(req).await {
Ok(m) => Ok(format!("added {} ({} isos)", m.id, m.iso_count)),
Err(e) => {
let mut out = format!("add failed: {}", e.error);
if let Some(h) = e.hint {
out.push_str("\nhint: ");
out.push_str(&h);
}
Err(out)
match s.nfs.add(req).await {
Ok(m) => Ok(format!("mounted {} ({} isos)", m.id, m.iso_count)),
Err(e) => Err(format!("mount failed: {e}")),
}
}
}
Some("remove") => {
let id = args
.get(1)
.ok_or_else(|| "usage: nfs remove <id>".to_string())?;
match s.nfs_shares.remove(id).await {
Ok(()) => Ok(format!("removed {id}")),
Err(e) => Err(format!("remove failed: {e}")),
Some("unmount") => {
let id = args.get(1).ok_or_else(|| "usage: nfs unmount <id>".to_string())?;
match s.nfs.remove(id).await {
Ok(()) => Ok(format!("unmounted {id}")),
Err(e) => Err(format!("unmount failed: {e}")),
}
}
Some("scan") => {
let id = args
.get(1)
.ok_or_else(|| "usage: nfs scan <id>".to_string())?;
match s.nfs_shares.rescan(id).await {
let id = args.get(1).ok_or_else(|| "usage: nfs scan <id>".to_string())?;
match s.nfs.rescan(id).await {
Ok(n) => Ok(format!("re-scanned {id}: {n} isos")),
Err(e) => Err(format!("scan failed: {e}")),
}
}
Some(other) => Err(format!(
"unknown nfs subcommand: {other}\ntry: nfs [list|add|remove|scan]"
"unknown nfs subcommand: {other}\ntry: nfs [list|mount|unmount|scan]"
)),
}
}
@@ -516,7 +368,10 @@ fn log_command(s: &AppState, args: &[String]) -> Result<String, String> {
Ok("log buffer cleared".into())
}
Some("tail") => {
let n: usize = args.get(1).and_then(|v| v.parse().ok()).unwrap_or(20);
let n: usize = args
.get(1)
.and_then(|v| v.parse().ok())
.unwrap_or(20);
let lines = s.log_bus.recent();
let start = lines.len().saturating_sub(n);
let mut out = String::new();
@@ -607,23 +462,18 @@ OpenPXE terminal — available commands:
isos list registered ISOs
clients list PXE clients seen this session
queue list list queued clients
queue assign <entry_id> <target> assign one queued client to a boot entry
queue assign-all <target> assign every waiting client
queue release <entry_id> release one queued client
gate list list gated-deployment queue
gate assign <entry_id> <target> assign one gate to a boot entry
gate assign-all <target> assign every waiting gate
gate release <entry_id> release one gate
share list list configured SMB shares
share add //srv/share [auth] add an SMB share; auth = 'guest' or 'user:pass'
share remove <id> forget an SMB share
share scan <id> re-list a share for new ISOs
nfs list list NFS mounts
nfs mount <s>:<e> [v3|v41] [ro|rw] add and mount an NFS share
nfs unmount <id> unmount and forget a share
nfs scan <id> re-scan a share for new ISOs
nfs list list configured NFSv3 shares
nfs add <srv>:<export> [port] add an NFSv3 share
nfs remove <id> forget an NFS share
nfs scan <id> re-list an NFS share for new ISOs
smb status outbound Samba state (Windows install media)
smb start | stop | reload control the outbound smbd
smb status SMB (Samba) state
smb start | stop | reload control smbd
log clear drop the in-memory log ring buffer
log tail [n] show the last n buffered lines (default 20)
@@ -638,10 +488,10 @@ mod tests {
#[test]
fn shell_split_basic() {
assert_eq!(shell_split(""), Vec::<String>::new());
assert_eq!(shell_split("share list"), vec!["share", "list"]);
assert_eq!(shell_split("nfs list"), vec!["nfs", "list"]);
assert_eq!(
shell_split("share add //nas/isos guest"),
vec!["share", "add", "//nas/isos", "guest"]
shell_split("nfs mount 10.0.0.5:/srv v41 ro"),
vec!["nfs", "mount", "10.0.0.5:/srv", "v41", "ro"]
);
}
@@ -671,10 +521,4 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(truncate("hi", 10), "hi");
assert_eq!(truncate("longerthanfive", 5), "long…");
}
#[test]
fn help_uses_queue_language() {
assert!(HELP_TEXT.contains("queue list"));
assert!(HELP_TEXT.contains("queued clients"));
}
}
-180
View File
@@ -1,180 +0,0 @@
//! Chunked upload sessions for browser-driven ISO uploads.
//!
//! The legacy multipart endpoint still exists for simple API clients, but
//! browsers get a better failure mode with raw chunks: progress advances after
//! each acknowledged write, partial files appear in the ISO directory
//! immediately, and reverse proxies are less likely to buffer an entire DVD
//! image before OpenPXE sees byte one.
use bytes::Bytes;
use openpxe_core::{Error, Result};
use openpxe_iso_store::{IsoMeta, IsoStore, UploadHandle};
use serde::Serialize;
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::sync::Arc;
use tokio::sync::Mutex;
use uuid::Uuid;
const DEFAULT_CHUNK_SIZE: u64 = 8 * 1024 * 1024;
#[derive(Clone, Default)]
pub struct UploadSessions {
inner: Arc<Mutex<HashMap<String, Arc<Mutex<UploadSession>>>>>,
}
struct UploadSession {
filename: String,
expected_size: Option<u64>,
offset: u64,
handle: Option<UploadHandle>,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize)]
pub struct UploadStarted {
pub upload_id: String,
pub iso_id: String,
pub filename: String,
pub offset: u64,
pub chunk_size: u64,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize)]
#[serde(rename_all = "snake_case")]
pub enum UploadAppend {
Progress { offset: u64 },
Complete { offset: u64, iso: Box<IsoMeta> },
}
impl UploadSessions {
pub async fn begin(
&self,
store: &IsoStore,
filename: &str,
expected_size: Option<u64>,
) -> Result<UploadStarted> {
if !filename.to_ascii_lowercase().ends_with(".iso") {
return Err(Error::Invalid("only .iso uploads accepted".to_string()));
}
let handle = store.begin_upload(filename).await?;
let iso_id = handle.id.clone();
let upload_id = Uuid::new_v4().to_string();
let session = UploadSession {
filename: filename.to_string(),
expected_size,
offset: 0,
handle: Some(handle),
};
self.inner
.lock()
.await
.insert(upload_id.clone(), Arc::new(Mutex::new(session)));
Ok(UploadStarted {
upload_id,
iso_id,
filename: filename.to_string(),
offset: 0,
chunk_size: DEFAULT_CHUNK_SIZE,
})
}
pub async fn append(
&self,
store: &IsoStore,
upload_id: &str,
offset: u64,
chunk: Bytes,
complete: bool,
) -> Result<UploadAppend> {
let Some(session_lock) = self.inner.lock().await.get(upload_id).cloned() else {
return Err(Error::Invalid(format!("no such upload '{upload_id}'")));
};
let mut session = session_lock.lock().await;
if session.offset != offset {
return Err(Error::Invalid(format!(
"expected offset {}, got {offset}",
session.offset
)));
}
let new_offset = session
.offset
.checked_add(chunk.len() as u64)
.ok_or_else(|| Error::Invalid("upload offset overflow".to_string()))?;
if let Some(expected) = session.expected_size {
if new_offset > expected {
return Err(Error::Invalid(format!(
"chunk exceeds declared upload size {expected}"
)));
}
}
let Some(handle) = session.handle.as_mut() else {
return Err(Error::Invalid("upload already completed".to_string()));
};
if let Err(e) = handle.write_chunk(&chunk).await {
let handle = session.handle.take();
drop(session);
self.inner.lock().await.remove(upload_id);
if let Some(handle) = handle {
let _ = handle.abort().await;
}
return Err(e);
}
session.offset = new_offset;
if !complete {
return Ok(UploadAppend::Progress { offset: new_offset });
}
if let Some(expected) = session.expected_size {
if new_offset != expected {
return Err(Error::Invalid(format!(
"final chunk ended at {new_offset}, expected {expected}"
)));
}
}
let Some(handle) = session.handle.take() else {
return Err(Error::Invalid("upload already completed".to_string()));
};
let filename = session.filename.clone();
drop(session);
tracing::info!(
target: "openpxe::http::upload",
upload_id,
filename = %filename,
received_bytes = new_offset,
"chunked upload body complete; introspecting"
);
let meta = match handle.finish(store).await {
Ok(meta) => meta,
Err(e) => {
self.inner.lock().await.remove(upload_id);
return Err(e);
}
};
self.inner.lock().await.remove(upload_id);
Ok(UploadAppend::Complete {
offset: new_offset,
iso: Box::new(meta),
})
}
pub async fn abort(&self, upload_id: &str) -> Result<()> {
let Some(session_lock) = self.inner.lock().await.remove(upload_id) else {
return Err(Error::Invalid(format!("no such upload '{upload_id}'")));
};
let mut session = session_lock.lock().await;
if let Some(handle) = session.handle.take() {
handle.abort().await?;
}
Ok(())
}
}
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
+1 -3
View File
@@ -51,9 +51,7 @@ pub fn asset_slice(name: &str) -> Option<std::borrow::Cow<'static, [u8]>> {
/// Enumerate embedded asset filenames. Useful for startup logging so the
/// operator can immediately tell which architectures will work.
pub fn list_assets() -> Vec<String> {
IpxeAssets::iter()
.map(std::borrow::Cow::into_owned)
.collect()
IpxeAssets::iter().map(std::borrow::Cow::into_owned).collect()
}
/// Log at startup which iPXE binaries are present and which are missing.
-16
View File
@@ -20,28 +20,12 @@ thiserror.workspace = true
anyhow.workspace = true
sha2.workspace = true
hex.workspace = true
bcrypt.workspace = true
uuid.workspace = true
time.workspace = true
parking_lot.workspace = true
bytes.workspace = true
tempfile = "3.12"
libc = "0.2"
# v0.4.61: server-side compose of the operator's uploaded raster into a
# fixed 1024x768 canvas so the PXE menu always gets a consistently-sized
# PNG regardless of what the operator uploaded. We use the bare-bones
# `image` crate (no default features) and explicitly enable only the
# decoders we accept on upload (PNG/JPEG/WebP/GIF) plus the PNG
# encoder. Keeps the build slim — no JPEG2000, TIFF, BMP, etc.
image = { version = "0.25", default-features = false, features = ["png", "jpeg", "webp", "gif"] }
# v0.4.67: pure-Rust NFSv3 client for reading remote ISOs without a
# kernel mount. See crates/iso-store/src/nfs_share.rs for usage.
nfs3_client = { workspace = true }
nfs3_types = { workspace = true }
# Needed for the Stream trait that wraps the mpsc receiver feeding
# NFS read-loop bytes into axum's Body::from_stream.
futures = { workspace = true }
[dev-dependencies]
tempfile = "3.12"
+11 -38
View File
@@ -78,9 +78,7 @@ pub fn introspect(path: &Path) -> IntrospectionReport {
let mut haystack = Vec::with_capacity(scan_bytes.min(32 * 1024 * 1024));
while read_total < scan_bytes {
let n = f.read(&mut buf).unwrap_or(0);
if n == 0 {
break;
}
if n == 0 { break; }
haystack.extend_from_slice(&buf[..n]);
read_total += n;
}
@@ -109,11 +107,8 @@ fn family_from_label(label: &str) -> DistroFamily {
let l = label.to_ascii_lowercase();
if l.contains("ubuntu") || l.contains("debian") || l.contains("mint") {
DistroFamily::DebianUbuntu
} else if l.contains("rhel")
|| l.contains("centos")
|| l.contains("fedora")
|| l.contains("rocky")
|| l.contains("alma")
} else if l.contains("rhel") || l.contains("centos") || l.contains("fedora")
|| l.contains("rocky") || l.contains("alma")
{
DistroFamily::RhelFedora
} else if l.contains("suse") || l.contains("opensuse") {
@@ -132,30 +127,17 @@ fn family_from_label(label: &str) -> DistroFamily {
fn guess_kernel_initrd(family: DistroFamily) -> (Option<&'static str>, Vec<&'static str>) {
match family {
DistroFamily::DebianUbuntu => (Some("/casper/vmlinuz"), vec!["/casper/initrd"]),
DistroFamily::RhelFedora => (
Some("/images/pxeboot/vmlinuz"),
vec!["/images/pxeboot/initrd.img"],
),
DistroFamily::OpenSuse => (
Some("/boot/x86_64/loader/linux"),
vec!["/boot/x86_64/loader/initrd"],
),
DistroFamily::Arch => (
Some("/arch/boot/x86_64/vmlinuz-linux"),
vec!["/arch/boot/x86_64/initramfs-linux.img"],
),
DistroFamily::RhelFedora => (Some("/images/pxeboot/vmlinuz"), vec!["/images/pxeboot/initrd.img"]),
DistroFamily::OpenSuse => (Some("/boot/x86_64/loader/linux"), vec!["/boot/x86_64/loader/initrd"]),
DistroFamily::Arch => (Some("/arch/boot/x86_64/vmlinuz-linux"), vec!["/arch/boot/x86_64/initramfs-linux.img"]),
DistroFamily::Alpine => (Some("/boot/vmlinuz-lts"), vec!["/boot/initramfs-lts"]),
DistroFamily::WindowsPe | DistroFamily::Unknown => (None, Vec::new()),
}
}
fn contains_ascii(haystack: &[u8], needle: &[u8]) -> bool {
if needle.is_empty() || haystack.len() < needle.len() {
return false;
}
haystack
.windows(needle.len())
.any(|w| w.eq_ignore_ascii_case(needle))
if needle.is_empty() || haystack.len() < needle.len() { return false; }
haystack.windows(needle.len()).any(|w| w.eq_ignore_ascii_case(needle))
}
#[cfg(test)]
@@ -164,18 +146,9 @@ mod tests {
#[test]
fn label_matching() {
assert_eq!(
family_from_label("Ubuntu 24.04"),
DistroFamily::DebianUbuntu
);
assert_eq!(
family_from_label("Rocky-9-x86_64-dvd"),
DistroFamily::RhelFedora
);
assert_eq!(
family_from_label("openSUSE-Leap-15.6"),
DistroFamily::OpenSuse
);
assert_eq!(family_from_label("Ubuntu 24.04"), DistroFamily::DebianUbuntu);
assert_eq!(family_from_label("Rocky-9-x86_64-dvd"), DistroFamily::RhelFedora);
assert_eq!(family_from_label("openSUSE-Leap-15.6"), DistroFamily::OpenSuse);
assert_eq!(family_from_label("ARCH_202604"), DistroFamily::Arch);
assert_eq!(family_from_label("weird-custom"), DistroFamily::Unknown);
}
+3 -18
View File
@@ -18,29 +18,14 @@
pub mod entry;
pub mod introspect;
pub mod nfs_share;
pub mod pxe_logo;
pub mod nfs;
pub mod smb;
pub mod smb_share;
pub mod store;
pub mod windows;
pub use entry::{BootEntry, BootKind, KernelArgs};
pub use introspect::{DistroFamily, IntrospectionReport};
// v0.4.65: kernel-mount NFS is gone. SMB shares via Samba's userspace
// `smbclient` CLI replaced it — works in any container (no
// CAP_SYS_ADMIN, no host kernel modules), matching how Bootimus and
// every other PXE/imaging tool that supports network storage handles
// it.
pub use nfs::{NfsAddRequest, NfsManager, NfsMount, NfsVersion};
pub use smb::{extract_windows_iso, SmbManager, SmbState};
pub use smb_share::{SmbAddRequest, SmbShare, SmbShareError, SmbShareManager, SmbStream};
// v0.4.67: NFS is back — this time as an in-process userspace NFSv3
// client (the `nfs3_client` crate) rather than a kernel mount. Same
// "works in any container" property as SMB, plus support for HTTP
// Range requests because NFSv3 READ3 takes an explicit offset.
pub use nfs_share::{NfsAddRequest, NfsShare, NfsShareError, NfsShareManager, NfsStream};
pub use store::{
generate_boot_entries_for, slugify_str, IsoCategory, IsoMeta, IsoSource, IsoStore,
UploadHandle,
};
pub use store::{generate_boot_entries_for, slugify_str, IsoMeta, IsoSource, IsoStore, UploadHandle};
pub use windows::{WimPatcher, WinPatchState};
+564
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,564 @@
//! NFS share manager.
//!
//! Lets an operator mount a remote NFS export as an ISO source instead of
//! uploading every ISO into the container's PVC. Supports NFSv3 and
//! NFSv4.1 — the two versions the user explicitly asked for.
//!
//! ## How it works
//!
//! 1. Operator submits a mount spec via the Storage tab:
//! `{ server: "10.0.0.20", export: "/srv/isos", version: "v41" }`.
//! 2. We slugify a stable id, mkdir `<work_dir>/nfs/<id>/`, then shell out
//! to `/bin/mount -t nfs -o vers=...,ro,nolock server:export local`.
//! 3. On success we walk the mount point looking for `*.iso` files and
//! register each one with the `IsoStore` as an external source — same
//! introspection pipeline as a web upload, but no sha256 (the bytes
//! live on a remote machine; hashing them would suck them through the
//! network on every restart).
//! 4. On failure we record `last_error` on the spec and persist anyway
//! so the UI can show a row in red rather than silently dropping it.
//!
//! ## Operational notes
//!
//! - Mounting NFS inside a container needs `CAP_SYS_ADMIN` and the
//! `nfs-common` package. The default image ships these (see Dockerfile).
//! - On OpenShift, the SCC must allow `CAP_SYS_ADMIN`. The bundled SCC
//! doesn't — operators have to opt in by switching to a more privileged
//! SCC or running NFS mounts as a CSI driver outside the pod.
//! - Mount commands are issued sequentially under a single mutex to avoid
//! `mount` racing on the same target dir.
//!
//! ## Persistence
//!
//! Mount specs (without runtime state) live at `<work_dir>/nfs.json`,
//! re-mounted on startup. Mounts that fail to come back online keep their
//! spec and their `last_error` so the operator sees what happened.
use crate::introspect::{introspect, IntrospectionReport};
use crate::store::{generate_boot_entries_for, slugify_str, IsoSource, IsoStore};
use parking_lot::Mutex;
use openpxe_core::{Error, Result};
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
use std::sync::Arc;
use time::OffsetDateTime;
use tokio::process::Command;
/// Wire-protocol versions we support. Keep this enum closed — silently
/// accepting "auto" or letting the kernel negotiate would mean operators
/// could never confirm which version is in use.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(rename_all = "lowercase")]
pub enum NfsVersion {
/// NFSv3 — UDP/TCP, separate `mountd` protocol. Required for many
/// older NAS appliances.
V3,
/// NFSv4.1 — single TCP port (2049), session-based. Modern default.
V41,
}
impl NfsVersion {
fn vers_arg(self) -> &'static str {
match self {
Self::V3 => "vers=3",
Self::V41 => "vers=4.1",
}
}
}
/// One configured mount. The id is generated from server+export so the
/// operator can re-add the same export idempotently.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct NfsMount {
pub id: String,
pub server: String,
pub export: String,
pub version: NfsVersion,
/// Read-only by default — most ISO libraries are. Operators that need
/// write can flip this off but OpenPXE itself never writes.
pub read_only: bool,
/// Local mount point under `<work_dir>/nfs/`.
pub local_path: PathBuf,
/// Whether the mount is currently active.
pub mounted: bool,
/// Last error encountered on a `mount` or `umount` attempt; cleared on
/// success.
pub last_error: Option<String>,
#[serde(with = "time::serde::rfc3339::option")]
pub last_attempt: Option<OffsetDateTime>,
/// Number of `.iso` files found on the share (re-counted on each scan).
pub iso_count: u32,
}
/// Spec submitted by the UI. Server and export are normalized before use.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Deserialize)]
pub struct NfsAddRequest {
pub server: String,
pub export: String,
#[serde(default = "default_version")]
pub version: NfsVersion,
#[serde(default = "default_ro")]
pub read_only: bool,
}
fn default_version() -> NfsVersion {
NfsVersion::V41
}
fn default_ro() -> bool {
true
}
#[derive(Debug, Default)]
struct Inner {
mounts: HashMap<String, NfsMount>,
}
/// Manages NFS mounts and surfaces them as ISO sources.
