a906c47f53cdef9d149332d66135ae3750864e4a
5
Commits
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3f9d8568f0 |
v0.4.67: NFSv3 alongside SMB (in-process via nfs3_client crate)
NFS is back — done right this time. v0.4.67 ships a pure-Rust NFSv3
client (`nfs3_client` 0.9 from the xetdata/Vaiz crate family) running
in-process inside the openpxe binary. No `mount.nfs`, no kernel
modules, no `CAP_SYS_ADMIN`, no subprocess. Works in every container
that the v0.4.65 SMB path works in (Unraid included).
The v0.4.65 SMB path stays as-is. Operators get both protocols
side-by-side and pick whichever their NAS prefers — or use both
together. NFSv3 has one architectural advantage over the SMB
userspace path: HTTP Range requests work for NFS-sourced ISOs
because NFSv3 READ3 takes an explicit offset. SMB-sourced ISOs still
return 416 for ranges (smbclient CLI can't seek mid-stream).
## What's new
- `crates/iso-store/src/nfs_share.rs` — `NfsShareManager` mirroring
`SmbShareManager` structurally. Lists ISOs via READDIR3+LOOKUP3+
GETATTR3, streams files via READ3 in 64 KiB chunks piped to axum
body streams. Uses `connect_from_privileged_port(false)` because
the openpxe binary runs as uid 10001 — most modern NFS servers
allow that; a server that demands privileged ports needs
`insecure` in /etc/exports, and the hint translation calls that
out specifically.
- `IsoSource::Nfs { share_id, relative_path }` variant alongside the
existing `Smb`. `IsoStore::iso_path_for` returns None for both;
the HTTP handler dispatches to the right share manager.
- `/api/nfs-shares` CRUD + scan endpoints, parallel to
`/api/smb-shares`. `POST` body: `{ server, export, port? }`.
- `nfs` terminal command back (this time as in-process, not kernel
mount): `list | add <srv>:<export> [port] | remove | scan`. The
v0.4.64 `nfs` command name pointing at kernel mount is moot
history — same name, completely different mechanism.
- Storage tab: a new NFS shares card sits directly below the SMB
shares card. The form is simpler (no auth fields) since NFSv3
uses AUTH_SYS and access is gated server-side by client IP.
- Dashboard "Images available" tile sums SMB + NFS reachable shares
into a generic "N remote shares" line.
## What's the same
- The structured `{error, stderr, hint}` JSON shape on failures
matches the SMB API exactly, so the UI's error banner renders
identically.
- Hint translation: NFS3ERR_ACCES → "exports list", NFS3ERR_NOENT →
"export path doesn't exist", `mount denied` → "/etc/exports may
need `insecure`", timeouts → "check IP/port/firewall".
- Persistence: `<work_dir>/nfs_shares.json`. No conflict with the
long-dead v0.4.64 `nfs.json`.
## Why nfs3_client
User picked it: pure-Rust matches the architecture, NFSv3 covers the
real-world cases, AUTH_SYS keeps the UI simple. The crate is at
0.9.0, MIT/Unlicense, rust-version 1.88 (we're on 1.95). Tokio
feature flag enabled. Image size unchanged at compile time — single
musl static binary, no extra OS packages.
## Tests
160 passing (was 150 in v0.4.66, +10):
- nfs_share parser: stable share ids, server normalization (smb://,
cifs://, \\, // all stripped).
- hint_for(): NFS3ERR_ACCES, NFS3ERR_NOENT, mount denied, unknown.
- status_label() covers the common nfsstat3 codes.
- HTTP integration: nfs-shares list starts empty, missing server
rejected, export without leading slash rejected.
`cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings` clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <[email protected]>
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1419309a2d |
v0.4.61: asset cache fix, PNG-enabled iPXE, composed PXE logo
Two real issues v0.4.6 left on the table: Asset caching: - index.html now interpolates the running OpenPXE version into every asset URL as `?v=<version>` (app.css, app.js, logo.svg). Combined with `Cache-Control: no-cache, must-revalidate` on the asset handlers, browsers and intermediary proxies are forced to fetch fresh on every upgrade. Without this, last release's bundled JS kept serving the old UI even after the operator pulled the new image — invisible to anyone who only checks the version chip in the footer (which is dynamic). - The Cache-Control header is also applied to logo.svg and loader.svg so a logo upload reflects immediately rather than after a hard refresh. Real-image PXE menu logo (matches iVentoy now): - New Dockerfile stage `ipxe-build` clones the iPXE source and compiles all four binaries (undionly.kpxe, snponly.efi for x86_64/i386, snponly.efi for arm64 via gcc-aarch64-linux-gnu) with IMAGE_PNG + CONSOLE_FRAMEBUFFER + CONSOLE_VESAFB enabled. Replaces the boot.ipxe.org fetch — those binaries are built without PNG support, which is why v0.4.6's `console --picture` line silently no-op'd. - `iso-store::pxe_logo::compose_pxe_logo` decodes any operator upload (PNG / JPEG / WebP / GIF), downscales-to-fit if larger than 600×200, and pastes it onto a transparent 1024×768 canvas centered horizontally with a 64-pixel top margin. iPXE paints the result at 1:1 on the typical VESA framebuffer, giving the iVentoy-style centered-logo look regardless of the operator's source dimensions. - GET /branding/pxe-logo now returns the composed PNG. wimboot still fetches from ipxe/wimboot's GitHub release (separately signed). - Dropped the ASCII OpenPXE wordmark from render_menu — once the real image paints, the banner would duplicate it visually. iPXE builds without PNG (none of ours after this release, but a third- party undionly might) simply show the menu without a logo, which is the right graceful-degradation outcome. Quality: - 142 tests passing (was 138 in v0.4.6): +4 pxe_logo unit tests covering canvas dimensions, centered-top placement, oversize downscale, and unsupported-bytes error handling; existing integration tests updated to verify the 1024×768 IHDR header from the composed PNG instead of round-tripping the raw upload. - cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets clean. - Image dependency: `image = "0.25"` with only `png/jpeg/webp/gif` features enabled. No new transitive C deps. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <[email protected]> |
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91848e02e3 |
v0.3.1: per-ISO boot password gate
Operators can now lock individual ISOs behind a password set in the
WebUI. Picking a locked image at the PXE menu prompts the operator on
the client console; the boot script is only released after a correct
match. The plaintext never leaves the request — server stores bcrypt
hashes, scripts never echo the candidate.
