v0.5.9: El Torito boot detection + retroactive re-introspect; static SSO login button
Storage / boot detection - Add El Torito boot-catalog detection to ISO introspection. This is the authoritative "can this boot at all?" signal: any ISO with a boot catalog (BSDs, ESXi, firmware tools, custom spins) is bootable via iPXE sanboot; a data/appliance ISO (e.g. a VMware vCenter bundle) has none and is honestly flagged. Replaces the crude ">1.5 GB ⇒ unbootable" size guess. - Re-introspect stale LOCAL ISOs on startup via an introspection-revision gate (INTROSPECT_REV). ISOs uploaded by an older binary carried a frozen family/boot profile — most visibly a Windows 11 ISO tagged Unknown before the UDF/UTF-16 detection landed, which then showed "won't boot" forever. An upgrade now re-probes and fixes them in place; no delete-and-re-upload. - WebUI bootability() keys off family / kernel / el_torito / remote-source instead of the size heuristic; dashboard family counts now bucket Windows / Linux / other honestly instead of lumping everything non-Windows under "Linux". SSO login button - The "Sign in with …" button keyed off the auth-gated /api/sso, which 401s pre-auth — so the button only survived on a stale in-memory config and vanished instance-wide on any fresh login-page load. Ship a minimal, non-sensitive SSO descriptor (enabled + idp_name + idp_logo_url, no metadata/entity-ID) on the public /api/me; the login card reads that. The button is now static whenever SSO is usable. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
This commit is contained in:
co-authored by
Claude Opus 4.8
parent
cb51b8db75
commit
06695c3d77
Generated
+8
-8
@@ -2669,7 +2669,7 @@ checksum = "c08d65885ee38876c4f86fa503fb49d7b507c2b62552df7c70b2fce627e06381"
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[[package]]
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name = "openpxe"
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version = "0.5.8"
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version = "0.5.9"
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dependencies = [
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"anyhow",
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"axum",
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@@ -2691,7 +2691,7 @@ dependencies = [
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[[package]]
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name = "openpxe-core"
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version = "0.5.8"
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version = "0.5.9"
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dependencies = [
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"anyhow",
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"base64",
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@@ -2718,7 +2718,7 @@ dependencies = [
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[[package]]
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name = "openpxe-dhcp-proxy"
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version = "0.5.8"
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version = "0.5.9"
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dependencies = [
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"anyhow",
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"bytes",
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@@ -2732,7 +2732,7 @@ dependencies = [
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[[package]]
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name = "openpxe-http-api"
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version = "0.5.8"
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version = "0.5.9"
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dependencies = [
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"anyhow",
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"axum",
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@@ -2768,7 +2768,7 @@ dependencies = [
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[[package]]
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name = "openpxe-ipxe-assets"
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version = "0.5.8"
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version = "0.5.9"
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dependencies = [
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"openpxe-core",
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"rust-embed",
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@@ -2778,7 +2778,7 @@ dependencies = [
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[[package]]
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name = "openpxe-iso-store"
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version = "0.5.8"
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version = "0.5.9"
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dependencies = [
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"anyhow",
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"bcrypt",
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@@ -2807,7 +2807,7 @@ dependencies = [
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[[package]]
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name = "openpxe-tftp"
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version = "0.5.8"
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version = "0.5.9"
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dependencies = [
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"anyhow",
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"bytes",
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@@ -2821,7 +2821,7 @@ dependencies = [
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[[package]]
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name = "openpxe-webui"
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version = "0.5.8"
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version = "0.5.9"
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[[package]]
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name = "p256"
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+1
-1
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ members = [
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]
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[workspace.package]
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version = "0.5.8"
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version = "0.5.9"
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edition = "2021"
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rust-version = "1.95"
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license = "MIT OR Apache-2.0"
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@@ -36,4 +36,4 @@ pub use profile::DeployProfile;
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pub use queue::{DeploymentQueue, QueueEntry};
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pub use saml::{IdpMetadata, SamlError, SpParams, VerifiedPrincipal, VerifiedResponse};
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pub use settings::{Settings, SettingsStore, TimeoutAction};
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pub use sso::{SsoConfig, SsoStore};
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pub use sso::{SsoConfig, SsoLoginInfo, SsoStore};
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@@ -73,6 +73,23 @@ impl SsoConfig {
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}
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}
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/// The minimal, non-sensitive slice of the SSO config that the **pre-auth**
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/// login screen needs to render the "Sign in with …" button. Carries only
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/// the display affordances — never the metadata XML/URL or entity ID, which
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/// stay behind the auth-gated `/api/sso`. Served as part of the public
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/// `/api/me` so the button renders reliably whether or not anyone is signed
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/// in (v0.5.9: fixes the button vanishing because `/api/sso` 401s pre-auth).