///
/// Cheap to clone — internal state is `Arc<Mutex<...>>`.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct NfsManager {
work_root: Arc<PathBuf>,
state_path: Arc<PathBuf>,
inner: Arc<Mutex<Inner>>,
iso_store: IsoStore,
/// Single-writer lock around the actual `mount`/`umount` shell-outs;
/// avoids racing on the same target directory.
mount_lock: Arc<tokio::sync::Mutex<()>>,
}
impl NfsManager {
/// Construct a manager rooted at `work_dir`. Mount points live under
/// `<work_dir>/nfs/<id>/`. State persists to `<work_dir>/nfs.json`.
#[must_use]
pub fn new(work_dir: &Path, iso_store: IsoStore) -> Self {
let work_root = work_dir.join("nfs");
let state_path = work_dir.join("nfs.json");
Self {
work_root: Arc::new(work_root),
state_path: Arc::new(state_path),
inner: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Inner::default())),
iso_store,
mount_lock: Arc::new(tokio::sync::Mutex::new(())),
}
}
/// Where this manager mounts shares. Used by `IsoStore` to resolve
/// NFS-backed `IsoMeta`s to their on-disk path.
#[must_use]
pub fn mount_root(&self) -> PathBuf {
self.work_root.as_ref().clone()
}
/// Load persisted state and re-attempt every mount. Errors are logged
/// per-mount but never fail the call — startup must not block on a
/// remote NFS server being slow.
pub async fn load_and_remount(&self) -> Result<()> {
tokio::fs::create_dir_all(self.work_root.as_path()).await?;
let mounts = match tokio::fs::read_to_string(self.state_path.as_path()).await {
Ok(text) => serde_json::from_str::<Vec<NfsMount>>(&text).unwrap_or_default(),
Err(_) => Vec::new(),
};
for mut m in mounts {
// Always start from "not mounted" — the kernel state was lost
// when the process died. We'll try to remount each one.
m.mounted = false;
m.last_error = None;
self.inner.lock().mounts.insert(m.id.clone(), m.clone());
if let Err(e) = self.try_mount(&m.id).await {
tracing::warn!(
target: "openpxe::nfs",
id = %m.id, error = %e,
"could not remount NFS share on startup"
);
}
}
Ok(())
}
/// Add a new mount. Returns the resulting `NfsMount` (with `mounted`
/// reflecting reality) or an error if the spec was invalid.
pub async fn add(&self, req: NfsAddRequest) -> Result<NfsMount> {
let server = req.server.trim().to_string();
let export = req.export.trim().to_string();
if server.is_empty() {
return Err(Error::Invalid("server is required".into()));
}
if !export.starts_with('/') {
return Err(Error::Invalid("export path must start with '/'".into()));
}
let id = mount_id(&server, &export);
let local_path = self.work_root.join(&id);
tokio::fs::create_dir_all(&local_path).await?;
let mount = NfsMount {
id: id.clone(),
server,
export,
version: req.version,
read_only: req.read_only,
local_path,
mounted: false,
last_error: None,
last_attempt: None,
iso_count: 0,
};
self.inner.lock().mounts.insert(id.clone(), mount);
self.persist_locked();
self.try_mount(&id).await?;
Ok(self.get(&id).expect("mount just inserted"))
}
/// Unmount and forget a share. Removes any ISOs it contributed from
/// the IsoStore and deletes the local mount point. Idempotent.
pub async fn remove(&self, id: &str) -> Result<()> {
// Best-effort umount; even if it fails (e.g. server unreachable)
// we still want to drop the in-memory record.
let _ = self.umount_one(id).await;
let local_path = {
let mut g = self.inner.lock();
g.mounts.remove(id).map(|m| m.local_path)
};
self.persist_locked();
self.iso_store.drop_external_source(id);
if let Some(p) = local_path {
// rmdir only — never recurse, the mount could still be live
// on some kernel error path and we don't want to nuke a
// remote filesystem.
let _ = tokio::fs::remove_dir(&p).await;
}
Ok(())
}
/// Re-scan a mounted share for ISOs, refreshing the IsoStore.
pub async fn rescan(&self, id: &str) -> Result<u32> {
let mount = self
.get(id)
.ok_or_else(|| Error::Invalid(format!("no such mount '{id}'")))?;
if !mount.mounted {
return Err(Error::Invalid(format!("mount '{id}' is not active")));
}
let count = self.scan_and_register(&mount).await?;
if let Some(m) = self.inner.lock().mounts.get_mut(id) {
m.iso_count = count;
}
self.persist_locked();
Ok(count)
}
/// Snapshot of every configured mount.
#[must_use]
pub fn list(&self) -> Vec<NfsMount> {
let g = self.inner.lock();
let mut v: Vec<_> = g.mounts.values().cloned().collect();
v.sort_by(|a, b| a.id.cmp(&b.id));
v
}
/// Look up a single mount by id.
#[must_use]
pub fn get(&self, id: &str) -> Option<NfsMount> {
self.inner.lock().mounts.get(id).cloned()
}
// ── internals ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
async fn try_mount(&self, id: &str) -> Result<()> {
let _g = self.mount_lock.lock().await;
let m = self
.get(id)
.ok_or_else(|| Error::Invalid(format!("no such mount '{id}'")))?;
let now = OffsetDateTime::now_utc();
// Already mounted? Skip — `mount` would error on a busy target
// and confuse the operator's UI status.
if is_mountpoint(&m.local_path).await {
self.update_status(id, true, None, now);
// Even though already mounted, we still want a fresh ISO count.
let count = self.scan_and_register(&m).await.unwrap_or(0);
self.update_iso_count(id, count);
return Ok(());
}
let opts = mount_options(&m);
let target = format!("{}:{}", m.server, m.export);
let output = Command::new("mount")
.arg("-t")
.arg("nfs")
.arg("-o")
.arg(&opts)
.arg(&target)
.arg(&m.local_path)
.output()
.await;
match output {
Ok(out) if out.status.success() => {
tracing::info!(
target: "openpxe::nfs",
id = %id, server = %m.server, export = %m.export,
version = ?m.version,
"NFS mount succeeded"
);
self.update_status(id, true, None, now);
let count = self.scan_and_register(&m).await.unwrap_or(0);
self.update_iso_count(id, count);
Ok(())
}
Ok(out) => {
let err = format!(
"mount exit {}: {}",
out.status.code().unwrap_or(-1),
String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr).trim()
);
tracing::warn!(target: "openpxe::nfs", id = %id, "{err}");
self.update_status(id, false, Some(err.clone()), now);
Err(Error::Invalid(err))
}
Err(e) => {
let err = format!("could not exec /bin/mount: {e}");
tracing::error!(target: "openpxe::nfs", id = %id, "{err}");
self.update_status(id, false, Some(err.clone()), now);
Err(Error::Invalid(err))
}
}
}
async fn umount_one(&self, id: &str) -> Result<()> {
let _g = self.mount_lock.lock().await;
let Some(m) = self.get(id) else { return Ok(()) };
if !is_mountpoint(&m.local_path).await {
self.update_status(id, false, None, OffsetDateTime::now_utc());
return Ok(());
}
// -l = lazy: detach immediately, finish when no process has a
// handle. Important if a stale ISO read is still in flight.
let out = Command::new("umount")
.arg("-l")
.arg(&m.local_path)
.output()
.await;
match out {
Ok(o) if o.status.success() => {
self.update_status(id, false, None, OffsetDateTime::now_utc());
Ok(())
}
Ok(o) => {
let e = format!(
"umount exit {}: {}",
o.status.code().unwrap_or(-1),
String::from_utf8_lossy(&o.stderr).trim()
);
self.update_status(id, false, Some(e.clone()), OffsetDateTime::now_utc());
Err(Error::Invalid(e))
}
Err(e) => {
let e = format!("could not exec /bin/umount: {e}");
self.update_status(id, false, Some(e.clone()), OffsetDateTime::now_utc());
Err(Error::Invalid(e))
}
}
}
/// Walk the mount point for `*.iso` files, introspect each one, and
/// register it with the IsoStore as an NFS-sourced entry. Returns the
/// count of ISOs registered.
async fn scan_and_register(&self, m: &NfsMount) -> Result<u32> {
// Drop any prior entries from this mount before re-registering, so
// a removed file disappears from the store.
self.iso_store.drop_external_source(&m.id);
let mut walker = tokio::fs::read_dir(&m.local_path).await?;
let mut count = 0u32;
while let Some(entry) = walker.next_entry().await? {
let p = entry.path();
if p.extension()
.and_then(|e| e.to_str())
.map(str::to_ascii_lowercase)
.as_deref()
!= Some("iso")
{
continue;
}
let filename = match p.file_name().and_then(|s| s.to_str()) {
Some(f) => f.to_string(),
None => continue,
};
let size = tokio::fs::metadata(&p).await?.len();
// Introspection is sync + IO-bound (reads ISO9660 PVD). Push
// it to a blocking thread so the runtime stays responsive on
// a slow share.
let p_owned = p.clone();
let report: IntrospectionReport =
tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || introspect(&p_owned))
.await
.map_err(|e| Error::Other(e.into()))?;
let id = format!("nfs-{}-{}", m.id, slugify_str(&filename));
let boot_entries = generate_boot_entries_for(&id, &filename, &report);
let source = IsoSource::Nfs {
mount_id: m.id.clone(),
relative_path: filename.clone(),
};
self.iso_store.register_external(
id,
filename,
size,
report,
boot_entries,
source,
);
count += 1;
}
Ok(count)
}
fn update_status(&self, id: &str, mounted: bool, err: Option<String>, ts: OffsetDateTime) {
if let Some(m) = self.inner.lock().mounts.get_mut(id) {
m.mounted = mounted;
m.last_error = err;
m.last_attempt = Some(ts);
}
self.persist_locked();
}
fn update_iso_count(&self, id: &str, count: u32) {
if let Some(m) = self.inner.lock().mounts.get_mut(id) {
m.iso_count = count;
}
self.persist_locked();
}
/// Atomically replace the on-disk JSON with the current state.
/// Persistence errors are logged, never propagated — settings live in
/// memory authoritatively, matching the SettingsStore policy.
fn persist_locked(&self) {
let mounts: Vec<NfsMount> = self.inner.lock().mounts.values().cloned().collect();
let path = self.state_path.as_path();
let tmp = path.with_extension("json.tmp");
let body = match serde_json::to_vec_pretty(&mounts) {
Ok(b) => b,
Err(e) => {
tracing::warn!(target: "openpxe::nfs", "serialize NFS state: {e}");
return;
}
};
if let Some(parent) = path.parent() {
let _ = std::fs::create_dir_all(parent);
}
if let Err(e) = std::fs::write(&tmp, body) {
tracing::warn!(target: "openpxe::nfs", "write NFS state tmp: {e}");
return;
}
if let Err(e) = std::fs::rename(&tmp, path) {
tracing::warn!(target: "openpxe::nfs", "rename NFS state: {e}");
}
}
}
fn mount_options(m: &NfsMount) -> String {
let mut opts = vec![m.version.vers_arg().to_string()];
if m.read_only {
opts.push("ro".into());
} else {
opts.push("rw".into());
}
// `nolock` for v3 — many storage appliances disable lockd; we don't
// need locking for read-only ISO access anyway.
if matches!(m.version, NfsVersion::V3) {
opts.push("nolock".into());
}
// Soft mount with a generous timeout — better to surface a hung share
// as a user-visible error than to wedge the iPXE client forever on a
// dead NFS server.
opts.push("soft".into());
opts.push("timeo=100".into());
opts.push("retrans=3".into());
opts.join(",")
}
fn mount_id(server: &str, export: &str) -> String {
let raw = format!("{server}{export}");
slugify_str(&raw)
}
/// Detect whether `path` is currently a mount point. We don't have
/// `is_mountpoint(2)`, so compare the parent's device id to the dir's;
/// if they differ the dir is a mount.
async fn is_mountpoint(path: &Path) -> bool {
let Some(parent) = path.parent() else {
return false;
};
let Ok(m1) = tokio::fs::metadata(path).await else {
return false;
};
let Ok(m2) = tokio::fs::metadata(parent).await else {
return false;
};
use std::os::unix::fs::MetadataExt;
m1.dev() != m2.dev()
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn version_arg() {
assert_eq!(NfsVersion::V3.vers_arg(), "vers=3");
assert_eq!(NfsVersion::V41.vers_arg(), "vers=4.1");
}
#[test]
fn mount_options_v3_includes_nolock() {
let m = NfsMount {
id: "x".into(),
server: "s".into(),
export: "/e".into(),
version: NfsVersion::V3,
read_only: true,
local_path: PathBuf::from("/tmp/x"),
mounted: false,
last_error: None,
last_attempt: None,
iso_count: 0,
};
let opts = mount_options(&m);
assert!(opts.contains("vers=3"));
assert!(opts.contains("ro"));
assert!(opts.contains("nolock"));
assert!(opts.contains("soft"));
}
#[test]
fn mount_options_v41_no_nolock() {
let m = NfsMount {
id: "x".into(),
server: "s".into(),
export: "/e".into(),
version: NfsVersion::V41,
read_only: false,
local_path: PathBuf::from("/tmp/x"),
mounted: false,
last_error: None,
last_attempt: None,
iso_count: 0,
};
let opts = mount_options(&m);
assert!(opts.contains("vers=4.1"));
assert!(opts.contains("rw"));
assert!(!opts.contains("nolock"));
}
#[test]
fn mount_id_is_stable_and_safe() {
let a = mount_id("10.0.0.5", "/srv/isos");
let b = mount_id("10.0.0.5", "/srv/isos");
assert_eq!(a, b);
assert!(!a.contains('/'));
assert!(!a.contains('.'));
}
}
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//! PXE boot-menu background compositor.
//!
//! The brief (v0.4.69): match iVentoy's polished graphical PXE screen.
//! iPXE built with `CONSOLE_FRAMEBUFFER` + `IMAGE_PNG` paints a PNG to
//! the framebuffer via `console --picture`, then draws the text menu on
//! top (the console's default background colour is rendered transparent
//! so the picture shows through the menu's blank cells). So what we
//! produce here is a **full-screen 1024×768 background**, not just a
//! floating logo:
//!
//! - a solid dark field (matches the WebUI dark theme so the product
//! feels consistent from browser to bare metal), with
//! - the operator's uploaded logo composited across the top, leaving
//! the lower ~two-thirds clear for the iPXE menu text.
//!
//! When no custom logo is uploaded we still return a designed
//! background — a dark field with a centered "rainbow-horizon" disc
//! echoing the bundled OpenPXE mark — so the boot screen is graphical
//! out of the box. This replaces the old ASCII wordmark entirely.
//!
//! iPXE does **not** scale pictures (confirmed against the decoder
//! source): the image is painted at native pixel size and the firmware
//! picks the smallest video mode that fits. 1024×768 is the universal
//! safe mode, so we pin the canvas there. Operators uploading a 4K logo
//! get it downscaled to fit the top band; tiny icons paint at native
//! size, centered.
//!
//! Input formats: anything the `image` crate decodes with our enabled
//! features — PNG, JPEG, WebP, GIF. iPXE itself only consumes PNG, so
//! we always *emit* PNG regardless of what the operator uploaded; a
//! WebP logo is transcoded here transparently.
use image::imageops::FilterType;
use image::{DynamicImage, ImageError, ImageFormat, Rgba, RgbaImage};
use std::io::Cursor;
/// Canvas dimensions. Pinned to 1024×768 — the universal framebuffer
/// mode every BIOS/UEFI console supports, and iPXE doesn't scale.
pub const CANVAS_W: u32 = 1024;
pub const CANVAS_H: u32 = 768;
/// Bounding box for the operator's logo across the top band. Wider than
/// the old floating-logo box because the logo now anchors a full
/// background rather than sitting alone on transparency.
const LOGO_MAX_W: u32 = 760;
const LOGO_MAX_H: u32 = 200;
/// Top margin from the canvas top to the logo's top edge.
const LOGO_TOP_MARGIN: u32 = 72;
/// Background fill — a near-black with a faint blue cast, matching the
/// WebUI's dark theme surface so the product reads as one piece from
/// browser to PXE screen.
const BG: Rgba<u8> = Rgba([11, 14, 22, 255]);
/// Compose the operator's uploaded raster (`Some`) — or the default
/// OpenPXE mark (`None`) — into a full-screen 1024×768 PNG background
/// and return the encoded bytes.
///
/// Errors only when a provided `src_bytes` can't be decoded; the
/// `None` path and the PNG encode are infallible for our fixed canvas.
pub fn compose_pxe_background(src_bytes: Option<&[u8]>) -> Result<Vec<u8>, ImageError> {
let mut canvas: RgbaImage = RgbaImage::from_pixel(CANVAS_W, CANVAS_H, BG);
match src_bytes {
Some(bytes) => {
let logo = image::load_from_memory(bytes)?;
let logo = downscale_to_fit(logo, LOGO_MAX_W, LOGO_MAX_H);
let logo_rgba = logo.to_rgba8();
let off_x = CANVAS_W.saturating_sub(logo_rgba.width()) / 2;
let off_y = LOGO_TOP_MARGIN.min(CANVAS_H.saturating_sub(logo_rgba.height()));
// `overlay` alpha-composites, so a transparent-background
// logo blends onto the dark field exactly as designed.
image::imageops::overlay(&mut canvas, &logo_rgba, off_x.into(), off_y.into());
}
None => draw_default_mark(&mut canvas),
}
let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(128 * 1024);
DynamicImage::ImageRgba8(canvas).write_to(&mut Cursor::new(&mut out), ImageFormat::Png)?;
Ok(out)
}
/// Back-compat shim for the old name — callers that pass a raw logo and
/// want it composited get the same result as `compose_pxe_background`
/// with `Some`.
pub fn compose_pxe_logo(src_bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>, ImageError> {
compose_pxe_background(Some(src_bytes))
}
/// Paint a centered "rainbow-horizon" disc onto the dark canvas as the
/// default brand mark when no operator logo is set. Pure pixel math —
/// no font, no SVG rasterizer, no extra deps. A filled circle with a
/// left-to-right hue sweep echoes the bundled `logo.svg` motif.
// Casts here are all bounded small-range geometry (radius ≤ 90, canvas
// ≤ 1024) — precision loss / wrap is structurally impossible.
#[allow(clippy::cast_precision_loss, clippy::cast_possible_wrap)]
fn draw_default_mark(canvas: &mut RgbaImage) {
let radius: i32 = 90;
let cx = (CANVAS_W / 2) as i32;
let cy = (LOGO_TOP_MARGIN + 100) as i32;
// Four-stop horizontal sweep across the disc (teal → blue → violet
// → magenta) — the OpenPXE palette.
let stops = [
[0x22u8, 0xd3, 0xaa],
[0x3b, 0x82, 0xf6],
[0x8b, 0x5c, 0xf6],
[0xec, 0x48, 0x99],
];
let r2 = radius * radius;
for dy in -radius..=radius {
for dx in -radius..=radius {
if dx * dx + dy * dy > r2 {
continue;
}
// Position across the disc in [0,1] left→right.
let t = (f32::from(i16::try_from(dx + radius).unwrap_or(0)))
/ (f32::from(i16::try_from(2 * radius).unwrap_or(1)));
let color = gradient_at(&stops, t);
// Soft edge: fade alpha in the outer 3px ring.
let dist = ((dx * dx + dy * dy) as f32).sqrt();
let alpha = if dist > (radius as f32 - 3.0) {
let edge = (radius as f32 - dist).clamp(0.0, 3.0) / 3.0;
(edge * 255.0) as u8
} else {
255
};
let px = cx + dx;
let py = cy + dy;
if px >= 0 && py >= 0 && (px as u32) < CANVAS_W && (py as u32) < CANVAS_H {
blend_pixel(canvas, px as u32, py as u32, color, alpha);
}
}
}
}
/// Linear interpolate across an N-stop palette at position `t` in [0,1].
// `segments`/`idx` are ≤ palette length (4) — f32 cast is exact.