## Backend
- New optional `password_hash: Option<String>` on `IsoMeta`. Skipped
during serialize when None, so existing meta.json files don't grow
a noisy `null` field.
- `IsoStore::set_password(id, Some("pw"))` hashes via bcrypt
`DEFAULT_COST` (10 — fast enough for an interactive iPXE prompt,
expensive enough to be hostile to brute force on a leaked
meta.json). `set_password(id, None)` and `set_password(id, Some(""))`
both clear.
- `IsoStore::verify_password` returns Ok(true) when no password is
set, so the gate stays open for the common case.
- `IsoMeta::is_password_protected()` predicate the HTTP layer + UI
share.
- NFS-sourced ISOs persist their hash in memory only — the share is
the source of truth for those, and it doesn't carry hash sidecars.
## HTTP API
- `PUT /api/isos/:id/password` body `{ "password": "..." }` to set,
`{ "password": null }` (or empty string) to clear.
- `DELETE /api/isos/:id/password` for the explicit clear.
- Both 204 on success, 404 for unknown ids.
- `/boot/<entry>.ipxe` now intercepts:
- no `?token=` -> render password-prompt script
- `?token=<wrong>` -> render auth-fail script (sleeps 2s, chains
back to the entry which re-prompts)
- `?token=<correct>` -> render the real boot script
- ISO without password ignores token entirely (per-MAC bookmarks
still work without changes).
## iPXE prompt
`render_password_prompt`:
- `set password ` then `read --secret password` — accepts input
without echoing.
- Empty input chains back to the main menu (lets the operator back
out of a misclick).
- Submit chains `?token=${password:uristring}`. The `:uristring`
modifier URL-encodes the value, so passwords with `&`, `?`, `=`,
spaces, etc. survive transport.
`render_password_failed`:
- Single line saying so + 2s sleep, then re-chains the entry.
- Server-side WARN log records the entry id only, never the
candidate value (verified in smoke test).
## UI
Storage tab's image table grows an `Auth` column showing
`protected` / `open`, plus a 🔒 next to the filename when locked.
Per-row "Set password" / "Password ✎" button toggles an inline
editor in the next table row containing:
- a "Password protect this image" checkbox
- a `<input type=password autocomplete=new-password>` (hidden when
the checkbox is off)
- a Save button
Save calls PUT or DELETE on `/api/isos/:id/password` based on the
checkbox state and clears the input field before re-rendering, so
the plaintext doesn't sit in the DOM longer than needed.
## Menu indicator
`render_family_menu` adds a `*` prefix immediately before the size
box on protected entries — ASCII only because some firmware menu
consoles mangle non-ASCII glyphs. Looks like:
item --key 1 win11_test-winpe *[ 5234 MB] Windows 11 Test ISO
## Tests
74 passing across the workspace (was 66 in v0.3.0):
- 3 new store unit tests (bcrypt round-trip, unknown-id error,
meta.json persistence across restart)
- 2 new ipxe_script unit tests (prompt/auth-fail invariants:
read --secret, uristring, no candidate echo)
- 3 new HTTP integration tests (full gate flow upload-set-prompt-
fail-success-clear, null/empty bodies, 404 on unknown id)
cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets clean.
Local smoke verified upload + lock + prompt + auth-fail + correct +
menu indicator + log scrub on a real release binary.
## Operational notes
- HTTP, not HTTPS — token rides in the query string. Acceptable on
a trusted boot VLAN; do NOT expose OpenPXE to untrusted networks
with this feature relied on for security. Reverse-proxy in front
of OpenPXE will end up with the token in access logs.
- bcrypt cost is `DEFAULT_COST` (10). One verify takes ~50ms on
modern x86, which is the worst-case latency added to a correct
boot. Tunable via the bcrypt crate if needed.
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20c585e3ed | Name update | ||
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3517c67831 | Name update |