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#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, Serialize, Deserialize)]
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pub struct SsoLoginInfo {
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/// True only when SSO is *usable* (enabled AND a metadata source is
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/// present) — i.e. clicking the button will actually reach an IdP.
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pub enabled: bool,
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/// Button label, e.g. "STC AD". Empty falls back to "SSO" in the UI.
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pub idp_name: String,
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/// Optional IdP logo rendered on the button. Empty = no image.
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pub idp_logo_url: String,
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}
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/// In-memory + on-disk SSO settings registry.
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#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
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pub struct SsoStore {
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@@ -111,6 +128,19 @@ impl SsoStore {
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self.inner.read().clone()
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}
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/// Public, non-sensitive descriptor for the login screen. Safe to
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/// expose pre-auth — it's exactly what the "Sign in with …" button
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/// keys off, with no metadata/entity-ID leakage. v0.5.9.
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#[must_use]
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pub fn login_info(&self) -> SsoLoginInfo {
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let cfg = self.inner.read();
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SsoLoginInfo {
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enabled: cfg.is_usable(),
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idp_name: cfg.idp_name.clone(),
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idp_logo_url: cfg.idp_logo_url.clone(),
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}
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}
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/// Replace the whole config in one shot. Light validation: metadata
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/// XML and URL are length-capped so an operator can't OOM us by
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/// pasting a 10 GiB blob; the IdP UI tab clamps the input visually,
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@@ -319,6 +319,12 @@ pub async fn api_me(State(state): State<AppState>, headers: axum::http::HeaderMa
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// and the logo asset is public, so this leaks nothing sensitive.
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let has_custom_logo = state.branding.has_any_web_logo();
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let logo_rev = state.branding.logo_rev();
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// v0.5.9: ship the non-sensitive SSO descriptor with every /api/me so
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// the pre-auth login screen can render the "Sign in with …" button
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// reliably. Previously the button keyed off the auth-gated /api/sso,
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// which 401s when logged out — the button only survived on a stale
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// in-memory config and vanished on any fresh login-page load.
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let sso = state.sso.login_info();
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if !state.admin.is_configured() {
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return (
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StatusCode::OK,
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@@ -327,6 +333,7 @@ pub async fn api_me(State(state): State<AppState>, headers: axum::http::HeaderMa
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"authenticated": false,
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"has_custom_logo": has_custom_logo,
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"logo_rev": logo_rev,
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"sso": sso,
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})),
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)
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.into_response();
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@@ -343,6 +350,7 @@ pub async fn api_me(State(state): State<AppState>, headers: axum::http::HeaderMa
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"session_user": u,
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"has_custom_logo": has_custom_logo,
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"logo_rev": logo_rev,
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"sso": sso,
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})),
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)
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.into_response(),
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@@ -353,6 +361,7 @@ pub async fn api_me(State(state): State<AppState>, headers: axum::http::HeaderMa
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"authenticated": false,
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"has_custom_logo": has_custom_logo,
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"logo_rev": logo_rev,
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"sso": sso,
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})),
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)
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.into_response(),
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@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
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use std::io::{Read, Seek, SeekFrom};
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use std::path::Path;
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#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
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#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize, Default)]
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#[serde(rename_all = "snake_case")]
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pub enum DistroFamily {
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DebianUbuntu,
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@@ -22,10 +22,22 @@ pub enum DistroFamily {
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Arch,
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Alpine,
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WindowsPe,
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#[default]
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Unknown,
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}
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#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
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/// Bumped whenever the introspection logic changes in a way that should
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/// re-classify already-uploaded ISOs. On startup the store re-runs
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/// `introspect` on any *local* ISO whose persisted report predates this
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/// revision (see `IsoStore::load_from_disk`), so an upgrade fixes stale
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/// metadata — e.g. a Windows 11 ISO tagged `Unknown` by an older binary —
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/// without the operator having to delete and re-upload it.