#[allow(clippy::cast_precision_loss)]
fn gradient_at(stops: &[[u8; 3]], t: f32) -> [u8; 3] {
let t = t.clamp(0.0, 1.0);
let segments = stops.len() - 1;
let scaled = t * segments as f32;
let idx = (scaled.floor() as usize).min(segments - 1);
let frac = scaled - idx as f32;
let a = stops[idx];
let b = stops[idx + 1];
[
lerp(a[0], b[0], frac),
lerp(a[1], b[1], frac),
lerp(a[2], b[2], frac),
]
}
fn lerp(a: u8, b: u8, t: f32) -> u8 {
(f32::from(a) + (f32::from(b) - f32::from(a)) * t).round() as u8
}
/// Alpha-blend `color` at `alpha` over the existing canvas pixel.
fn blend_pixel(canvas: &mut RgbaImage, x: u32, y: u32, color: [u8; 3], alpha: u8) {
let bg = canvas.get_pixel(x, y).0;
let a = f32::from(alpha) / 255.0;
let out = Rgba([
lerp(bg[0], color[0], a),
lerp(bg[1], color[1], a),
lerp(bg[2], color[2], a),
255,
]);
canvas.put_pixel(x, y, out);
}
fn downscale_to_fit(img: DynamicImage, max_w: u32, max_h: u32) -> DynamicImage {
let (w, h) = (img.width(), img.height());
if w <= max_w && h <= max_h {
return img;
}
img.resize(max_w, max_h, FilterType::Lanczos3)
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use image::{ImageBuffer, Rgb};
fn solid_png(w: u32, h: u32, rgb: [u8; 3]) -> Vec<u8> {
let img: ImageBuffer<Rgb<u8>, Vec<u8>> = ImageBuffer::from_pixel(w, h, Rgb(rgb));
let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(4096);
DynamicImage::ImageRgb8(img)
.write_to(&mut Cursor::new(&mut out), ImageFormat::Png)
.unwrap();
out
}
#[test]
fn custom_logo_emits_canvas_sized_png_with_dark_field() {
let src = solid_png(120, 60, [200, 50, 50]);
let out = compose_pxe_background(Some(&src)).unwrap();
let img = image::load_from_memory(&out).unwrap().to_rgba8();
assert_eq!(img.width(), CANVAS_W);
assert_eq!(img.height(), CANVAS_H);
// A far corner should be the opaque dark background fill, not
// transparent — this is a full background now, not a floating
// logo on transparency.
let corner = img.get_pixel(CANVAS_W - 1, CANVAS_H - 1);
assert_eq!(corner.0, BG.0, "corner should be the dark fill");
}
#[test]
fn custom_logo_painted_in_top_band() {
let src = solid_png(100, 40, [10, 200, 10]);
let out = compose_pxe_background(Some(&src)).unwrap();
let canvas = image::load_from_memory(&out).unwrap().to_rgba8();
let cx = (CANVAS_W - 100) / 2;
let cy = LOGO_TOP_MARGIN;
let inside = canvas.get_pixel(cx + 10, cy + 10);
assert!(
inside.0[1] > 100 && inside.0[0] < 100,
"logo pixel color mismatch: {inside:?}"
);
}
#[test]
fn default_background_is_dark_with_a_painted_mark() {
let out = compose_pxe_background(None).unwrap();
let canvas = image::load_from_memory(&out).unwrap().to_rgba8();
assert_eq!(canvas.width(), CANVAS_W);
assert_eq!(canvas.height(), CANVAS_H);
// Corner is dark fill.
assert_eq!(canvas.get_pixel(2, CANVAS_H - 2).0, BG.0);
// Center of the disc is not the background fill (something was
// painted there).
let center = canvas.get_pixel(CANVAS_W / 2, LOGO_TOP_MARGIN + 100);
assert_ne!(center.0, BG.0, "default mark should paint over the field");
}
#[test]
fn webp_or_jpeg_input_is_accepted_and_transcoded_to_png() {
// Encode a JPEG and confirm the compositor decodes it and emits
// a valid PNG (iPXE only eats PNG, so transcoding is the point).
let img: ImageBuffer<Rgb<u8>, Vec<u8>> = ImageBuffer::from_pixel(80, 80, Rgb([90, 90, 90]));
let mut jpeg = Vec::new();
DynamicImage::ImageRgb8(img)
.write_to(&mut Cursor::new(&mut jpeg), ImageFormat::Jpeg)
.unwrap();
let out = compose_pxe_background(Some(&jpeg)).unwrap();
// Output must be a PNG (magic bytes) of canvas size.
assert_eq!(&out[..8], b"\x89PNG\r\n\x1a\n");
let img = image::load_from_memory(&out).unwrap();
assert_eq!(img.width(), CANVAS_W);
}
#[test]
fn unsupported_bytes_returns_error_not_panic() {
let r = compose_pxe_background(Some(b"\xde\xad\xbe\xef not an image"));
assert!(r.is_err());
}
#[test]
fn gradient_endpoints_match_stops() {
let stops = [[0, 0, 0], [255, 255, 255]];
assert_eq!(gradient_at(&stops, 0.0), [0, 0, 0]);
assert_eq!(gradient_at(&stops, 1.0), [255, 255, 255]);
}
}
+17 -80
View File
@@ -25,11 +25,11 @@
//! Samba), we return `SmbState::SmbdMissing` and the UI surfaces the
//! gap. No panics, no retries, no silent failure.
use parking_lot::Mutex;
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
use std::process::{Child, Command, Stdio};
use std::sync::Arc;
use parking_lot::Mutex;
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, Eq)]
#[serde(rename_all = "snake_case", tag = "state")]
@@ -72,9 +72,7 @@ impl SmbManager {
/// ISO under `smb_dir/<slug>/` becomes a share named `<slug>`. Returns
/// the sorted list.
pub fn discover_shares(&self) -> Vec<String> {
let Ok(rd) = std::fs::read_dir(&self.smb_dir) else {
return vec![];
};
let Ok(rd) = std::fs::read_dir(&self.smb_dir) else { return vec![]; };
let mut out: Vec<String> = rd
.flatten()
.filter(|e| e.path().is_dir())
@@ -132,9 +130,7 @@ impl SmbManager {
let shares = match self.write_conf() {
Ok(v) => v,
Err(e) => {
let s = SmbState::Failed {
reason: format!("write smb.conf: {e}"),
};
let s = SmbState::Failed { reason: format!("write smb.conf: {e}") };
*self.state.lock() = s.clone();
return s;
}
@@ -143,8 +139,7 @@ impl SmbManager {
.args([
"--foreground",
"--no-process-group",
"--configfile",
self.conf_path.to_str().unwrap_or(""),
"--configfile", self.conf_path.to_str().unwrap_or(""),
"--log-stdout",
])
.stdin(Stdio::null())
@@ -161,9 +156,7 @@ impl SmbManager {
s
}
Err(e) => {
let s = SmbState::Failed {
reason: format!("spawn smbd: {e}"),
};
let s = SmbState::Failed { reason: format!("spawn smbd: {e}") };
*self.state.lock() = s.clone();
s
}
@@ -175,15 +168,11 @@ impl SmbManager {
#[allow(unsafe_code)]
pub fn reconcile(&self) -> SmbState {
let mut g = self.child.lock();
if g.is_none() {
return self.state.lock().clone();
}
if g.is_none() { return self.state.lock().clone(); }
let shares = match self.write_conf() {
Ok(v) => v,
Err(e) => {
let s = SmbState::Failed {
reason: format!("write smb.conf: {e}"),
};
let s = SmbState::Failed { reason: format!("write smb.conf: {e}") };
*self.state.lock() = s.clone();
return s;
}
@@ -202,13 +191,8 @@ impl SmbManager {
// covers this is `nix`, which pulls ~40 transitive deps for a
// single signal send. One documented unsafe call is the better
// tradeoff for a container-first project.
unsafe {
libc::kill(pid, libc::SIGHUP);
}
let s = SmbState::Running {
pid: pid as u32,
shares,
};
unsafe { libc::kill(pid, libc::SIGHUP); }
let s = SmbState::Running { pid: pid as u32, shares };
*self.state.lock() = s.clone();
s
} else {
@@ -228,19 +212,15 @@ impl SmbManager {
}
fn smbd_present() -> bool {
let Ok(paths) = std::env::var("PATH") else {
return false;
};
let Ok(paths) = std::env::var("PATH") else { return false; };
for dir in std::env::split_paths(&paths) {
if dir.join("smbd").is_file() {
return true;
}
if dir.join("smbd").is_file() { return true; }
}
false
}
const SMB_CONF_GLOBAL: &str = r"[global]
workgroup = OPENPXE
workgroup = PXEFORGE
server min protocol = SMB2
smb ports = 445
log level = 1
@@ -255,15 +235,6 @@ lock directory = /tmp
state directory = /tmp
cache directory = /tmp
pid directory = /tmp
# WinPE reconnect hardening. Windows Setup can reboot mid-install and
# reconnect from the same IP; stale sessions/oplocks otherwise cause
# intermittent `net use` failures on the second stage.
reset on zero vc = yes
oplocks = no
kernel oplocks = no
level2 oplocks = no
strict locking = no
deadtime = 1
";
/// Extract a Windows ISO at `iso_path` into `smb_dir/<slug>/`. Uses
@@ -274,11 +245,7 @@ deadtime = 1
/// Idempotent: if the target dir already contains `sources/boot.wim`, we
/// skip extraction. Callers who want a forced re-extract should remove the
/// dir first.
pub fn extract_windows_iso(
iso_path: &Path,
smb_dir: &Path,
slug: &str,
) -> std::io::Result<PathBuf> {
pub fn extract_windows_iso(iso_path: &Path, smb_dir: &Path, slug: &str) -> std::io::Result<PathBuf> {
let target = smb_dir.join(slug);
if target.join("sources").join("boot.wim").is_file() {
tracing::debug!(target: "openpxe::smb", slug, "ISO already extracted, skipping");
@@ -296,9 +263,7 @@ pub fn extract_windows_iso(
.stdout(Stdio::null())
.stderr(Stdio::piped())
.output()?;
if out.status.success() {
return Ok(target);
}
if out.status.success() { return Ok(target); }
tracing::warn!(
target: "openpxe::smb",
stderr=%String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr),
@@ -313,9 +278,7 @@ pub fn extract_windows_iso(
.args(["-C"])
.arg(&target)
.output()?;
if out.status.success() {
return Ok(target);
}
if out.status.success() { return Ok(target); }
return Err(std::io::Error::other(format!(
"bsdtar failed: {}",
String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr)
@@ -331,9 +294,7 @@ fn which(cmd: &str) -> Option<PathBuf> {
let paths = std::env::var_os("PATH")?;
for dir in std::env::split_paths(&paths) {
let p = dir.join(cmd);
if p.is_file() {
return Some(p);
}
if p.is_file() { return Some(p); }
}
None
}
@@ -359,9 +320,7 @@ mod tests {
let m = SmbManager::new(dir.path().into());
let st = m.start();
// Restore PATH before asserting so any subsequent failure is legible.
if let Some(p) = saved {
std::env::set_var("PATH", p);
}
if let Some(p) = saved { std::env::set_var("PATH", p); }
assert_eq!(st, SmbState::SmbdMissing);
}
@@ -388,27 +347,5 @@ mod tests {
assert!(conf.contains("guest ok = yes"));
assert!(conf.contains("read only = yes"));
assert!(conf.contains("server min protocol = SMB2"));
assert!(conf.contains("workgroup = OPENPXE"));
}
#[test]
fn write_conf_includes_winpe_reconnect_tuning() {
let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
let m = SmbManager::new(dir.path().into());
m.write_conf().unwrap();
let conf = std::fs::read_to_string(dir.path().join("smb.conf")).unwrap();
for expected in [
"reset on zero vc = yes",
"oplocks = no",
"kernel oplocks = no",
"level2 oplocks = no",
"strict locking = no",
"deadtime = 1",
] {
assert!(
conf.contains(expected),
"missing Windows reconnect Samba option {expected} in:\n{conf}"
);
}
}
}
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
+54 -389
View File
@@ -3,8 +3,8 @@
use crate::entry::{BootEntry, BootKind, KernelArgs};
use crate::introspect::{introspect, DistroFamily, IntrospectionReport};
use bytes::Bytes;
use openpxe_core::{Error, Result};
use parking_lot::RwLock;
use openpxe_core::{Error, Result};
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
use std::collections::HashMap;
@@ -15,59 +15,22 @@ use tokio::io::AsyncWriteExt;
/// Where the bytes for an ISO actually live.
///
/// `Local` — uploaded ISO, sits at `<iso_dir>/<id>.iso`.
/// `Smb` (v0.4.65) — remote SMB share, streamed via Samba's
/// userspace `smbclient` CLI subprocess. No kernel mount, no local
/// cache. Sequential whole-file streaming; HTTP Range requests
/// return 416.
/// `Nfs` (v0.4.67) — remote NFSv3 share, streamed via the pure-Rust
/// `nfs3_client` crate (in-process, no subprocess). Same "works in
/// any container" property as SMB, plus Range requests work because
/// NFSv3 READ3 takes an explicit offset.
/// The default is `Local` — uploaded ISOs sit in `<iso_dir>/<id>.iso`.
/// `Nfs` entries point at a file inside a remote share that the
/// `NfsManager` is keeping mounted. We resolve the on-disk path lazily
/// in [`IsoStore::iso_path_for`] using the `nfs_root` set at startup.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(tag = "kind", rename_all = "snake_case")]
pub enum IsoSource {
#[default]
Local,
/// v0.4.65: SMB via userspace `smbclient` works in any container.
Smb {
share_id: String,
/// Filename at the share root. We don't support nested paths
/// in v0.4.65; ISOs live at the top of the share.
relative_path: String,
},
/// v0.4.67: NFSv3 via the in-process `nfs3_client` crate.
Nfs {
share_id: String,
/// Filename at the export root.
mount_id: String,
/// Path relative to the mount point — typically just the filename.
relative_path: String,
},
}
/// Where the ISO lands in the PXE menu hierarchy.
///
/// Auto-detected family (Debian, Windows, …) still drives BIOS/UEFI
/// behaviour and per-entry boot args, but the *menu placement* is
/// operator-controlled — an operator who's uploaded a TinyCore live ISO
/// to use as a recovery shim, or a SystemRescue image, can flip its
/// category to `Tools` so it lands next to memtest/shell instead of
/// under Linux Installers.
///
/// Old `meta.json` files without this field deserialize as `Os`, which
/// matches v0.4.1 behaviour (everything goes under OS Installers).
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Default, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(rename_all = "snake_case")]
pub enum IsoCategory {
/// "OS Installer" — routed via the auto-detected family into the
/// Linux / Windows installer submenus.
#[default]
Os,
/// "Tool" — surfaced under the Tools menu next to memtest, shell,
/// NIC info, etc. Family detection still decides BIOS/UEFI vs
/// wimboot vs sanboot at boot time.
Tools,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct IsoMeta {
/// Stable slug used in URLs (derived from the uploaded filename).
@@ -85,29 +48,6 @@ pub struct IsoMeta {
/// Old `meta.json` files without this field deserialize as `Local`.
#[serde(default)]
pub source: IsoSource,
/// Optional bcrypt hash of an operator-set password. When present,
/// `/boot/<entry>.ipxe` returns a `read --secret` prompt instead of
/// the boot script until the client chains back with the correct
/// `?token=...`. We never store, log, or transmit the plaintext.
/// Skipped on serialize when None to keep meta.json clean for
/// the common no-password case.
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
pub password_hash: Option<String>,
/// Where the ISO sits in the PXE menu hierarchy — operator-controlled,
/// not driven by family detection. Defaults to [`IsoCategory::Os`].
#[serde(default)]
pub category: IsoCategory,
}
impl IsoMeta {
/// Convenience predicate the HTTP layer + UI can both use.
#[must_use]
pub fn is_password_protected(&self) -> bool {
self.password_hash
.as_deref()
.map(str::trim)
.is_some_and(|h| !h.is_empty())
}
}
pub struct UploadHandle {
@@ -154,8 +94,6 @@ impl UploadHandle {
introspection,
boot_entries,
source: IsoSource::Local,
password_hash: None,
category: IsoCategory::default(),
};
store.persist_meta(&meta).await?;
store.insert(meta.clone());
@@ -177,6 +115,10 @@ struct Inner {
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct IsoStore {
iso_dir: Arc<PathBuf>,
/// Where NFS mounts land on disk. Set at startup via
/// [`IsoStore::set_nfs_root`]; required for resolving any
/// `IsoSource::Nfs` entry.
nfs_root: Arc<RwLock<Option<PathBuf>>>,
inner: Arc<RwLock<Inner>>,
}
@@ -184,10 +126,17 @@ impl IsoStore {
pub fn new(iso_dir: PathBuf) -> Self {
Self {
iso_dir: Arc::new(iso_dir),
nfs_root: Arc::new(RwLock::new(None)),
inner: Arc::new(RwLock::new(Inner::default())),
}
}
/// Tell the store where NFS mounts live. Without this set,
/// `IsoSource::Nfs` entries cannot be resolved to a file path.
pub fn set_nfs_root(&self, root: PathBuf) {
*self.nfs_root.write() = Some(root);
}
pub async fn ensure_dirs(&self) -> Result<()> {
tokio::fs::create_dir_all(self.iso_dir.as_path()).await?;
Ok(())
@@ -201,9 +150,7 @@ impl IsoStore {
let mut entries = tokio::fs::read_dir(self.iso_dir.as_path()).await?;
while let Some(e) = entries.next_entry().await? {
let p = e.path();
if p.extension().and_then(|s| s.to_str()) != Some("json") {
continue;
}
if p.extension().and_then(|s| s.to_str()) != Some("json") { continue; }
if !p
.file_name()
.and_then(|s| s.to_str())
@@ -247,9 +194,6 @@ impl IsoStore {
return Err(Error::Invalid(format!("iso '{id}' already exists")));
}
let partial_path = self.iso_dir.join(format!("{id}.partial"));
if partial_path.exists() {
return Err(Error::Invalid(format!("iso '{id}' is already uploading")));
}
let file = tokio::fs::File::create(&partial_path).await?;
Ok(UploadHandle {
id,
@@ -283,39 +227,36 @@ impl IsoStore {
self.inner.read().isos.get(id).cloned()
}
/// Resolve an ISO id to its on-disk path, if any. For local
/// (uploaded) ISOs this is `<iso_dir>/<id>.iso`. For SMB-sourced
/// ISOs there is no on-disk path — the HTTP handler must stream
/// via `SmbShareManager::stream_iso` instead. Returns `None` for
/// SMB sources or when the file is missing.
/// Resolve an ISO id to its on-disk path, if any. For local entries
/// this is `<iso_dir>/<id>.iso`; for NFS entries it's
/// `<nfs_root>/<mount_id>/<relative_path>`. Returns None if the file
/// is missing or the source isn't resolvable (e.g. NFS share
/// unmounted).
pub fn iso_path_for(&self, id: &str) -> Option<PathBuf> {
let meta = self.get(id)?;
match &meta.source {
IsoSource::Local => {
let path = self.iso_path(id);
let path = match &meta.source {
IsoSource::Local => self.iso_path(id),
IsoSource::Nfs {
mount_id,
relative_path,
} => {
let root = self.nfs_root.read().clone()?;
root.join(mount_id).join(relative_path)
}
};
if path.exists() {
Some(path)
} else {
None
}
}
// SMB and NFS sources have no local path — they're
// streamed in-process. Callers must inspect the source
// kind first and dispatch to the appropriate share
// manager.
IsoSource::Smb { .. } | IsoSource::Nfs { .. } => None,
}
}
/// Delete an ISO and its sidecar metadata. Only acts on local
/// (uploaded) ISOs; for SMB-backed ISOs the operator must remove
/// the file from the share or unregister the share entirely.
/// Delete an ISO and its sidecar metadata. Only acts on local ISOs;
/// for NFS-backed ISOs the operator must remove the file from the
/// share or unmount the NFS share entirely.
pub async fn delete(&self, id: &str) -> Result<()> {
let meta = self.get(id);
let is_local = matches!(
meta.as_ref().map(|m| &m.source),
Some(IsoSource::Local) | None
);
let is_local = matches!(meta.as_ref().map(|m| &m.source), Some(IsoSource::Local) | None);
if is_local {
let iso = self.iso_path(id);
let meta_path = self.meta_path(id);
@@ -326,10 +267,10 @@ impl IsoStore {
Ok(())
}
/// Register an externally-sourced ISO (SMB share, etc.). Used by
/// `SmbShareManager` after listing a share. We do **not** persist
/// a `meta.json` on disk for these — the source of truth is the
/// share itself, and the manager re-scans on startup.
/// Register an externally-sourced ISO (e.g. NFS-mounted). Used by
/// `NfsManager` after walking a freshly-mounted share. We do **not**
/// persist a `meta.json` on disk for these — the source of truth is
/// the share itself, and the NFS manager re-scans on startup.
pub fn register_external(
&self,
id: String,
@@ -348,155 +289,19 @@ impl IsoStore {
introspection,
boot_entries,
source,
password_hash: None,
category: IsoCategory::default(),
};
self.inner.write().isos.insert(id, meta);
}
/// Drop every entry that belongs to `share_id`. Used by the SMB
/// and NFS share managers when an operator removes a share, or
/// before re-scanning to clean out stale entries. The same id
/// space serves both protocols — share ids are slugified from
/// `server+share` (SMB) or `server+export` (NFS) and the
/// protocol-specific prefix prevents collisions.
pub fn drop_external_source(&self, share_id: &str) {
/// Drop every entry that belongs to `mount_id`. Used by the NFS
/// manager when an operator removes a share, or before re-scanning
/// to clean out stale entries.
pub fn drop_external_source(&self, mount_id: &str) {
let mut g = self.inner.write();
g.isos.retain(|_, m| match &m.source {
IsoSource::Smb { share_id: sid, .. } | IsoSource::Nfs { share_id: sid, .. } => {
sid != share_id
}
IsoSource::Local => true,
g.isos.retain(|_, m| {
!matches!(&m.source, IsoSource::Nfs { mount_id: mid, .. } if mid == mount_id)
});
}
/// Set or clear an ISO's boot password.
