feat(saml): wire SAML 2.0 SSO end-to-end (pure-Rust) + Settings/Storage UI consolidation (v0.5.1)

SAML SSO (the config was storage-only since v0.4.5; now it logs you in):
- New openpxe-core::saml — pure-Rust SP built on bergshamra (XML-DSig +
  exclusive c14n via RustCrypto, no OpenSSL/xmlsec/libxml2). The static
  musl binary stays C-free; samael was rejected for hard-requiring OpenSSL.
  * metadata.rs   — parse IdP EntityDescriptor (SSO URLs + signing certs),
                    build our SP metadata.
  * authn_request.rs — build + HTTP-Redirect-encode AuthnRequests.
  * response.rs   — verify the signature against the pinned IdP cert
                    (trusted_keys_only + strict_verification for XSW),
                    then enforce Status/Destination/Audience/time-bounds/
                    signature-scope. Stateless; returns the IDs the HTTP
                    layer needs.
- http-api saml_routes: GET /api/sso/login (302 to IdP), POST /api/sso/acs
  (verify -> InResponseTo correlation / IdP-initiated gating / assertion
  replay guard -> mint operator session -> 302), GET /api/sso/metadata.
  Added to the pre-auth allowlist; /api/sso config stays gated.
- SsoConfig gains entity_id (SP Entity ID, defaults to public base URL)
  and allow_idp_initiated (default off), mirroring FleetDM.
- Access model: any IdP-authenticated, cryptographically-verified user gets
  an operator session (single-tier; local admin remains the fallback owner).
- Login page: the "Sign in with <IdP>" button now drives the real flow and
  surfaces sso_error redirects.

UI consolidation:
- Removed the Advanced sidebar tab; folded its webhook-notifications +
  API-reference cards into a collapsible "Advanced" disclosure at the
  bottom of Settings.
- Merged the Storage tab's separate SMB and NFS cards into one "Remote
  shares" card with a protocol dropdown and a unified, protocol-badged
  table. No backend changes — same /api/smb-shares + /api/nfs-shares.

Tests: 17 SAML core tests (accept + reject tampered/unsigned/wrong-key/
wrong-audience/expired/future/wrong-issuer/non-success) and 6 ACS
integration tests (happy path, IdP-initiated gating, SP correlation,
replay, garbage). Full workspace: 206 tests green, clippy clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
This commit is contained in:
Miles Ward
2026-05-31 00:50:28 -04:00
co-authored by Claude Opus 4.8
parent 252b557b9c
commit cbcd63bb14
21 changed files with 3748 additions and 298 deletions
+241
View File
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//! IdP metadata parsing + SP metadata generation.
//!
//! We parse only what the SP flow needs: the IdP Entity ID, its
//! `SingleSignOnService` endpoints (HTTP-Redirect / HTTP-POST), and the
//! X.509 signing certificate(s). Everything else in the document is ignored.
use base64::Engine;
use super::{SamlError, SpParams};
/// SAML 2.0 binding URIs.
pub const BINDING_REDIRECT: &str = "urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:bindings:HTTP-Redirect";
pub const BINDING_POST: &str = "urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:bindings:HTTP-POST";
/// The subset of an IdP's `EntityDescriptor` the SP flow consumes.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct IdpMetadata {
/// The IdP's Entity ID — we require incoming assertions to be issued by it.
pub entity_id: String,
/// SSO endpoint for the HTTP-Redirect binding (where we send AuthnRequests).
pub sso_redirect_url: Option<String>,
/// SSO endpoint for the HTTP-POST binding (fallback target).
pub sso_post_url: Option<String>,
/// DER-encoded X.509 signing certificate(s). More than one appears during
/// key rotation; verification tries each.
pub signing_certs_der: Vec<Vec<u8>>,
}
impl IdpMetadata {
/// Parse an IdP `EntityDescriptor` document.