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///
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/// rev 1 (v0.5.9): added El Torito boot-catalog detection + broadened
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/// Windows (UDF/UTF-16) detection becomes retroactive.
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pub const INTROSPECT_REV: u32 = 1;
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#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, Serialize, Deserialize)]
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pub struct IntrospectionReport {
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pub family: DistroFamily,
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pub volume_label: Option<String>,
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@@ -35,17 +47,28 @@ pub struct IntrospectionReport {
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pub initrd_paths: Vec<String>,
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/// True if `sources/boot.wim` present — Windows install media.
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pub has_boot_wim: bool,
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/// True if the ISO carries an El Torito boot catalog — i.e. it is
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/// bootable by BIOS/UEFI firmware and therefore by iPXE `sanboot`
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/// (emulated CD). This is the authoritative "can this boot at all?"
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/// signal for ISOs we can't classify as Linux or Windows (BSDs, ESXi,
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/// firmware tools, custom spins). A *data* ISO (e.g. a VMware vCenter
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/// appliance bundle) has no boot catalog and reports `false`. v0.5.9.
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#[serde(default)]
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pub el_torito: bool,
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/// Revision of the introspection logic that produced this report. Old
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/// `meta.json` files without the field deserialize as 0, which is
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/// below [`INTROSPECT_REV`], triggering a one-time re-introspect on
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/// the next startup. v0.5.9.
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#[serde(default)]
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pub introspect_rev: u32,
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}
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/// Probe an ISO file on disk. Never fails — on unrecoverable IO error we log
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/// and return an `Unknown` family so the uploader still sees a record.
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pub fn introspect(path: &Path) -> IntrospectionReport {
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let mut report = IntrospectionReport {
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family: DistroFamily::Unknown,
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volume_label: None,
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kernel_path: None,
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initrd_paths: Vec::new(),
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has_boot_wim: false,
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introspect_rev: INTROSPECT_REV,
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..Default::default()
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};
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let Ok(mut f) = std::fs::File::open(path) else {
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@@ -68,6 +91,11 @@ pub fn introspect(path: &Path) -> IntrospectionReport {
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}
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}
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// Does the ISO have an El Torito boot catalog? This is what decides
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// whether an ISO we *can't* otherwise classify is bootable at all —
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// a bootable ISO sanboots; a data/appliance ISO (no catalog) can't.
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report.el_torito = detect_el_torito(&mut f);
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// Cheap content scan: read the first ~64 MiB, look for signature filenames.
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// This is enough to identify `sources/boot.wim` (Windows) and common
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// kernel/initrd paths for the major Linux distros.
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@@ -222,6 +250,44 @@ fn filename_looks_windows(path: &Path) -> bool {
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TOKENS.iter().any(|t| name.contains(t))
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}
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/// The boot-system identifier string in an El Torito Boot Record Volume
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/// Descriptor (offset 7, NUL-padded to 32 bytes).
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const EL_TORITO_ID: &[u8] = b"EL TORITO SPECIFICATION";
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/// Detect an El Torito boot catalog — the marker that an ISO is bootable
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/// by BIOS/UEFI firmware (and thus by iPXE `sanboot`).
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///
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/// The ISO9660 Volume Descriptor Set starts at LBA 16 (offset 0x8000) and
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/// runs one 2048-byte descriptor per sector until a Set Terminator
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/// (type 0xFF). A Boot Record descriptor (type 0x00) whose 32-byte boot
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/// system identifier reads "EL TORITO SPECIFICATION" means the image
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/// declares an El Torito boot catalog. We only confirm its presence — we
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/// don't parse the catalog (sanboot/the firmware does that). The walk is
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/// capped so a malformed/huge image can't spin us. v0.5.9.