///
/// `Some("plaintext")` hashes via bcrypt (cost 10 — fast enough for
/// an interactive iPXE prompt, slow enough to be hostile to brute
/// force on a leaked meta.json) and persists.
///
/// `None` removes the password — the next /boot/<id>.ipxe request
/// returns the script directly without a prompt.
///
/// We never store, log, or transmit the plaintext.
pub async fn set_password(&self, id: &str, password: Option<&str>) -> Result<()> {
let new_hash = match password {
None => None,
Some(pw) => {
let pw = pw.trim();
if pw.is_empty() {
None
} else {
let h = bcrypt::hash(pw, bcrypt::DEFAULT_COST)
.map_err(|e| Error::Other(e.into()))?;
Some(h)
}
}
};
// Update in-memory + grab a clone for persistence outside the lock.
let updated = {
let mut g = self.inner.write();
let m = g
.isos
.get_mut(id)
.ok_or_else(|| Error::Invalid(format!("no such iso '{id}'")))?;
m.password_hash = new_hash;
m.clone()
};
// NFS-sourced ISOs have no on-disk meta.json — skip persistence
// for them (the password lives in memory until the manager
// re-scans the share, then it's gone). Document this in the API
// handler so the operator knows.
if matches!(updated.source, IsoSource::Local) {
self.persist_meta(&updated).await?;
}
Ok(())
}
/// Flip an ISO's menu category. Persists to `meta.json` for local
/// ISOs; NFS-sourced ISOs keep the change in memory only (the next
/// re-scan would overwrite it anyway).
pub async fn set_category(&self, id: &str, category: IsoCategory) -> Result<IsoMeta> {
let updated = {
let mut g = self.inner.write();
let m = g
.isos
.get_mut(id)
.ok_or_else(|| Error::Invalid(format!("no such iso '{id}'")))?;
m.category = category;
m.clone()
};
if matches!(updated.source, IsoSource::Local) {
self.persist_meta(&updated).await?;
}
Ok(updated)
}
/// Absolute path to the directory holding local ISO uploads. Used
/// by the HTTP layer for the disk-space endpoint — the volume that
/// hosts this directory is what runs out of room first.
#[must_use]
pub fn iso_dir(&self) -> PathBuf {
self.iso_dir.as_path().to_path_buf()
}
/// `(total_bytes, available_bytes)` for the filesystem hosting the
/// ISO directory. Returns `None` if `statvfs` fails (read-only
/// filesystem with no quota, mount disappeared, …) — callers
/// should treat that as "unknown" rather than zero.
///
/// Lives here rather than the HTTP crate because `http-api`'s
/// `#![forbid(unsafe_code)]` rules out the libc FFI directly, and
/// because this is naturally an `IsoStore` question — the volume
/// of interest is whatever's hosting the iso dir.
#[must_use]
pub fn disk_usage(&self) -> Option<(u64, u64)> {
disk_usage_for(self.iso_dir.as_path())
}
/// Verify a candidate password against the stored bcrypt hash.
/// Returns:
/// - `Ok(true)` — match (or the ISO has no password set; boot is open)
/// - `Ok(false)` — mismatch
/// - `Err(_)` — id not found, or bcrypt error
pub fn verify_password(&self, id: &str, candidate: &str) -> Result<bool> {
let meta = self
.get(id)
.ok_or_else(|| Error::Invalid(format!("no such iso '{id}'")))?;
let Some(hash) = meta.password_hash else {
return Ok(true); // no password set — anyone can boot
};
bcrypt::verify(candidate, &hash).map_err(|e| Error::Other(e.into()))
}
}
/// Resolve `(total, available)` bytes for the filesystem hosting `path`.
/// Returns `None` if `statvfs` fails.
#[allow(unsafe_code)]
fn disk_usage_for(path: &std::path::Path) -> Option<(u64, u64)> {
use std::ffi::CString;
use std::os::unix::ffi::OsStrExt;
let c = CString::new(path.as_os_str().as_bytes()).ok()?;
// SAFETY: `statvfs` is repr(C); a zeroed value is a valid initial
// state per POSIX. The FFI call writes every field we then read.
let mut stat: libc::statvfs = unsafe { std::mem::zeroed() };
// SAFETY: `c` is a NUL-terminated C string pointing into a stack
// CString that outlives this call; `&mut stat` is a unique aligned
// pointer to a stack-local `statvfs`. The kernel writes through
// it but does not retain the pointer past return.
let rc = unsafe { libc::statvfs(c.as_ptr(), &raw mut stat) };
if rc != 0 {
return None;
}
// Use f_frsize (fundamental block size). f_bsize is "preferred I/O
// block" and doesn't always match the unit f_blocks is denominated
// in — on some BSDs it would over-report by a factor of 8.
let frsize = stat.f_frsize as u64;
let total = stat.f_blocks as u64 * frsize;
let avail = stat.f_bavail as u64 * frsize;
Some((total, avail))
}
fn slugify(filename: &str) -> String {
@@ -541,10 +346,7 @@ pub fn generate_boot_entries_for(
/// Build `BootEntry`s from the introspection report. URLs are relative —
/// the HTTP layer rewrites them with the public base URL per request.
fn generate_boot_entries(id: &str, filename: &str, r: &IntrospectionReport) -> Vec<BootEntry> {
let title = r
.volume_label
.clone()
.unwrap_or_else(|| filename.to_string());
let title = r.volume_label.clone().unwrap_or_else(|| filename.to_string());
match r.family {
DistroFamily::WindowsPe if r.has_boot_wim => {
// Standard wimboot chain. Paths are in-ISO; the HTTP layer maps
@@ -568,22 +370,12 @@ fn generate_boot_entries(id: &str, filename: &str, r: &IntrospectionReport) -> V
fam if r.kernel_path.is_some() => {
let base = format!("iso/{id}");
let kernel_url = format!("{base}{}", r.kernel_path.as_deref().unwrap_or(""));
let initrd_urls = r
.initrd_paths
.iter()
.map(|p| format!("{base}{p}"))
.collect();
let args = KernelArgs {
cmdline: linux_cmdline(fam, id),
};
let initrd_urls = r.initrd_paths.iter().map(|p| format!("{base}{p}")).collect();
let args = KernelArgs { cmdline: linux_cmdline(fam, id) };
vec![BootEntry {
id: format!("{id}-linux"),
title,
kind: BootKind::LinuxKernel {
kernel_url,
initrd_urls,
args,
},
kind: BootKind::LinuxKernel { kernel_url, initrd_urls, args },
}]
}
_ => {
@@ -592,9 +384,7 @@ fn generate_boot_entries(id: &str, filename: &str, r: &IntrospectionReport) -> V
vec![BootEntry {
id: format!("{id}-sanboot"),
title: format!("{title} (SAN boot — may fail for >1GiB ISOs)"),
kind: BootKind::SanBootIso {
iso_url: format!("iso/{id}.iso"),
},
kind: BootKind::SanBootIso { iso_url: format!("iso/{id}.iso") },
}]
}
}
@@ -604,17 +394,8 @@ fn linux_cmdline(family: DistroFamily, id: &str) -> String {
// The HTTP layer resolves `${base-url}` at render time.
let iso_url = format!("${{base-url}}/iso/{id}.iso");
match family {
// VMware-UEFI fix (v0.4.5, matching Bootimus v0.1.67's Casper
// patch): drop `netboot=url url=… ---` in favour of the
// canonical Casper option `iso-url=` and add `ds=nocloud` so
// cloud-init / subiquity (live-server) doesn't stall waiting on
// a metadata datasource that doesn't exist in PXE. Without
// `ds=nocloud`, Ubuntu live-server / Mint / Pop!_OS / elementary
// ISOs would boot fine on bare-metal UEFI but hang at "cloud-init
// running" on VMware-UEFI guests because the vmxnet3 driver's
// late-init upsets cloud-init's network probe.
DistroFamily::DebianUbuntu => format!(
"boot=casper initrd=initrd ds=nocloud ip=dhcp iso-url={iso_url}"
"boot=casper netboot=url url={iso_url} ip=dhcp ---"
),
DistroFamily::RhelFedora => format!(
"inst.repo={iso_url} inst.stage2={iso_url} ip=dhcp"
@@ -635,8 +416,6 @@ fn linux_cmdline(family: DistroFamily, id: &str) -> String {
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use crate::introspect::{DistroFamily, IntrospectionReport};
use tempfile::tempdir;
#[test]
fn slugify_basic() {
@@ -648,118 +427,4 @@ mod tests {
// If a path sneaks in, file_stem strips the directory — OK, not a hazard.
assert_eq!(slugify("/etc/passwd"), "passwd");
}
#[test]
fn casper_cmdline_vmware_uefi_safe() {
// v0.4.5 regression guard: the Debian/Ubuntu cmdline must use
// the canonical Casper `iso-url=` option and include
// `ds=nocloud` so VMware-UEFI guests don't hang at "cloud-init
// running" waiting on a metadata datasource that PXE can't
// provide. The legacy `netboot=url url=… ---` form is gone for
// good.
let s = linux_cmdline(DistroFamily::DebianUbuntu, "ubuntu-24-04");
assert!(s.contains("boot=casper"), "{s}");
assert!(s.contains("iso-url=${base-url}/iso/ubuntu-24-04.iso"), "{s}");
assert!(s.contains("ds=nocloud"), "{s}");
assert!(s.contains("ip=dhcp"), "{s}");
assert!(!s.contains("netboot=url"), "legacy option leaked: {s}");
assert!(!s.contains(" --- "), "stray ---: {s}");
}
fn fake_meta(id: &str) -> IsoMeta {
IsoMeta {
id: id.into(),
filename: format!("{id}.iso"),
size_bytes: 0,
sha256_hex: None,
uploaded_at: OffsetDateTime::now_utc(),
introspection: IntrospectionReport {
family: DistroFamily::Unknown,
volume_label: None,
kernel_path: None,
initrd_paths: vec![],
has_boot_wim: false,
},
boot_entries: vec![],
source: IsoSource::Local,
password_hash: None,
category: IsoCategory::default(),
}
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn password_round_trip_set_verify_clear() {
let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
let store = IsoStore::new(dir.path().to_path_buf());
store.ensure_dirs().await.unwrap();
store
.inner
.write()
.isos
.insert("alpha".into(), fake_meta("alpha"));
// No password set — verify_password returns Ok(true) for any input.
assert!(store.verify_password("alpha", "anything").unwrap());
assert!(!store.get("alpha").unwrap().is_password_protected());
// Set a password.
store.set_password("alpha", Some("hunter2")).await.unwrap();
let m = store.get("alpha").unwrap();
assert!(m.is_password_protected());
assert!(m.password_hash.unwrap().starts_with("$2"));
// Verify correct + wrong.
assert!(store.verify_password("alpha", "hunter2").unwrap());
assert!(!store.verify_password("alpha", "wrong").unwrap());
assert!(!store.verify_password("alpha", "").unwrap());
// Clear by passing None or an empty string.
store.set_password("alpha", None).await.unwrap();
assert!(!store.get("alpha").unwrap().is_password_protected());
store.set_password("alpha", Some("again")).await.unwrap();
store.set_password("alpha", Some(" ")).await.unwrap();
assert!(!store.get("alpha").unwrap().is_password_protected());
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn set_password_for_unknown_id_errors() {
let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
let store = IsoStore::new(dir.path().to_path_buf());
store.ensure_dirs().await.unwrap();
let r = store.set_password("does-not-exist", Some("pw")).await;
assert!(matches!(r, Err(Error::Invalid(_))));
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn begin_upload_rejects_existing_partial_file() {
let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
let store = IsoStore::new(dir.path().to_path_buf());
store.ensure_dirs().await.unwrap();
tokio::fs::write(dir.path().join("ubuntu.partial"), b"in-flight")
.await
.unwrap();
let r = store.begin_upload("ubuntu.iso").await;
assert!(matches!(r, Err(Error::Invalid(_))));
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn password_persists_via_meta_json_for_local_isos() {
// Hash makes it onto disk so it survives a restart.
let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
let store = IsoStore::new(dir.path().to_path_buf());
store.ensure_dirs().await.unwrap();
let meta = fake_meta("alpha");
store.persist_meta(&meta).await.unwrap();
store.insert(meta);
store.set_password("alpha", Some("s3cret")).await.unwrap();
// Re-load from disk and confirm the hash came back.
let store2 = IsoStore::new(dir.path().to_path_buf());
store2.load_from_disk().await.unwrap();
let reloaded = store2.get("alpha").expect("reloaded");
assert!(reloaded.is_password_protected());
assert!(store2.verify_password("alpha", "s3cret").unwrap());
assert!(!store2.verify_password("alpha", "wrong").unwrap());
}
}
+13 -50
View File
@@ -54,10 +54,7 @@ pub struct WimPatcher {
impl WimPatcher {
#[must_use]
pub fn new(smb_host: String, smb_share: String) -> Self {
Self {
smb_host,
smb_share,
}
Self { smb_host, smb_share }
}
/// Apply WinPE patches to `boot.wim` inside `extracted_iso_dir`. Returns
@@ -75,40 +72,31 @@ impl WimPatcher {
let work = match tempfile::tempdir() {
Ok(d) => d,
Err(e) => {
return WinPatchState::Failed {
reason: format!("tempdir: {e}"),
}
}
Err(e) => return WinPatchState::Failed { reason: format!("tempdir: {e}") },
};
// Stage the two files we want present at /Windows/System32/.
let staging = work.path().join("stage/Windows/System32");
if let Err(e) = std::fs::create_dir_all(&staging) {
return WinPatchState::Failed {
reason: format!("staging mkdir: {e}"),
};
return WinPatchState::Failed { reason: format!("staging mkdir: {e}") };
}
if let Err(e) = std::fs::write(staging.join("winpeshl.ini"), WINPESHL_INI) {
return WinPatchState::Failed {
reason: format!("write winpeshl.ini: {e}"),
};
return WinPatchState::Failed { reason: format!("write winpeshl.ini: {e}") };
}
let startnet = render_startnet(&self.smb_host, &self.smb_share);
if let Err(e) = std::fs::write(staging.join("startnet.cmd"), startnet) {
return WinPatchState::Failed {
reason: format!("write startnet.cmd: {e}"),
};
return WinPatchState::Failed { reason: format!("write startnet.cmd: {e}") };
}
// Build a wimlib update command file:
// add <stage>/Windows/System32 /Windows/System32
let update_file = work.path().join("update.cmd");
let update_cmd = format!("add \"{}\" \"/Windows/System32\"\n", staging.display());
let update_cmd = format!(
"add \"{}\" \"/Windows/System32\"\n",
staging.display()
);
if let Err(e) = std::fs::write(&update_file, update_cmd) {
return WinPatchState::Failed {
reason: format!("write update.cmd: {e}"),
};
return WinPatchState::Failed { reason: format!("write update.cmd: {e}") };
}
// Run wimlib-imagex update against image index 2 (WinPE).
@@ -132,9 +120,7 @@ impl WimPatcher {
String::from_utf8_lossy(&o.stderr)
),
},
Err(e) => WinPatchState::Failed {
reason: format!("spawn wimlib-imagex: {e}"),
},
Err(e) => WinPatchState::Failed { reason: format!("spawn wimlib-imagex: {e}") },
}
}
}
@@ -147,9 +133,7 @@ fn which(cmd: &str) -> Option<PathBuf> {
let paths = std::env::var_os("PATH")?;
for dir in std::env::split_paths(&paths) {
let p = dir.join(cmd);
if p.is_file() {
return Some(p);
}
if p.is_file() { return Some(p); }
}
None
}
@@ -190,11 +174,7 @@ fn render_startnet(host: &str, share: &str) -> String {
)
.unwrap();
s.push_str(":havenet\r\n");
writeln!(
s,
"echo Mapping install media from \\\\{host}\\{share}...\r"
)
.unwrap();
writeln!(s, "echo Mapping install media from \\\\{host}\\{share}...\r").unwrap();
writeln!(
s,
":mapshare\r\nnet use Z: \\\\{host}\\{share} /user:guest \"\" /persistent:no && goto mapped\r\n\
@@ -225,23 +205,6 @@ mod tests {
assert!(s.contains("setup.exe"));
}
#[test]
fn startnet_primes_workstation_and_surfaces_mapping_errors() {
let s = render_startnet("10.0.0.5", "win11");
assert!(
s.contains("net start Workstation"),
"WinPE should explicitly start the SMB client before net use:\n{s}"
);
let net_use_line = s
.lines()
.find(|line| line.contains("net use Z:"))
.expect("net use line");
assert!(
!net_use_line.contains(">nul"),
"net use errors must remain visible in WinPE console: {net_use_line}"
);
}
#[test]
fn patcher_reports_wimlib_missing_gracefully() {
// We don't assume wimlib is present in CI; this checks the missing
+28 -100
View File
@@ -4,16 +4,16 @@
use clap::{Parser, Subcommand};
use openpxe_core::{
ClientRegistry, Config, DeploymentQueue, DhcpMode, HostBindings, LogBus, LogBusLayer, Metrics,
ClientRegistry, Config, DhcpMode, DeploymentQueue, HostBindings, LogBus, LogBusLayer, Metrics,
SettingsStore,
};
use openpxe_dhcp_proxy::DhcpProxyServer;
use openpxe_http_api::{build_router, AppState};
use openpxe_iso_store::{IsoStore, NfsShareManager, SmbManager, SmbShareManager};
use openpxe_iso_store::{IsoStore, NfsManager, SmbManager};
use std::sync::Arc;
use openpxe_tftp::TftpServer;
use std::net::{Ipv4Addr, SocketAddr};
use std::path::PathBuf;
use std::sync::Arc;
use tokio::io::AsyncReadExt;
#[derive(Debug, Parser)]
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ enum Command {
/// docker run --rm \
/// -v /my/isos:/seed:ro \
/// -v openpxe-data:/var/lib/openpxe/isos \
/// openpxe:0.4.1 seed --from /seed
/// openpxe:0.1.0 seed --from /seed
Seed {
/// Source directory containing one or more `.iso` files.
