v0.6.2: Mythos Validation — full-codebase polish, hot-path optimizations, dhcproto 0.15
Codebase-wide review pass: finish or remove every loose end, take the safe performance wins on the serving hot paths, and refresh the dependency tree for reliability. No behavior changes for working clients; legacy clients get clearer protocol errors. Finalize / cleanup: - Remove mac_allowlist/subnet_allowlist config fields — parsed but never enforced since introduction; the operator wants line-of-sight serving, so the honest fix is deletion, not wiring. - Remove dead ClientRegistry API (get, set_selected_target, always-None selected_target field, never-emitted DhcpRequest/ HttpIsoAsset events). - TFTP: reject WRQ with ERR_ILLEGAL_OP and non-octet modes with a clear error instead of silent timeouts (legacy-client friendliness); fold plan_window into cfg(test); drop the unused-constant keep-alive hack. - rustfmt sweep over the six files with accumulated drift. Hot-path optimizations (all behavior-preserving): - Serve embedded iPXE binaries zero-copy (Cow over rodata) on both TFTP and HTTP — was a ~1 MiB heap copy per boot file request. - Cache the composited PXE boot-menu background PNG keyed on the branding logo revision — was ~50-200 ms of image work per booting client; now one compose per logo change. - Run bcrypt verify/hash on the blocking pool (boot password gate, login, setup, credential rotation) so CPU-heavy auth can't stall the workers streaming ISO ranges to imaging machines. - iso_raw: reuse the already-cloned IsoMeta for path resolution instead of a second registry lock + deep clone per range request. - DriverEscalation: amortize the TTL sweep (1-min interval + inline staleness check) instead of an O(map) retain per DHCP packet. - format_mac: one allocation instead of four per datagram. - Introspection haystack sized to min(scan cap, file size) — was guaranteed a 32 MiB realloc on every large-ISO probe. Robustness: - parse_range: malformed Range headers are now ignored per RFC 7233 (200 + full body) instead of answered with a bogus 206. Dependencies: - dhcproto 0.12 -> 0.15: drops the deprecated/unmaintained trust-dns-proto from the tree (hickory-proto), three releases of DHCP option coverage. Compiles + passes the full suite unchanged. - socket2 0.6 (dedupes tree), bcrypt 0.19, tower-http 0.6.11 (sheds iri-string), tokio 1.52.3 / hyper 1.10 lockfile refresh; dead nom workspace entry removed; requested versions synced to shipped reality. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
This commit is contained in:
co-authored by
Claude Opus 4.8
parent
4f193cac05
commit
5da05a519d
@@ -125,9 +125,7 @@ impl AdminStore {
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{
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let mut g = self.inner.write();
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if g.admin.is_some() {
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return Err(Error::Invalid(
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"admin account already configured".into(),
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));
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return Err(Error::Invalid("admin account already configured".into()));
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}
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g.admin = Some(admin.clone());
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}
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@@ -346,7 +344,7 @@ mod tests {
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assert!(s.bootstrap("", "hunter2hunter2").is_err());
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assert!(s.bootstrap("ad:min", "hunter2hunter2").is_err()); // ':' reserved
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assert!(s.bootstrap("admin", "short").is_err()); // <8 chars
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// 65-char username is too long.
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// 65-char username is too long.
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let long = "a".repeat(65);
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assert!(s.bootstrap(&long, "hunter2hunter2").is_err());
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}
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@@ -12,11 +12,9 @@ use time::OffsetDateTime;
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#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
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pub enum ClientEvent {
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DhcpDiscover,
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DhcpRequest,
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PxeBootServerRequest,
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TftpRead { file: String },
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HttpScriptFetch { target: String },
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HttpIsoAsset { file: String },
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}
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#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
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@@ -32,8 +30,6 @@ pub struct ClientSnapshot {
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// Events are left with default serialization (9-tuple) — they're
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// diagnostic only and not consumed by the UI today.
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pub events: Vec<(OffsetDateTime, ClientEvent)>,
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/// The boot target (ISO id) last selected via the iPXE menu, if any.
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pub selected_target: Option<String>,
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}
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#[derive(Debug, Default)]
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@@ -66,7 +62,6 @@ impl ClientRegistry {
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first_seen: now,
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last_seen: now,
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events: Vec::new(),
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selected_target: None,
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});
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entry.last_seen = now;
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if ip.is_some() {
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@@ -84,13 +79,6 @@ impl ClientRegistry {
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}
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}
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pub fn set_selected_target(&self, mac: &str, target: Option<String>) {
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let mut guard = self.inner.write();
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if let Some(c) = guard.get_mut(mac) {
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c.selected_target = target;
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}
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}
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#[must_use]
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pub fn list(&self) -> Vec<ClientSnapshot> {
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let guard = self.inner.read();
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@@ -99,9 +87,4 @@ impl ClientRegistry {
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v.sort_by_key(|c| std::cmp::Reverse(c.last_seen));
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v
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}
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#[must_use]
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pub fn get(&self, mac: &str) -> Option<ClientSnapshot> {
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self.inner.read().get(mac).cloned()
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}
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}
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@@ -40,10 +40,6 @@ pub struct NetworkConfig {
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pub dhcp_port: u16,
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/// UDP port for PXE Boot Server discovery. Standard is 4011.
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pub pxe_port: u16,
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/// Optional allowlist of client MAC prefixes (OUI). Empty = serve everyone.
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pub mac_allowlist: Vec<String>,
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/// Optional allowlist of subnets (CIDR). Empty = serve everyone.
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pub subnet_allowlist: Vec<String>,
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}
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#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize, Default)]
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@@ -105,8 +101,6 @@ impl Default for NetworkConfig {
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dhcp_bind: IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::UNSPECIFIED),
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dhcp_port: 67,
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pxe_port: 4011,
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mac_allowlist: Vec::new(),
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subnet_allowlist: Vec::new(),
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}
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}
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}
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@@ -303,7 +303,10 @@ mod tests {
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smtp_host: "smtp.example.com".into(),
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..Default::default()
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});
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assert!(matches!(r, Err(Error::Invalid(_))), "missing recipient should reject");
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assert!(
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matches!(r, Err(Error::Invalid(_))),
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"missing recipient should reject"
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);
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s.replace(NotifyConfig {
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enabled: true,
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kind: NotifyKind::Smtp,
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@@ -181,10 +181,7 @@ mod tests {
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Ipv4Addr::new(192, 168, 1, 255)
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);
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assert_eq!(
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subnet_broadcast(
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Ipv4Addr::new(10, 5, 3, 7),
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Ipv4Addr::new(255, 255, 0, 0)
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),
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subnet_broadcast(Ipv4Addr::new(10, 5, 3, 7), Ipv4Addr::new(255, 255, 0, 0)),
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Ipv4Addr::new(10, 5, 255, 255)
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);
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}
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@@ -196,7 +193,8 @@ mod tests {
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// and confirm send_magic transmits the exact 102-byte packet.
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let rx = UdpSocket::bind(SocketAddrV4::new(Ipv4Addr::LOCALHOST, 0)).unwrap();
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let port = rx.local_addr().unwrap().port();
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rx.set_read_timeout(Some(std::time::Duration::from_secs(2))).unwrap();
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rx.set_read_timeout(Some(std::time::Duration::from_secs(2)))
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.unwrap();
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let packet = magic_packet([0x0a, 0x1b, 0x2c, 0x3d, 0x4e, 0x5f]);
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let sent = send_magic(&packet, &[Ipv4Addr::LOCALHOST], port).unwrap();
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