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fn detect_el_torito(f: &mut std::fs::File) -> bool {
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let mut vd = [0u8; 2048];
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for lba in 16u64..32 {
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if f.seek(SeekFrom::Start(lba * 2048)).is_err() || f.read_exact(&mut vd).is_err() {
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return false;
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}
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// Every descriptor in the set carries the "CD001" magic; once it's
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// missing we've walked off the end of a valid set.
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if &vd[1..6] != b"CD001" {
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return false;
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}
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match vd[0] {
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// Boot Record descriptor carrying the El Torito signature.
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0x00 if vd[7..7 + EL_TORITO_ID.len()] == *EL_TORITO_ID => return true,
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// Volume Descriptor Set Terminator — nothing bootable found.
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0xFF => return false,
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// Any other descriptor (incl. a non-El-Torito boot record) —
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// keep walking the set.
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_ => {}
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}
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}
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false
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}
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod tests {
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use super::*;
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@@ -260,6 +326,40 @@ mod tests {
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assert!(!contains_utf16le_ci(b"boot.wim plain ascii", "boot.wim"));
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}
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#[test]
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fn el_torito_boot_catalog_detected() {
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let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
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// Helper: stamp a 2048-byte descriptor at `lba` with type + magic.
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let stamp = |img: &mut [u8], lba: usize, ty: u8| {
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let off = lba * 2048;
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img[off] = ty;
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img[off + 1..off + 6].copy_from_slice(b"CD001");
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};
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// Bootable image: PVD @16, El Torito Boot Record @17, terminator @18.
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let mut boot = vec![0u8; 2048 * 19];
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stamp(&mut boot, 16, 0x01);
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stamp(&mut boot, 17, 0x00);
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boot[17 * 2048 + 7..17 * 2048 + 7 + EL_TORITO_ID.len()].copy_from_slice(EL_TORITO_ID);
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stamp(&mut boot, 18, 0xFF);
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let bp = dir.path().join("boot.iso");
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std::fs::write(&bp, &boot).unwrap();
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let mut f = std::fs::File::open(&bp).unwrap();
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assert!(
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detect_el_torito(&mut f),
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"El Torito boot record should match"
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);
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// Data/appliance image: PVD @16, terminator @17, no boot record.
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let mut data = vec![0u8; 2048 * 18];
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stamp(&mut data, 16, 0x01);
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stamp(&mut data, 17, 0xFF);
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let dp = dir.path().join("data.iso");
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std::fs::write(&dp, &data).unwrap();
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let mut f2 = std::fs::File::open(&dp).unwrap();
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assert!(!detect_el_torito(&mut f2), "data ISO has no boot catalog");
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}
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#[test]
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fn filename_hint_catches_windows_isos() {
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use std::path::Path;
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@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@
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//! UI to ask for. (If a future server needs Kerberos or non-default
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//! uid mapping we can add those, but for ISO read access nobody does.)
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use crate::introspect::{DistroFamily, IntrospectionReport};
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use crate::introspect::IntrospectionReport;
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use crate::store::{generate_boot_entries_for, slugify_str, IsoSource, IsoStore};
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use bytes::Bytes;
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use nfs3_client::tokio::TokioConnector;
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@@ -399,13 +399,7 @@ impl NfsShareManager {
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// Same approach as SMB: no real introspection over the
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// network in v0.4.67. The boot-entry generator falls back
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// to filename-based sanboot detection.
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let report = IntrospectionReport {
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family: DistroFamily::Unknown,
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volume_label: None,
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kernel_path: None,
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initrd_paths: Vec::new(),
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has_boot_wim: false,
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};
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let report = IntrospectionReport::default();
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let boot_entries = generate_boot_entries_for(&iso_id, &entry.filename, &report);
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let source = IsoSource::Nfs {
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share_id: share.id.clone(),
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@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@
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//! hint}` error shape is shared so the storage tab renders all three
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//! protocols through one code path.