#[arg(long)]
@@ -100,15 +100,9 @@ async fn main() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
let iso_store = IsoStore::new(config.paths.iso_dir.clone());
iso_store.load_from_disk().await?;
let clients = ClientRegistry::new();
let queue = DeploymentQueue::new();
let gates = DeploymentQueue::new();
let settings = SettingsStore::load_or_default(&config.paths.work_dir);
let hosts = HostBindings::load_or_default(&config.paths.work_dir);
let boot_log = openpxe_core::BootLog::load_or_default(&config.paths.work_dir);
let branding = openpxe_core::BrandingStore::load_or_default(&config.paths.work_dir);
let admin = openpxe_core::AdminStore::load_or_default(&config.paths.work_dir);
let sso = openpxe_core::SsoStore::load_or_default(&config.paths.work_dir);
let notify = openpxe_core::NotifyStore::load_or_default(&config.paths.work_dir);
let sessions = openpxe_http_api::auth::SessionStore::default();
let metrics = Metrics::new();
// Build the SMB manager unconditionally — it starts/stops on the
@@ -120,30 +114,13 @@ async fn main() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
let _ = smb.start();
}
// v0.4.65: SMB share manager — Samba `smbclient` userspace
// consumer. Replaces the kernel-mount NFS path that v0.4.64
// shipped; that didn't work on hosts whose kernel lacked the nfs
// client modules (Unraid is the dominant case). `smbclient` does
// the SMB protocol entirely in userspace over TCP and works in
// any container regardless of capabilities or kernel modules.
let smb_shares = SmbShareManager::new(&config.paths.work_dir, iso_store.clone());
if let Err(e) = smb_shares.load_and_rescan().await {
tracing::warn!(
target: "openpxe::smb",
"could not reload SMB shares on startup: {e}"
);
}
// v0.4.67: NFSv3 share manager — pure-Rust in-process consumer
// via the `nfs3_client` crate. Sits alongside the SMB manager;
// operators pick whichever protocol their NAS prefers, or use
// both. No subprocess, no kernel mount, works in any container.
let nfs_shares = NfsShareManager::new(&config.paths.work_dir, iso_store.clone());
if let Err(e) = nfs_shares.load_and_rescan().await {
tracing::warn!(
target: "openpxe::nfs",
"could not reload NFS shares on startup: {e}"
);
// NFS manager. The mount root has to be set on the IsoStore *before*
// we replay any persisted mounts, otherwise an in-memory IsoMeta
// pointing at an NFS source can't resolve to a path.
let nfs = NfsManager::new(&config.paths.work_dir, iso_store.clone());
iso_store.set_nfs_root(nfs.mount_root());
if let Err(e) = nfs.load_and_remount().await {
tracing::warn!(target: "openpxe::nfs", "could not reload NFS mounts: {e}");
}
// Sniff network details for the Network tab. None of these are
@@ -161,20 +138,11 @@ async fn main() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
iso_store: iso_store.clone(),
clients: clients.clone(),
settings: settings.clone(),
queue: queue.clone(),
queue: gates.clone(),
hosts: hosts.clone(),
boot_log: boot_log.clone(),
branding: branding.clone(),
admin: admin.clone(),
sessions: sessions.clone(),
sso: sso.clone(),
saml: openpxe_http_api::saml_routes::SamlRuntime::default(),
notify: notify.clone(),
metrics: metrics.clone(),
smb: Some(smb.clone()),
smb_shares: smb_shares.clone(),
nfs_shares: nfs_shares.clone(),
uploads: openpxe_http_api::uploads::UploadSessions::default(),
nfs: nfs.clone(),
log_bus: log_bus.clone(),
started_at: time::OffsetDateTime::now_utc(),
public_base_url: public_base_url.clone(),
@@ -188,15 +156,7 @@ async fn main() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
let http_task = tokio::spawn(async move {
let listener = tokio::net::TcpListener::bind(http_addr).await?;
tracing::info!(target: "openpxe::http", "HTTP listening on {http_addr}");
// `into_make_service_with_connect_info` is required so per-request
// `ConnectInfo<SocketAddr>` extractors can resolve the peer IP —
// used by `/boot/<entry>.ipxe` to record the booting client's
// address into the Host log. Without this the extractor 500s.
axum::serve(
listener,
router.into_make_service_with_connect_info::<std::net::SocketAddr>(),
)
.await?;
axum::serve(listener, router).await?;
Ok::<_, anyhow::Error>(())
});
@@ -250,11 +210,7 @@ async fn run_command(cmd: Command, config: Config) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
/// Reuses `IsoStore::begin_upload` / `finish` so the resulting meta on disk
/// is identical to a web upload — same slug rules, same introspection, same
/// sha256.
async fn seed_from_dir(
src: &std::path::Path,
config: &Config,
dry_run: bool,
) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
async fn seed_from_dir(src: &std::path::Path, config: &Config, dry_run: bool) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
let store = IsoStore::new(config.paths.iso_dir.clone());
store.load_from_disk().await?;
let mut entries = tokio::fs::read_dir(src).await?;
@@ -262,12 +218,7 @@ async fn seed_from_dir(
let mut skipped = 0u32;
while let Some(entry) = entries.next_entry().await? {
let p = entry.path();
if p.extension()
.and_then(|e| e.to_str())
.map(str::to_ascii_lowercase)
.as_deref()
!= Some("iso")
{
if p.extension().and_then(|e| e.to_str()).map(str::to_ascii_lowercase).as_deref() != Some("iso") {
continue;
}
let filename = p
@@ -275,14 +226,8 @@ async fn seed_from_dir(
.and_then(|s| s.to_str())
.ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("non-utf8 filename: {}", p.display()))?
.to_string();
println!(
" {} ({} bytes)",
filename,
tokio::fs::metadata(&p).await?.len()
);
if dry_run {
continue;
}
println!(" {} ({} bytes)", filename, tokio::fs::metadata(&p).await?.len());
if dry_run { continue; }
let mut handle = match store.begin_upload(&filename).await {
Ok(h) => h,
@@ -297,23 +242,15 @@ async fn seed_from_dir(
let mut buf = vec![0u8; 1024 * 1024];
loop {
let n = file.read(&mut buf).await?;
if n == 0 {
break;
}
if n == 0 { break; }
let chunk: bytes::Bytes = buf[..n].to_vec().into();
handle.write_chunk(&chunk).await?;
}
let meta = handle.finish(&store).await?;
println!(
" -> id={} family={:?}",
meta.id, meta.introspection.family
);
println!(" -> id={} family={:?}", meta.id, meta.introspection.family);
imported += 1;
}
println!(
"\nimported={imported} skipped={skipped} {}",
if dry_run { "(dry run)" } else { "" }
);
println!("\nimported={imported} skipped={skipped} {}", if dry_run { "(dry run)" } else { "" });
Ok(())
}
@@ -357,8 +294,9 @@ fn hostname() -> std::io::Result<String> {
if let Ok(h) = std::fs::read_to_string("/proc/sys/kernel/hostname") {
return Ok(h.trim().to_string());
}
std::env::var("HOSTNAME")
.map_err(|_| std::io::Error::new(std::io::ErrorKind::NotFound, "no hostname"))
std::env::var("HOSTNAME").map_err(|_| std::io::Error::new(
std::io::ErrorKind::NotFound, "no hostname",
))
}
fn init_tracing(bus: Arc<LogBus>) {
@@ -390,10 +328,7 @@ fn detect_network_info(our_ip: Ipv4Addr) -> NetworkInfo {
// `ip -o -f inet addr show` lists every interface with its
// `inet a.b.c.d/mask`. We match the line that mentions our IP.
if let Ok(out) = Command::new("ip")
.args(["-o", "-f", "inet", "addr", "show"])
.output()
{
if let Ok(out) = Command::new("ip").args(["-o", "-f", "inet", "addr", "show"]).output() {
if let Ok(text) = String::from_utf8(out.stdout) {
for line in text.lines() {
if !line.contains(&our_ip.to_string()) {
@@ -418,10 +353,7 @@ fn detect_network_info(our_ip: Ipv4Addr) -> NetworkInfo {
}
// `ip route show default` -> "default via 10.0.0.1 dev enp1s0 ..."
if let Ok(out) = Command::new("ip")
.args(["route", "show", "default"])
.output()
{
if let Ok(out) = Command::new("ip").args(["route", "show", "default"]).output() {
if let Ok(text) = String::from_utf8(out.stdout) {
if let Some(line) = text.lines().next() {
let mut parts = line.split_whitespace();
@@ -442,11 +374,7 @@ fn detect_network_info(our_ip: Ipv4Addr) -> NetworkInfo {
fn prefix_to_dotted(prefix: u8) -> String {
let prefix = prefix.min(32);
let mask: u32 = if prefix == 0 {
0
} else {
u32::MAX << (32 - prefix)
};
let mask: u32 = if prefix == 0 { 0 } else { u32::MAX << (32 - prefix) };
format!(
"{}.{}.{}.{}",
(mask >> 24) & 0xff,
+14 -48
View File
@@ -45,12 +45,7 @@ impl TftpServer {
clients: Arc<ClientRegistry>,
metrics: openpxe_core::Metrics,
) -> Self {
Self {
bind,
port,
clients,
metrics,
}
Self { bind, port, clients, metrics }
}
pub async fn run(self) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
@@ -91,9 +86,7 @@ async fn handle_rrq(
let Some(req) = parse_rrq(&packet) else {
return Ok(());
};
let Request {
filename, options, ..
} = req;
let Request { filename, options, .. } = req;
// Per-transfer ephemeral socket.
let sock = bind_udp(bind_ip, 0)?;
@@ -105,9 +98,7 @@ async fn handle_rrq(
&peer.ip().to_string(),
Some(peer.ip()),
None,
ClientEvent::TftpRead {
file: filename.clone(),
},
ClientEvent::TftpRead { file: filename.clone() },
);
return Ok(());
};
@@ -121,9 +112,7 @@ async fn handle_rrq(
&peer.ip().to_string(),
Some(peer.ip()),
None,
ClientEvent::TftpRead {
file: filename.clone(),
},
ClientEvent::TftpRead { file: filename.clone() },
);
// Negotiate options.
@@ -184,9 +173,7 @@ async fn handle_rrq(
// Send one window worth of DATA.
for _ in 0..window {
if offset >= total {
break;
}
if offset >= total { break; }
let end = (offset + blksize).min(total);
let chunk = &file_bytes[offset..end];
let pkt = encode_data(block_no, chunk);
@@ -268,30 +255,20 @@ struct Request {
}
fn parse_rrq(pkt: &[u8]) -> Option<Request> {
if pkt.len() < 4 {
return None;
}
if pkt.len() < 4 { return None; }
let op = u16::from_be_bytes([pkt[0], pkt[1]]);
if op != OP_RRQ {
return None;
}
if op != OP_RRQ { return None; }
let mut rest = &pkt[2..];
let filename = read_cstr(&mut rest)?;
let mode = read_cstr(&mut rest)?;
let mut options = Vec::new();
while !rest.is_empty() {
let Some(k) = read_cstr(&mut rest) else { break };
if k.is_empty() {
break;
}
if k.is_empty() { break; }
let v = read_cstr(&mut rest).unwrap_or_default();
options.push((k.to_ascii_lowercase(), v));
}
Some(Request {
filename,
mode,
options,
})
Some(Request { filename, mode, options })
}
fn read_cstr(buf: &mut &[u8]) -> Option<String> {
@@ -339,12 +316,8 @@ async fn recv_ack(sock: &UdpSocket, peer: SocketAddr) -> anyhow::Result<u16> {
let mut buf = [0u8; 32];
loop {
let (n, from) = sock.recv_from(&mut buf).await?;
if from.ip() != peer.ip() {
continue;
}
if n < 4 {
continue;
}
if from.ip() != peer.ip() { continue; }
if n < 4 { continue; }
let op = u16::from_be_bytes([buf[0], buf[1]]);
match op {
OP_ACK => return Ok(u16::from_be_bytes([buf[2], buf[3]])),
@@ -371,19 +344,14 @@ async fn wait_for_ack(
Ok(Ok(_)) => {}
Ok(Err(_)) | Err(_) => {
tries += 1;
if tries > 5 {
return Ok(false);
}
if tries > 5 { return Ok(false); }
}
}
}
}
fn bind_udp(bind: IpAddr, port: u16) -> anyhow::Result<UdpSocket> {
let domain = match bind {
IpAddr::V4(_) => Domain::IPV4,
IpAddr::V6(_) => Domain::IPV6,
};
let domain = match bind { IpAddr::V4(_) => Domain::IPV4, IpAddr::V6(_) => Domain::IPV6 };
let sock = Socket::new(domain, Type::DGRAM, Some(Protocol::UDP))?;
sock.set_reuse_address(true)?;
sock.set_nonblocking(true)?;
@@ -414,9 +382,7 @@ pub fn plan_window(
let mut o = offset;
let mut b = starting_block;
for _ in 0..window {
if o >= total {
break;
}
if o >= total { break; }
let end = (o + blksize).min(total);
out.push((b, end - o));
o = end;
+46 -423
View File
@@ -8,49 +8,37 @@
* CSS lands). */
:root {
/* Jet-black dark palette (default). Modelled on Netbox Labs's
near-black product chrome, with surfaces stepping subtly upward
rather than the previous blue-tinted ramp, so the UI reads as a
genuine "dark" rather than "dim navy". */
--bg: #030303;
--bg-panel: #0a0a0a;
--bg-panel-2: #141414;
--bg-elev: #1c1c1c;
--fg: #e8eaed;
--fg-dim: #9aa0a6;
--fg-dimmer: #6b7077;
--accent: #00d4b4; /* Netbox-ish teal — kept for brand */
/* Dark palette (default). */
--bg: #0b1018;
--bg-panel: #121826;
--bg-panel-2: #1a2334;
--bg-elev: #223047;
--fg: #e4e8ef;
--fg-dim: #8a94a7;
--fg-dimmer: #5a6379;
--accent: #00d4b4; /* Netbox-ish teal */
--accent-dim: #07a38c;
--warn: #ffb347;
--err: #ef6e6e;
--ok: #4ade80;
--border: #1f1f1f;
--border-soft: #141414;
--terminal-bg: #050505;
--shadow-card: 0 1px 0 rgba(255,255,255,0.02), 0 8px 24px rgba(0,0,0,0.55);
--border: #223047;
--border-soft: #172033;
--terminal-bg: #06090e;
--shadow-card: 0 1px 0 rgba(255,255,255,0.02), 0 8px 24px rgba(0,0,0,0.25);
--radius: 6px;
--radius-lg: 10px;
--sidebar-w: 240px;
--topbar-h: 56px;
--mono: ui-monospace, SFMono-Regular, Menlo, Consolas, monospace;
--sans: -apple-system, BlinkMacSystemFont, "Segoe UI", Roboto, system-ui, sans-serif;
/* v0.4.63: tie native form-control rendering (checkboxes, scroll bars,
date pickers) to the active OpenPXE theme. Without this, the inline
`<meta name="color-scheme" content="dark light">` in index.html forces
dark form chrome in *both* themes so the SSO "Enable single sign-on"
checkbox renders as an opaque black square against the light-mode
panel, ignoring our accent-color hint. CSS `color-scheme` overrides
the meta and tracks `data-theme` correctly. */
color-scheme: dark;
}
:root[data-theme="light"] {
color-scheme: light;
/* Light palette high-contrast neutral, accent unchanged for brand
consistency. Designed against Netbox Labs's reference screenshot:
near-white surfaces, soft grey dividers, dark text. */
--bg: #f6f8fb;
--bg-panel: #fbfcfe;
--bg-panel: #ffffff;
--bg-panel-2: #f0f3f8;
--bg-elev: #e6ebf2;
--fg: #1c2330;
@@ -63,11 +51,7 @@
--ok: #1f9b54;
--border: #d8dde6;
--border-soft: #e7eaf0;
/* Light-mode terminal: the pane background and chrome track the rest
of the light theme. Per-level text colours below recolour-on-light
so log lines stay readable on a pale background previously the
terminal was locked to dark and looked like a stuck panel. */
--terminal-bg: #ffffff;
--terminal-bg: #0d1219; /* terminal stays dark even in light mode */
--shadow-card: 0 1px 0 rgba(0,0,0,0.02), 0 6px 18px rgba(20,28,52,0.06);
}
@@ -100,37 +84,14 @@ code, kbd { font-family: var(--mono); font-size: 12.5px;
border-right: 1px solid var(--border);
display: flex; flex-direction: column;
}
/* The brand block sits flush with the topbar so the sidebar+topbar reads
as one continuous bar across the top of the app, rather than a chunky
2-line logo block plus a separate (smaller-typeface) page title. The
height/border-bottom match the topbar exactly so the divider runs
straight across without a step. */
.sidebar .brand {
display: flex; align-items: center; gap: 12px;
padding: 0 18px;
height: var(--topbar-h);
padding: 14px 18px;
border-bottom: 1px solid var(--border);
}
.sidebar .brand img { width: 26px; height: 26px; flex: none; }
.sidebar .brand strong {
font-size: 15px; font-weight: 600;
letter-spacing: 0.2px;
color: var(--fg);
}
/* v0.4.69: FleetDM-style full-width custom logo. When the operator has
uploaded a custom brand mark, the sidebar header drops the bundled
26px mark + "OpenPXE" wordmark and instead lets the uploaded image
span the header left-aligned, capped at 200x50, scaled to fit
without distortion. The wordmark is hidden so the operator's logo is
the sole brand element (their logo presumably already contains their
name). The bundled-default case keeps the mark + wordmark. */
.sidebar .brand.has-custom-logo { gap: 0; }
.sidebar .brand.has-custom-logo img {
width: auto; height: 50px; max-width: 200px;
object-fit: contain; object-position: left center; flex: none;
}
.sidebar .brand.has-custom-logo strong { display: none; }
.sidebar .brand img { width: 40px; height: auto; }
.sidebar .brand strong { font-size: 16px; letter-spacing: 0.4px; }
.sidebar .brand .sub { color: var(--fg-dim); font-size: 11px; }
.sidebar nav { padding: 10px 0; flex: 1; overflow-y: auto; }
.sidebar nav a {
display: flex; align-items: center; gap: 10px;
@@ -152,40 +113,10 @@ code, kbd { font-family: var(--mono); font-size: 12.5px;
}
.sidebar nav a.active .count { background: var(--accent); color: #002923; }
.sidebar .footer {
padding: 12px 18px; border-top: 1px solid var(--border);
padding: 10px 18px; border-top: 1px solid var(--border);
color: var(--fg-dimmer); font-size: 11px;
display: flex; flex-direction: column; gap: 4px;
}
.sidebar .footer code { background: transparent; color: var(--fg-dim); padding: 0;
font-size: 11px; word-break: break-all; }
.sidebar .footer .status-row {
display: flex; align-items: center; gap: 8px;
margin-bottom: 4px;
}
.sidebar .footer .status-row .dot {
width: 8px; height: 8px; border-radius: 50%; display: inline-block;
background: var(--fg-dimmer); flex: none;
}
.sidebar .footer .status-row .dot.ok { background: var(--ok);
box-shadow: 0 0 6px color-mix(in srgb, var(--ok) 60%, transparent); }
.sidebar .footer .status-row .dot.err { background: var(--err); }
.sidebar .footer .status-row .dot.warn { background: var(--warn); }
.sidebar .footer .status-label { color: var(--fg-dim); }
.sidebar .footer .status-value { color: var(--fg); font-weight: 600; }
.sidebar .footer .status-value.ok { color: var(--ok); }
.sidebar .footer .status-value.err { color: var(--err); }
.sidebar .footer .status-value.warn { color: var(--warn); }
.sidebar .footer .footer-sub { color: var(--fg-dimmer); margin-top: 2px; }
/* Persistent backend identity. Sits below the advertised URL so even
when an operator has uploaded their own logo, "what is this" stays
answerable from the bottom-left of every page. */
.sidebar .footer .footer-version {
margin-top: 8px; padding-top: 8px;
border-top: 1px dashed var(--border-soft);
color: var(--fg-dim);
font-variant-numeric: tabular-nums;
letter-spacing: 0.2px;
}
.sidebar .footer code { background: transparent; color: var(--fg-dim); padding: 0; }
/* ── Top bar ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────── */
@@ -299,7 +230,7 @@ button, .btn {
cursor: pointer;
transition: background 0.12s ease;
}
button:hover, .btn:hover { background: var(--accent-dim); color: #f4fffd; }
button:hover, .btn:hover { background: var(--accent-dim); color: #fff; }
button.ghost { background: transparent; color: var(--fg); border: 1px solid var(--border); }
button.ghost:hover { background: var(--bg-panel-2); color: var(--fg); }
button.danger { background: transparent; color: var(--err); border: 1px solid color-mix(in srgb, var(--err) 35%, transparent); }
@@ -310,83 +241,23 @@ label.field {
}
label.field .name { color: var(--fg-dim); font-size: 12px; }
label.field .hint { color: var(--fg-dimmer); font-size: 11px; }
/* All single-line inputs share one chrome rule. Pre-v0.4.6 we only
styled type=text/number, which left type=password fields rendering
with the default browser look visibly off vs adjacent text fields
in the Account card. The negation list keeps `type=checkbox`,
`type=file`, and `type=range` (none of which we use inside
`label.field`) from picking up the padded-box look. */
label.field input:not([type="checkbox"]):not([type="file"]):not([type="range"]),
label.field input[type="text"],
label.field input[type="number"],
label.field select,
label.field textarea {
width: 100%; background: var(--bg); color: var(--fg);
border: 1px solid var(--border); border-radius: var(--radius);
padding: 7px 10px; font: inherit;
/* iOS/Safari shrinks password-field text by default; clamp it so
the password input matches the username input's metrics. */
font-size: 14px; line-height: 1.4;
box-shadow: none; -webkit-appearance: none; appearance: none;