///
/// Robust to namespace-prefix variation (matches on local element names),
/// since IdPs disagree on prefixes (`md:`, `ns0:`, default, …).
pub fn parse(xml: &str) -> Result<Self, SamlError> {
let doc = roxmltree::Document::parse(xml).map_err(|e| SamlError::Xml(e.to_string()))?;
let root = doc.root_element();
// The signing IDP descriptor. Some metadata wraps multiple
// descriptors (AA, SP) in one document; we want IDPSSODescriptor.
let idp_desc = root
.descendants()
.find(|n| n.is_element() && n.tag_name().name() == "IDPSSODescriptor")
.ok_or_else(|| SamlError::Metadata("IDPSSODescriptor".into()))?;
// Entity ID lives on the EntityDescriptor (root, or an ancestor of the
// IDPSSODescriptor when several are nested).
let entity_id = idp_desc
.ancestors()
.find_map(|n| {
if n.tag_name().name() == "EntityDescriptor" {
n.attribute("entityID")
} else {
None
}
})
.or_else(|| root.attribute("entityID"))
.map(str::to_owned)
.ok_or_else(|| SamlError::Metadata("entityID".into()))?;
let mut sso_redirect_url = None;
let mut sso_post_url = None;
for sso in idp_desc
.children()
.filter(|n| n.is_element() && n.tag_name().name() == "SingleSignOnService")
{
let binding = sso.attribute("Binding").unwrap_or("");
let location = sso.attribute("Location").map(str::to_owned);
match binding {
BINDING_REDIRECT if sso_redirect_url.is_none() => sso_redirect_url = location,
BINDING_POST if sso_post_url.is_none() => sso_post_url = location,
_ => {}
}
}
// Signing certs: KeyDescriptor with use="signing" or no use attribute
// (a bare KeyDescriptor is valid for both signing and encryption).
let mut signing_certs_der = Vec::new();
for kd in idp_desc
.children()
.filter(|n| n.is_element() && n.tag_name().name() == "KeyDescriptor")
{
match kd.attribute("use") {
Some("signing") | None => {}
Some(_) => continue, // encryption-only key — skip
}
for cert_node in kd
.descendants()
.filter(|n| n.is_element() && n.tag_name().name() == "X509Certificate")
{
let b64: String = node_text(&cert_node)
.chars()
.filter(|c| !c.is_whitespace())
.collect();
if b64.is_empty() {
continue;
}
let der = base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD
.decode(b64.as_bytes())
.map_err(|e| SamlError::Base64(e.to_string()))?;
signing_certs_der.push(der);
}
}
if signing_certs_der.is_empty() {
return Err(SamlError::NoSigningCert);
}
Ok(Self {
entity_id,
sso_redirect_url,
sso_post_url,
signing_certs_der,
})
}
/// Preferred SSO destination for an outbound AuthnRequest: HTTP-Redirect
/// if advertised, otherwise HTTP-POST.
pub fn sso_destination(&self) -> Option<&str> {
self.sso_redirect_url
.as_deref()
.or(self.sso_post_url.as_deref())
}
}
/// Build our SP `EntityDescriptor` XML so an IdP admin can import OpenPXE as a
/// relying party. Advertises the ACS URL (HTTP-POST binding) and an emailAddress
/// NameID format — matching what the response path expects.
pub fn build_sp_metadata(sp: &SpParams) -> String {
let entity = xml_escape(&sp.entity_id);
let acs = xml_escape(&sp.acs_url);
format!(
r#"<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<EntityDescriptor xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:metadata" entityID="{entity}">
<SPSSODescriptor AuthnRequestsSigned="false" WantAssertionsSigned="true" protocolSupportEnumeration="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol">
<NameIDFormat>urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.1:nameid-format:emailAddress</NameIDFormat>
<AssertionConsumerService Binding="{BINDING_POST}" Location="{acs}" index="0" isDefault="true"/>
</SPSSODescriptor>
</EntityDescriptor>
"#
)
}
/// Collect the concatenated text of an element's direct text children.