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use crate::introspect::{DistroFamily, IntrospectionReport};
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use crate::introspect::IntrospectionReport;
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use crate::store::{generate_boot_entries_for, slugify_str, IsoSource, IsoStore};
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use bytes::Bytes;
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use openpxe_core::{Error, Result};
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@@ -480,13 +480,7 @@ impl SftpShareManager {
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// register `Unknown` and let the boot-entry generator fall
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// back to filename-based detection. SFTP *could* do bounded
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// PVD reads (it has random access) — a follow-up can add it.
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let report = IntrospectionReport {
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family: DistroFamily::Unknown,
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volume_label: None,
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kernel_path: None,
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initrd_paths: Vec::new(),
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has_boot_wim: false,
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};
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let report = IntrospectionReport::default();
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let boot_entries = generate_boot_entries_for(&iso_id, &entry.filename, &report);
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let source = IsoSource::Sftp {
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share_id: share.id.clone(),
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@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@
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//! streaming. A follow-up release can add libsmbclient-based seek if
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//! a real workload needs it.
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use crate::introspect::{DistroFamily, IntrospectionReport};
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use crate::introspect::IntrospectionReport;
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use crate::store::{generate_boot_entries_for, slugify_str, IsoSource, IsoStore};
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use openpxe_core::{Error, Result};
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use parking_lot::Mutex;
|
||||
@@ -470,13 +470,7 @@ impl SmbShareManager {
|
||||
// and the operator gets *something* bootable. A follow-up
|
||||
// release can do a bounded `smbclient get` of the first
|
||||
// 64 KiB for real detection.
|
||||
let report = IntrospectionReport {
|
||||
family: DistroFamily::Unknown,
|
||||
volume_label: None,
|
||||
kernel_path: None,
|
||||
initrd_paths: Vec::new(),
|
||||
has_boot_wim: false,
|
||||
};
|
||||
let report = IntrospectionReport::default();
|
||||
let boot_entries = generate_boot_entries_for(&iso_id, &entry.filename, &report);
|
||||
let source = IsoSource::Smb {
|
||||
share_id: share.id.clone(),
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -223,7 +223,8 @@ impl IsoStore {
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if let Ok(text) = tokio::fs::read_to_string(&p).await {
|
||||
if let Ok(meta) = serde_json::from_str::<IsoMeta>(&text) {
|
||||
if let Ok(mut meta) = serde_json::from_str::<IsoMeta>(&text) {
|
||||
self.reintrospect_if_stale(&mut meta).await;
|
||||
self.insert(meta);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -231,6 +232,46 @@ impl IsoStore {
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// v0.5.9: re-run introspection on a *local* ISO whose persisted report
|
||||
/// predates the current logic. ISOs uploaded by an older binary carry a
|
||||
/// stale family/boot profile — most visibly a Windows 11 ISO tagged
|
||||
/// `Unknown` before the UDF/El-Torito detection landed, which then shows
|
||||
/// as "won't boot" forever. Re-probing on startup fixes them in place,
|
||||
/// no delete-and-re-upload. Bounded: only `Local` sources (we have the
|
||||
/// bytes locally) below [`introspect::INTROSPECT_REV`], so it runs at
|
||||
/// most once per ISO per upgrade. The probe reads up to ~64 MiB, so we
|
||||
/// push it onto the blocking pool to keep the async runtime responsive.