}
/* v0.4.63: with `appearance: none`, the native <select> dropdown arrow
disappears, which makes the "Metadata source" pick-list look like a
plain (and slightly squished) text input. Paint our own chevron via
background-image so the control still reads as a dropdown, and reserve
right-padding for it. The data-URI SVG inherits currentColor via the
`stroke` attribute so the arrow follows light/dark theme without a
second declaration. */
label.field select {
background-image: url("data:image/svg+xml;utf8,<svg xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2000/svg' viewBox='0 0 12 8' fill='none' stroke='%239aa0a6' stroke-width='1.6' stroke-linecap='round' stroke-linejoin='round'><polyline points='1.5,1.5 6,6 10.5,1.5'/></svg>");
background-repeat: no-repeat;
background-position: right 10px center;
background-size: 11px 7px;
padding-right: 30px;
}
:root[data-theme="light"] label.field select {
background-image: url("data:image/svg+xml;utf8,<svg xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2000/svg' viewBox='0 0 12 8' fill='none' stroke='%235a6377' stroke-width='1.6' stroke-linecap='round' stroke-linejoin='round'><polyline points='1.5,1.5 6,6 10.5,1.5'/></svg>");
}
label.field input:focus, label.field select:focus, label.field textarea:focus {
outline: none; border-color: var(--accent);
box-shadow: 0 0 0 1px color-mix(in srgb, var(--accent) 35%, transparent);
}
label.check {
display: flex; gap: 10px; align-items: center;
padding: 8px 10px; margin-bottom: 6px;
border: 1px solid var(--border-soft); border-radius: var(--radius);
}
/* v0.4.63: native checkboxes used to render as opaque black squares in
light mode because the page meta declares `color-scheme: dark light`
and `accent-color` alone only repaints the *check mark* (not the
container). Take full control of the chrome so the box reads cleanly
on both palettes and the checked state lights up in our accent. */
label.check input[type="checkbox"] {
appearance: none; -webkit-appearance: none;
width: 16px; height: 16px; flex: none;
background: var(--bg);
border: 1px solid var(--border);
border-radius: 3px;
display: inline-grid; place-content: center;
cursor: pointer; margin: 0;
transition: background 0.1s ease, border-color 0.1s ease;
}
label.check input[type="checkbox"]:hover { border-color: var(--accent); }
label.check input[type="checkbox"]:checked {
background: var(--accent);
border-color: var(--accent);
}
label.check input[type="checkbox"]:checked::after {
/* Classic glyph built from a rotated rectangle border. Colour is
#002923 (the same near-black we use on solid-accent buttons) so the
tick stays legible against the teal fill in both themes. */
content: '';
width: 4px; height: 8px;
border: solid #002923;
border-width: 0 2px 2px 0;
transform: rotate(45deg) translate(-1px, -1px);
}
label.check input[type="checkbox"]:focus-visible {
outline: none;
box-shadow: 0 0 0 2px color-mix(in srgb, var(--accent) 35%, transparent);
}
label.check input { accent-color: var(--accent); }
/* ── Drop zone ────────────────────────────────────────────────────── */
@@ -410,7 +281,8 @@ label.check input[type="checkbox"]:focus-visible {
/* Imaging progress widget
Animated brand mark paired with a horizontal progress bar; surfaces
on Dashboard and the Queue tab. */
on Dashboard and the Queue tab. Renamed from `.forge-progress` in
v0.3.0 the anvil-themed naming is gone with the rebrand. */
.queue-progress {
display: flex; align-items: center; gap: 16px;
padding: 16px;
@@ -504,23 +376,11 @@ tr.unbootable td:first-child { border-left: 3px solid var(--warn); }
.dot.err { background: var(--err); }
.dot.warn { background: var(--warn); }
/* Inline form rows. The default is a 4-column grid sized for the
Account card's "Current / New username / New password / Confirm"
quartet; the `.cols-3` modifier swaps to a 3-column layout for the
SSO header strip (display name / logo URL / metadata source). All
`.form-row > label.field` children share the same baseline because
their inner inputs share metrics via the global rule above. */
.form-row { display: grid; grid-template-columns: repeat(4, 1fr); gap: 10px 14px; align-items: end; }
.form-row.cols-3 { grid-template-columns: repeat(3, 1fr); }
.form-row.cols-2 { grid-template-columns: repeat(2, 1fr); }
.form-row label.field { margin-bottom: 0; }
@media (max-width: 900px) {
.form-row,
.form-row.cols-3,
.form-row.cols-2 { grid-template-columns: 1fr; }
}
/* Inline form rows. */
.form-row { display: grid; grid-template-columns: repeat(4, 1fr); gap: 10px 14px; }
@media (max-width: 900px) { .form-row { grid-template-columns: 1fr; } }
/* ── Queued deployment visual ────────────────────────────────────── */
/* ── Gate queue "horse race" visual ──────────────────────────────── */
.queue-track {
display: grid; gap: 6px;
padding: 10px 0;
@@ -554,289 +414,52 @@ tr.unbootable td:first-child { border-left: 3px solid var(--warn); }
min-height: 480px;
box-shadow: var(--shadow-card);
}
/* Terminal pane colours follow the active theme. Hard-coded hexes
(#050505, #181818, #cfd6e2 etc.) were leaving the light-mode pane
looking dark; we keep palette-aware vars instead so the toggle works. */
.terminal .pane {
flex: 1; overflow: auto;
padding: 10px 14px;
font-family: var(--mono); font-size: 12.5px; line-height: 1.5;
color: var(--fg);
color: #cfd6e2;
white-space: pre-wrap; word-break: break-word;
}
.terminal .pane .lvl-error { color: var(--err); }
.terminal .pane .lvl-warn { color: var(--warn); }
.terminal .pane .lvl-info { color: var(--fg); }
.terminal .pane .lvl-debug { color: var(--fg-dim); }
.terminal .pane .lvl-trace { color: var(--fg-dimmer); }
.terminal .pane .ts { color: var(--fg-dimmer); }
.terminal .pane .tg { color: var(--accent); }
.terminal .pane .lvl-info { color: #cfd6e2; }
.terminal .pane .lvl-debug { color: #8b94a8; }
.terminal .pane .lvl-trace { color: #5a6379; }
.terminal .pane .ts { color: #5a6379; }
.terminal .pane .tg { color: #7cd3ff; }
.terminal .pane .echo { color: var(--accent); }
.terminal .input-row {
display: flex; align-items: center; gap: 8px;
padding: 8px 14px;
background: var(--bg-panel-2);
border-top: 1px solid var(--border);
background: #0a0e15;
border-top: 1px solid #1d2330;
}
.terminal .input-row .prompt { color: var(--accent); font-family: var(--mono); }
.terminal .input-row input {
flex: 1; background: transparent; border: 0; color: var(--fg);
flex: 1; background: transparent; border: 0; color: #e4e8ef;
font: inherit; font-family: var(--mono); font-size: 13px;
outline: none; padding: 4px 0;
}
.terminal .toolbar {
display: flex; gap: 8px; align-items: center;
padding: 8px 14px;
background: var(--bg-panel-2);
border-bottom: 1px solid var(--border);
font-size: 12px; color: var(--fg-dim);
background: #0a0e15;
border-bottom: 1px solid #1d2330;
font-size: 12px; color: #8a94a7;
}
.terminal .toolbar .right { margin-left: auto; display: flex; gap: 6px; }
.terminal .toolbar button {
padding: 3px 9px; font-size: 11px;
background: transparent; color: var(--fg-dim); border: 1px solid var(--border);
background: transparent; color: #8a94a7; border: 1px solid #1d2330;
font-weight: 500;
}
.terminal .toolbar button:hover { color: var(--fg); background: var(--bg-elev); }
/* Auth screen (first-run setup + login)
Used when /api/me reports setup_required or !authenticated. The
regular .shell is hidden; this overlay takes the full viewport so
the operator never sees half-loaded dashboard chrome while the auth
state is unknown. Same palette as the rest of the UI borrows the
Sonarr/Radarr layout (centered narrow card on the page background).
*/
.auth-screen {
position: fixed; inset: 0;
display: flex; align-items: center; justify-content: center;
background: var(--bg);
padding: 24px;
z-index: 100;
}
.auth-card {
width: 100%; max-width: 380px;
background: var(--bg-panel);
border: 1px solid var(--border);
border-radius: var(--radius-lg);
box-shadow: var(--shadow-card);
padding: 28px 28px 22px;
}
.auth-card .brand-row {
display: flex; align-items: center; gap: 12px;
margin-bottom: 18px;
}
.auth-card .brand-row img { width: 32px; height: 32px; flex: none; }
.auth-card .brand-row .name { font-size: 17px; font-weight: 600; letter-spacing: 0.2px; color: var(--fg); }
/* v0.5.0: FleetDM-style custom logo on the login/setup card the
uploaded logo spans the card header and the "OpenPXE" wordmark is
dropped (the logo is the brand). Matches the sidebar treatment. */
.auth-card .brand-row.has-custom-logo { justify-content: center; gap: 0; margin-bottom: 22px; }
.auth-card .brand-row.has-custom-logo img {
width: auto; height: 52px; max-width: 240px;
object-fit: contain; object-position: center;
}
.auth-card h2 {
margin: 0 0 6px; font-size: 16px; font-weight: 600; color: var(--fg);
}
.auth-card .lede {
color: var(--fg-dim); font-size: 13px; margin: 0 0 18px;
line-height: 1.5;
}
.auth-card .field { margin-bottom: 12px; }
.auth-card input[type="text"],
.auth-card input[type="password"] {
width: 100%; background: var(--bg); color: var(--fg);
border: 1px solid var(--border); border-radius: var(--radius);
padding: 9px 11px; font: inherit; font-size: 13.5px;
}
.auth-card input:focus { outline: none; border-color: var(--accent); }
.auth-card .submit { width: 100%; padding: 9px 12px; margin-top: 6px; }
.auth-card .auth-err {
margin-top: 12px; color: var(--err); font-size: 12.5px;
}
.auth-card .auth-foot {
margin-top: 14px; padding-top: 12px;
border-top: 1px solid var(--border-soft);
color: var(--fg-dimmer); font-size: 11.5px; text-align: center;
}
.auth-card .sso-btn {
width: 100%; margin-top: 10px;
background: transparent; color: var(--fg);
border: 1px solid var(--border);
padding: 9px 12px;
}
.auth-card .sso-btn:hover {
background: var(--bg-panel-2); border-color: var(--accent); color: var(--fg);
}
.auth-card .sso-btn .meta { color: var(--fg-dim); font-size: 11px; margin-top: 2px; }
/* Top-right user menu (v0.4.6)
The "signed in as X" identity + sign-out moved out of the sidebar
footer in v0.4.6 the sidebar footer is now reserved for the
service-state trio (Service status / Advertised URL / Backend
version). The button matches the theme toggle's size + chrome so
the top-right reads as a tidy two-icon strip. */
.user-menu { position: relative; }
.user-btn {
display: inline-flex; align-items: center; justify-content: center;
width: 36px; height: 32px;
background: transparent; color: var(--fg);
border: 1px solid var(--border); border-radius: 8px;
cursor: pointer; padding: 0;
transition: background 0.15s ease, border-color 0.15s ease;
}
.user-btn:hover { background: var(--bg-panel-2); border-color: var(--accent); }
.user-pop {
position: absolute; right: 0; top: 38px;
min-width: 200px;
background: var(--bg-panel);
border: 1px solid var(--border);
border-radius: var(--radius-lg);
box-shadow: var(--shadow-card);
padding: 6px;
z-index: 60;
display: flex; flex-direction: column; gap: 2px;
}
.user-pop[hidden] { display: none; }
.user-pop .user-pop-name {
padding: 8px 10px 6px;
border-bottom: 1px solid var(--border-soft);
margin-bottom: 4px;
color: var(--fg); font-weight: 600; font-size: 13px;
overflow: hidden; text-overflow: ellipsis; white-space: nowrap;
}
.user-pop .user-pop-item {
text-align: left; width: 100%;
background: transparent; color: var(--fg);
border: 0; border-radius: var(--radius);
padding: 7px 10px; font: inherit; font-size: 13px; font-weight: 500;
cursor: pointer;
}
.user-pop .user-pop-item:hover {
background: var(--bg-panel-2); color: var(--fg);
}
.user-pop .user-pop-danger { color: var(--err); }
.user-pop .user-pop-danger:hover {
background: color-mix(in srgb, var(--err) 12%, transparent);
color: var(--err);
}
.terminal .toolbar button:hover { color: #e4e8ef; background: #1d2330; }
/* ── About card ─────────────────────────────────────────────────── */
.about-hero { padding: 20px 24px; }
.about-hero h2 { font-size: 22px; margin: 0 0 8px; color: var(--fg); }
/* Span the full main column rather than capping at 60ch the page is
read at typical desktop widths and the cap was leaving the right two
thirds of the panel awkwardly empty. */
.about-hero .lead { color: var(--fg-dim); font-size: 14px; max-width: none; }
.about-hero .lead { color: var(--fg-dim); font-size: 14px; max-width: 60ch; }
.about-hero .who { margin-top: 18px; font-size: 13px; }
.about-hero .who span { color: var(--fg-dim); }
.about-hero .who strong { color: var(--accent); }
.about-hero a { color: var(--accent); }
/* ── API reference (Settings → bottom) ─────────────────────────── */
.api-ref { display: grid; gap: 18px; padding: 16px; }
.api-ref .group h3 {
margin: 0 0 8px; font-size: 13px; color: var(--fg-dim);
text-transform: uppercase; letter-spacing: 0.8px;
}
.api-ref .ep {
display: grid; grid-template-columns: 64px minmax(200px, 1fr) 2fr;
gap: 12px; align-items: baseline;
padding: 6px 0; border-top: 1px solid var(--border-soft);
font-size: 13px;
}
.api-ref .ep:first-child { border-top: 0; }
.api-ref .ep .method {
font-family: var(--mono); font-weight: 600; font-size: 11px;
padding: 2px 6px; border-radius: 4px;
text-align: center; letter-spacing: 0.6px;
}
.api-ref .ep .method.get { background: color-mix(in srgb, var(--ok) 22%, transparent); color: var(--ok); }
.api-ref .ep .method.post { background: color-mix(in srgb, var(--accent) 22%, transparent); color: var(--accent); }
.api-ref .ep .method.put { background: color-mix(in srgb, var(--warn) 22%, transparent); color: var(--warn); }
.api-ref .ep .method.delete { background: color-mix(in srgb, var(--err) 22%, transparent); color: var(--err); }
.api-ref .ep .path { font-family: var(--mono); color: var(--fg); word-break: break-all; }
.api-ref .ep .desc { color: var(--fg-dim); }
@media (max-width: 900px) {
.api-ref .ep { grid-template-columns: 1fr; gap: 4px; }
.api-ref .ep .method { justify-self: start; }
}
/* ── Disk space card ───────────────────────────────────────────── */
.diskbar {
height: 10px; border-radius: 5px;
background: var(--bg-elev);
overflow: hidden; margin-top: 8px;
}
.diskbar .fill {
height: 100%;
background: linear-gradient(90deg, var(--accent-dim), var(--accent));
transition: width 0.4s ease;
}
.diskbar.warn .fill { background: var(--warn); }
.diskbar.full .fill { background: var(--err); }
.disk-meta { display: flex; gap: 14px; font-size: 12px; color: var(--fg-dim); margin-top: 8px; flex-wrap: wrap; }
.disk-meta strong { color: var(--fg); font-weight: 600; font-variant-numeric: tabular-nums; }
/* ── Logo upload (Settings) ────────────────────────────────────── */
.logo-preview {
display: flex; align-items: center; gap: 14px;
padding: 12px;
background: var(--bg-panel-2);
border: 1px solid var(--border);
border-radius: var(--radius);
}
.logo-preview .swatch {
width: 56px; height: 56px;
display: flex; align-items: center; justify-content: center;
background: var(--bg); border: 1px solid var(--border);
border-radius: var(--radius);
flex: none;
}
.logo-preview .swatch img { max-width: 48px; max-height: 48px; }
.logo-preview .info { flex: 1; min-width: 0; }
.logo-preview .info .name { color: var(--fg); font-weight: 600; }
.logo-preview .info .meta { color: var(--fg-dim); font-size: 12px; margin-top: 2px; }
/* v0.5.1: collapsible "Advanced" disclosure at the bottom of Settings
(the former Advanced sidebar tab). A quiet, full-width toggle that
expands to reveal the notification + API-reference cards. */
.advanced-disclosure { width: 100%; }
.advanced-summary {
list-style: none;
cursor: pointer;
user-select: none;
display: flex;
align-items: center;
gap: 8px;
padding: 10px 14px;
color: var(--fg-dim);
font-size: 13px;
font-weight: 600;
background: var(--bg-panel-2);
border: 1px solid var(--border);
border-radius: var(--radius);
}
.advanced-summary:hover { color: var(--fg); }
.advanced-summary::-webkit-details-marker { display: none; }
.advanced-summary::before {
content: "▸";
font-size: 11px;
transition: transform 0.15s ease;
}
.advanced-disclosure[open] .advanced-summary::before { transform: rotate(90deg); }
/* v0.5.1: protocol tag on a unified Remote-shares row (SMB / NFS). */
.proto-badge {
display: inline-block;
font-size: 10px;
font-weight: 700;
letter-spacing: 0.04em;
padding: 1px 6px;
margin-right: 8px;
border-radius: 4px;
vertical-align: middle;
background: var(--bg-panel-2);
border: 1px solid var(--border);
color: var(--fg-dim);
}
+122 -1436
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+10 -44
View File
@@ -5,15 +5,8 @@
<meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1" />
<meta name="color-scheme" content="dark light" />
<title>OpenPXE</title>
<!-- v0.4.61: the `?v=…` query string is replaced by the server at
request time with the running OpenPXE version. That guarantees a
fresh URL on every upgrade so browsers (and intermediary proxies)
can't keep serving stale JS / CSS / branding from before the
deploy. Combined with `Cache-Control: no-cache, must-revalidate`
on the asset handlers, the practical caching window is one
version. -->
<link rel="stylesheet" href="/assets/app.css?v={{ASSET_VERSION}}" />
<link rel="icon" type="image/svg+xml" href="/assets/logo.svg?v={{ASSET_VERSION}}&r={{LOGO_REV}}" />
<link rel="stylesheet" href="/assets/app.css" />
<link rel="icon" type="image/svg+xml" href="/assets/logo.svg" />
<!-- Theme is read from localStorage *before* paint to avoid the
dark→light flash on every navigation. Falls back to the OS
preference and finally to dark. -->
@@ -32,9 +25,12 @@
<body>
<div class="shell">
<aside class="sidebar">
<div class="{{BRAND_CLASS}}">
<img src="/assets/logo.svg?v={{ASSET_VERSION}}&r={{LOGO_REV}}" alt="OpenPXE" />
<div class="brand">
<img src="/assets/logo.svg" alt="" />
<div>
<strong>OpenPXE</strong>
<div class="sub">v<span data-bind="version">0.3.0</span></div>
</div>
</div>
<nav>
<a data-view="dashboard" class="active">Dashboard</a>
@@ -52,27 +48,18 @@
<span class="count" data-bind="host_count">0</span>
</a>
<a data-view="terminal">Terminal</a>
<a data-view="settings">Settings</a>
<a data-view="about">About</a>
</nav>
<div class="footer">
<div class="status-row">
<span class="dot" data-bind="ready_dot" title="Server readiness"></span>
<span class="status-label">Service status:</span>
<span class="status-value" data-bind="ready_label">checking…</span>
</div>
<div class="footer-sub">Advertised to clients</div>
Advertised to clients<br/>
<code>{{BASE_URL}}</code>
<!-- The brand badge at the top can be overridden by operator-uploaded
logos; keep "OpenPXE v…" pinned in the footer so the backend
identity is always visible regardless of branding. -->
<div class="footer-version">OpenPXE&nbsp;v<span data-bind="version">0.4.63</span></div>
</div>
</aside>
<header class="topbar">
<h1 data-bind="view_title">Dashboard</h1>
<div class="spacer"></div>
<span class="chip" data-bind="ready_chip" title="Server readiness">checking…</span>
<span class="chip"><strong data-bind="iso_count2">0</strong>&nbsp;images</span>
<span class="chip"><strong data-bind="client_count2">0</strong>&nbsp;clients</span>
<span class="chip"><strong data-bind="queue_count2">0</strong>&nbsp;in queue</span>
@@ -96,32 +83,11 @@
<path d="M20.5 14A8 8 0 0 1 10 3.5 a8 8 0 1 0 10.5 10.5z"/>
</svg>
</button>
<!-- v0.4.6: signed-in operator menu. Sits next to the theme toggle
in the top-right corner so the sidebar footer stays clean for
the "Service status / Advertised URL / Backend version" trio.