fn node_text(n: &roxmltree::Node<'_, '_>) -> String {
n.children()
.filter(roxmltree::Node::is_text)
.filter_map(|c| c.text())
.collect()
}
/// Minimal XML attribute/text escaping for the values we interpolate.
fn xml_escape(s: &str) -> String {
let mut out = String::with_capacity(s.len());
for c in s.chars() {
match c {
'&' => out.push_str("&amp;"),
'<' => out.push_str("&lt;"),
'>' => out.push_str("&gt;"),
'"' => out.push_str("&quot;"),
'\'' => out.push_str("&apos;"),
_ => out.push(c),
}
}
out
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
// A trimmed-down Keycloak-style IdP descriptor (cert body is a stand-in;
// signing tests build real certs in the parent module's tests).
const SAMPLE: &str = r#"<md:EntityDescriptor xmlns:md="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:metadata"
xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"
entityID="https://idp.example.com/realms/fleet">
<md:IDPSSODescriptor protocolSupportEnumeration="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol">
<md:KeyDescriptor use="signing">
<ds:KeyInfo><ds:X509Data><ds:X509Certificate>
QUJDREVG
</ds:X509Certificate></ds:X509Data></ds:KeyInfo>
</md:KeyDescriptor>
<md:KeyDescriptor use="encryption">
<ds:KeyInfo><ds:X509Data><ds:X509Certificate>WlpaWg==</ds:X509Certificate></ds:X509Data></ds:KeyInfo>
</md:KeyDescriptor>
<md:SingleSignOnService Binding="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:bindings:HTTP-Redirect"
Location="https://idp.example.com/realms/fleet/protocol/saml"/>
<md:SingleSignOnService Binding="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:bindings:HTTP-POST"
Location="https://idp.example.com/realms/fleet/protocol/saml"/>
</md:IDPSSODescriptor>
</md:EntityDescriptor>"#;
#[test]
fn parses_entity_sso_and_signing_cert() {
let m = IdpMetadata::parse(SAMPLE).unwrap();
assert_eq!(m.entity_id, "https://idp.example.com/realms/fleet");
assert_eq!(
m.sso_redirect_url.as_deref(),
Some("https://idp.example.com/realms/fleet/protocol/saml")
);
assert!(m.sso_post_url.is_some());
// Only the signing KeyDescriptor's cert is collected (ABCDEF), not the
// encryption one (ZZZZ).
assert_eq!(m.signing_certs_der.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(m.signing_certs_der[0], b"ABCDEF");
}
#[test]
fn missing_signing_cert_is_rejected() {
let xml = r#"<EntityDescriptor xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:metadata" entityID="x">
<IDPSSODescriptor>
<SingleSignOnService Binding="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:bindings:HTTP-Redirect" Location="https://x/sso"/>
</IDPSSODescriptor></EntityDescriptor>"#;
assert!(matches!(
IdpMetadata::parse(xml),
Err(SamlError::NoSigningCert)
));
}
#[test]
fn missing_idp_descriptor_is_rejected() {
let xml = r#"<EntityDescriptor xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:metadata" entityID="x"></EntityDescriptor>"#;
assert!(matches!(
IdpMetadata::parse(xml),
Err(SamlError::Metadata(_))
));
}
#[test]
fn sp_metadata_contains_entity_and_acs() {
let sp = SpParams {
entity_id: "https://pxe.example.com".into(),
acs_url: "https://pxe.example.com/api/sso/acs".into(),
};
let xml = build_sp_metadata(&sp);
assert!(xml.contains(r#"entityID="https://pxe.example.com""#));
assert!(xml.contains("https://pxe.example.com/api/sso/acs"));
assert!(xml.contains(BINDING_POST));
// Must be well-formed.
roxmltree::Document::parse(&xml).unwrap();
}
}