|
||||
async fn reintrospect_if_stale(&self, meta: &mut IsoMeta) {
|
||||
if !matches!(meta.source, IsoSource::Local)
|
||||
|| meta.introspection.introspect_rev >= crate::introspect::INTROSPECT_REV
|
||||
{
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
let path = self.iso_path(&meta.id);
|
||||
if !path.exists() {
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
let Ok(fresh) = tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || introspect(&path)).await else {
|
||||
tracing::warn!(target: "openpxe::iso", id = %meta.id, "re-introspect task failed");
|
||||
return;
|
||||
};
|
||||
let before = meta.introspection.family;
|
||||
meta.introspection = fresh;
|
||||
meta.boot_entries = generate_boot_entries(&meta.id, &meta.filename, &meta.introspection);
|
||||
if let Err(e) = self.persist_meta(meta).await {
|
||||
tracing::warn!(target: "openpxe::iso", id = %meta.id, "re-introspect persist: {e}");
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
tracing::info!(
|
||||
target: "openpxe::iso",
|
||||
id = %meta.id,
|
||||
from = ?before,
|
||||
to = ?meta.introspection.family,
|
||||
el_torito = meta.introspection.el_torito,
|
||||
"re-introspected stale ISO metadata"
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn insert(&self, meta: IsoMeta) {
|
||||
self.inner.write().isos.insert(meta.id.clone(), meta);
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -687,13 +728,7 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
size_bytes: 0,
|
||||
sha256_hex: None,
|
||||
uploaded_at: OffsetDateTime::now_utc(),
|
||||
introspection: IntrospectionReport {
|
||||
family: DistroFamily::Unknown,
|
||||
volume_label: None,
|
||||
kernel_path: None,
|
||||
initrd_paths: vec![],
|
||||
has_boot_wim: false,
|
||||
},
|
||||
introspection: IntrospectionReport::default(),
|
||||
boot_entries: vec![],
|
||||
source: IsoSource::Local,
|
||||
password_hash: None,
|
||||
|
||||
+47
-21
@@ -165,18 +165,31 @@
|
||||
if (fam === 'windows_pe') {
|
||||
return { ok: true };
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (!iso.introspection.kernel_path) {
|
||||
// Not Windows and no Linux kernel/initrd detected. Small images can
|
||||
// still try the sanboot fallback; large ones almost certainly aren't
|
||||
// network-bootable installers (e.g. appliance bundles like VMware
|
||||
// VCSA) — flag them clearly instead of with a Linux-centric message.
|
||||
if (iso.size_bytes > 1.5 * 1024 * 1024 * 1024) {
|
||||
return { ok: false, reason: "not a recognized network-bootable installer (no Windows or Linux boot files found) — this image can't be PXE-booted" };
|
||||
}
|
||||
return { ok: true, warn: 'no kernel detected — sanboot fallback may not work' };
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Linux with a detected kernel/initrd — direct kernel+initrd boot.
|
||||
if (iso.introspection.kernel_path) {
|
||||
return { ok: true };
|
||||
}
|
||||
// v0.5.9: any other ISO that carries an El Torito boot catalog is
|
||||
// bootable via iPXE sanboot (emulated CD) — BSDs, ESXi, firmware
|
||||
// tools, custom Linux spins. This replaces the old "> 1.5 GB ⇒
|
||||
// unbootable" size guess with the authoritative on-disk boot signal,
|
||||
// so a large bootable ISO is no longer mislabeled and a Windows ISO
|
||||
// re-introspected on upgrade lights up correctly.
|
||||
if (iso.introspection.el_torito) {
|
||||
return { ok: true, warn: 'generic bootable ISO — boots via sanboot (emulated CD)' };
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Remote-share ISOs aren't introspected (no random access over the
|
||||
// network), so el_torito is unknown — assume bootable and let sanboot
|
||||
// try rather than cry wolf.
|
||||
const remote = iso.source && iso.source.kind && iso.source.kind !== 'local';
|
||||
if (remote) {
|
||||
return { ok: true, warn: 'remote ISO — not introspected; sanboot is attempted at boot' };
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Local ISO with no Windows/Linux boot files and no El Torito catalog:
|
||||
// a data/appliance image (e.g. a VMware vCenter bundle), not a bootable
|
||||
// installer.
|
||||
return { ok: false, reason: 'data/appliance ISO — no El Torito boot catalog and no Windows/Linux installer files, so it can’t be PXE-booted' };
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// v0.5.2: pretty label for an unattended file's detected kind.