The whole block is hidden until /api/me confirms a session. -->
<div class="user-menu" data-bind="user_menu_wrap" style="display:none">
<button id="user-menu-btn" class="user-btn" type="button"
aria-label="Account menu" aria-haspopup="true" aria-expanded="false"
title="Account">
<svg viewBox="0 0 24 24" width="18" height="18" fill="none"
stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round">
<circle cx="12" cy="8" r="3.6"/>
<path d="M4.5 20a7.5 7.5 0 0 1 15 0"/>
</svg>
</button>
<div id="user-menu-pop" class="user-pop" data-bind="user_menu_pop" hidden>
<div class="user-pop-name" data-bind="user_pop_name"></div>
<button type="button" class="user-pop-item" data-bind="user_pop_edit">Edit account</button>
<button type="button" class="user-pop-item user-pop-danger" data-bind="user_pop_logout">Sign out</button>
</div>
</div>
</header>
<main class="main" id="view-root"></main>
</div>
<script src="/assets/app.js?v={{ASSET_VERSION}}"></script>
<script src="/assets/app.js"></script>
</body>
</html>
+8 -49
View File
@@ -7,68 +7,27 @@
//! nav, top bar with secondary tabs, card-dense content panels.
#![forbid(unsafe_code)]
/// Render the top-level page.
///
/// * `base_url` is interpolated into the footer so operators can see at
/// a glance what URL clients are PXE-booting from.
/// * `asset_version` is appended as `?v=…` to every asset URL so each
/// release ships with brand-new asset URLs — browsers (and any
/// intermediary proxy) can't keep serving last release's `app.js`
/// when we know the new one is incompatible. Combined with
/// `Cache-Control: no-cache, must-revalidate` on the asset handlers,
/// the worst-case caching window is one version.
/// * `logo_rev` is appended to the brand-mark and favicon URLs as an
/// extra `&r=…` token. Unlike `asset_version` it changes every time
/// the operator swaps the custom logo, so the top-left mark updates
/// immediately on the next page load instead of being pinned to the
/// release version (which only changes on upgrade). `index.html`
/// itself is served `no-cache`, so the fresh token lands as soon as
/// the operator reloads after an upload.
/// * `has_custom_logo` switches the sidebar brand block between the
/// bundled mark + "OpenPXE" wordmark (false) and a FleetDM-style
/// full-width custom logo with the wordmark hidden (true). Rendered
/// server-side so there's no flash of the default mark before JS runs.
/// Render the top-level page. `base_url` is interpolated into the footer
/// so operators can see at a glance what URL clients are PXE-booting from.
#[must_use]
pub fn index_html(
base_url: &str,
asset_version: &str,
logo_rev: u64,
has_custom_logo: bool,
) -> String {
let brand_class = if has_custom_logo {
"brand has-custom-logo"
} else {
"brand"
};
INDEX_HTML
.replace("{{BASE_URL}}", base_url)
.replace("{{ASSET_VERSION}}", asset_version)
.replace("{{LOGO_REV}}", &logo_rev.to_string())
.replace("{{BRAND_CLASS}}", brand_class)
pub fn index_html(base_url: &str) -> String {
INDEX_HTML.replace("{{BASE_URL}}", base_url)
}
#[must_use]
pub fn app_js() -> &'static str {
APP_JS
}
pub fn app_js() -> &'static str { APP_JS }
#[must_use]
pub fn app_css() -> &'static str {
APP_CSS
}
pub fn app_css() -> &'static str { APP_CSS }
#[must_use]
pub fn logo_svg() -> &'static str {
LOGO_SVG
}
pub fn logo_svg() -> &'static str { LOGO_SVG }
/// Larger, faster-cycling rainbow disc — used for the page-load
/// transition and the imaging-progress widget on Dashboard / Queue.
/// Pure SVG + SMIL, no JS, no GIF.
#[must_use]
pub fn loader_svg() -> &'static str {
LOADER_SVG
}
pub fn loader_svg() -> &'static str { LOADER_SVG }
const INDEX_HTML: &str = include_str!("index.html");
const APP_CSS: &str = include_str!("app.css");
+23 -104
View File
@@ -14,14 +14,9 @@
# Debian slim at ~75 MB + binary ~25 MB is fine for a PXE server that
# spends most of its life idle.
ARG RUST_VERSION=1.95
ARG RUST_VERSION=1.82
########## fetch iPXE binaries + wimboot ##########
# Pulls the upstream boot.ipxe.org pre-builds (no PNG support) plus
# wimboot. These cover the arches we don't build from source here:
# BIOS undionly.kpxe and i386-efi (which need a 32-bit x86 toolchain),
# and serve as the baseline that the PNG-enabled x86_64/arm64 UEFI
# binaries from the `ipxe-build` stage overlay on top of.
########## fetch iPXE binaries ##########
FROM debian:12-slim AS fetch
RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends curl ca-certificates \
&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
@@ -29,85 +24,27 @@ WORKDIR /src
COPY scripts/fetch-ipxe.sh scripts/fetch-ipxe.sh
RUN mkdir -p assets/ipxe && bash scripts/fetch-ipxe.sh
########## build PNG-enabled iPXE from source ##########
# v0.4.69: THE graphical-boot-menu unlock. iVentoy paints a PNG
# background on the PXE screen using stock iPXE built with
# CONSOLE_FRAMEBUFFER + IMAGE_PNG + CONSOLE_CMD; the public iPXE
# binaries omit those, so `console --picture` is a no-op on them.
# We build our own from upstream with that thin config delta.
#
# The historical blocker was cc1 segfaulting when an amd64 gcc ran
# under QEMU emulation on an arm64 host. The fix: pin this stage to
# $BUILDPLATFORM (the NATIVE builder arch — arm64 on an Apple-Silicon
# Mac, amd64 in x86 CI) and cross-compile with a real cross toolchain
# (CROSS_COMPILE=x86_64-linux-gnu-). The compiler runs native and
# emits x86_64 — no emulation, no segfault. arm64-efi builds natively.
FROM --platform=$BUILDPLATFORM debian:12-slim AS ipxe-build
# libc6-dev is REQUIRED and easy to miss under --no-install-recommends:
# iPXE's host utilities (elf2efi, zbin) compile with the native gcc and
# pull <stdint.h>; without the native libc headers gcc's #include_next
# falls through to iPXE's freestanding headers and dies on bits/stdint.h.
# The target (iPXE firmware) code is -ffreestanding/-nostdinc, so the
# x86_64 cross toolchain needs NO cross libc headers.
RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
git make perl gcc binutils libc6-dev \
gcc-x86-64-linux-gnu binutils-x86-64-linux-gnu \
ca-certificates \
&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
WORKDIR /src
COPY scripts/build-ipxe.sh scripts/build-ipxe.sh
COPY deploy/ipxe/local/ deploy/ipxe/local/
RUN mkdir -p assets/ipxe && bash scripts/build-ipxe.sh /src/assets/ipxe
########## build openpxe ##########
FROM rust:${RUST_VERSION}-bookworm AS build
WORKDIR /src
# v0.4.5: build a fully static musl binary (matches Bootimus v0.1.70's
# move). The resulting `/openpxe` has no glibc dependency at all, which:
# - Lets the runtime stage be any Linux distro (we still ship Debian
# slim for the `samba` / `wimtools` / `nfs-common` shellouts, but a
# scratch/distroless variant becomes a one-line swap).
# - Cuts a class of "GLIBC_2.39 not found" surprises when running on
# older RHEL/Rocky hosts that don't match Debian 12's libc version.
# - Sidesteps cross-compilation snags (the binary is its own world).
#
# x86_64-unknown-linux-musl is fully static by default (no extra
# RUSTFLAGS needed). musl-tools provides the linker.
RUN apt-get update \
&& apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends musl-tools \
&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/* \
&& rustup target add x86_64-unknown-linux-musl
# Copy the whole workspace in one go. We used to do a two-pass "cache-prime
# with stubs, then real build" dance for dep-compile reuse; that turned out
# to silently serve stale stub binaries when cargo's fingerprint didn't
# notice the source swap. A single build is ~1.5 min longer on cold cache
# but guarantees the binary reflects the sources we copied.
# Do not copy rust-toolchain.toml into the image. The local workspace pins
# developer tooling, but inside Docker we intentionally use the Rust version
# selected by the base image. Copying rust-toolchain.toml with
# `channel = "stable"` makes rustup download a second full toolchain during
# `cargo build`, which is slow and can exhaust small Colima/CI disks.
COPY Cargo.toml Cargo.lock ./
COPY Cargo.toml rust-toolchain.toml ./
COPY crates/ crates/
# Baseline binaries (BIOS / i386 / wimboot), then overlay the
# PNG-enabled x86_64 + arm64 UEFI binaries built from source. The
# overlay wins for snponly.efi / ipxe.efi / snponly-arm64.efi so the
# common modern clients get the graphical background; the rest keep the
# upstream no-PNG binaries and the menu's `|| console` text fallback.
COPY --from=fetch /src/assets/ipxe /src/assets/ipxe
COPY --from=ipxe-build /src/assets/ipxe/snponly.efi /src/assets/ipxe/snponly.efi
COPY --from=ipxe-build /src/assets/ipxe/ipxe.efi /src/assets/ipxe/ipxe.efi
# Cache cargo registry + target across builds. The mtime touch is
# Cache cargo registry + target across builds. The `--no-edit` touch is
# belt-and-suspenders: cargo occasionally misses mtime-only changes on
# networked FS; this forces a fingerprint check.
RUN --mount=type=cache,target=/usr/local/cargo/registry \
--mount=type=cache,target=/src/target,sharing=locked \
find crates -name '*.rs' -exec touch {} + && \
cargo build --release --target x86_64-unknown-linux-musl --bin openpxe && \
cp target/x86_64-unknown-linux-musl/release/openpxe /openpxe && \
cargo build --release --bin openpxe && \
cp target/release/openpxe /openpxe && \
ls -l /openpxe
########## runtime ##########
@@ -115,45 +52,27 @@ FROM debian:12-slim AS runtime
RUN apt-get update \
&& apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
ca-certificates libcap2-bin tini gosu iproute2 \
wimtools samba smbclient \
wimtools samba nfs-common \
&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/* \
&& useradd --system --uid 10001 --home-dir /var/lib/openpxe --shell /usr/sbin/nologin openpxe \
&& mkdir -p /var/lib/openpxe/isos /var/lib/openpxe/work /var/lib/openpxe/smb \
&& chown -R openpxe:openpxe /var/lib/openpxe
# v0.4.5: the openpxe binary itself is now built against musl and is
# fully static — no glibc dependency. The runtime stage still ships
# Debian slim because OpenPXE shells out to the packages below for
# functionality we deliberately don't reimplement in-process:
#
# wimtools - `wimlib-imagex`, used to inject startnet.cmd into boot.wim.
# samba - `smbd` serves extracted Windows install media on :445 so
# WinPE can `net use`. Guest read-only, scoped to
# /var/lib/openpxe/smb. This package provides the SERVER
# side only; the client CLI is a separate package below.
# smbclient - v0.4.66: Samba's `smbclient` userspace CLI, used by
# the Storage tab's SMB shares manager to list and stream
# ISOs from remote SMB servers without ever mounting them
# in the kernel. In Debian 12 `smbclient` is NOT pulled
# in by the `samba` package — they're siblings, not
# parent/child. v0.4.65 shipped without this line and
# every "Add share" attempt surfaced
# `could not exec smbclient: No such file or directory`
# until this landed.
# iproute2 - `ip addr` / `ip route` for the auto-detected Network
# tab fields (NIC name, subnet mask, default gateway).
# Tiny, always available; we don't pull in netlink crates
# for this one-shot startup probe.
# gosu - drops privileges cleanly from root after the entrypoint
# fixes bind-mount ownership (common OpenShift/Docker UX
# issue).
#
# v0.4.65 dropped `nfs-common` — kernel-mount NFS is gone. The SMB
# shares replacement uses userspace `smbclient` and needs no kernel
# helpers.
#
# A future "openpxe-static" variant could drop everything except the
# binary onto distroless once we move the Windows + SMB legs to
# in-process Rust crates.
# Runtime deps explained:
# wimtools - provides `wimlib-imagex`, used to inject startnet.cmd into boot.wim.
# samba - `smbd` serves extracted Windows install media on :445 for WinPE
# to `net use`. Guest read-only, scoped to /var/lib/openpxe/smb.
# nfs-common - provides `mount.nfs` / `mount.nfs4` for the Storage tab's
# NFS share manager. Mount also requires the container to run
# with CAP_SYS_ADMIN — without it, mount(2) returns EPERM and
# the manager surfaces a clear error in the UI instead of
# failing silently.
# iproute2 - `ip addr` / `ip route` for the auto-detected Network tab
# fields (NIC name, subnet mask, default gateway). Tiny,
# always available; we don't pull in netlink crates for
# this one-shot startup probe.
# gosu - drops privileges cleanly from root after the entrypoint fixes
# bind-mount ownership (common OpenShift/Docker UX issue).
# Windows-specific tools only activate when the WebUI toggle is on.
COPY --from=build /openpxe /usr/local/bin/openpxe
COPY deploy/docker/entrypoint.sh /usr/local/bin/entrypoint.sh
-14
View File
@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
/*
* OpenPXE iPXE build override console options.
*
* Included at the end of config/console.h. CONSOLE_FRAMEBUFFER is the
* unified graphical framebuffer console (EFI GOP on UEFI, VESA on
* BIOS); it's what `console --picture` paints into. This is the same
* single flag iVentoy enables for its graphical PXE screen.
*
* We *add* the framebuffer console rather than replacing the default
* EFI/BIOS text consoles, so text output still works before/after the
* picture is set.
*/
#define CONSOLE_FRAMEBUFFER
-23
View File
@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
/*
* OpenPXE iPXE build override general options.
*
* iPXE includes <config/local/general.h> at the end of config/general.h,
* so anything defined here is layered on top of the stock defaults
* without editing upstream files. We enable exactly the features the
* graphical PXE boot menu needs:
*
* IMAGE_PNG - PNG decoder, so `console --picture <png>` can paint
* the operator's logo / OpenPXE background.
* IMAGE_PNM - Netpbm decoder (cheap; harmless belt-and-suspenders).
* CONSOLE_CMD - the `console` command itself. Without it you get
* "console: command not found" even with a framebuffer.
*
* (CONSOLE_FRAMEBUFFER lives in config/local/console.h.)
*
* Everything else stays at upstream defaults we are intentionally a
* thin, auditable delta over stock iPXE so the UBDL/GPL story is simple.
*/
#define IMAGE_PNG
#define IMAGE_PNM
#define CONSOLE_CMD
+1 -1
View File
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ spec:
fsGroup: 10001
containers:
- name: openpxe
image: gitea.milesward.dev/mward4/openpxe:0.4.1
image: ghcr.io/casperadmin/openpxe:0.1.0
imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent
ports:
- name: dhcp
+7 -7
View File
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ boot from OpenPXE". Pick the one that matches what you have.
## Path A — build on Unraid, push to Gitea registry, pull by tag
Recommended once you've done it once. Image is published to
`gitea.milesward.dev/mward4/openpxe:0.4.1` (or your equivalent) and
`gitea.milesward.dev/mward4/openpxe:0.1.0` (or your equivalent) and
every Unraid template / docker-compose just references the tag.
Pre-flight:
@@ -40,14 +40,14 @@ What it does:
3. `docker build` against `deploy/docker/Dockerfile`.
4. `docker login gitea.milesward.dev:3000` using a temp `DOCKER_CONFIG`
so the credential never lands in your real `~/.docker/config.json`.
5. `docker push` both `:0.4.1` and `:latest`.
5. `docker push` both `:0.1.0` and `:latest`.
6. Logout, scrub the temp config, delete the workspace.
After it finishes, in Unraid → Docker → Add Container, set:
| Field | Value |
|------------|-------------------------------------------------|
| Repository | `gitea.milesward.dev/mward4/openpxe:0.4.1` |
| Repository | `gitea.milesward.dev/mward4/openpxe:0.1.0` |
| Network | `host` |
| Extra args | `--cap-add=NET_BIND_SERVICE` |
@@ -88,14 +88,14 @@ then:
```bash
# On the build host
docker save openpxe:0.4.1 | gzip > openpxe-0.4.1.tar.gz
docker save openpxe:0.1.0 | gzip > openpxe-0.1.0.tar.gz
# Transfer (rsync / scp / SMB / ZFS-replicate / sneakernet)
scp openpxe-0.4.1.tar.gz root@unraid:/tmp/
scp openpxe-0.1.0.tar.gz root@unraid:/tmp/
# On Unraid
gunzip -c /tmp/openpxe-0.4.1.tar.gz | docker load
docker tag openpxe:0.4.1 gitea.milesward.dev/mward4/openpxe:0.4.1
gunzip -c /tmp/openpxe-0.1.0.tar.gz | docker load
docker tag openpxe:0.1.0 gitea.milesward.dev/mward4/openpxe:0.1.0
```
If you want it pullable by tag from other Unraid templates, push to
+2 -2
View File
@@ -34,8 +34,8 @@
Air-gapped network PXE boot server. Container-native Rust
implementation — DHCP proxy + TFTP + iPXE chainload + HTTP ISO
streaming, all in one process. Web UI for ISO upload, NFS share
mounting, and Queued Deployment for coordinated launch of one ISO
across many waiting clients.
mounting, and Queued Deployment ("horse-race" simultaneous launch
of one ISO across many waiting clients).
NEVER touches the client OS trust store: no test-signed drivers,
no testsigning toggle, no httpdisk.sys. Windows boot uses vanilla
+2 -2
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
# Phase 6 — recommendations
The v0.4.1 cut leaves OpenPXE in a state where the entire protocol stack
and operator UI are exercised by the automated test suite, the container is
The v0.2.0 cut leaves OpenPXE in a state where the entire protocol stack
and operator UI are exercised by 66 automated tests, the container is
multi-arch buildable, and the image ships at ~97 MB. What's left before
this looks and feels like a 1.0 product is mostly **real-hardware
validation** plus a small batch of features that can only sensibly be
+12 -11
View File
@@ -265,9 +265,10 @@ tab is one click from the brand bar.
- Persisted to `<work_dir>/hosts.json`. Like `SettingsStore`, in-memory
is authoritative — disk corruption falls back to empty rather than
failing startup.
- The DHCP reply embeds `?mac=${mac}` in the boot.ipxe URL; iPXE
substitutes the literal MAC client-side, so the HTTP layer can
short-circuit past the menu when a binding exists.
- Inspired by Tinkerbell `smee`'s MAC-prepended URL pattern. The DHCP
reply now embeds `?mac=${mac}` in the boot.ipxe URL; iPXE substitutes
the literal MAC client-side, so the HTTP layer can short-circuit
past the menu when a binding exists.
- `/api/hosts` GET / POST / DELETE drives the **Hosts** tab.
**Prometheus metrics** (`crates/core/src/metrics.rs`):
@@ -287,17 +288,18 @@ warning-free. Replaced `format!()`-into-`String` with
`Reverse`, fixed `map_or(false, …)``is_some_and`, and a handful of
other idiom fixes.
**UI overhaul** for the pre-beta milestone:
**UI overhaul** for the v0.2.0 pre-beta milestone:
- Light + dark themes via `:root[data-theme=light]` token swap.
Toggled by a top-right button or the `T` key. Persisted in
localStorage; pre-paint inline script avoids dark→light flash.
- New SVG logos: a refined OpenPXE mark (`logo.svg`) and a compact
SMIL-animated loader (`loader.svg`). Pure SVG, embedded in the binary.
- Deployment progress widget on the Dashboard and Queue: animated
OpenPXE mark paired with a `linear-gradient(warn → accent)` progress bar
- New SVG logos: a refined anvil (`logo.svg`) and a SMIL-animated
`anvil-forge.svg` (rising sparks + pulsing underglow). Pure SVG —
no GIFs, no CSS keyframes for the sparks.
- "Forge progress" widget on the Dashboard and Queue: animated
anvil paired with a `linear-gradient(warn → accent)` progress bar
with a moving sheen. Goes idle (greyscale, no sheen) at zero
imaging load.
- Loader replaced "Loading..." text with the same OpenPXE mark.
- Loader replaced "Loading" text with the same anvil.
- Sidebar gains a **Hosts** tab.
**Windows boot validation**:
@@ -315,8 +317,7 @@ other idiom fixes.
fixes: explicit `net start Workstation` before `net use`, surfaces
errors instead of blind retries.
**Test posture**: protocol, HTTP, ISO-store, Windows script, queue, metrics,
and UI-offline checks all run in the workspace test suite.
**Test count**: 66 → up from 56 in v0.1.0.
## What's deferred to Phase 6
-106
View File
@@ -1,106 +0,0 @@
# PXE menu theme — research for next-release follow-up
Status: queued. v0.4.63 keeps the ASCII-banner fallback + `console --picture`
compositor wired; this note captures the design for the menu-theming work
that lands once iPXE rebuilt with `IMAGE_PNG` is published.
## How iVentoy actually does it
iVentoy is closed-source for its menu, but the supporting bits are
public at https://github.com/ventoy/PXE — a vanilla iPXE snapshot
(`iPXE/ipxe-bd13697`) used to produce the loader binaries iVentoy
serves over TFTP (`pxeboot.efi`, `iventoy_loader_16000`,
`iventoy_loader_16000_uefi`).
The graphical menu itself is rendered by iPXE's framebuffer console
with a baked-in PNG background via `console --picture` — same
primitive OpenPXE already uses in `crates/http-api/src/ipxe_script.rs`.
Evidence:
- The iPXE build in `ventoy/PXE` is configured with `CONSOLE_FRAMEBUFFER`
+ `IMAGE_PNG` + `CONSOLE_CMD` (the three flags `console --picture`
needs).
- iVentoy issue #11 confirms "iventoy using default 1024x768"; users
report 800x600 / 1024x768 / 1280x720 / 1280x1024 / 1920x1080 as
selectable resolutions from the iVentoy web UI **Configuration tab**,
not via EDID auto-detect. iPXE has no EDID parsing; the daemon writes
a resolution-tagged script per boot and serves the matching PNG.
- iVentoy docs explicitly state both Free and Pro editions **do not
support** modifying the boot background/title — it's baked into the
shipped PNG assets.
- Chrome is iPXE's native `menu` / `item` / `choose` widgets (single
highlight bar, no borders) painted on top of the PNG, with margins
set via `console --left/--right/--top/--bottom` to keep the text off
the logo. Not GRUB, not syslinux — UEFI iVentoy uses iPXE's
`snponly.efi` / `pxeboot.efi`, and `--picture` does work under UEFI
GOP despite older folklore.
Do not conflate this with Ventoy-USB, which is a separate codebase and
uses GRUB2 themes (`theme.txt`, `background_ventoy.png`, `select_c.png`).
## Rust ingredients to replicate / surpass
Most of these already exist in the workspace.
1. **Compositor (extend, don't replace)** — extend
`crates/iso-store/src/pxe_logo.rs` to emit per-resolution PNGs
(1024x768, 1280x1024, 1920x1080 as the v1 set). `image` +
`imageproc` crates handle scaling; `ab_glyph` / `fontdue` for raster
text (subtitle, hostname, version). One source SVG/logo, three to
five rendered PNGs cached on disk.
2. **Script generator**`ipxe_script.rs` already emits
`console --picture … || console`. Add a `?res=` query param (or
per-MAC client hint persisted in `hosts.json`) and serve the matching
PNG plus matching `console --x --y` line. Keep the text-console
fallback already in place.
3. **Resolution selection** — iPXE exposes `${vesa-x}` / `${vesa-y}` on
BIOS; UEFI side we can probe firmware vars at chain-time. The simpler
v1 is a "low-res / hi-res" toggle in Settings plus a per-host
override — mirrors iVentoy's UX, no kernel helper needed. True EDID
parsing is overkill for the first cut.
4. **Chrome upgrades over iVentoy** — iPXE menus are limited (single
highlight, no borders). To look distinctly cooler without leaving
iPXE: paint border / title / footer **into the PNG**, leave a window
in the middle, then `console --left/--right/--top/--bottom` to inset
the iPXE menu exactly into that window. ASCII box-drawing inside the
menu remains fragile (iPXE mangles non-ASCII on some builds — already
noted in `ipxe_script.rs`).
## Recommended architecture for the next OpenPXE release
- Build a `pxe_theme` module beside `pxe_logo.rs`: takes operator logo
+ theme tokens (accent colour, title, footer) and renders a layered
PNG (background gradient → framing chrome → logo → title bar → footer
with `${hostname}` / `${version}` / `${ip}`) at the three target
resolutions. Cache by hash of inputs.
- Serve at `/branding/pxe-menu-{w}x{h}.png`. Default 1024x768; expose a
Settings dropdown.
- In `ipxe_script.rs`, emit
`console --picture …/pxe-menu-1024x768.png --left 80 --right 80 --top 180 --bottom 60 || console`,
then the existing `menu` / `item` / `choose` block — text now lands
inside the framed window.
- Compile iPXE with `CONSOLE_FRAMEBUFFER`, `IMAGE_PNG`, `CONSOLE_CMD`,
`CONSOLE_VESAFB` (BIOS) and `CONSOLE_EFIFB` (UEFI). The v0.4.61 image
attempted this in-Docker via QEMU emulation and hit `cc1` segfaults.
The follow-up will use a Gitea Actions runner pinned to native
`linux/amd64` (an Unraid host already exists for this).
- Stretch goal: a second "theme pack" that ships a layered PNG with
subtle scanlines / grid — iPXE can't animate, but a well-designed
static composite beats iVentoy's plain centered logo handily.
## Source URLs
- https://github.com/ventoy/PXE
- https://github.com/ventoy/PXE/tree/master/iPXE
- https://github.com/ventoy/PXE/issues/11 — 1024x768 default
- https://github.com/ventoy/PXE/issues/59 — iVentoy iPXE EFI loader
- https://ipxe.org/cmd/console — `--picture` and compile flags
- https://github.com/ipxe/ipxe/discussions/945 — background image how-to
- https://github.com/ipxe/ipxe/discussions/802 — `CONSOLE_FRAMEBUFFER`
requirement
- https://github.com/ipxe/ipxe/discussions/1006 — picture resolution
behaviour
- https://www.iventoy.com/en/doc_edition.html — background / title not
user-customisable
- https://kingtam.win/archives/iventoy.html — third-party iPXE-based
iVentoy alternative
@@ -1,199 +0,0 @@
# OpenPXE v0.5.1 — SAML SSO wiring + Settings/Storage UI consolidation
**Date:** 2026-05-31
**Author:** Miles Ward (with Claude)
**Status:** Approved design → implementation
## Summary
Three workstreams for v0.5.1:
1. **Wire SAML 2.0 SSO** end-to-end (currently config is persisted but no runtime
sign-in exists). Pure-Rust implementation that preserves the static-musl /
no-OpenSSL architecture, mirroring how FleetDM exposes and handles SAML.
2. **Fold the Advanced sidebar tab into Settings** as a collapsible section.
3. **Merge the Storage tab's SMB and NFS cards** into one "Remote shares" card
with a protocol dropdown.
Then bump `0.5.0 → 0.5.1`, build the static musl image, push `:0.5.1` + `:latest`
to Gitea, create the release, and scrub registry credentials.
## Decisions (locked with the user)
- **Crypto:** pure-Rust via `bergshamra` (XML-DSig + exclusive c14n, RustCrypto-based,
`#![forbid(unsafe_code)]`, ~99% xmlsec interop). `samael` is rejected — it
hard-requires OpenSSL/`xmlsec`/`libxml2` C deps, which would break the static
musl binary and the project's pure-Rust / no-OpenSSL architecture.
- **Access model:** any SAML assertion the IdP successfully authenticates and that
we cryptographically verify mints a full operator session. No user table, no
roles, no domain allowlist. The local admin account remains a guaranteed
fallback owner regardless of SSO state.
- **Flows:** SP-initiated (the "Sign in with <IdP>" button) is always on.
IdP-initiated is supported but gated behind an `allow_idp_initiated` toggle
(default off), mirroring FleetDM's "Allow SSO login initiated by identity
provider."
## Scope boundaries (v0.5.1)
In scope: SP-initiated + (gated) IdP-initiated login, signature verification on the
SAML Response/Assertion, full SP-side semantic validation, SP metadata endpoint,
login-page button wiring.
Out of scope (note for later releases): EncryptedAssertion (assertions must be
unencrypted), signed AuthnRequests (sent unsigned; Keycloak "client signature
required" must be off), Single Logout (SLO), multi-user accounts / RBAC / JIT role
mapping.
---
## Workstream 1 — SAML SP wiring (pure-Rust)
### New dependencies (workspace)
- `bergshamra` — XML-DSig verification + exclusive c14n (pure Rust).
- `roxmltree` (read/navigate) and/or `quick-xml` (build/serialize) — parse IdP
metadata + SAMLResponse, build AuthnRequest and SP metadata.
- `x509-parser` — extract the IdP signing certificate / public key from metadata.
- `flate2` — raw DEFLATE for the HTTP-Redirect binding.
- `base64` — encode/decode SAMLRequest/SAMLResponse.
All pure-Rust → the `x86_64-unknown-linux-musl` static build stays OpenSSL-free.
Exact `bergshamra` function signatures (`verify`, `DsigContext`, `KeysManager`,
`Key`, `VerifiedReference`, `VerifyResult`) will be pinned against the installed
crate source during implementation.
### Module boundaries
Pure protocol logic lives in `openpxe-core` (no axum dependency, unit-testable);
HTTP wiring lives in `openpxe-http-api`.
- `crates/core/src/saml/mod.rs` — public surface + shared types
(`VerifiedPrincipal { email, display_name, name_id, session_index }`, `SamlError`).
- `crates/core/src/saml/metadata.rs` — parse IdP `EntityDescriptor`: IdP EntityID,
`SingleSignOnService` locations + bindings, and one or more X.509 signing
certificates. Also build **our** SP metadata XML.
- `crates/core/src/saml/authn_request.rs` — build an AuthnRequest, return both the
request ID (to track) and the encoded HTTP-Redirect query value
(deflate → base64 → URL-encode).
- `crates/core/src/saml/response.rs` — decode `SAMLResponse` (base64 → XML),
**verify the signature via bergshamra** against the IdP cert, then enforce SP
semantics, returning `VerifiedPrincipal` or a typed `SamlError`.
### SP-side validation (response.rs)
After a cryptographically valid signature over the Response and/or the Assertion:
1. `Status` is `Success`.
2. `Destination` (if present) equals our ACS URL.
3. `Conditions/AudienceRestriction/Audience` equals our SP EntityID.
4. `NotBefore` / `NotOnOrAfter` within bounds (allow small clock skew, e.g. ±60s).
5. `InResponseTo` matches an outstanding request we issued (SP-initiated). Absent
for IdP-initiated, which is only accepted when `allow_idp_initiated` is true.
6. Assertion-ID replay guard: reject a previously consumed assertion ID.
7. NameID is the email (`nameid-format:emailAddress`). Display name read from
common attributes (`name`, `displayname`, `cn`, `urn:oid:2.5.4.3`).
XML Signature Wrapping (XSW) defenses come from bergshamra (duplicate-ID rejection,
strict positional verification); enable its strict verification options. We
additionally confirm the verified `Reference` covers the element we read claims from.
### State (in `openpxe-http-api`)
Two small TTL-pruned in-memory stores (parking_lot `Mutex<HashMap<...>>`):
- **Outstanding requests:** `request_id → issued_at`, TTL ≈ 5 min, for `InResponseTo`.
- **Consumed assertions:** `assertion_id → expires_at`, TTL = assertion validity,
for replay protection.
(In-memory is acceptable: a single-container app; a restart simply invalidates
in-flight logins.)
### Routes (all pre-auth; added to the public allowlist in the auth middleware)
- `GET /api/sso/login` → build AuthnRequest, record its ID, 302 to the IdP SSO URL
(HTTP-Redirect binding) with `SAMLRequest` + `RelayState`.
- `POST /api/sso/acs` → consume `SAMLResponse` (form-encoded). Verify + validate.
On success: `SessionStore::create(email)`, set the `openpxe_session` cookie
(same attributes as forms login), 302 to the dashboard. On failure: 302 back to
the login page with an error indicator. (Mirrors FleetDM's `/sso/callback`.)
- `GET /api/sso/metadata` → serve our SP `EntityDescriptor` XML for IdP import.
### Config changes (`crates/core/src/sso.rs`)
Add to `SsoConfig` (preserve existing fields + validation):
- `entity_id: String` — SP Entity ID (mirrors FleetDM's "Entity ID"); defaults to
the configured public base URL. The ACS URL is derived as
`<public_base_url>/api/sso/acs`.
- `allow_idp_initiated: bool` — default `false`.
`GET /api/sso` returns the new fields; `PUT /api/sso` validates and persists them.
### Login page (`crates/webui/src/app.js`)
Replace the "configured · runtime pending" message: the existing
"Sign in with <IdP>" button navigates to `GET /api/sso/login`. Render the IdP logo
(if `idp_logo_url` set) and use `idp_name` as the label. Keep the existing
FleetDM-style login layout.
### Testing
- `core/saml` unit tests using a self-signed test keypair we control:
- Parse representative Keycloak IdP metadata → correct SSO URL + cert.
- Build an AuthnRequest → well-formed, deflate/base64 round-trips, ID recorded.
- A correctly signed Response → `VerifiedPrincipal { email, .. }`.
- Reject: tampered signature, expired (`NotOnOrAfter`), wrong audience,
replayed assertion ID, unsigned response, `Status != Success`.
- `http-api` integration test: `GET /api/sso/login` returns a 302 with a
`SAMLRequest` query param; a crafted signed `SAMLResponse` POSTed to
`/api/sso/acs` (signed with the test key) sets an `openpxe_session` cookie.
---
## Workstream 2 — Advanced tab → Settings
- Remove the `Advanced` sidebar entry (`crates/webui/src/index.html`) and its
`advanced` view route in `app.js`.
- In the Settings view, append a **collapsible "Advanced" disclosure**
(default-collapsed) at the bottom containing the existing **Webhook
Notifications** card and the **API reference** block (moved out of the removed
Advanced view).
- No backend changes; `/api/notify*` and `/api/docs` endpoints are unchanged.
---
## Workstream 3 — Storage: merge SMB + NFS → "Remote shares"
- Replace the separate "SMB shares" and "NFS shares" cards with a single
**"Remote shares"** card:
- One add-form with a **protocol dropdown (SMB / NFS)**. Selecting the protocol
swaps the fields: SMB → server, share, guest checkbox, username, password;
NFS → server, export path.
- One unified table with a leading **Protocol** column (SMB/NFS badge), then
server/share-or-export, auth, ISO count, reachability, and Re-scan / Remove
actions.
- **No backend changes.** The form dispatches to the existing
`POST /api/smb-shares` or `POST /api/nfs-shares`; the table merges
`GET /api/smb-shares` + `GET /api/nfs-shares`, tagging each row with its
protocol. Re-scan/Remove call the existing per-protocol endpoints.
- Leaves the card pattern open for a future "Config files" card.
---
## Release
1. Bump workspace version `0.5.0 → 0.5.1` (`Cargo.toml`).
2. `cargo fmt`, `cargo clippy`, `cargo test` (all crates) green.
3. Build the static musl binary + Docker image; verify SAML deps compile clean
under musl (no OpenSSL/C linkage).
4. Push `openpxe:0.5.1` + `openpxe:latest` to Gitea via the established
temp-DOCKER_CONFIG pipeline; scrub credentials (logout + verify no token traces).
5. Create the Gitea release `v0.5.1` with notes.
## Risks
- `bergshamra` is pre-1.0 and unaudited. Mitigation: pin the version, enable strict
verification, keep the local-admin fallback, and own the SP-semantic checks
carefully (audience/Conditions/replay/InResponseTo — where SP vulns usually live).
- SAML is security-sensitive; negative tests (tamper/expiry/audience/replay/unsigned)
are part of the definition of done, not optional.
+6 -6
View File
@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ Two options. Pick one.
Big ISOs stream — there is no 2 GB limit, but expect upload to be
throttled by your browser ↔ host link. The UI shows a progress bar; the
animated OpenPXE mark on the Dashboard tab fires up while imaging is in
animated anvil on the Dashboard tab fires up while imaging is in
flight.
### 2b. Bulk seed from a directory (recommended for fresh deploys / CI)
@@ -290,7 +290,7 @@ INFO openpxe::http: GET /iso/ubuntu-…/casper/initrd Range=bytes=0- 200 OK 75
```
The **Terminal** tab in the web UI shows the same thing live, plus a
short whitelisted command palette (`status`, `clients`, `queue`,
short whitelisted command palette (`status`, `clients`, `gate`,
`hosts`, `log`).
### 5d. Internet-side ISO sources
@@ -347,19 +347,19 @@ default for production hardware.
## 7. Re-imaging — the “Queued Deployment” flow
Different scenario: you have **a rack of 30 servers** to image
identically, all at once. Dont bind 30 MACs by hand. Use the queue.
identically, all at once. Dont bind 30 MACs by hand. Use the gate.
1. **Dont** create host bindings.
2. PXE-boot every machine. They land on the menu.
3. On each: select **Queued Deployment**. They get position #1, #2,
…, #30 and start long-polling.
4. In the UI: **Queue** tab shows all 30 lined up. Pick the
4. In the UI: **Forge Gate** tab shows all 30 lined up. Pick the
ISO, click **Assign to all waiting**.
5. Every clients open long-poll wakes up at the same instant and
chains the same boot script. They all start imaging
simultaneously.
simultaneously — the “horse race gate” opens.
The animated OpenPXE progress widget on the Dashboard runs while any client is
The animated anvil widget on the Dashboard runs while any client is
still in the kernel-fetch phase.
---
-74
View File
@@ -1,74 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Build PNG-enabled iPXE binaries from source.
#
# Why from source: the official boot.ipxe.org binaries (and the
# Debian-packaged ones) are NOT built with CONSOLE_FRAMEBUFFER +
# IMAGE_PNG + CONSOLE_CMD, so `console --picture` is a no-op on them —
# you can't paint a graphical boot-menu background. iVentoy solves this
# by shipping its own iPXE build with exactly those three flags; we do
# the same, from upstream iPXE, with a thin auditable config delta
# (deploy/ipxe/local/{general,console}.h).
#
# Why a real cross-compiler instead of QEMU: building amd64 iPXE by
# emulating an amd64 gcc under QEMU on an arm64 host intermittently
# segfaults cc1 (the reason this was stuck for ~8 releases). Running a
# NATIVE arm64 gcc that cross-targets x86_64 (CROSS_COMPILE=
# x86_64-linux-gnu-) sidesteps emulation entirely — the compiler is a
# native binary, it just emits x86_64 objects. This stage is meant to
# run on $BUILDPLATFORM (the native builder arch), NOT the emulated
# target platform.
#
# Outputs (into $DEST), using the filenames OpenPXE's arch mapping
# expects:
# snponly.efi x86_64 UEFI, PNG-enabled
# ipxe.efi x86_64 UEFI, PNG-enabled (bundled drivers)
#
# We build ONLY x86_64 UEFI, always via the x86_64 cross toolchain
# (`x86_64-linux-gnu-gcc`). That's deliberately host-arch-agnostic: it
# works whether this stage runs on an arm64 Mac builder or an amd64 CI
# runner, because the cross compiler runs native and emits x86_64
# either way. Building arm64-efi or BIOS here would re-introduce a
# dependency on the host arch (native arm64 build) or a 32-bit multilib
# toolchain — so those arches keep their upstream-fetched (no-PNG)
# binaries and fall back to the menu's clean `|| console` text screen.
# Modern PXE clients are overwhelmingly x86_64 UEFI, which get the full
# graphical background.
set -euo pipefail
ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd)"
DEST="${1:-$ROOT/assets/ipxe}"
WORK="$(mktemp -d)"
trap 'rm -rf "$WORK"' EXIT
# Pinned upstream iPXE. Rolling master is fine functionally, but a pin
# keeps builds reproducible and protects against a transient master
# breakage. Bump deliberately.
IPXE_REPO="https://github.com/ipxe/ipxe.git"
IPXE_REF="${IPXE_REF:-master}"
echo ">> cloning iPXE ($IPXE_REF)"
git clone --depth 1 --branch "$IPXE_REF" "$IPXE_REPO" "$WORK/ipxe" 2>/dev/null \
|| git clone "$IPXE_REPO" "$WORK/ipxe"
SRC="$WORK/ipxe/src"
echo ">> applying OpenPXE config overrides (PNG + framebuffer + console cmd)"
mkdir -p "$SRC/config/local"
cp "$ROOT/deploy/ipxe/local/general.h" "$SRC/config/local/general.h"
cp "$ROOT/deploy/ipxe/local/console.h" "$SRC/config/local/console.h"
mkdir -p "$DEST"
# x86_64 UEFI — cross-compiled with the native arm64 gcc targeting
# x86_64. HOST_CC stays the native cc for iPXE's build-time utilities
# (elf2efi, zbin, …); only the target objects use the cross compiler.
echo ">> building x86_64 UEFI (snponly.efi, ipxe.efi)"
make -C "$SRC" -j"$(nproc)" \
CROSS_COMPILE=x86_64-linux-gnu- \
bin-x86_64-efi/snponly.efi \
bin-x86_64-efi/ipxe.efi
cp "$SRC/bin-x86_64-efi/snponly.efi" "$DEST/snponly.efi"
cp "$SRC/bin-x86_64-efi/ipxe.efi" "$DEST/ipxe.efi"
echo ">> iPXE build complete:"
ls -l "$DEST"/snponly.efi "$DEST"/ipxe.efi