|
||||
function unattendedKindLabel(k) {
|
||||
@@ -291,14 +304,23 @@
|
||||
el('div', {class: 'card'}, el('div', {class: 'stat'}, [
|
||||
el('div', {class: 'label'}, 'Images available'),
|
||||
el('div', {class: 'value'}, String(isos.length)),
|
||||
el('div', {class: 'trend'},
|
||||
isos.filter(i => i.introspection.family === 'windows_pe').length + ' Windows · ' +
|
||||
isos.filter(i => i.introspection.family !== 'windows_pe').length + ' Linux · ' +
|
||||
el('div', {class: 'trend'}, (() => {
|
||||
// v0.5.9: count families honestly. Anything that isn't a known
|
||||
// Linux family or Windows lands in "other" (data/appliance ISOs
|
||||
// like VMware VCSA, or as-yet-unclassified images) instead of
|
||||
// being lumped under "Linux".
|
||||
const LINUX = ['debian_ubuntu', 'rhel_fedora', 'opensuse', 'arch', 'alpine'];
|
||||
const win = isos.filter(i => i.introspection.family === 'windows_pe').length;
|
||||
const lin = isos.filter(i => LINUX.includes(i.introspection.family)).length;
|
||||
const other = isos.length - win - lin;
|
||||
// v0.4.67+v0.5.5: count all remote-share protocols. Label
|
||||
// generically since operators may use any mix of SMB/NFS/SFTP.
|
||||
((status.smb_share_reachable || 0) + (status.nfs_share_reachable || 0) + (status.sftp_share_reachable || 0)) +
|
||||
' remote share' +
|
||||
(((status.smb_share_reachable || 0) + (status.nfs_share_reachable || 0) + (status.sftp_share_reachable || 0)) === 1 ? '' : 's')),
|
||||
const remote = (status.smb_share_reachable || 0) + (status.nfs_share_reachable || 0) + (status.sftp_share_reachable || 0);
|
||||
const parts = [win + ' Windows', lin + ' Linux'];
|
||||
if (other > 0) parts.push(other + ' other');
|
||||
parts.push(remote + ' remote share' + (remote === 1 ? '' : 's'));
|
||||
return parts.join(' · ');
|
||||
})()),
|
||||
])),
|
||||
el('div', {class: 'card'}, el('div', {class: 'stat'}, [
|
||||
el('div', {class: 'label'}, 'Uptime'),
|
||||
@@ -2280,7 +2302,9 @@
|
||||
// own self-contained <form>; when SSO is enabled, a distinct
|
||||
// "Sign in with …" button sits below a divider — the credential
|
||||
// fields no longer double as the SSO trigger.
|
||||
const ssoLive = ssoConfig && ssoConfig.enabled && (ssoConfig.metadata_url || ssoConfig.metadata);
|
||||
// `enabled` from /api/me already means "usable" (enabled AND a metadata
|
||||
// source is configured), so the button only shows when SSO will work.
|
||||
const ssoLive = !!(ssoConfig && ssoConfig.enabled);
|
||||
const ssoBlock = ssoLive
|
||||
? el('div', {class:'sso-block'}, [
|
||||
el('div', {class:'auth-divider'}, el('span', {}, 'or')),
|
||||
@@ -2525,10 +2549,12 @@
|
||||
])));
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Preload the SSO config so the login card can offer the operator
|
||||
// an "Sign in with X" button when configured. Failure is harmless.
|
||||
try { ssoConfig = await fetch('/api/sso').then(r => r.ok ? r.json() : null); }
|
||||
catch { ssoConfig = null; }
|
||||
// v0.5.9: the login card's "Sign in with …" button keys off the SSO
|
||||
// descriptor that /api/me now carries (public, non-sensitive: enabled
|
||||
// + idp_name + idp_logo_url). It's available signed in or out, so the
|
||||
// button is static — it no longer relied on the auth-gated /api/sso,
|
||||
// which 401s pre-auth and made the button vanish on fresh login loads.
|
||||
ssoConfig = me.sso || null;
|
||||
|
||||
if (me.setup_required) {
|
||||
showAuthScreen('setup');
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user